内蒙古武警效忠胡春华，接任军委主席。胡春华去湖北造势。习近平文盲念诗又出丑
内蒙古武警效忠胡春华，接任军委主席。胡春华去湖北造势。习近平文盲念诗又出丑
大家好，欢迎回到我的频道！中国军网2025年5月13日发了一篇关于武警内蒙古总队的报道，标题是《求真务实改作风 帮建基层鼓士气》，竟然一次没提“习主席”，连“军委主席负责制”这些忠诚口号都没有！当然了，军报不提习近平基本已经是常态了。文章只强调落实中央八项规定和军委十项规定，而八项规定是胡锦涛的八项规定。这是在暗暗向胡锦涛的接班人胡春华“表忠心”，这戳破了习近平“表面风光”的假象，表明习近平已经丧失党政军大权，目前就是一个虚位的国家元首在前台参演。
首先，我们看一下这篇5月13日早上8点发布的军网报道。文章说武警内蒙古总队在搞学习教育，落实中央八项规定和军委十项规定，改进作风、鼓舞士气。整篇报道没提“习近平主席”，连“两个确立”“两个维护”这些习派标配口号都没出现！它只说“对标中央八项规定精神、军委十项规定”，听从的是“中央军委”的指令。过去，军队报道必定把“习主席”挂在嘴边，尤其是习近平推“军委主席负责制”以来，忠诚表态到处都是。现在军报完全当习近平这个军委主席不存在。解放军报早就明确表态，书记 是“一班之长”，决不能当作“一家之主”!这就是针对习近平。表明习近平丧失军权，军队根本就不买习近平的账了！更有人提到，武警内蒙古总队的表态可能跟胡锦涛的亲信曹均章有关，因为曹均章5月8日以武警副司令身份代理司令员，出席政法会议，疑似在为胡春华接军委主席造势！
中国的党八股都特别的变态，规定的特别严格，什么级别的人给几秒钟的镜头，央视都有规定。曹均章仅仅是一名中将，级别不够。但是，央视还是捕捉到不到1秒钟的画面。曹均章抬头可以清晰的看到他的脸，央视并没有给曹均章拍到名牌。
八项规定是2012年12月4日政治局通过的，内容包括精简会议、减少出访、反腐倡廉，号称是习近平的反腐招牌。这根本不是习近平的主意！八项规定明确规定，中国国家领导人出国访问，一般不安排中资机构，华侨华人，留学生代表等到机场迎送。习近平刚刚访问俄罗斯，公然违反八项规定，这个俄罗斯中国总商会，就是中国的间谍机构。
2012年，习近平刚当上总书记，实际权力还在胡锦涛手里。八项规定的落实是由胡锦涛的铁杆刘云山推动的。刘云山当时是政治局常委、书记处书记，主持中央党建工作领导小组，12月开了会，专门研究八项规定的落地措施。党建领导小组是胡锦涛的地盘，中共党建工作领导小组是中共政治局领导的党建工作议事协调机构，1988年成立，负责对党建工作领域的重大问题进行决策，成员由主管党建工作的中共中央政治局常委、分管有关党务工作的中共中央政治局委员、中共中央书记处书记等人员组成。首任小组组长是时任中央政治局常委、中纪委书记的乔石，后来是政治局常委、书记处书记、国家副主席胡锦涛担任组长。乔石是哪个派系的，我还真是太清楚。以前的这些不太好确定，他如果提拔一个马仔，就容易确定了。习近平2007-2012年当过组长，但是2012年被刘云山接手，说明胡锦涛派系当时还掌控党务。直到2014年，习近平拿下周永康，彭丽媛团队炒作《习大大爱着彭麻麻》掀起个人崇拜，这两件事只隔9天，才标志着习近平真正从胡锦涛手里夺权。所以，八项规定其实是“胡锦涛的八项规定”，跟习近平没有什么关系，习近平自己也不遵守。
2013年12月28日，习近平去北京庆丰包子铺吃包子，摆出一副亲民姿态。这件事正好发生在八项规定推出后一年，这是习近平配合胡锦涛的政策，硬着头皮演戏。因为2014年掌权后，习近平就再也没干过这种“接地气”的事儿，也从没第一时间出现在救灾现场。所以，武警内蒙古总队2025年重提八项规定，却不提习近平，感觉像在向胡锦涛的遗产致敬，暗藏政治信号。这可能跟胡春华有关，因为胡春华可是胡锦涛的接班人，而曹均章的动作更像在为胡春华上位准备！
胡春华2009到2012年当过内蒙古自治区党委书记，现在他是全国政协副主席。网友发现，武警内蒙古总队的司令员刘会成和政委肖方举都不是习近平的嫡系。刘会成63岁，2017年起当司令，8年没有升迁，之前在武警北京总队干过国旗护卫队大队长。肖方举在吉林、四川武警干过，简历也不像习近平的亲信。加上内蒙古是胡春华的老地盘，武警总队选在这时候表态，感觉像在给胡春华站台。更关键的是，曹均章，是胡锦涛的“马仔”，2025年5月8日以武警副司令身份代理司令员，出席政法会议，央视还特意给了他一秒抬头镜头，这可能是故意传递政治信号！曹均章2008年汶川地震时是陆军第十三集团军149师副师长，带队救灾，给胡锦涛留下深刻印象，后来被提拔为武警副司令。曹均章代理司令，说明胡锦涛“动了杀机”，要借武警力量彻底清算习近平的政治集团！
我们再看看胡春华的最新动态，这名网友说，胡春华率团赴湖北调研，感谢这名网友的消息。
2025年5月10到12日，胡春华率全国政协农业和农村委员会调研组，去了湖北鄂州、黄冈、黄石，实地考察长江堤防、灌排泵站、高标准农田、粮食企业，跟基层干部群众聊水利基础设施，服务农业生产。调研组夸湖北落实习近平的“三农”精神，但重点提了“节水优先、空间均衡、系统治理、两手发力”的治水思路。胡春华这次高调调研，表面是响应习近平政策，但强调粮食安全这种议题，感觉像在刷存在感。加上4月他访问非洲三国，跟习近平的东盟行打擂台，这可能是在向党内喊话。尤其8月8-12日的四中全会快到了，胡锦涛派系动作不断，比如日内瓦会谈李成钢抢风头，武警表态和曹均章可能都在为胡春华造势，为胡春华接任军委主席准备！
我们再看看习近平的“风光假象”。表面上，习近平还是大忙人，5月13日在中拉论坛开幕式上高调演讲，念诗“人生乐在相知心”。
这习近平念着首诗，一看就知道习近平是文盲啊。 别人给他写什么，他就念什么。这首诗的前半句是汉恩自浅胡恩深。习近平这个文盲，他根本不可能知道前半句是什么。一看这个意境，就是怨妇心态，不高兴啊，这首诗的名字是什么，叫做明妃曲，明妃是谁，就是王昭君。这是王安石怀才不遇，不高兴的时候写的诗，他写了好多。我思谁能谋，我语听者谁。这是失败才会写的诗，不过习近平也的确失败了，这就是高级黑。
