何卫东跳船，还是江马仔张又侠不提习近平。习被政治工作部狂打脸。亚冬会无人喝彩。江苏军区闭口不提习近平
何卫东跳船，还是江马仔张又侠不提习近平。习被政治工作部狂打脸。亚冬会无人喝彩。江苏军区闭口不提习近平
大家好，习近平马仔何卫东，也没有有利消息出来。军委政治工作部印发《关于聚焦“铸牢政治忠诚、打好攻坚之战”深化教育实践活动的通知》。
这个消息到底怎么解读，我们还需要研究，因为我觉得有问题，什么事情都怕比，不比好像觉得习近平好像觉得习近平大权在握，一比，这习近平下台了呀。根本没有人搭理他。中国的独裁体制就是上有所好，下必甚焉。军委不能说不提习近平，还是那么象征性的提一句两句。到了下面，江苏军区就直接不提习近平了。这个江苏军区司令叶民胜，我们简单看看他的派系。他以前的上司是谁，他以前的上司对习近平就挺不忿。要不然，怎么叫做上有所好，下必甚焉。叶民胜以前的老板就看习近平不顺眼，所以叶民胜干脆就一句也不提习近平。教练在场下骂人，球员就敢在场上打人。叶民胜的前上司敢蹬习近平，叶民胜就敢上手打习近平。
习近平开亚冬会也没有人搭理他
因为政治工作部主任苗华已经被抓了。而主管政治工作部的军委副主席，我不知道是张又侠还是何卫东。
如果主管政治工作部的军委副主席是何卫东的话，那么这个通知是谁签发的呢？何卫东还能不能主持工作呢。这都是问号。因为三中全会之前把何宏军晋升上将，就是为了拿下苗华，让何宏军主持工作。让军队的工作不至于瘫痪，尤其是政治工作部的工作。现在看上去中国军委政治工作部还在运转。那么何卫东，还能说上多少话，都是问号。
现在习近平真的就是个屁
我们看最新的2025年2月5日中国军委政治工作部发的通知，提了两次习近平，一次是习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想，一次是习近平强军思想。看上去好像一切正常。我们再看2023年8月1日，还是政治工作部发的通知，这才几天，刚好1年半，差距实在是太巨大了。提了12次习近平，还有一次习主席。这样一对比，现在习近平真的就是个屁。
我们仔细看1年半之前的这个通知，开头正是习近平思想和习近平强军思想。就是现在的这两句，也就是说搁一年半之前，这就刚开始吹呢，怎么就停了呢，怎么就太监了呢，怎么就嘎然而止呢了。这是把习近平放在眼里吗？这不就是掩人耳目吗？
我们看当时这个吹，习近平强军思想是习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想的重要组成部分，全面系统阐述习近平强军思想的重大意义、重大意义还没舔够，后面是科学体系、精髓要义、实践要求，习近平强军思想学习教育的基本教材。深刻领悟“两个确立”的决定性意义，增强“四个意识”、坚定“四个自信”、做到“两个维护”，贯彻军委主席负责制，坚决听从党中央、中央军委和习主席指挥。
大家看现在这个版本就是一年半以前的删节再删节的版本，极简再极简的版本。如果不是掩人耳目，压根就不会再提习近平了。尤其不会再提什么坚决听从习主席指挥，因为军队现在不听习近平指挥呀。
自从去年2024年7月三中全会后，中共军方、高层内部就出现了诸多异常。观察党魁习近平是否掌控军权，一定要看人事的变动。非要听床的话，就看军媒报道的细节以及各方在学习三中全会和中央军委政治工作会议精神时的表态。
在过去半年多的时间里，各战区、各军种在学习上述两个会议精神时的表态都与以往明显不同，「习思想」以及「两个确立」等多次被忽略，「习主席」或不被提及或只被轻描淡写。就是戴个帽，习近平现在还没有正式下台，人没走，茶就开始凉了。
虽然中共军方高层为了掩盖这样的变化，一度在某些报道军委的资讯中加上了「习思想」等，但值得注意的是，各战区、各军种的表态却基本没有变化，这是因为淡化习的命令既然已经发出，就不会轻易改变，否则军队就会乱了套。
某种程度上也是中共，应对海外舆论的炒作，不然的话，就直接不提习近平了。
显然，在中共高层公布中南海的变动前，正式宣布习近平下台之前呢，党卫军各战区、各军种的表态仍在持续。2025年1月17日，军报、军委又刊发「江苏省军区深入学习贯彻中央军委政治工作会议精神——传承优良传统 典型示范引领」的报道，通篇依旧是不见一次「习主席」，而是三次提到「中央军委政治工作会议」。
如此对待由习近平主持召开并讲话的会议，却在学习时只提会议不提一向要效忠的「习主席」，传递的资讯还不明显吗？而此次表态的是江苏省军区，也很不寻常。
江苏省军区是中共中央军委国防动员部管理的一个省军区，为正军级单位，其管辖范围为江苏省。其同时受中央军委国防动员部和中共江苏省委、省政府双重领导。在中共军改后，省军区系统不再管理作战部队，主要职能转向行政工作和服务工作，因此文职人员增多。说是双重领导其实是军委领导，他是业务却和地方和江苏很密切。就是管理机制不顺。
江苏省军区司令叶民胜前上司是火箭军政委徐西盛
目前江苏省军区司令叶民胜曾任南部战区空军助理参谋长，2019年12月，由空军大校军衔晋升为空军少将军衔。叶民胜，到底是谁啊，我也不知道。2019年南部战区空军司令和政委是谁啊？南部战区空军政委徐西盛，这不就是现在火箭军政委吗？
2024年10月，习近平跑到安徽黄山的火箭军61基地611旅演戏啊。徐西盛在这里瞪习近平呢，有人觉得我是听床，确实就是听床。这不是证据来了，他就不是听床了。
中国的中央军委下达了秘密淡化习近平的命令，到了徐西盛这里，他就敢瞪习近平，到了徐西盛的前下属，现任江苏省军区司令叶民胜这里，他就只字不提习近平。
这就是火箭军政委徐西盛，那徐西盛的前下属，江苏省军区司令叶民胜，他就敢上手挠习近平，这就叫做上有所好，下必甚焉。
