新闻联播强调习在胡锦涛领导下的地瓜经济。铁帽子王是习远平？财政下行，中共过紧日子，发布《反对浪费条例》。经济下行，献忠频发。北京海淀区前进小学献忠
新闻联播强调习在胡锦涛领导下的地瓜经济。铁帽子王是习远平？财政下行，中共过紧日子，发布《反对浪费条例》。经济下行，献忠频发。北京海淀区前进小学献忠
大家好，
欢迎回到我们的频道！在美中贸易战持续升温、地方财政岌岌可危的背景下，中共再次高喊“过紧日子”，并于2025年5月修订颁布了《党政机关厉行节约反对浪费条例》。这是否只是表面节约，还是财政危机下的无奈之举？“过紧日子”背后的经济困境，是中共财政的压力
2025年5月18日，新华社报道，中共中央、国务院正式发布修订后的《党政机关厉行节约反对浪费条例》，要求各级党政机关“勒紧腰带”，遏制铺张浪费，确保有限财政资金优先用于关键领域和重大任务。《条例》细化了公务接待、公务用车、会议活动、办公用房等支出标准，禁止高档工作餐、超规格接待、非公务活动纳入接待范围、变相旅游等行为，并叫停新建具有接待功能的宾馆及招待所，减少党性教育培训机构建设。
这里面提到了一次习思想。
《人民日报》评论指出，铺张浪费问题屡禁不止，执行中面临阻力，反映出节约措施的落实难度。
自2019年美中贸易战升级以来，美国对华关税壁垒和出口限制重创中国经济，导致地方财政收入锐减。2024年预算报告显示，广东、北京、上海、广州、深圳等一线省市普遍入不敷出，云南等省份的支出甚至高达收入的3倍。地方政府陷入严重财政困境，频频提及“砸锅卖铁”，部分省市还成立“砸锅卖铁”工作专班，试图通过卖资产、压开支应对危机。财政部长刘昆曾明确表示，“过紧日子”不是短期措施，而是长期方针，2025年的重申表明财政压力已逼近临界点，中共不得不通过制度化节约来缓解经济困局。
修订后的《条例》针对公务领域的铺张浪费问题，列出具体禁令，如工作餐提供高档菜肴或烟酒、外宾接待超规格、接待清单不实、以培训为名豪华装修等。这些细则暴露了中共行政成本高企的顽疾，尤其在财政吃紧时，浪费现象更显刺眼。《条例》通过强化监督机制、细化支出标准，旨在显著降低行政运行成本，将资金优先投向经济发展、民生保障等关键领域。然而，官媒承认节约措施执行不力，显示地方利益集团和官僚体系的阻力，可能削弱政策效果。
中共重申“过紧日子”不仅是应对美中贸易战的经济策略，更反映了地方政府“本质上已经破产”的严峻现实。公开报道指出，地方财政已无回旋余地，传统“土地财政”难以为继，债务压力高企。“中共进一步走下坡路”，节约政策是“没办法解决”财政困境的无奈之举。贸易战导致出口下滑、产业链外移，叠加疫情后经济复苏乏力，中共被迫压缩行政开支以维持政权稳定。然而，长期坚持“过紧日子”可能引发基层执行力下降、官员积极性受挫，进一步加剧治理难题。
美中贸易战下，中共修订《厉行节约反对浪费条例》，重申“过紧日子”，表面是节约行政成本，实则是应对财政破产的紧急措施。地方入不敷出、“砸锅卖铁”的窘境暴露了经济困境的严重性。你认为“过紧日子”能救中共的财政危机吗？贸易战会否进一步压垮中国经济？
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在美中贸易战持续升级、国内经济下行压力加大的背景下，中共重申“过紧日子”，并于2025年5月18日修订颁布《党政机关厉行节约反对浪费条例》，试图通过制度化节约应对财政危机。然而，与此同时，中国多地频发的“献忠事件”引发关注。2025年5月15日，北京海淀区和广州南站接连发生车辆冲撞和持刀伤人事件，官方却淡化处理，相关报道被迅速下架。
美中贸易战自2019年以来重创中国经济，关税壁垒、出口受限导致地方财政收入锐减。根据2024年预算报告，广东、北京、上海、广州、深圳等一线城市入不敷出，云南支出高达收入3倍，地方政府陷入“本质上破产”状态，频提“砸锅卖铁”应对债务危机。 房地产市场持续低迷，占GDP超25%的房产行业萎缩，消费者信心受挫。2024年，北京、上海零售总额分别下降3.1%和2.8%，广州、深圳仅微增0.3%和1%。 青年失业率官方数据达16.9%，实际可能更高，年轻人陷入“历史垃圾时间”的绝望情绪，部分甚至选择“躺平”或依赖父母。 经济下行直接削弱了民众的生活安全感，贫富差距、就业困难和资产贬值加剧了社会不满，为献忠事件的发生埋下伏笔。
2025年5月15日，北京海淀区前进小学附近发生车辆冲撞行人事件，网传一辆黑色特斯拉恶意撞击人群，造成4人受伤，社交媒体发布现场影片显示多人倒地，肇事司机被控制，但官方通报淡化为“小客车刮碰行人事故”，网易相关报道被下架。同日，广州南站一楼安检区外，一名35岁男子李某某持水果刀伤人，造成1人轻伤，现场陷入混乱，官方仅以简短通报回应。 这些“献忠事件”，与2024年珠海、常德等地献忠事件事件相似。
经济下行是此类事件频发的深层原因。房地产崩盘导致家庭财富缩水，70%中国家庭财富与房产挂钩，未完工楼盘让购房者血本无归。 低薪、裁员和高债务压垮中产和底层，北京一投资银行职员2024年薪资被砍30%，同事被裁，反映普遍的经济焦虑。 广州就业中心每天上万外来工求职，工资很低，岗位稀缺。 这种绝望情绪在缺乏制度化宣泄渠道，比如自由表达或司法救济的情况下，容易演变为“报复社会”的行为，献忠事件成为社会压力的集中爆发。
面对献忠事件，中共官方采取淡化处理和信息管控策略。北京海淀事件中，官方通报避免提及“恶意冲撞”，媒体报道被迅速下架；广州南站事件仅公布简要信息，没有公布嫌疑人动机。 这种处理方式旨在维护社会稳定，但可能适得其反。墙内审查严格，社交媒体如微博、知乎对敏感话题的讨论被迅速清理，迫使民众转向X等海外平台发声。
民众逐渐意识到“社会可毒打个人，个人也可毒打社会”，对献忠事件，模仿行为可能扩散。 政府淡化事件、压制信息，反而加深公众不信任，助长不满情绪，可能进一步刺激新的献忠事件。
