三中中共文件已经昭告习近平下台，我们还在才猜？越南叫板习近平的底气是什么？
三中中共文件已经昭告习近平下台，我们还在才猜？越南叫板习近平的底气是什么？
大家好，这名网友说，
大包我这几天翻三中全会报告，全文没提两个维护，只有两个毫不动摇，这是不是意味着去年7月习失势的消息就昭告天下了？
我的回复是，我找了一下，这是两个东西，一个是三中全会的公报，一个是三中全会决定的全文
公报大概是6000字，决定全文是2万2千字，公报大概是三分之一
这两个文件都提到了两个维护，都提到了以习近平为核心。但是都只说了一次，只有全文里面提到过两个毫不动摇。
“两个维护”自2018年提出，强调习近平核心地位和党中央权威，常用于党建、反腐和意识形态领域，比如2022年如二十大报告多次提及。《公报》和《决定》各提一次，没有单独突出。相比之下，“两个毫不动摇”源于邓小平，胡锦涛，贯穿经济改革，强调公有制与非公有制并重，符合三中全会经济导向，特别是在当前经济下行，房地产危机、消费疲软背景下，重申此原则旨在稳定民营企业信心。
可以说中共党内有意淡化习近平个人色彩，回归集体领导，而“两个毫不动摇”的强调可能暗示胡锦涛影响力上升。当然了两个毫不动摇也只提了一次。
我对比一下舔包指数，这名网友的说法还是很有道理的。2000字文章，省委书记就能提10次，20次习近平。
三中全会的公报和全文作为中共党的最高文件，自然是比一名省委书记的发言，重要性高出好几倍。作为中共重要的党内文件，三中全会，公报，全文，只是提了3次，4次习近平。相比呢20大报告，其实一次习近平都没有提过，因为20大报告是习近平自己念的。但是这里面有习近平的同义词，就是新时代中国特色社会主义思想也就是说，习近平自己作报告，都能吹自己8次。三中全会的确是比20大报告淡化了。但是，不是没有提两个维护，提过一次。
所以这名网友的说法，的确是淡化了，但是没有那么显眼。
所以应该不是把习近平立马下架，而是一个逐渐下架的过程。
习近平计划于2025年4月14日开启对东南亚三国的访问，首站为越南，停留两天，随后前往马来西亚和柬埔寨。在美中贸易战升级、全球供应链重塑的背景下，越南因其独特的地缘经济地位成为此行焦点。尤其在越南明确不对抗美国高关税政策，并通过高官耐人寻味的表态后，习近平访越被外界视为一场高风险的博弈。越南副总理兼外交部长裴青山在4月12日接受越通社采访时，提出对习近平访问的四项期待，其中对南海等历史遗留问题的“坦诚、真诚、务实、相互理解、换位思考”表述，暗示越南有意利用自身有利地位，向中国施压以换取重大让步。这是否意味着越南高官的放话已为习近平设下“大放血”的谈判门槛？
当前，中美贸易战进入白热化阶段。2025年，美国对华关税飙升至145%，中国报复性关税达125%，双方对抗震动全球。东南亚国家同样面临美国高关税压力，越南商品被加征46%，柬埔寨49%，但与中国的针锋相对不同，越南展现了灵活的外交策略。4月10日，东盟10国经济部长视讯会议后宣布，不对美国单边关税采取报复，强调通过对话维护区域稳定与经济增长。越南尤为积极，自4月3日起，越南领导人密集召开会议、与美国沟通，成立以副总理裴青山为首的“加强合作、主动应对美国经贸政策调整”工作组。越共总书记苏林亲自致电川普，副总理胡德福赴美谈判，承诺对美国商品零关税，推动采购250架波音客机、军用飞机及60亿美元液化天然气等，总额超900亿美元的订单。越南还下调23类美国商品关税，部分税率低于美国对越关税，消除技术壁垒，并加强对原产地欺诈和非法转口的监管。这些举措直接回应美国遏制中国转口贸易的诉求，显示越南在美中博弈中已经站队美国，只不过还给中国留些口惠而实不至的面子而已。
越南的底气源于其在全球供应链中的关键地位。过去十年，越南成为制造业转移热点，吸引苹果、三星、英特尔等跨国企业投资，2024年对美出口额达1230亿美元，顺差占其GDP的30%。同时，中国是越南最大贸易伙伴，2024年中越贸易额创历史新高，达2052亿美元，占越南外贸总额的28%。越南既依赖中国投资高铁、港口等基建和市场，又需要美国出口红利，这种双重依赖赋予越南独特的谈判筹码。尤其在中美贸易战加剧、中国面临高关税孤立时，越南作为贸易缓冲带的角色越发重要。习近平此行旨在深化中越产业链合作，利用越南规避美国关税，分散贸易风险。然而，越南高官的表态表明，中国如果想达成目标，需付出高昂代价。
