四中改组人选确定，何卫东缺席植树活动，将长期失踪，直到官宣落马
四中全会新的政治局常委人选确定
四中改组人选确定，何卫东缺席植树活动，将长期失踪，直到官宣落马。四中全会新的政治局常委人选确定
大家好，2025年4月2日，中国中央军委副主席张又侠参加北京市通州区的义务植树活动，与中央军委委员刘振立、张升民及北京市委书记尹力等人共同植树。张又侠74岁了，还能挥锹铲土、扶苗浇灌，显示张又侠身体状况尚佳，依然活跃在公开场合。这种高龄仍参与体力活动的表现，与另一位军委副主席何卫东的“失踪”形成鲜明对比。
何卫东自3月11日全国人大闭幕会后没有公开出现，到现在已经失踪3个礼拜，缺席了中央军委领导连续第43年参加的植树活动。中央军委本届班子已经有2人出事：李尚福2023年8月落马，苗华2024年11月被公布“停职检查”。何卫东作为68岁的军委副主席，仕途履历显赫，从31集团军到东部战区司令，2022年破格提拔为军委副主席，却突然缺席如此重要的象征性活动，异常程度不言而喻。我之前的确说过，何卫东在官宣被抓之前可能会长期失踪。何卫东的缺席不仅坐实了其被查传闻，更暗示何卫东可能面临与李尚福、苗华类似的命运。
何卫东的长期失踪，与当前军中大清洗的背景高度相关。美国情报机构认为何卫东已经被查落马，中国国防部发言人吴谦3月27日的回应仅17字：“没有这方面的消息，不了解这方面的情况。”这种暧昧态度，与吴谦去年11月28日对董军被查传闻的强硬辟谣，所谓纯属捏造，造谣者居心叵测，形成对比，显示官方对何卫东问题讳莫如深。
何卫东的失踪可能与胡锦涛主导的清洗行动有关。胡锦涛“心狠手辣”，在清洗习近平嫡系31军、何卫东等人的时候毫不留情，毫不手软。何卫东作为习近平破格提拔的军委副主席，其仕途与习近平的军中根基31集团军密切相关。胡锦涛主导清洗，必然不会放过何卫东这样的关键人物。何卫东的长期失踪，可能意味着其已被正式立案调查，甚至可能步李尚福后尘，面临开除党籍和法律制裁。
光杆司令也是早就说过的概念。现在军委习近平就真的是光杆司令，张又侠是江泽民的人，刘振立张升民是胡锦涛的人。只有习近平本人是习近平的人。现在是货真价实的光杆司令
大外宣这个标题，就比较幼稚。苗华“停职检查”留有余地。他们是不了解胡锦涛这个人，不知道胡锦涛心狠手辣，还留有余地。笑话。现在大家现在就能知道胡锦涛是什么人啊。对苗华还能留有余地，想什么呢？，苗华2024年11月被公布涉嫌严重违纪、停职检查，至今未有后续消息。苗华作为中央军委政治工作部主任，是习近平在军队中的重要支柱，其被查同样指向胡锦涛对习近平派系的系统性打击。
“停职检查”在中共反腐中往往是立案调查的前奏，不是“留有余地”的信号。参考李尚福，2023年8月李尚福失踪后，两个月后被免职，2024年6月才公布开除党籍，罪名包括受贿和行贿。苗华的“停职检查”已过去5个月，胡锦涛主导军队大清洗，苗华的命运早就已经注定。大外宣所谓“留有余地”，忽略了胡锦涛的政治手腕。当过总书记的人，哪个不是心狠手辣。胡锦涛如果要彻底剥夺习近平的军权，必然对苗华、何卫东等人一查到底，绝无姑息可能。就是不了解胡锦涛在权力斗争中的一贯风格。胡锦涛把31军直接团灭了。
光杆司令，一个不留，这都是我早就说过的。
四中全会的人事方案已基本明朗，最关键的是谁将接替习近平。我原先推测的三种方案中，第三方案现在已经成为第一方案。石泰峰不会接替蔡奇进入中央书记处，而是担任中组部长，而且因为年龄原因，石泰峰二十一大的时候将会退休，不会成为政治局常委。石泰峰会担任两年半的中组部长。因此，袁家军将接替蔡奇成为中央书记处书记。石泰峰接任中组部长后，石泰峰与三个可能的接班人胡春华、袁家军、李强相比，与胡春华关系更近，因为两人都担任过内蒙古党委书记。内蒙古倒查20年的行动表面上针对胡春华，但实际查处的官员，比如说宋亮，这个人百分百属于习近平。宋亮在别的习近平派系的关系人中出现过。说明此举并非真正针对胡春华，大外宣所谓内蒙古倒查20年是针对胡春华的说法缺乏证据，更多是自我想象。
四中全会的人事方案已基本清晰，最核心的问题是习近平的接班人选。原先推测的三种方案中，第三方案现已成为第一方案。石泰峰未按原第二方案接替蔡奇进入中央书记处，而是接任李干杰担任中组部长。石泰峰1956年出生，到2027年二十一大时将年满71岁，超出政治局常委的常规年龄线（68岁），因此不可能成为常委。中央书记处书记的空缺将由袁家军填补，而不是石泰峰。
袁家军作为政治局委员、浙江省委书记，近年来仕途上升迅速，袁家军和胡锦涛儿子胡海峰在浙江省的时间线几乎吻合。袁家军就是扮演的保护胡海峰的角色。这张照片我没有给大家解说过，这是时任浙江省丽水市委书记胡海峰，接近丽水市见义勇为先进代表。
