胡锦涛要不要政改？习大势已去，墙内出现多处冲塔迹象。叼盘胡锡进力挺《和谐社会》？胡锦涛发动军事政变的意义？
胡锦涛要不要政改？习大势已去，墙内出现多处冲塔迹象。叼盘胡锡进力挺《和谐社会》？胡锦涛发动军事政变的意义？
大家好，
这名网友说
大包，不知道这个算不算一个弱证据啊，最近知乎有个帖子问古今中外最伟大的人，下边回复统一都基本上都是说胡锦涛，这个在之前都不可能的，但是这个帖子几天了还没有删，评论区也没有被封禁。
我的回复是，
这个我说过一次，别的网友也说过。冲塔增多的迹象还是挺明显。
胡锦涛2002-2012年任总书记，胡锦涛“和谐社会”理念在当时颇受认可，但近年来习近平主导的“新时代”叙事已取代胡锦涛时代的话语体系。2022年中共二十大上，胡锦涛被强行架离会场，被解读为习近平对团派的打压。如今墙内公开赞颂胡锦涛，而且没有被删帖，可能暗示审查尺度有所松动，或有势力刻意放任此类言论以试探舆论反应。
大外宣一直在强化团派团灭的叙事模式，但是明显与事实不符。无法解释苗华何卫东被抓，习近平接连缺席10次以上的重要会议。习近平就是一种形同被软禁的状态。习近平要不要出来演戏要看胡锦涛的意思。
这名网友说
我发现了一个弱证据。胡锡进的微博主页换背景了，新背景中有“和谐社区”的字样，让人想起胡锦涛的“和谐社会”。
我的回复是，
一件两件事情不能说明问题，但是这样的事情多了。那就能说明问题了。我特意去看了，我没有微博账号，我看不到里面胡锡进的留言。胡锡进的嗅觉很灵敏，而且什么盘都能叼。这是不是胡锡进得到什么消息，或者在带风向，那就不知道了。
胡锡进作为体制内资深媒体人，以敏锐嗅觉和灵活站队著称，什么盘都能叼，左右横跳。胡锡进微博动态经常被解读为政治风向标。胡锡进毫无疑问是党的人。胡锦涛相关话题在墙内敏感度极高，提到其名字曾被严格审查，胡锡进更换背景或有深意。一种可能是胡锡进嗅到高层风向，借“和谐”概念试探性地向胡锦涛派系示好；另一种说法可能是胡锡进个人行为，未必有官方授意。但是这种可能比较低。胡锡进的立场历来随风向调整，2022年他曾力挺习近平三连任，如今如果转向，可能是胡锡进知道习近平下台的消息。
有人在墙内何卫东的一张照片下面发现留言
标志着全线溃败，已经跛脚鸭了；已经hua国锋了，估计快揭锅了，8月底看答案吧。
虽然这些话都没有主语，但是墙内人应该一看就知道在说谁。何卫东作为“习家军”核心，何卫东被调查，表明胡锦涛反攻成功。评论没有被删除，也可能暗示审查松动或地方默许。
最引人注目的是5月22日抖音主播直播事件。主播预言习近平“超不过五年就下台”，并称接班人为“前代老板的义子”，网友猜测为胡春华或胡海峰，随后直播间被封禁。胡春华，1963年生，曾被胡锦涛视为接班人选，2022年没有进入政治局，被边缘化，2025年仕途回暖。主播言论虽大胆，但直播间被封禁表明官方仍然对敏感话题保持高压。网友讨论胡春华、胡海峰，甚至提到“侠总”，可能指张又侠），反映墙内对习近平接班人的关注，墙内这种直播能存在，就已经说明问题了。
最近这样的迹象太多了。综合来看，这些“弱证据”虽多，但单独看均不足以说明问题。但是这种迹象太多了。
这名网友说
习近平说支持群众靠自身力量，解决社会治安问题，是不是想效仿毛毛泽东搞武斗。
我的回复是，就和我们刚才说的这些弱证据是一样的。习近平想不想搞武斗，我不知道习近平怎么想的，我没有给习近平开发一个脑机接口。我们只能根据习近平的行为来推测，从习近平的行为来推测呢，他的确是想武斗，但是实际上搞没搞？没有啊。
这名话又说，
最近墙内对言论的钳制力度下降了很多
没发现啊 前天还被抖音封了一个礼拜 而且也根本不是什么太敏感的言论😂
抖音知乎B站全是胡锦涛
现在B站讲毛的和文革都多了
同样的道理，习近平想走文革路线，也并没有完全走成。
胡锦涛到底想不想政治改革，民主改革。
这个我不知道，但是他肯定想利用这股政治能量。
既然反习，那就是逆向操作。
中文的俗语说，小人畏威不畏德
笑贫不笑娼
毛泽东在《论持久战》里说，我们不要宋襄公“蠢猪式的仁义道德”
其实表达都是一个意思。
就是抓住了民族的劣根性，只崇拜权威。
不杀比杀人的难度，还大，关键是胡锦涛能不能控盘。