叶民胜如此表态只能说是在遵循来自军委的指示。
比较奇怪的是这样不提「习主席」的表态是否得到了江苏省委书记信长星的背书？或者说不需要信长星的同意？因为江苏省军区同时还要接受江苏省委、省政府的双重领导，信长星是省军区党委第一书记。
从信长星的履历看，其曾长期在劳动和社会保障部任职，直至2008年，其后任人力资源和社会保障部副部长、国家公务员局局长、书记等，直至2016年，同年任安徽省委副书记，至2020年转任青海省委副书记，后升任省长、省委书记，2023年转任江苏省委书记。信长星有可能是江泽民的人，还需要进一步分析。赵乐际曾经是青海省委书记，但是赵乐际和信长星，时间差的很远。如果信长星和赵乐际是一个派系的。
那么信长星去青海就是为了维护赵乐际的基本盘，如果信长星和赵乐际就不是一个派系的，那单说啊。
不过，浸染在中共官场上的官员，不管内心如何想，在表面上都会做足功夫，对习近平表忠心。如去年12月23日，中共江苏省第十四届委员会第八次全体会议在南京举行，信长星作了讲话，提到了「两个确立」和「深化认识习近平对江苏工作重要讲话精神」，提到了「习思想」和「掌舵领航」，但这基本都是各级官员表忠的标配，也不代表其内心所想就是如此。
这就是所谓的风派，没有真正的风派，表面功夫不能说明问题。李鸿忠出了名的舔习近平，忠诚不绝对，就是绝对不忠诚。我看李鸿忠是真的不忠诚习近平才对。即便李鸿忠这么跪舔习近平没有人认为，李鸿忠和习近平是一个派系的啊。仅仅是口头跪舔，那只能说明是中共党八股的文化，马屁文化不要脸而已，不能作为派系判断的理由。
第九届亚洲冬季运动会开幕式于2025年2月7日晚在黑龙江省哈尔滨市举行，习近平出席开幕式并宣布开幕。据中共官媒报导，出席开幕式的算得上外国领导人的只有这么几位：文莱苏丹哈桑纳尔、吉尔吉斯斯坦总统扎帕罗夫、巴基斯坦总统扎尔达里、泰国总理佩通坦、韩国国会议长禹元植。
大家就在现场合影这照片除去他们的老婆，能不能凑够两桌麻将？除了泰国总理是名女性，我们看彭丽媛右边也就4位，还有一个是国际奥委会主席。习近平这两位女性我不知道是不是他们的老婆。真正的所谓的国家领导人，都凑不够两桌麻将。
就是没有人搭理习近平，这就应该是大国国际地位的真实体现。本来一个独裁国家，就不应该去给他捧场。去给独裁国家捧场，那就是出卖良知，出卖良心。好的，谢谢大家。
英文翻译
He Weidong jumped ship, and Jiang’s henchman Zhang Youxia still didn’t mention Xi Jinping. Xi was slapped in the face by the Political Work Department. No one cheered at the Asian Winter Games. The Jiangsu Military Region kept silent about Xi Jinping
Hello everyone, Xi Jinping’s henchman He Weidong, there is no good news. The Political Work Department of the Military Commission issued the “Notice on Deepening the Education and Practice Activities of Focusing on “Forging Political Loyalty and Winning the Battle of Hard Work”.
We still need to study how to interpret this news, because I think there is a problem. They are afraid of comparison in everything. If they don’t compare, it seems that Xi Jinping thinks that Xi Jinping is in power. Once they compare, Xi Jinping has stepped down. No one cares about him at all. China’s dictatorship system is that if the superiors like something, the subordinates will be even more like it. The Military Commission cannot say that it will not mention Xi Jinping, but it still mentions it symbolically. At the bottom, the Jiangsu Military Region simply does not mention Xi Jinping. Let’s take a quick look at the faction of Ye Minsheng, the commander of the Jiangsu Military Region. Who was his former boss? His former boss was very angry with Xi Jinping. Otherwise, how can it be said that if the superiors like something, the subordinates will be even more like it. Ye Minsheng’s former boss didn’t like Xi Jinping, so Ye Minsheng simply didn’t mention Xi Jinping at all. The coach cursed off the court, and the players dared to beat him on the court. Ye Minsheng’s former boss dared to kick Xi Jinping, and Ye Minsheng dared to hit Xi Jinping.