2025年4月12日，越通社刊发对裴青山的专访，明确习近平访越的四项期待：一是加强高层战略沟通，二是深化各领域合作，三是促进人文交流，四是以“坦诚、真诚、务实、相互理解、换位思考”的精神，通过交流妥善处理边界领土等历史遗留问题，管控南海分歧，避免影响两国关系大局。第四点措辞罕见，耐人寻味。裴青山要求中国在南海问题上“坦诚”，暗指过去中国可能隐瞒意图或行动，比如岛礁建设；“真诚”暗示不满中国虚伪姿态，比如单方面划定九段线；“务实”批评中国空谈意识形态，比如命运共同体，而不是实质解决；“相互理解、换位思考”要求中国考虑越南立场，而不是以大国自居；“避免海上问题影响大局”更是直白警告，如果南海争端处理不当，可能动摇中越合作根基。这种强硬表态折射出越南对自身优势的清醒认知：作为供应链枢纽和地缘要冲，越南有资本向中国索要更多回报。
越南的自信还源于其近年外交成果。2022年越共总书记阮富仲访华，习近平承诺尊重越南主权，但南海问题未获突破。2023年10月，中共军委副主席张又侠访越，与越南国防部长潘文江会谈，签署防务合作意向书和边防协议，越南国家主席梁强高度评价成果。然而，潘文江重申越南立场：依据《联合国海洋法公约》和《东海各方行为宣言》，以和平方式解决争端，尽快达成《东海行为准则》。这表明越南并未满足于既有合作，而是将南海问题作为对华谈判的筹码。
习近平访越面临的压力因此显著。越南的期待不仅是经济合作，更是地缘让步。然而，习近平的让步空间有限，因为习近平现在也不真正掌握大权，习近平能不能真正拍板决策，我们也不知道，可以继续观察。
越南的选择将是关键。奉行“竹子外交”的越南，既不愿因亲华引发美国制裁，又无法完全脱离中国经济。2024年中越贸易数据凸显依赖性：中国占越南进口的35%，越南对华出口占总量的20%。但是越南对美出口的战略价值更高，美国市场直接影响越南经济增长。如果中国在访越中满足越南的经济和南海诉求，越南可能继续扮演中立角色，维持产业链合作；如果中国仅提供有限投资而没有地缘让步，越南可能在转口贸易监管上配合美国，限制中国商品流入，间接削弱中国经济。目前看越南已经由总理部署了实际行动，配合美国，打击中国的转口贸易，堵住中国占便宜，钻空子的机会。但是越南可能表面上也不不会跟中国翻脸。
从裴青山代表越南高层的言辞中，可以看出，越南对于自己身处非常有利的谈判地位，是心知肚明的。裴青山的表态为越南定下高谈判基调。越南深知自身在供应链和地缘中的杠杆作用。
2023年越南GDP增长5.8%，外资流入300亿美元，远超东盟平均水平。这种底气让越南敢于向中国“要价”。历史上，越南在中越关系中常以弱势姿态寻求平衡，但当前局势赋予越南主动权。1979年中越战争后，两国关系历经波折，1991年正常化以来，经济合作成为主轴，但南海争端始终是阴影。2014年中国981钻井平台事件引发越南反华事件，2019年西沙渔船冲突再掀波澜。越南公众对中国的戒心重重，民调显示60%越南民众支持亲美，也限制越共的亲华空间。
长期看，越南的选择将影响东南亚格局。若越南倒向美国，中国可能转而扶持柬埔寨、老挝，形成“亲华小圈子”，但是成本高昂且效果有限。如果越南保持中立，中国可通过经济捆绑巩固区域影响力，但是需要持续让步。裴青山的放话表明，越南已为谈判设下高门槛，习近平访越不仅是一场外交秀，更是一场资源与底线的较量。
因此，习近平访问越南恐怕难以让中国得到什么实质性的东西。
好的，谢谢大家。
英文翻译
The Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee has announced Xi Jinping’s resignation, and we are still guessing? What is Vietnam’s confidence in challenging Xi Jinping?