2024年11月至2025年4月，习近平军中亲信何卫东、苗华被查，被解读为胡锦涛反攻。31军，现在的73军作为“习家军”核心，习近平下台，31军可能被视为“叛军”，失去政治信任。胡锦涛“团灭31军”后，攻台难度增加，客观上保障台海10-20年和平。2025年，习近平攻台计划受阻，一是因军权受创，二是因美中博弈加剧。美国对台政策明确，如果中共武统台湾，美国几乎必然介入。2024年《美台关系报告》显示，美国对台军售超20亿美元，战略模糊转向清晰。中国一直宣传洗脑疑美论，但是习近平一旦攻台，美国百分百会下场
美国对台湾不管，任由中共统一台湾，这在政治上根本就不现实。
美国都无法容忍苏联统治世界，难道还能容忍中共成为世界一哥吗？
不存在这种政治现实。
胡锦涛通过不流血政变推翻习近平，确实可能降低攻台可能性，间接维护台海和平。
现在就是需要胡锦涛要“控盘”，民族的劣根性就是“崇拜权威”。“小人畏威不畏德”“笑贫不笑娼”，毛泽东在《论持久战》里笑话宋襄公“蠢猪式的仁义道德”，意指胡锦涛如果不展现强硬手段，比如把习近平挂路灯，难以服众。中共历史中，权力交接常常伴随暴力清洗，比如1976年“四人帮”被捕，胡锦涛如果选择“不杀”，需要极强的政治手腕。必须完全控盘，不然被习近平反杀就成笑话了。
2胡锦涛2024年6月发动“军事政变”），可能通过反腐（如何卫东被查）或人事调整（如石泰峰接手中组部）削弱习派，但不流血政变需要更高控盘能力。胡锦涛2002-2012年执政以温和著称，胡锦涛“和谐社会”理念注重平衡，如果延续这一风格，不把习近平挂路灯，体现这种“宽容”。万一失手，就会被笑话是蠢猪式的仁义道德。
但网友质疑，如果胡锦涛不推进民主改革，推翻习近平的意义何在？胡锦涛执政时期没有实质推进民主。2012年《政治体制改革报告》显示，党内民主仅停留试点。胡锦涛还不如胡耀邦呢。1984年8月中旬，陕西全省县级以上主要负责领导干部300多人，在经过四轮分步骤无记名投票后，白纪年以最高得票获得省委推荐。8月30日，中央宣布了白纪年的任命。胡耀邦还直接县处级干部直选省委书记呢。
胡锦涛干了什么，什么都没干。
2025年胡锦涛重掌权力，其目标可能是恢复胡派影响力，而非改革体制。习近平2012-2025年通过废除任期制（2018年修宪）和反腐（2013年周永康案）巩固权力，但导致经济低迷和党内不满。胡锦涛推翻习近平，可能仅为权力再分配，而非制度变革，难以改变中共权威政治的本质。胡锦涛如果无法展现强硬一面，可能难以服众，控盘难度极大。
再看台海局势影响。31军被“团灭”后，习近平下台，军方忠诚度可能下降，攻台能力受限。2025年，美中博弈加剧（美中关税战，川普的关税），美国对台支持力度空前（2024年美台联合军演）。如果中共武统，美国介入可能性极高，而且国际社会日本，澳大利亚会直接下场参战。攻台成本巨大。胡锦涛主导权力交接，通过内斗，客观上降低攻台风险，保障台海和平。避免美国卷入战争。
但这是否出于“爱台湾”，存疑。胡锦涛更可能是为团派利益，避免内乱导致中共政权不稳。
最后，胡锦涛不流血政变体现的“和平、宽容基因”值得探讨。中共历史上，权力交接多伴随暴力，比如1949年后多次大清洗。胡锦涛如果通过非暴力手段实现交接（如反腐、人事调整），确实展现了和平交接的可能性。
胡锦涛利用反习能量推翻习近平，需极强控盘能力，但不流血政变难度极大。如果不推进民主，推翻习近平仅为权力再分配，意义有限。团灭31军客观上降低攻台可能性，保障台海和平，但是未必出于“爱台湾”，更可能是夺取军权。不流血政变如果成功。
最大的意义就在于，给东大国的政治历史写下，很罕见这种和平与宽容的基因。
毕竟虽然胡锦涛要维持一个威权政权。但是不折腾，避免战争，给经济发展留出空间
说白了，中国承平已久，很多人都是既得利益，不希望跟着习近平让这些既得利益都灰飞烟灭。
好的，谢谢大家。
英文翻译
Does Hu Jintao want political reform? Xi Jinping is doomed, and there are many signs of attacks on the tower. Hu Xijin, holding a plate, strongly supports “Harmonious Society”? What is the significance of Hu Jintao’s military coup?