见义勇为属于政法委管辖的职权范围。当时的丽水市领导张赟，的职务就是丽水市政法委书记。张赟说白了就是胡海峰的大保镖。袁家军曾经提拔张赟担任浙江省委办公厅副主任。相比之下，石泰峰的角色更像是过渡性安排，重点在于掌控人事权，为新的总书记的上台铺路。接班人选可能在胡春华、袁家军、李强三人中产生，而石泰峰与胡春华的关系最密切，明摆着就是胡春华。
胡春华和石泰峰都担任过内蒙古党委书记：胡春华2009年至2012年任内蒙古党委书记，石泰峰2019年至2022年任内蒙古党委书记。两人虽未直接共事，但内蒙古官场的政治生态可能使他们形成某种默契或派系联系。
内蒙古倒查20年的反腐行动（2000-2020年）表面上被大外宣解读为针对胡春华，但实际查处的官员多与习近平派系相关。例如，宋亮（2011-2017年在内蒙古任职）被明确确认为习近平派系，宋亮在其他习近平派系官员的关系网中出现过。而云光中、邢云、云公民等人的派系归属虽未完全明确，但是储波（2001-2010年任内蒙古党委书记）和岳福洪（2001-2010年任副书记）作为习近平派系的核心人物，掌控内蒙古长达10年，储波和岳福洪任期内的官员多半也属习近平派系。这表明，倒查20年更可能是针对习近平派系，而不是真正针对胡春华。
内蒙古倒查20年的反腐行动被大外宣解读为针对胡春华，但是缺乏证据支持。储波作为习近平老爸习仲勋的秘书曹志斌的老板（2001-2010年任内蒙古党委书记），储波派系归属明确指向习近平。曹志斌是否直接为储波服务虽未百分百确认，但两人同时期在湖南的职务。储波为省委副书记，曹志斌为省委副秘书长，显示高度对应关系，暗示可能的上下级关系。
倒查20年覆盖2000-2020年，如果针对胡春华（2009-2012年在内蒙古），只需倒查10年（2010-2020年），而不是倒查20年。这是简单的常识，10年和20年的区别，这么明显还看不出来吗？
20年的时间跨度恰好覆盖储波和岳福洪的任期，查处的官员（比如宋亮）多属习近平派系，说明此举更可能是针对习近平派系官员的整肃。大外宣所谓“查胡春华”的说法缺乏具体证据，比如无法指认哪位落马官员是胡春华的“铁杆马仔”。我觉得最多两派在互抓，互殴，不是一派在大清洗另外一派。要不然胡锦涛怎么可能翻盘呢。因为当时的中纪委书记赵乐际是江泽民的人，江胡当时合作了。习近平凭什么主导中纪委，中纪委书记又不是习近平的人。
中国军方倒查装备采购至2017年10月，恰好是赵克石卸任军委后勤保障部部长的时间。赵克石作为军委副主席何卫东的“师傅”，赵克石任期内的采购问题可能牵涉习近平派系。何卫东近期被抓传闻，结合政治局会议无画面，植树只有张又侠没有何卫东，显示习近平派系在军队内部也面临大清洗的压力。这与内蒙古倒查20年的逻辑一致：表面上的反腐，实则是派系斗争的延续，不是针对特定接班人选，比如胡春华。
当时胡春华也不对习近平构成威胁啊，当时传言习下李上，没有传言习下胡春华上啊。
四中全会的人事方案已明朗，袁家军接替蔡奇进入中央书记处，石泰峰因年龄原因无缘常委，转而掌控中组部，为接班人选铺路。石泰峰与胡春华的内蒙古关联，使石泰峰更可能支持胡春华成为习近平的接班人。
石泰峰担任内蒙古党委书记期间的大秘于立新就是胡春华担任内蒙古党委书记期间提拔的正厅级。于立新提拔正厅级的时候，虽然胡春华已经离开内蒙古，去广东担任省委书记。但是于立新是在胡春华担任内蒙古党委书记期间参加的中央党校培训班。这个培训班说白了就是正厅级的资格证书。必须参加中央党校的培训班才能提拔正厅级。也就是说胡春华安排石泰峰的大秘于立新参加中央党校培训班，从而获得晋升正厅级的资格的。
内蒙古倒查20年表面针对胡春华，实际上查的是习近平派系官员（比如宋亮），可能是江泽民胡锦涛为了阻止习近平三连任的行动的一部分。大外宣所谓“查胡春华”论调缺乏证据，更多是臆测。习近平派系现在是内忧外患，下任总书记就是胡春华。政治局常委的人选基本确定之后，我们下一步应该关注政治局委员，改选的人员名单了
好的，谢谢大家。
英文翻译
The candidates for the reorganization of the Fourth Central Committee have been determined. He Weidong was absent from the tree planting activity and will be missing for a long time until he is officially announced to be dismissed. The new candidates for the Politburo Standing Committee of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee have been determined