经济下行与献忠事件形成恶性循环。贸易战和房地产危机导致失业、收入下降，侵蚀社会稳定基础，催生报复性暴力。 献忠事件频发又加剧公众恐慌，抑制消费，比如北京、广州餐饮业2024年关闭300万家餐馆，进一步影响经济。 政府的“过紧日子”政策虽意在节约财政，但削减行政开支可能降低基层治理效能，地方官员因工资拖欠或裁员失去积极性，难以有效应对社会不安。 中共优先支持高科技和出口导向产业，比如新能源），而忽视家庭消费，消费仅占GDP50%，无法从根本上缓解民众经济压力，献忠事件或将继续发酵。
这名网友说，
庆亲王也可以是习远平。最实惠的就是他了
那也有可能是彭丽媛，不是铁帽子王，是铁帽子王妃
这名网友说，
昨晚新闻联播一直强调2004年习近平书记在浙江时候地瓜经济以及对中央关于民营企业放权政策的执行情况，意在凸出胡锦涛总书记，温家宝总理时候的习近平…..意味深长哦。
在经济下行、“献忠事件”频发的背景下，2025年5月18日晚《新闻联播》聚焦2004年习近平在浙江的“地瓜经济”及落实中央民营企业放权政策，强调习近平在胡锦涛总书记和温家宝总理领导下取得的成绩，耐人寻味。2004年，习近平任浙江省委书记，提出“地瓜经济”理论，形容民营经济如地瓜藤蔓，扎根基层、延伸全国，带动浙江GDP年均增长14%。他推动简政放权，支持温州、宁波等地民企发展，与胡锦涛的“科学发展观”和温家宝的4万亿经济刺激政策相呼应。胡锦涛任总书记（2002-2012）期间，经济持续增长，2008年金融危机后温家宝推出4万亿刺激计划，巩固中国经济大国地位。
《新闻联播》刻意突出胡温时期的习近平，可能有以下含义：
转移经济下行焦点：当前经济困境（贸易战、房地产崩盘、失业率高企）引发民怨，宣传2004年的成功案例意在缓解公众不满，
重塑民企支持形象：习近平近年强调国企主导、“共同富裕”，被指打压民营经济，重提习近平在胡温时代支持民企的过往，
这就典型的打着红旗反红旗，支持民企根本就不是习近平的意思。
这名网友说，
国企信贷增速这点很能反映包子的权力，陈云派系就是计划经济官僚集团，包子上台后给民企贷款越来越少，14到18年，国企资产基本翻了倍，直至2022年落实两个毫不动摇后，民企信贷增速才恢复。
我的回复是，这名网友的数据才是最有说服力的。民企信贷，这才是真金白银。所以很多中共的口号，不要看他们说什么，而是要看他们做什么。给民众信贷这才是实际行动
好的，谢谢大家。
英文翻译
The news broadcast emphasized Xi’s sweet potato economy under Hu Jintao’s leadership. Is Xi Yuanping the iron-hat king? With the fiscal downturn, the CCP is living a tight life and issued the “Regulations on Opposing Waste”. With the economic downturn, Xianzhong is frequent. Xianzhong at Qianjin Primary School in Haidian District, Beijing
Hello everyone,
Welcome back to our channel! Against the backdrop of the continued escalation of the US-China trade war and the precarious situation of local finances, the CCP once again shouted “living a tight life” and revised and promulgated the “Regulations on Party and Government Organs to Practice Economy and Oppose Waste” in May 2025. Is this just superficial saving, or a helpless move under the fiscal crisis? The economic difficulties behind “living a tight life” are the pressure on the CCP’s finances
On May 18, 2025, Xinhua News Agency reported that the CPC Central Committee and the State Council officially issued the revised “Regulations on Party and Government Organs to Practice Economy and Oppose Waste”, requiring party and government organs at all levels to “tighten their belts”, curb extravagance and waste, and ensure that limited financial funds are used first in key areas and major tasks. The Regulations specify expenditure standards for official receptions, official vehicles, conferences and activities, office space, etc., prohibit high-end working meals, oversized receptions, non-official activities included in the reception scope, disguised tourism, etc., and stop the construction of new hotels and guesthouses with reception functions, and reduce the construction of party education and training institutions.