Hello everyone,
This netizen said
Dabao, I don’t know if this is considered weak evidence. Recently, there was a post on Zhihu asking about the greatest person in ancient and modern times, and the replies below basically all said Hu Jintao. This was impossible before, but this post has not been deleted for a few days, and the comment area has not been banned.
My reply is,
I have said this once, and other netizens have also said it. The signs of increasing attacks on the tower are still quite obvious.
Hu Jintao served as general secretary from 2002 to 2012. Hu Jintao’s concept of “harmonious society” was quite recognized at the time, but in recent years, the “new era” narrative led by Xi Jinping has replaced the discourse system of the Hu Jintao era. At the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2022, Hu Jintao was forcibly taken away from the venue, which was interpreted as Xi Jinping’s suppression of the Youth League faction. Now that posts are openly praising Hu Jintao inside the wall, and they have not been deleted, it may imply that the censorship standards have been loosened, or that some forces deliberately allow such remarks to test the reaction of public opinion.
The big foreign propaganda has been strengthening the narrative mode of the group faction being destroyed, but it is obviously inconsistent with the facts. It is impossible to explain the arrest of Miao Hua and He Weidong, and Xi Jinping’s absence from more than 10 important meetings in a row. Xi Jinping is in a state of house arrest. Whether Xi Jinping wants to come out to act depends on Hu Jintao’s intention.
This netizen said
I found a weak evidence. Hu Xijin’s Weibo homepage has changed its background. The new background has the words “harmonious community”, which reminds people of Hu Jintao’s “harmonious society”.
My reply is,
One or two things cannot explain the problem, but there are more such things. That can explain the problem. I went to see it on purpose. I don’t have a Weibo account, so I can’t see Hu Xijin’s message. Hu Xijin has a very sensitive nose and can handle anything. Whether Hu Xijin got some information or is leading the trend, I don’t know.
As a senior media person in the system, Hu Xijin is known for his keen sense of smell and flexible stance. He can handle any dish and jump left and right. Hu Xijin’s Weibo dynamics are often interpreted as a political weather vane. Hu Xijin is undoubtedly a member of the party. Topics related to Hu Jintao are extremely sensitive inside the wall. Mentioning his name has been strictly censored. Hu Xijin’s change of background may have a deep meaning. One possibility is that Hu Xijin smelled the wind direction of the top leaders and tentatively showed goodwill to Hu Jintao’s faction by using the concept of “harmony”; another possibility may be Hu Xijin’s personal behavior, which may not be authorized by the official. But this possibility is relatively low. Hu Xijin’s position has always adjusted with the wind direction. In 2022, he strongly supported Xi Jinping’s third term. If he changes now, it may be that Hu Xijin knows the news of Xi Jinping’s resignation.
Someone found a message under a photo of He Weidong inside the wall
It means that the whole line has been defeated and it is already a lame duck; it is already Hua Guofeng, and it is estimated that the pot will be exposed soon. Let’s see the answer at the end of August.
Although these words have no subject, people inside the wall should know who they are talking about at a glance. As the core of the “Xi Family Army”, He Weidong’s investigation shows that Hu Jintao’s counterattack was successful. The comments were not deleted, which may also imply a loosening of censorship or local acquiescence.