Hello everyone, on April 2, 2025, Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of China, participated in the voluntary tree planting activity in Tongzhou District, Beijing, and planted trees with Liu Zhenli, Zhang Shengmin, members of the Central Military Commission, and Yin Li, Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee. Zhang Youxia is 74 years old, and he can still shovel soil and support seedlings and water them, showing that Zhang Youxia is in good health and is still active in public. This performance of participating in physical activities at an advanced age is in sharp contrast to the “disappearance” of He Weidong, another vice chairman of the Military Commission.
He Weidong has not appeared in public since the closing meeting of the National People’s Congress on March 11. He has been missing for 3 weeks and has missed the tree planting activity that the leaders of the Central Military Commission have participated in for 43 consecutive years. Two people in the current team of the Central Military Commission have already had problems: Li Shangfu was dismissed in August 2023, and Miao Hua was announced to be “suspended for inspection” in November 2024. As the 68-year-old vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, He Weidong has a distinguished career, from the 31st Group Army to the commander of the Eastern Theater Command. In 2022, he was promoted to vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. However, he suddenly missed such an important symbolic event, which is abnormal. I did say before that He Weidong might be missing for a long time before the official announcement of his arrest. He Weidong’s absence not only confirmed the rumors that he was under investigation, but also suggested that He Weidong might face a similar fate as Li Shangfu and Miao Hua.