This mentions Xi Jinping Thought once.
The People’s Daily commented that the problem of extravagance and waste has been repeatedly banned and faced resistance in implementation, reflecting the difficulty of implementing conservation measures.
Since the escalation of the US-China trade war in 2019, US tariff barriers and export restrictions on China have hit China’s economy hard, resulting in a sharp drop in local fiscal revenue. The 2024 budget report shows that first-tier provinces and cities such as Guangdong, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen generally have more expenses than income, and provinces such as Yunnan have expenditures as high as three times their income. Local governments are in serious financial difficulties and frequently mention “smashing pots and selling irons”. Some provinces and cities have also set up special working groups for “smashing pots and selling irons” to try to deal with the crisis by selling assets and reducing expenditures. Finance Minister Liu Kun has made it clear that “living a tight life” is not a short-term measure, but a long-term policy. The reaffirmation in 2025 shows that fiscal pressure has approached the critical point, and the CPC has to alleviate the economic difficulties through institutionalized savings.
The revised “Regulations” list specific prohibitions on extravagance and waste in the public sector, such as providing high-end dishes or tobacco and alcohol for working meals, exceeding the standards for receiving foreign guests, false reception lists, and luxurious decoration in the name of training. These details expose the stubborn problem of high administrative costs of the CPC, especially when the fiscal situation is tight, the waste is more glaring. The “Regulations” aims to significantly reduce administrative operating costs by strengthening the supervision mechanism and refining the expenditure standards, and give priority to investing funds in key areas such as economic development and people’s livelihood security. However, the official media admitted that the implementation of the savings measures was not effective, indicating the resistance of local interest groups and the bureaucratic system, which may weaken the policy effect.