The most eye-catching was the Douyin anchor live broadcast incident on May 22. The anchor predicted that Xi Jinping “will step down in no more than five years” and said that the successor would be “the adopted son of the previous boss”. Netizens speculated that it would be Hu Chunhua or Hu Haifeng, and then the live broadcast room was banned. Hu Chunhua, born in 1963, was once regarded as a successor by Hu Jintao. He did not enter the Politburo in 2022 and was marginalized. His career picked up in 2025. Although the anchor’s remarks were bold, the ban on the live broadcast room showed that the authorities still maintained high pressure on sensitive topics. Netizens discussed Hu Chunhua and Hu Haifeng, and even mentioned “Xia Zong”, which may refer to Zhang Youxia), reflecting the attention of the people inside the wall to Xi Jinping’s successor. The existence of such live broadcasts inside the wall already explains the problem.
There are too many such signs recently. Overall, although there are many “weak evidences”, none of them can explain the problem. But there are too many such signs.
This netizen said
Xi Jinping said that he supports the masses to solve social security problems by their own strength. Is he trying to imitate Mao Zedong to engage in armed struggle?
My reply is that it is the same as the weak evidence we just mentioned. I don’t know what Xi Jinping thinks about whether he wants to engage in armed struggle. I haven’t developed a brain-computer interface for Xi Jinping. We can only speculate based on Xi Jinping’s behavior. From Xi Jinping’s behavior, he does want to engage in armed struggle, but did he actually do it? No.
This netizen also said,
Recently, the control of speech within the wall has decreased a lot
I didn’t notice that I was blocked by Douyin for a week the day before yesterday, and it was not a very sensitive speech at all😂
Douyin, Zhihu, and Bilibili are all Hu Jintao
Now Bilibili talks about Mao and the Cultural Revolution
By the same token, Xi Jinping wanted to follow the Cultural Revolution route, but he didn’t completely succeed.
Does Hu Jintao really want political reform and democratic reform?
I don’t know this, but he definitely wants to use this political energy.
Since he is against Xi, it is a reverse operation.
As the Chinese proverb says, villains fear power but not virtue
Laugh at poverty but not at prostitutes
In “On Protracted War”, Mao Zedong said that we don’t want the “idiot-like benevolence and morality” of Duke Xiang of Song
In fact, they all express the same meaning.
It is to grasp the bad nature of the nation, which only worships authority.
Not killing is more difficult than killing. The key is whether Hu Jintao can control the situation.
From November 2024 to April 2025, Xi Jinping’s military confidants He Weidong and Miao Hua were investigated, which was interpreted as Hu Jintao’s counterattack. The 31st Army, now the 73rd Army, is the core of the “Xi Family Army”. When Xi Jinping steps down, the 31st Army may be regarded as a “rebel” and lose political trust. After Hu Jintao “annihilated the 31st Army”, the difficulty of attacking Taiwan increased, objectively guaranteeing 10-20 years of peace in the Taiwan Strait. In 2025, Xi Jinping’s plan to attack Taiwan was blocked, first because of the damage to military power, and second because of the intensified game between the United States and China. The United States has a clear policy toward Taiwan. If the CCP unifies Taiwan by force, the United States will almost certainly intervene. The 2024 “Report on US-Taiwan Relations” shows that the United States has sold more than $2 billion in arms to Taiwan, and strategic ambiguity has turned to clarity. China has been promoting brainwashing and suspicion of the United States, but once Xi Jinping attacks Taiwan, the United States will definitely end up
The United States does not care about Taiwan and allows the CCP to unify Taiwan. This is politically unrealistic.
The United States could not tolerate the Soviet Union ruling the world, so how could it tolerate the CCP becoming the world’s number one brother?
There is no such political reality.
Hu Jintao’s overthrow of Xi Jinping through a bloodless coup may indeed reduce the possibility of attacking Taiwan and indirectly maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait.