王安石的失落心态，跟习近平眼下的处境还挺贴合：2025年，他亲信何卫东、苗华被查，武警内蒙古总队表态不提他，胡锦涛派系反扑，权力岌岌可危。网友调侃，这诗简直是习近平的“失败写照”，念出来就像在自嘲：想“相知心”，结果连军队和亲信的“心”都没抓住！
前半句是怨妇心态，后半句就更不吉利了。
可怜青冢已芜没
尚有哀弦留至今
这也不知道是谁给他写的，我都不知道该怎么说了，这不就是坟都没了的意思吗。完全是高级黑。太不吉利了。习近平如果不是文盲，绝对不说这句话的。
几天前，习近平还去了莫斯科参加胜利日庆典，跟普京握手寒暄。这些“风光”全是表面功夫！在莫斯科，党媒报道没给习近平特写镜头，照片比2023年访俄时小了一圈，普京还派排名第8和第9的副总理接送，简直是外交冷遇！
这就像习近平在台上演戏，军队却在台下唱反调，说明习近平已经丧失军权。更别提2024年11月到2025年4月，习近平的亲信何卫东、苗华、于忠福接连被查，这是胡锦涛派系借反腐清算“习家军”，曹均章的代理司令身份更像胡锦涛在军中的一枚棋子！
“武警内蒙古总队和曹均章效忠胡春华”主要有这么几点：
第一，武警报道重提八项规定，这是胡锦涛的遗产，不提习近平向胡锦涛表忠。第二，胡春华在内蒙古当过书记，刘会成和肖方举又不是习近平的人，表态可能有派系背景。第三，曹均章是胡锦涛的“马仔”，汶川地震时表现突出，被胡锦涛提拔，2025年代理武警司令，央视特意给镜头，感觉像在传递“胡春华接管军权”的信号。第四，胡春华最近高调得很，非洲行、湖北调研，像在为四中全会铺路，武警表态和曹均章的动作可能是胡锦涛派系的又一棋子。第五，2024年11月到2025年4月，习近平亲信何卫东、苗华被查，这是胡锦涛派系清算“习家军”，曹均章的崛起和胡春华的布局高度吻合。第六，四中全会快到了，胡锦涛拍戏动作频频，比如李成钢在日内瓦的表现，胡春华的湖北调研，武警表态像在配合造势，可能为胡春华接任军委主席做准备！
综合来看，“武警内蒙古总队和曹均章效忠胡春华”有一定依据，尤其是八项规定的胡锦涛派系背景、胡春华的内蒙古根基、曹均章的胡锦涛背景、胡春华的湖北调研高调亮相，以及胡锦涛派系在四中全会前的频频动作，都指向胡锦涛的布局。
英文翻译
Inner Mongolia Armed Police pledged loyalty to Hu Chunhua and took over as Chairman of the Military Commission. Hu Chunhua went to Hubei to build momentum. Xi Jinping made a fool of himself again by reciting poems as an illiterate
Hello everyone, welcome back to my channel! On May 13, 2025, China Military Network published a report on the Inner Mongolia Armed Police Corps, titled “Seeking Truth and Practicality to Change Work Style, Helping to Build Grassroots and Boosting Morale”, but did not mention “Chairman Xi” once, not even the “Chairman of the Military Commission is responsible for the system of loyalty”! Of course, it is basically normal for the military newspaper not to mention Xi Jinping. The article only emphasizes the implementation of the Central Eight Regulations and the Military Commission’s Ten Regulations, and the Eight Regulations are Hu Jintao’s Eight Regulations. This is secretly “showing loyalty” to Hu Chunhua, Hu Jintao’s successor, which punctures the illusion of Xi Jinping’s “superficial glory”, indicating that Xi Jinping has lost the power of the party, government and military, and is currently a virtual head of state participating in the front stage.