He Weidong’s long-term disappearance is highly related to the background of the current military purge. US intelligence agencies believe that He Weidong has been investigated and dismissed. Wu Qian, a spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Defense, responded on March 27 with only 17 words: “There is no news in this regard, and I don’t know the situation in this regard.” This ambiguous attitude contrasts with Wu Qian’s tough refutation of the rumor that Dong Jun was under investigation on November 28 last year, saying that it was purely fabricated and the rumor maker had ulterior motives, showing that the official is very secretive about the He Weidong issue.
He Weidong’s disappearance may be related to the purge led by Hu Jintao. Hu Jintao was “ruthless and merciless” and showed no mercy when purging Xi Jinping’s direct line of 31st Army, He Weidong and others. As the vice chairman of the Military Commission promoted by Xi Jinping, He Weidong’s career is closely related to Xi Jinping’s military base, the 31st Group Army. Hu Jintao led the purge and would definitely not let go of key figures like He Weidong. He Weidong’s long-term disappearance may mean that he has been formally investigated and may even follow in the footsteps of Li Shangfu and face expulsion from the party and legal sanctions.
The concept of a bare commander is also a concept that has been mentioned for a long time. Now Xi Jinping of the Military Commission is really a bare commander. Zhang Youxia is Jiang Zemin’s man, and Liu Zhenli and Zhang Shengmin are Hu Jintao’s men. Only Xi Jinping himself is Xi Jinping’s man. Now he is a real bare commander
The title of the big foreign propaganda is relatively naive. Miao Hua’s “suspension for inspection” leaves room for maneuver. They don’t know Hu Jintao as a person, and don’t know that Hu Jintao is ruthless and has room for maneuver. Joke. Now everyone knows what kind of person Hu Jintao is. Why is there still room for Miao Hua? In November 2024, Miao Hua was announced to be suspected of serious violations of discipline and suspended for inspection. There has been no follow-up news so far. As the director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, Miao Hua is an important pillar of Xi Jinping in the military. His investigation also points to Hu Jintao’s systematic crackdown on Xi Jinping’s faction. “Suspension for inspection” is often a prelude to an investigation in the CCP’s anti-corruption campaign, not a signal of “leaving room for maneuver.” Refer to Li Shangfu. After Li Shangfu disappeared in August 2023, he was dismissed two months later. It was not until June 2024 that he was expelled from the party on charges including bribery and bribery. Five months have passed since Miao Hua’s “suspension for inspection”. Hu Jintao has led the military purge, and Miao Hua’s fate has long been doomed. The so-called “leaving room for maneuver” in the big foreign propaganda ignores Hu Jintao’s political skills. Who has been the general secretary is not ruthless. If Hu Jintao wants to completely deprive Xi Jinping of his military power, he will definitely investigate Miao Hua, He Weidong and others thoroughly, and there will be no possibility of leniency. It is because he does not understand Hu Jintao’s consistent style in the power struggle. Hu Jintao directly wiped out the 31st Army.
I have said that I will leave no one behind.
The personnel plan for the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee has been basically clear, and the most critical thing is who will succeed Xi Jinping. Among the three plans I originally speculated, the third plan has now become the first plan. Shi Taifeng will not replace Cai Qi to enter the Central Secretariat, but will serve as the Minister of the Organization Department. Moreover, due to age reasons, Shi Taifeng will retire at the 21st National Congress and will not become a member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee. Shi Taifeng will serve as the Minister of the Organization Department for two and a half years. Therefore, Yuan Jiajun will replace Cai Qi as the Secretary of the Central Secretariat. After Shi Taifeng took over as the Minister of the Organization Department, Shi Taifeng has a closer relationship with Hu Chunhua than the three possible successors Hu Chunhua, Yuan Jiajun and Li Qiang, because both of them have served as the Secretary of the Inner Mongolia Party Committee. The 20-year retrospective investigation in Inner Mongolia is ostensibly aimed at Hu Chunhua, but the officials actually investigated, such as Song Liang, are 100% Xi Jinping’s. Song Liang has appeared among the people associated with other Xi Jinping factions. This shows that this move is not really aimed at Hu Chunhua. The claim that the 20-year retrospective investigation in Inner Mongolia is aimed at Hu Chunhua lacks evidence and is more of a self-imagination.