Hello everyone, this netizen said,
I have been reading the report of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee these days. The whole text does not mention the two maintenances, only the two unshakable. Does this mean that the news of Xi’s loss of power was announced to the world in July last year?
My reply is, I looked it up, these are two things, one is the communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, and the other is the full text of the decision of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee
The communique is about 6,000 words, and the full text of the decision is 22,000 words, and the communique is about one-third
Both documents mentioned the two maintenances, and both mentioned Xi Jinping as the core. But they were only mentioned once, and only the full text mentioned the two unshakable.
“Two maintenances” have been proposed since 2018, emphasizing Xi Jinping’s core position and the authority of the Party Central Committee. They are often used in the fields of party building, anti-corruption and ideology. For example, the report of the 20th CPC National Congress in 2022 mentioned it many times. The “Communique” and “Decision” each mentioned it once, without highlighting it separately. In contrast, the “two unshakable” principles originated from Deng Xiaoping and Hu Jintao, and run through economic reforms, emphasizing the importance of both public and non-public ownership, which is in line with the economic orientation of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee. Especially in the current context of economic downturn, real estate crisis, and weak consumption, reaffirming this principle is intended to stabilize the confidence of private enterprises.
It can be said that the CPC intends to downplay Xi Jinping’s personal color and return to collective leadership, and the emphasis on the “two unshakable” principles may imply the rise of Hu Jintao’s influence. Of course, the two unshakable principles were only mentioned once.
I compared the licking index, and the netizen’s statement is still very reasonable. In a 2,000-word article, the provincial party secretary can mention Xi Jinping 10 times, 20 times.
As the highest document of the CPC, the communiqué and full text of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee are naturally several times more important than the speech of a provincial party secretary. As an important party document of the CPC, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, the communiqué, and the full text only mentioned Xi Jinping 3 times, 4 times. In comparison, the 20th National Congress report, in fact, Xi Jinping did not mention it once, because the 20th National Congress report was read by Xi Jinping himself. But there is a synonym for Xi Jinping, which is the thought of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era. In other words, Xi Jinping can brag about himself 8 times in his own report. The Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee is indeed more diluted than the 20th CPC National Congress report. However, it is not that the two safeguards were not mentioned, but it was mentioned once.
So the netizen’s statement is indeed diluted, but not so conspicuous.
So it should not be an immediate removal of Xi Jinping, but a gradual removal process.
Xi Jinping plans to start his visit to three Southeast Asian countries on April 14, 2025, with Vietnam as the first stop, staying for two days, and then going to Malaysia and Cambodia. Against the backdrop of the escalation of the US-China trade war and the reshaping of the global supply chain, Vietnam has become the focus of this trip due to its unique geo-economic position. Especially after Vietnam made it clear that it would not confront the US high tariff policy and made intriguing statements through senior officials, Xi Jinping’s visit to Vietnam was seen by the outside world as a high-risk game. In an interview with VNA on April 12, Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son put forward four expectations for Xi Jinping’s visit. Among them, the expression of “frankness, sincerity, pragmatism, mutual understanding, and empathy” on historical issues such as the South China Sea implies that Vietnam intends to use its advantageous position to put pressure on China in exchange for major concessions. Does this mean that the Vietnamese senior officials have set a “bloody” negotiation threshold for Xi Jinping?