First, let’s take a look at this military network report released at 8 am on May 13. The article said that the Inner Mongolia Armed Police Corps is carrying out study and education, implementing the eight central regulations and the ten military regulations, improving work style and boosting morale. The entire report did not mention “President Xi Jinping”, and even the standard slogans of the Xi faction, such as “two establishments” and “two maintenances”, did not appear! It only said “benchmarking the spirit of the eight central regulations and the ten military regulations”, and obeyed the instructions of the “Central Military Commission”. In the past, military reports must have mentioned “President Xi” all the time, especially since Xi Jinping promoted the “Chairman of the Military Commission Responsibility System”, and loyal statements were everywhere. Now the military newspaper completely treats Xi Jinping, the Chairman of the Military Commission, as non-existent. The People’s Liberation Army Daily has long made it clear that the secretary is the “head of a class” and must not be regarded as the “head of a family”! This is aimed at Xi Jinping. It shows that Xi Jinping has lost military power, and the military does not buy Xi Jinping’s account at all! Some people even mentioned that the statement of the Inner Mongolia Armed Police Corps may be related to Cao Junzhang, a close confidant of Hu Jintao, because Cao Junzhang attended the political and legal meeting on May 8 as the deputy commander of the Armed Police and served as the acting commander, suspected of building momentum for Hu Chunhua to take over as the chairman of the Military Commission!
China’s party jargon is particularly perverted, and the regulations are particularly strict. CCTV has regulations on how many seconds of footage a person of a certain rank should be given. Cao Junzhang was only a lieutenant general, and his rank was not high enough. However, CCTV still captured less than 1 second of footage. Cao Junzhang looked up and his face could be clearly seen, but CCTV did not take a picture of Cao Junzhang’s name tag.
The eight regulations were passed by the Political Bureau on December 4, 2012. The content includes streamlining meetings, reducing visits, and fighting corruption and promoting integrity. It is known as Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption signboard. This is not Xi Jinping’s idea at all! The eight regulations clearly stipulate that when Chinese state leaders visit abroad, Chinese-funded institutions, overseas Chinese, and international student representatives are generally not arranged to greet and see off at the airport. Xi Jinping just visited Russia and openly violated the eight regulations. The China General Chamber of Commerce in Russia is China’s spy agency.