No one paid attention to Xi Jinping when he held the Asian Winter Games
Because Miao Hua, director of the Political Work Department, had been arrested. And I don’t know whether the vice chairman of the Military Commission in charge of the Political Work Department is Zhang Youxia or He Weidong.
If He Weidong is the vice chairman of the Military Commission in charge of the Political Work Department, then who issued this notice? Can He Weidong still preside over the work? These are all question marks. Because before the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, He Hongjun was promoted to general in order to take down Miao Hua and let He Hongjun preside over the work. So that the work of the army would not be paralyzed, especially the work of the Political Work Department. Now it seems that the Political Work Department of the Chinese Military Commission is still operating. So how much He Weidong can say is all question marks.
Xi Jinping is really a piece of shit now
Let’s look at the latest notice issued by the Political Work Department of the Chinese Military Commission on February 5, 2025. Xi Jinping was mentioned twice, once for Xi Jinping’s Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and once for Xi Jinping’s Thought on Strengthening the Military. It seems that everything is normal. Let’s look at the notice issued by the Political Work Department on August 1, 2023. It’s only been a few days, just one and a half years. The gap is really too huge. Xi Jinping was mentioned 12 times, and once for Chairman Xi. In this comparison, Xi Jinping is really a piece of shit now.
Let’s take a closer look at this notice from one and a half years ago. The beginning is Xi Jinping Thought and Xi Jinping’s Thought on Strengthening the Military. These two sentences now, that is to say, one and a half years ago, it just started to blow, why did it stop, why did it become a eunuch, why did it stop abruptly. Is this taking Xi Jinping seriously? Isn’t this just covering up the truth?