At present, the Sino-US trade war has entered a white-hot stage. In 2025, the US tariffs on China soared to 145%, and China’s retaliatory tariffs reached 125%. The confrontation between the two sides shocked the world. Southeast Asian countries are also facing high US tariffs. Vietnamese goods are subject to an additional 46% and Cambodia’s 49%, but unlike China’s tit-for-tat, Vietnam has demonstrated a flexible diplomatic strategy. On April 10, the economic ministers of the 10 ASEAN countries announced after a video conference that they would not retaliate against the US unilateral tariffs, emphasizing the maintenance of regional stability and economic growth through dialogue. Vietnam is particularly active. Since April 3, Vietnamese leaders have held intensive meetings and communicated with the United States, and set up a working group headed by Deputy Prime Minister Bui Thanh Son to “strengthen cooperation and actively respond to the adjustment of US economic and trade policies.” General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam To Lin personally called Trump, and Deputy Prime Minister Hu Defu went to the United States for negotiations, promising zero tariffs on US goods and promoting the purchase of 250 Boeing passenger aircraft, military aircraft and $6 billion in liquefied natural gas, with a total order of more than $90 billion. Vietnam also lowered tariffs on 23 categories of US goods, some of which were lower than the US tariffs on Vietnam, eliminated technical barriers, and strengthened supervision of origin fraud and illegal re-exports. These measures directly respond to the US’s demand to curb China’s re-export trade, showing that Vietnam has already sided with the United States in the US-China game, but has left China some face for lip service.
Vietnam’s confidence comes from its key position in the global supply chain. In the past decade, Vietnam has become a hot spot for manufacturing transfer, attracting investments from multinational companies such as Apple, Samsung, and Intel. In 2024, its exports to the United States reached US$123 billion, and its surplus accounted for 30% of its GDP. At the same time, China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner. In 2024, China-Vietnam trade volume hit a record high of US$205.2 billion, accounting for 28% of Vietnam’s total foreign trade. Vietnam relies on China’s investment in infrastructure and markets such as high-speed rail and ports, and also needs US export dividends. This dual dependence gives Vietnam a unique bargaining chip. Especially when the Sino-US trade war intensifies and China faces high tariff isolation, Vietnam’s role as a trade buffer zone becomes increasingly important. Xi Jinping’s visit aims to deepen China-Vietnam industrial chain cooperation, use Vietnam to circumvent US tariffs, and diversify trade risks. However, the statements of senior Vietnamese officials indicate that if China wants to achieve its goals, it will have to pay a high price.
On April 12, 2025, Vietnam News Agency published an exclusive interview with Bui Thanh Son, clarifying Xi Jinping’s four expectations for his visit to Vietnam: first, strengthening high-level strategic communication; second, deepening cooperation in various fields; third, promoting cultural exchanges; and fourth, in the spirit of “frankness, sincerity, pragmatism, mutual understanding, and empathy”, properly handling historical issues such as borders and territories through exchanges, managing differences in the South China Sea, and avoiding affecting the overall situation of bilateral relations. The fourth point is worded in a rare and intriguing way. Bui Thanh Son asked China to be “frank” on the South China Sea issue, implying that China may have concealed its intentions or actions in the past, such as island construction; “sincerity” implies dissatisfaction with China’s hypocritical posture, such as unilaterally demarcating the nine-dash line; “pragmatism” criticizes China for empty talk of ideology, such as a community of shared destiny, rather than substantive solutions; “mutual understanding and empathy” requires China to consider Vietnam’s position, rather than regard itself as a great power; “avoiding maritime issues from affecting the overall situation” is a direct warning that if the South China Sea dispute is not handled properly, it may shake the foundation of China-Vietnam cooperation. This tough statement reflects Vietnam’s clear understanding of its own advantages: as a supply chain hub and geopolitical hub, Vietnam has the capital to demand more returns from China.