Now we need Hu Jintao to “control the situation”, and the bad nature of the nation is “worship of authority.” “The villain fears power but not virtue” and “laughs at poverty but not at prostitutes”. Mao Zedong laughed at Duke Xiang of Song’s “idiot-like benevolence and morality” in “On Protracted War”, meaning that if Hu Jintao does not show tough measures, such as hanging Xi Jinping on a street lamp, it will be difficult to convince the public. In the history of the Communist Party of China, power transfers are often accompanied by violent purges. For example, the arrest of the “Gang of Four” in 1976. If Hu Jintao chooses “not to kill”, he needs extremely strong political skills. He must be completely in control, otherwise it will be a joke to be killed by Xi Jinping.
2 Hu Jintao launched a “military coup” in June 2024), and may weaken the Xi faction through anti-corruption (How Weidong was investigated) or personnel adjustments (such as Shi Taifeng taking over the Organization Department of the Central Committee), but a bloodless coup requires a higher level of control. Hu Jintao was known for his moderateness during his administration from 2002 to 2012. Hu Jintao’s concept of “harmonious society” focuses on balance. If he continues this style and does not hang Xi Jinping on a street lamp, it will reflect this “tolerance”. If he fails, he will be laughed at for being a fool-like benevolence and morality.
But netizens questioned, if Hu Jintao did not promote democratic reform, what is the point of overthrowing Xi Jinping? Hu Jintao did not substantially promote democracy during his administration. The 2012 “Political System Reform Report” shows that intra-party democracy has only remained in the pilot stage. Hu Jintao is not as good as Hu Yaobang. In mid-August 1984, more than 300 major leaders at or above the county level in Shaanxi Province, after four rounds of secret ballots in stages, Bai Jinian was recommended by the provincial party committee with the highest votes. On August 30, the central government announced Bai Jinian’s appointment. Hu Yaobang also directly elected the provincial party secretary from county-level cadres.
What did Hu Jintao do? Nothing.
When Hu Jintao regains power in 2025, his goal may be to restore the influence of the Hu faction rather than reform the system. Xi Jinping consolidated his power from 2012 to 2025 by abolishing the term system (2018 constitutional amendment) and fighting corruption (2013 Zhou Yongkang case), but it led to economic downturn and dissatisfaction within the party. Hu Jintao’s overthrow of Xi Jinping may only be a redistribution of power, not institutional reform, and it is difficult to change the nature of the CCP’s authoritarian politics. If Hu Jintao cannot show a tough side, he may not be able to convince the public and it will be extremely difficult to control the situation.
Let’s look at the impact of the situation in the Taiwan Strait. After the 31st Army was “annihilated”, Xi Jinping stepped down, the military’s loyalty may decline, and the ability to attack Taiwan will be limited. In 2025, the game between the United States and China will intensify (the US-China tariff war, Trump’s tariffs), and the United States will support Taiwan unprecedentedly (the US-Taiwan joint military exercise in 2024). If the CCP unifies by force, the United States is very likely to intervene, and Japan and Australia in the international community will directly participate in the war. The cost of attacking Taiwan is huge. Hu Jintao led the transfer of power and objectively reduced the risk of attacking Taiwan through internal fighting, ensuring peace in the Taiwan Strait. Avoid the United States from being involved in the war.
But whether this is out of “love for Taiwan” is questionable. Hu Jintao is more likely to be for the interests of the group faction to avoid internal strife that will lead to instability in the CCP regime.
Finally, the “peace and tolerance gene” embodied in Hu Jintao’s bloodless coup is worth discussing. In the history of the Communist Party of China, power transfers are often accompanied by violence, such as the multiple major purges after 1949. If Hu Jintao achieves the handover through non-violent means (such as anti-corruption and personnel adjustments), it does show the possibility of a peaceful handover.
Hu Jintao used anti-Xi energy to overthrow Xi Jinping, which requires extremely strong control ability, but a bloodless coup is extremely difficult. If democracy is not promoted, overthrowing Xi Jinping is only for power redistribution, which has limited significance. The annihilation of the 31st Army objectively reduces the possibility of attacking Taiwan and ensures peace in the Taiwan Strait, but it may not be out of “love for Taiwan”, but more likely to seize military power. If a bloodless coup succeeds.
The greatest significance is that it writes down the political history of a great country in the East, which is a rare gene of peace and tolerance.
After all, although Hu Jintao wants to maintain an authoritarian regime. But not tossing, avoiding war, leaving room for economic development
To put it bluntly, China has been peaceful for a long time, and many people have vested interests. They don’t want to follow Xi Jinping and let these vested interests disappear.
OK, thank you everyone.
END