Let’s look at the boast at that time. Xi Jinping’s Thought on Strengthening the Military is an important part of Xi Jinping’s Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. The great significance and great significance of Xi Jinping’s Thought on Strengthening the Military are not enough. Behind it is a scientific system, essence, and practical requirements. It is the basic textbook for the study and education of Xi Jinping’s Thought on Strengthening the Military. Deeply understand the decisive significance of the “two establishments”, enhance the “four consciousnesses”, strengthen the “four self-confidences”, and achieve the “two safeguards”, implement the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Military Commission, and resolutely obey the command of the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and Chairman Xi.
Everyone sees that the current version is a version that was deleted and deleted again a year and a half ago, and it is a very simple version. If it is not to cover up, Xi Jinping will not be mentioned at all. In particular, there will be no mention of resolutely obeying Chairman Xi’s command, because the army does not listen to Xi Jinping’s command now.
Since the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in July 2024 last year, many abnormalities have occurred in the military and high-level of the Chinese Communist Party. To observe whether the party leader Xi Jinping controls the military power, we must look at personnel changes. If you really want to listen, just look at the details reported by the military media and the statements made by various parties when studying the spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee and the Political Work Conference of the Central Military Commission.
In the past six months or so, the statements made by various theater commands and military services when studying the spirit of the above two conferences have been significantly different from the past. “Xi Jinping Thought” and “Two Establishments” have been ignored many times, and “Chairman Xi” has either not been mentioned or only been downplayed. It’s just a hat. Xi Jinping has not officially stepped down yet. Before he left, the tea has begun to cool.
Although the top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party’s military once added “Xi Jinping Thought” to some information reporting on the Military Commission in order to cover up such changes, it is worth noting that the statements of various theater commands and military services have basically not changed. This is because since the order to downplay Xi has been issued, it will not be easily changed, otherwise the army will be in chaos.
To a certain extent, it is also the Chinese Communist Party’s response to the hype of overseas public opinion. Otherwise, Xi Jinping would not be mentioned directly.
Obviously, before the top leaders of the Communist Party of China announced the changes in Zhongnanhai and officially announced Xi Jinping’s resignation, the statements of the various theaters and services of the SS were still continuing. On January 17, 2025, the military newspaper and the Military Commission published a report titled “Jiangsu Provincial Military District Deeply Studying and Implementing the Spirit of the Central Military Commission’s Political Work Conference – Inheriting Fine Traditions and Leading by Typical Demonstration”. The report still did not mention “Chairman Xi” once throughout the article, but mentioned the “Central Military Commission Political Work Conference” three times.
Treating the meeting chaired and addressed by Xi Jinping in this way, but only mentioning the meeting when studying, not mentioning “Chairman Xi” who has always been loyal to him, isn’t the message conveyed obvious? And it is also unusual that the Jiangsu Provincial Military District made the statement this time.
The Jiangsu Provincial Military District is a provincial military district managed by the National Defense Mobilization Department of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China. It is a full-army-level unit and its jurisdiction covers Jiangsu Province. It is also under the dual leadership of the National Defense Mobilization Department of the Central Military Commission and the Jiangsu Provincial Committee and Provincial Government of the Communist Party of China. After the CCP’s military reform, the provincial military district system no longer manages combat troops, and its main functions shift to administrative and service work, so the number of civilian personnel has increased. It is said to be dual leadership, but it is actually the leadership of the Military Commission. He is in charge of business but is very close to the local area and Jiangsu. It’s just that the management mechanism is not smooth.
The former boss of Jiangsu Provincial Military District Commander Ye Minsheng is Rocket Force Political Commissar Xu Xisheng
Currently, Jiangsu Provincial Military District Commander Ye Minsheng was the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the Southern Theater Command. In December 2019, he was promoted from the rank of Air Force Colonel to the rank of Air Force Major General. Ye Minsheng, who is he, I don’t know. Who is the Air Force Commander and Political Commissar of the Southern Theater Command in 2019? Xu Xisheng, Political Commissar of the Air Force of the Southern Theater Command, isn’t this the current Rocket Force Political Commissar?
In October 2024, Xi Jinping went to the 611 Brigade of the 61st Base of the Rocket Force in Huangshan, Anhui to act. Xu Xisheng is staring at Xi Jinping here. Some people think I am eavesdropping on the bed, and I am indeed eavesdropping on the bed. If this is not the evidence, he is not eavesdropping on the bed.