In 2012, Xi Jinping had just become general secretary, and the actual power was still in the hands of Hu Jintao. The implementation of the eight regulations was promoted by Hu Jintao’s diehard Liu Yunshan. Liu Yunshan was a member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee and Secretary of the Secretariat at the time. He presided over the Central Party Building Leading Group, which held a meeting in December to study the implementation measures of the eight regulations. The Party Building Leading Group is Hu Jintao’s territory. The CPC Party Building Leading Group is a deliberative and coordinating body for party building work led by the CPC Political Bureau. It was established in 1988 and is responsible for making decisions on major issues in the field of party building work. Its members are composed of members of the CPC Political Bureau Standing Committee in charge of party building work, members of the CPC Political Bureau in charge of relevant party affairs, and secretaries of the CPC Secretariat. The first group leader was Qiao Shi, then member of the CPC Political Bureau Standing Committee and Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Later, Hu Jintao, member of the CPC Political Bureau Standing Committee, Secretary of the Secretariat, and Vice President of the State, served as the group leader. I know exactly which faction Qiao Shi belongs to. It was not easy to determine these things before. If he promoted a lackey, it would be easy to determine. Xi Jinping served as the group leader from 2007 to 2012, but was taken over by Liu Yunshan in 2012, indicating that Hu Jintao’s faction still controlled party affairs at the time. It was not until 2014, when Xi Jinping took down Zhou Yongkang and Peng Liyuan’s team hyped “Xi Dada Loves Peng Mama” to stir up a cult of personality. These two events were only nine days apart, which marked that Xi Jinping had truly taken power from Hu Jintao. Therefore, the eight regulations are actually “Hu Jintao’s eight regulations” and have nothing to do with Xi Jinping, and Xi Jinping himself does not abide by them.
On December 28, 2013, Xi Jinping went to Beijing Qingfeng Baozi Shop to eat buns, putting on a people-friendly attitude. This happened exactly one year after the introduction of the eight regulations. This was Xi Jinping cooperating with Hu Jintao’s policy and acting with his head held high. Because after taking power in 2014, Xi Jinping never did such “down-to-earth” things again, and never appeared at the disaster relief site at the first time. Therefore, the Inner Mongolia Armed Police Corps re-mentioned the eight regulations in 2025, but did not mention Xi Jinping. It feels like paying tribute to Hu Jintao’s legacy, hiding political signals. This may be related to Hu Chunhua, because Hu Chunhua is Hu Jintao’s successor, and Cao Junzhang’s actions seem to be preparing for Hu Chunhua’s rise!
Hu Chunhua served as the Party Secretary of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region from 2009 to 2012, and now he is the Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Netizens discovered that Liu Huicheng, the commander of the Inner Mongolia Armed Police Corps, and Xiao Fangju, the political commissar, are not Xi Jinping’s direct line. Liu Huicheng, 63, has been the commander since 2017 and has not been promoted for 8 years. He previously served as the captain of the national flag guard in the Beijing Armed Police Corps. Xiao Fangju worked in the Jilin and Sichuan Armed Police Corps, and his resume does not look like that of Xi Jinping’s confidant. In addition, Inner Mongolia is Hu Chunhua’s old territory, and the Armed Police Corps chose to express its position at this time, which feels like it is supporting Hu Chunhua. More importantly, Cao Junzhang is Hu Jintao’s “henchman”. On May 8, 2025, he attended the political and legal meeting as the deputy commander of the armed police. CCTV also deliberately gave him a one-second head-up shot, which may be a deliberate political signal! Cao Junzhang was the deputy commander of the 149th Division of the 13th Army Group during the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008. He led the disaster relief team and impressed Hu Jintao. He was later promoted to deputy commander of the armed police. Cao Junzhang’s acting commander shows that Hu Jintao “had murderous intentions” and wanted to use the armed police to thoroughly liquidate Xi Jinping’s political group!
Let’s take a look at Hu Chunhua’s latest developments. This netizen said that Hu Chunhua led a delegation to Hubei for research. Thanks to this netizen for the news.
From May 10 to 12, 2025, Hu Chunhua led the research team of the Agriculture and Rural Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference to Ezhou, Huanggang, and Huangshi, Hubei, to inspect the Yangtze River embankments, irrigation and drainage pumping stations, high-standard farmland, and grain enterprises, and talked with grassroots cadres and the masses about water conservancy infrastructure and serving agricultural production. The research team praised Hubei for implementing Xi Jinping’s “Three Rural Issues” spirit, but focused on the water management ideas of “water conservation first, spatial balance, system governance, and two-pronged efforts”. Hu Chunhua’s high-profile research this time is ostensibly in response to Xi Jinping’s policies, but emphasizing issues such as food security feels like a way to show his presence. In addition, his visit to three African countries in April competed with Xi Jinping’s ASEAN trip, which may be a message to the party. Especially with the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China from August 8 to 12 approaching, Hu Jintao’s faction has been making constant moves, such as Li Chenggang stealing the limelight at the Geneva talks, the armed police’s statement and Cao Junzhang may all be building momentum for Hu Chunhua and preparing for Hu Chunhua to take over as Chairman of the Central Military Commission!
Let’s take a look at Xi Jinping’s “illusion of glory”. On the surface, Xi Jinping is still a busy man. On May 13, he gave a high-profile speech at the opening ceremony of the China-Latin America Forum and recited the poem “The joy of life lies in knowing each other’s hearts”.