The CPC’s reiteration of “living a tight life” is not only an economic strategy to deal with the US-China trade war, but also reflects the grim reality that local governments are “essentially bankrupt.” Public reports point out that local finances have no room for maneuver, traditional “land finance” is unsustainable, and debt pressure is high. “The CCP is going downhill further”, and the austerity policy is a helpless move that “cannot solve” the fiscal dilemma. The trade war has led to a decline in exports and the relocation of the industrial chain. Coupled with the weak economic recovery after the epidemic, the CCP has been forced to cut administrative expenses to maintain the stability of the regime. However, long-term adherence to “living a tight life” may lead to a decline in grassroots execution and frustration of officials’ enthusiasm, further exacerbating governance difficulties.
Under the US-China trade war, the CCP revised the “Regulations on Strict Economy and Opposition to Waste” and reiterated that “living a tight life” is ostensibly to save administrative costs, but in fact it is an emergency measure to deal with fiscal bankruptcy. The dilemma of local governments not making ends meet and “selling pots and irons” exposes the severity of the economic difficulties. Do you think “living a tight life” can save the CCP’s fiscal crisis? Will the trade war further crush the Chinese economy?
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As the US-China trade war continues to escalate and the downward pressure on the domestic economy increases, the CPC reiterated its “tight living” policy and revised and promulgated the “Regulations on Party and Government Organs to Practice Economy and Oppose Waste” on May 18, 2025, attempting to cope with the fiscal crisis through institutionalized economy. However, at the same time, the frequent “Xianzhong Incidents” in many parts of China have attracted attention. On May 15, 2025, vehicle collisions and knife-wounding incidents occurred in Haidian District, Beijing and Guangzhou South Railway Station, but the authorities downplayed the incidents and related reports were quickly removed from the shelves.
The US-China trade war has hit China’s economy hard since 2019, and tariff barriers and export restrictions have led to a sharp drop in local fiscal revenue. According to the 2024 budget report, first-tier cities such as Guangdong, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen are spending more than they earn, and Yunnan’s expenditure is as high as three times its income. Local governments are in a state of “essential bankruptcy” and frequently mention “selling pots and irons” to cope with the debt crisis. The real estate market continues to be sluggish, the real estate industry, which accounts for more than 25% of GDP, has shrunk, and consumer confidence has been frustrated. In 2024, the total retail sales in Beijing and Shanghai will drop by 3.1% and 2.8% respectively, while Guangzhou and Shenzhen will only increase slightly by 0.3% and 1%. The official data of youth unemployment rate reached 16.9%, which may actually be higher. Young people are trapped in the despair of “historical garbage time”, and some even choose to “lie down” or rely on their parents. The economic downturn directly weakened the people’s sense of security in life. The gap between the rich and the poor, employment difficulties and asset depreciation have aggravated social dissatisfaction, laying the groundwork for the Xianzhong incident.
On May 15, 2025, a vehicle hit pedestrians near Qianjin Primary School in Haidian District, Beijing. It was reported online that a black Tesla maliciously hit the crowd, causing 4 injuries. The video of the scene released on social media showed that many people fell to the ground and the driver was controlled, but the official report downplayed it as a “passenger car scratching pedestrians accident”, and the relevant reports on NetEase were removed from the shelves. On the same day, outside the security inspection area on the first floor of Guangzhou South Station, a 35-year-old man named Li injured people with a fruit knife, causing one person to be slightly injured. The scene fell into chaos, and the official only responded with a brief report. These “Xianzhong incidents” are similar to the Xianzhong incidents in Zhuhai, Changde and other places in 2024.
The economic downturn is the deep reason for the frequent occurrence of such incidents. The collapse of the real estate market has led to the shrinkage of family wealth. 70% of Chinese family wealth is linked to real estate, and unfinished buildings have left homebuyers with nothing. Low wages, layoffs and high debts have crushed the middle and lower classes. An investment bank employee in Beijing had his salary cut by 30% in 2024, and his colleagues were laid off, reflecting widespread economic anxiety. Tens of thousands of migrant workers seek jobs at the Guangzhou Employment Center every day, with very low wages and scarce jobs. This kind of despair is easy to evolve into “revenge on society” in the absence of institutionalized venting channels, such as free expression or judicial relief. The Xianzhong incident has become a concentrated outbreak of social pressure.