China’s Central Military Commission issued a secret order to downplay Xi Jinping. When it came to Xu Xisheng, he dared to glare at Xi Jinping. When it came to Xu Xisheng’s former subordinate, the current commander of the Jiangsu Provincial Military District, Ye Minsheng, he did not mention Xi Jinping at all.
This is Xu Xisheng, the political commissar of the Rocket Force. Xu Xisheng’s former subordinate, the commander of the Jiangsu Provincial Military District, Ye Minsheng, dared to scratch Xi Jinping. This is called “what the superior likes, the subordinate will do even more.”
Ye Minsheng’s statement can only be said to be following the instructions from the Military Commission.
What is more strange is whether this statement of not mentioning “Chairman Xi” has been endorsed by Xin Changxing, secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee? Or does it not require Xin Changxing’s consent? Because the Jiangsu Provincial Military District also has to accept the dual leadership of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee and the Provincial Government, and Xin Changxing is the first secretary of the Provincial Military District Party Committee.
Judging from Xin Changxing’s resume, he had worked in the Ministry of Labor and Social Security for a long time until 2008. He then served as Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Social Security, Director and Secretary of the State Civil Service Bureau, etc. Until 2016, he served as Deputy Secretary of the Anhui Provincial Party Committee in the same year. In 2020, he was transferred to the Deputy Secretary of the Qinghai Provincial Party Committee, and then promoted to Governor and Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee. In 2023, he was transferred to the Secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee. Xin Changxing may be Jiang Zemin’s man, and further analysis is needed. Zhao Leji was once the Secretary of the Qinghai Provincial Party Committee, but Zhao Leji and Xin Changxing were far apart in time. If Xin Changxing and Zhao Leji are from the same faction.
Then Xin Changxing went to Qinghai to maintain Zhao Leji’s base. If Xin Changxing and Zhao Leji are not from the same faction, then let’s talk about it separately.
However, officials who are immersed in the CCP officialdom, no matter what they think in their hearts, will do their best on the surface to show their loyalty to Xi Jinping. For example, on December 23 last year, the 8th Plenary Session of the 14th Jiangsu Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China was held in Nanjing. Xin Changxing made a speech, mentioning “two establishments” and “deepening the understanding of the spirit of Xi Jinping’s important speech on Jiangsu work”, and mentioned “Xi Jinping Thought” and “steering the ship”, but these are basically the standard configurations for officials at all levels to show their loyalty, and they do not mean that this is what they think in their hearts.
This is the so-called Feng faction. There is no real Feng faction, and superficial efforts cannot explain the problem. Li Hongzhong is famous for licking Xi Jinping. If his loyalty is not absolute, he is absolutely disloyal. I think Li Hongzhong is really disloyal to Xi Jinping. Even if Li Hongzhong licks Xi Jinping so much, no one thinks that Li Hongzhong and Xi Jinping are from the same faction. It is just verbal licking, which can only show that the CCP’s party jargon culture and the flattery culture are shameless, and cannot be used as a reason for factional judgment.
The opening ceremony of the 9th Asian Winter Games was held in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province on the evening of February 7, 2025. Xi Jinping attended the opening ceremony and announced the opening. According to the official media of the Chinese Communist Party, there were only a few foreign leaders who attended the opening ceremony: Brunei Sultan Hassanal, Kyrgyz President Sadyav Zardar, Pakistani President Zardari, Thai Prime Minister Petunthan, and South Korean National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-sik.
Everyone took a group photo on the spot. Excluding their wives, can they make up enough for two mahjong tables? Except for the Thai Prime Minister, who is a woman, there are only four people on the right of Peng Liyuan, and one is the President of the International Olympic Committee. I don’t know if these two women of Xi Jinping are their wives. The real so-called national leaders can’t even make up two mahjong tables.
No one paid attention to Xi Jinping, which should be the true reflection of the international status of a great power. A dictatorship should not be supported. To support a dictatorship is to sell out your conscience. Okay, thank you everyone.
END