This Xi Jinping is reciting a poem, and you can tell at a glance that Xi Jinping is illiterate. He reads whatever others write to him. The first half of this poem is “Han’s grace is shallow, Hu’s grace is deep.” Xi Jinping, an illiterate man, has no way of knowing what the first half of the sentence means. At first glance at this artistic conception, it is the mentality of a resentful woman, unhappy. What is the name of this poem? It is called Ming Fei Qu. Who is Ming Fei? It is Wang Zhaojun. This is a poem written by Wang Anshi when he was unhappy because he felt that his talent was not appreciated. He wrote a lot of poems. Who can plan for me? Who can listen to my words? This is a poem that only failure can write, but Xi Jinping has indeed failed. This is a high-level black.
Wang Anshi’s lost mentality is quite consistent with Xi Jinping’s current situation: in 2025, his confidants He Weidong and Miao Hua were investigated, the Inner Mongolia Corps of the Armed Police Force stated that he would not mention him, and Hu Jintao’s faction counterattacked, and his power was in jeopardy. Netizens joked that this poem is simply Xi Jinping’s “portrait of failure”. Reading it out is like self-mockery: I want to “know each other’s heart”, but I didn’t even catch the “heart” of the army and confidants!
The first half of the sentence is the mentality of a resentful woman, and the second half is even more unlucky.
It’s a pity that the tomb is already overgrown
The mournful strings remain to this day
I don’t know who wrote this for him, I don’t know what to say, doesn’t this mean that the tomb is gone? It’s completely high-level black. It’s too unlucky. If Xi Jinping is not illiterate, he will never say this.
A few days ago, Xi Jinping went to Moscow to attend the Victory Day celebrations and shook hands with Putin. These “scenes” are all superficial! In Moscow, the party media did not give Xi Jinping a close-up shot. The photo was smaller than when he visited Russia in 2023. Putin also sent the 8th and 9th ranked deputy prime ministers to pick him up, which was simply a diplomatic cold reception!
It’s like Xi Jinping is acting on the stage, but the army is singing the opposite tune off the stage, which shows that Xi Jinping has lost his military power. Not to mention that from November 2024 to April 2025, Xi Jinping’s confidants He Weidong, Miao Hua, and Yu Zhongfu were investigated one after another. This is the Hu Jintao faction’s use of anti-corruption to liquidate the “Xi Family Army”. Cao Junzhang’s acting commander status is more like a pawn of Hu Jintao in the army!
There are several main reasons for “The Armed Police Corps in Inner Mongolia and Cao Junzhang are loyal to Hu Chunhua”:
First, the Armed Police reported the re-mention of the eight regulations, which is Hu Jintao’s legacy, but did not mention Xi Jinping’s loyalty to Hu Jintao. Second, Hu Chunhua was the secretary of Inner Mongolia, and Liu Huicheng and Xiao Fangju are not Xi Jinping’s people. Their statements may have factional backgrounds. Third, Cao Junzhang is Hu Jintao’s “henchman”. He performed outstandingly during the Wenchuan earthquake and was promoted by Hu Jintao. In 2025, he served as the acting commander of the Armed Police. CCTV deliberately gave him a shot, which felt like it was sending a signal that “Hu Chunhua took over the military power.” Fourth, Hu Chunhua has been very high-profile recently, traveling to Africa and conducting research in Hubei, which seems to be paving the way for the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee. The Armed Police’s statement and Cao Junzhang’s actions may be another pawn of Hu Jintao’s faction. Fifth, from November 2024 to April 2025, Xi Jinping’s confidants He Weidong and Miao Hua were investigated. This is the liquidation of the “Xi Family Army” by Hu Jintao’s faction. The rise of Cao Junzhang is highly consistent with Hu Chunhua’s layout. Sixth, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee is approaching, and Hu Jintao is making frequent moves, such as Li Chenggang’s performance in Geneva, Hu Chunhua’s Hubei investigation, and the armed police’s statement that they are cooperating to build momentum, which may be preparing for Hu Chunhua to take over as Chairman of the Central Military Commission!
Overall, there is a certain basis for “the Inner Mongolia Corps of the Armed Police and Cao Junzhang are loyal to Hu Chunhua”, especially the Hu Jintao faction background of the Eight Regulations, Hu Chunhua’s Inner Mongolia roots, Cao Junzhang’s Hu Jintao background, Hu Chunhua’s high-profile appearance in Hubei investigation, and the frequent actions of the Hu Jintao faction before the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee, all point to Hu Jintao’s layout.
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