Vietnam’s confidence also stems from its diplomatic achievements in recent years. In 2022, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Nguyen Phu Trong visited China, and Xi Jinping promised to respect Vietnam’s sovereignty, but there was no breakthrough on the South China Sea issue. In October 2023, Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, visited Vietnam and held talks with Vietnamese Defense Minister Phan Van Giang. They signed a letter of intent for defense cooperation and a border defense agreement, and Vietnamese President Luong Cuong highly praised the results. However, Phan Van Giang reiterated Vietnam’s position: to resolve disputes peacefully in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea, and to reach a Code of Conduct in the East Sea as soon as possible. This shows that Vietnam is not satisfied with the existing cooperation, but uses the South China Sea issue as a bargaining chip in negotiations with China.
The pressure faced by Xi Jinping’s visit to Vietnam is therefore significant. Vietnam’s expectations are not only economic cooperation, but also geopolitical concessions. However, Xi Jinping’s room for concessions is limited, because Xi Jinping is not really in power now. We don’t know whether Xi Jinping can really make the final decision. We can continue to observe.
Vietnam’s choice will be the key. Vietnam, which pursues “bamboo diplomacy”, is unwilling to trigger US sanctions due to its pro-China stance, but it cannot completely break away from the Chinese economy. The 2024 China-Vietnam trade data highlights dependence: China accounts for 35% of Vietnam’s imports, and Vietnam’s exports to China account for 20% of the total. However, Vietnam’s exports to the United States have a higher strategic value, and the US market directly affects Vietnam’s economic growth. If China meets Vietnam’s economic and South China Sea demands during its visit to Vietnam, Vietnam may continue to play a neutral role and maintain industrial chain cooperation; if China only provides limited investment without geopolitical concessions, Vietnam may cooperate with the United States in entrepot trade supervision, restrict the inflow of Chinese goods, and indirectly weaken the Chinese economy. At present, Vietnam has deployed practical actions by the Prime Minister to cooperate with the United States to crack down on China’s entrepot trade and block China’s opportunities to take advantage and exploit loopholes. But Vietnam may not turn its face with China on the surface.
From the words of Bui Thanh Son on behalf of Vietnam’s top leaders, it can be seen that Vietnam is well aware of its very advantageous negotiating position. Bui Thanh Son’s statement set a high negotiating tone for Vietnam. Vietnam is well aware of its leverage in the supply chain and geography.
In 2023, Vietnam’s GDP grew by 5.8%, and foreign investment inflows reached 30 billion US dollars, far exceeding the ASEAN average. This confidence allows Vietnam to “ask for a price” from China. Historically, Vietnam has often sought balance in Sino-Vietnamese relations with a weak attitude, but the current situation gives Vietnam the initiative. After the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, the relationship between the two countries has experienced twists and turns. Since normalization in 1991, economic cooperation has become the main axis, but the South China Sea dispute has always been a shadow. The 2014 Chinese 981 drilling platform incident triggered anti-China incidents in Vietnam, and the 2019 Xisha fishing boat conflict caused another wave. The Vietnamese public is wary of China. Polls show that 60% of Vietnamese people support pro-US, which also limits the pro-China space of the Communist Party of Vietnam.
In the long run, Vietnam’s choice will affect the Southeast Asian situation. If Vietnam leans towards the United States, China may turn to support Cambodia and Laos to form a “pro-China circle”, but the cost is high and the effect is limited. If Vietnam remains neutral, China can consolidate its regional influence through economic ties, but it needs to continue to make concessions. Pei Qingshan’s words show that Vietnam has set a high threshold for negotiations. Xi Jinping’s visit to Vietnam is not only a diplomatic show, but also a contest of resources and bottom lines.
Therefore, it is difficult for Xi Jinping to visit Vietnam to get anything substantial from China.
OK, thank you everyone.
END