In the face of the Xianzhong incident, the Chinese Communist Party officials adopted a strategy of downplaying and information control. In the Haidian incident in Beijing, the official report avoided mentioning “malicious collisions” and media reports were quickly removed; the Guangzhou South Station incident only released brief information and did not disclose the suspect’s motives. This approach is intended to maintain social stability, but it may backfire. Censorship is strict inside the wall, and social media such as Weibo and Zhihu are quickly cleared of discussions on sensitive topics, forcing people to turn to overseas platforms such as X to voice their opinions.
People are gradually realizing that “society can beat individuals, and individuals can also beat society”, and imitation of the Xianzhong incident may spread. The government’s downplaying of the incident and suppressing information will deepen public distrust, fuel dissatisfaction, and may further stimulate new Xianzhong incidents.
The economic downturn and the Xianzhong incident form a vicious cycle. The trade war and the real estate crisis have led to unemployment and income declines, eroding the foundation of social stability and giving rise to retaliatory violence. The frequent occurrence of Xianzhong incidents has exacerbated public panic and suppressed consumption. For example, the catering industry in Beijing and Guangzhou will close 3 million restaurants in 2024, further affecting the economy. Although the government’s “tight living” policy is intended to save finances, cutting administrative expenses may reduce the effectiveness of grassroots governance. Local officials lose enthusiasm due to wage arrears or layoffs, and it is difficult to effectively respond to social unrest. The CCP gives priority to supporting high-tech and export-oriented industries, such as new energy, while ignoring household consumption, which only accounts for 50% of GDP. It is unable to fundamentally alleviate the economic pressure on the people, and the Xianzhong incident may continue to ferment.
This netizen said,
Prince Qing can also be Xi Yuanping. He is the most cost-effective one
It could also be Peng Liyuan, not an iron-hat prince, but an iron-hat princess
This netizen said,
Last night’s news broadcast kept emphasizing the sweet potato economy when Secretary Xi Jinping was in Zhejiang in 2004 and the implementation of the central government’s policy on decentralization of private enterprises, which was intended to highlight Xi Jinping during the time of General Secretary Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao… It is meaningful.
Against the backdrop of economic downturn and frequent “Xianzhong incidents”, the evening of May 18, 2025, “News Broadcast” focused on Xi Jinping’s “sweet potato economy” in Zhejiang in 2004 and the implementation of the central government’s policy of decentralization of private enterprises, emphasizing Xi Jinping’s achievements under the leadership of General Secretary Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, which is intriguing. In 2004, Xi Jinping was appointed Secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee and proposed the “sweet potato economy” theory, describing the private economy as a sweet potato vine, rooted in the grassroots and extending across the country, driving Zhejiang’s GDP to grow by an average of 14% per year. He promoted the simplification of administration and decentralization, and supported the development of private enterprises in Wenzhou, Ningbo and other places, which echoed Hu Jintao’s “Scientific Outlook on Development” and Wen Jiabao’s 4 trillion economic stimulus policy. During Hu Jintao’s tenure as General Secretary (2002-2012), the economy continued to grow. After the 2008 financial crisis, Wen Jiabao launched a 4 trillion stimulus plan to consolidate China’s status as an economic power.
The “News Broadcast” deliberately highlights Xi Jinping during the Hu-Wen era, which may have the following meanings:
Shifting the focus of the economic downturn: The current economic difficulties (trade war, real estate collapse, high unemployment rate) have caused public resentment, and promoting the successful case of 2004 is intended to ease public dissatisfaction,
Reshaping the image of supporting private enterprises: Xi Jinping has emphasized the dominance of state-owned enterprises and “common prosperity” in recent years, and has been accused of suppressing the private economy. It reiterates Xi Jinping’s past support for private enterprises during the Hu-Wen era.
This is a typical example of waving the red flag to oppose the red flag. Supporting private enterprises is not Xi Jinping’s intention at all.
This netizen said,
The growth rate of state-owned enterprise credit can well reflect Baozi’s power. Chen Yun’s faction is a planned economy bureaucratic group. After Baozi came to power, he gave less and less loans to private enterprises. From 2014 to 2018, the assets of state-owned enterprises basically doubled. It was not until 2022 that the implementation of the two unshakable policies restored the growth rate of private enterprise credit.
My reply is that the data of this netizen is the most convincing. Private enterprise credit is real money. So for many slogans of the CCP, don’t look at what they say, but look at what they do. Giving credit to the people is the real action
Okay, thank you everyone.
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