The personnel plan for the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee has been basically clear, and the core issue is Xi Jinping’s successor. Among the three originally speculated plans, the third plan has now become the first plan. Shi Taifeng did not replace Cai Qi to enter the Central Secretariat according to the original second plan, but succeeded Li Ganjie as the Minister of the Organization Department. Shi Taifeng was born in 1956 and will be 71 years old by the 21st National Congress in 2027, exceeding the normal age line of the Politburo Standing Committee (68 years old), so it is impossible for him to become a member of the Standing Committee. The vacancy of the Secretary of the Central Secretariat will be filled by Yuan Jiajun, not Shi Taifeng.
As a member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee, Yuan Jiajun has risen rapidly in his career in recent years. The timeline of Yuan Jiajun and Hu Jintao’s son Hu Haifeng in Zhejiang Province almost coincides. Yuan Jiajun plays the role of protecting Hu Haifeng. I haven’t explained this photo to you. This is Hu Haifeng, then Secretary of the Lishui Municipal Party Committee of Zhejiang Province, approaching the advanced representative of Lishui City’s bravery.
Bravery falls within the jurisdiction of the Political and Legal Committee. Zhang Yun, the leader of Lishui City at the time, was the Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee of Lishui City. Zhang Yun is, to put it bluntly, Hu Haifeng’s bodyguard. Yuan Jiajun once promoted Zhang Yun to be the deputy director of the General Office of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee. In contrast, Shi Taifeng’s role is more like a transitional arrangement, focusing on controlling personnel power and paving the way for the new general secretary to take office. The successor may be Hu Chunhua, Yuan Jiajun, and Li Qiang. Shi Taifeng has the closest relationship with Hu Chunhua, so it is obvious that it is Hu Chunhua.
Both Hu Chunhua and Shi Taifeng have served as Inner Mongolia Party Secretary: Hu Chunhua served as Inner Mongolia Party Secretary from 2009 to 2012, and Shi Taifeng served as Inner Mongolia Party Secretary from 2019 to 2022. Although the two have not worked together directly, the political ecology of the Inner Mongolia officialdom may have led them to form some kind of tacit understanding or factional connection.
Inner Mongolia’s 20-year anti-corruption campaign (2000-2020) was superficially interpreted by the foreign propaganda as targeting Hu Chunhua, but most of the officials actually investigated were related to Xi Jinping’s faction. For example, Song Liang (served in Inner Mongolia from 2011 to 2017) was clearly identified as a member of Xi Jinping’s faction, and Song Liang appeared in the relationship network of other Xi Jinping’s faction officials. Although the factional affiliation of Yun Guangzhong, Xing Yun, Yun Gongmin and others is not completely clear, Chu Bo (Secretary of the Inner Mongolia Communist Party Committee from 2001 to 2010) and Yue Fuhong (Deputy Secretary from 2001 to 2010) are the core figures of Xi Jinping’s faction and have controlled Inner Mongolia for 10 years. Most of the officials during Chu Bo and Yue Fuhong’s tenure also belong to Xi Jinping’s faction. This shows that the 20-year retrospective investigation is more likely to target Xi Jinping’s faction rather than Hu Chunhua.
Inner Mongolia’s 20-year retrospective anti-corruption campaign was interpreted by the foreign propaganda as targeting Hu Chunhua, but there is no evidence to support it. Chu Bo is the boss of Cao Zhibin, the secretary of Xi Jinping’s father Xi Zhongxun (Secretary of the Inner Mongolia Communist Party Committee from 2001 to 2010), and Chu Bo’s factional affiliation clearly points to Xi Jinping. Although it is not 100% confirmed whether Cao Zhibin directly served Chu Bo, the two held positions in Hunan at the same time. Chu Bo is the deputy secretary of the provincial party committee, and Cao Zhibin is the deputy secretary-general of the provincial party committee, showing a high degree of correspondence, suggesting a possible superior-subordinate relationship.
The 20-year investigation covers 2000-2020. If it is Hu Chunhua (in Inner Mongolia from 2009 to 2012), only 10 years (2010-2020) need to be investigated, not 20 years. This is simple common sense. The difference between 10 years and 20 years is so obvious, can’t you see it?
The 20-year time span just covers the tenure of Chu Bo and Yue Fuhong. Most of the officials investigated (such as Song Liang) belong to Xi Jinping’s faction, which shows that this move is more likely to be a purge of officials from Xi Jinping’s faction. The so-called “investigation of Hu Chunhua” in the big foreign propaganda lacks specific evidence, such as it is impossible to identify which official who was dismissed is Hu Chunhua’s “hardcore henchman”. I think at most the two factions are arresting and fighting each other, not one faction purging the other faction. Otherwise, how could Hu Jintao turn the tables? Because the then Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Zhao Leji was Jiang Zemin’s man, and Jiang and Hu cooperated at the time. Why does Xi Jinping lead the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection? The Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection is not Xi Jinping’s man.
The Chinese military traced back equipment procurement to October 2017, which happened to be the time when Zhao Keshi stepped down as the head of the Logistics Support Department of the Central Military Commission. As the “master” of He Weidong, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, Zhao Keshi’s procurement issues during his tenure may involve Xi Jinping’s faction. The recent rumors of He Weidong’s arrest, combined with the lack of footage of the Politburo meeting, and the fact that only Zhang Youxia and He Weidong were planted, show that Xi Jinping’s faction is also facing pressure for a major purge within the military. This is consistent with the logic of Inner Mongolia’s 20-year traceback: the superficial anti-corruption is actually a continuation of factional struggles, not targeting specific successors, such as Hu Chunhua.
At that time, Hu Chunhua did not pose a threat to Xi Jinping. At that time, it was rumored that Xi would step down and Li would take over, but there was no rumor that Xi would step down and Hu Chunhua would take over.
The personnel plan for the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee has become clear. Yuan Jiajun replaced Cai Qi in the Central Secretariat. Shi Taifeng missed the Standing Committee due to age reasons and took control of the Organization Department of the Central Committee to pave the way for the successor. Shi Taifeng’s connection with Hu Chunhua in Inner Mongolia makes it more likely that Shi Taifeng will support Hu Chunhua as Xi Jinping’s successor.
Yu Lixin, Shi Taifeng’s chief secretary during his tenure as Inner Mongolia Party Secretary, was promoted to the rank of director-general during Hu Chunhua’s tenure as Inner Mongolia Party Secretary. When Yu Lixin was promoted to the rank of director-general, Hu Chunhua had already left Inner Mongolia and went to Guangdong to serve as the provincial party secretary. But Yu Lixin attended the Central Party School training class during Hu Chunhua’s tenure as Inner Mongolia Party Secretary. To put it bluntly, this training class is a qualification certificate for the rank of director-general. One must attend the Central Party School training class to be promoted to the rank of director-general. In other words, Hu Chunhua arranged for Shi Taifeng’s chief secretary Yu Lixin to attend the Central Party School training class to obtain the qualification for promotion to the rank of director-general.
Inner Mongolia’s 20-year retrospective investigation is ostensibly aimed at Hu Chunhua, but in fact it is investigating officials from Xi Jinping’s faction (such as Song Liang), which may be part of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s actions to prevent Xi Jinping from being re-elected for three consecutive terms. The so-called “investigation of Hu Chunhua” argument of the big foreign propaganda lacks evidence and is more of speculation. Xi Jinping’s faction is now facing internal and external troubles, and the next general secretary is Hu Chunhua. After the candidates for the Politburo Standing Committee are basically determined, our next step should be to focus on the list of members of the Politburo and the list of re-elected personnel
Okay, thank you everyone.
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