疑似胡锦涛在政治局扩大会议讲话流出的背景、内容与影响分析
疑似胡锦涛在政治局扩大会议讲话流出的背景、内容与影响分析
近日，网络上流传一份标称为“胡锦涛同志在中央政治局扩大会议上的讲话速记稿”，引发广泛关注。该讲话内容涉及对中共历史使命的回顾、改革开放路线的捍卫、过去十年政策偏差的批评，以及对四中全会人事安排的建议。尽管该文本真伪不知道，也许只是一个节目效果，其内容与当前政治局势的敏感性使其成为舆论焦点。
自2024年7月中共二十届三中全会以来，习近平的公开活动模式发生显著变化，接连缺席2024年8月的全军军事理论工作会议、2024年9月的第79届联合国大会、2024年11月中国国际进口博览会、2025年4月的全国双拥模范城（县）命名大会等等10次重要会议，如果胡锦涛的讲话，我们无法合适真伪的话，那么习近平缺席活动，这是一个事实。而且缺席了多达10次，这个被软禁的区别，到底是什么？
和软禁还是有区别的:软禁不需要配合演戏。苏林访华那次，包子的声音听起来就是那么愤懑与恐慌。
同时，中央军委高层清洗（苗华、何卫东被查）、张又侠崛起（如单独会见印尼防长、参加双拥会议）以及胡锦涛派系（胡春华、石泰峰）活跃，暗示高层博弈加剧。X平台传言称习近平丧失军权、形同“华国锋第二”，四中全会可能退位。这些迹象为疑似胡锦涛讲话的流出提供了政治土壤，反映党内对路线与权力的激烈争论。
胡锦涛作为2002-2012年中共总书记，以“科学发展观”与温和外交著称，其执政时期延续邓小平改革开放路线，强调集体领导与经济优先。尽管2012年十八大后其影响力减弱，但胡派（李克强，胡春华、汪洋等）在近年政治局与地方要职中仍占重要位置。
李克强不是因为和习近平斗了10年不至于被习近平做掉
2022年二十大闭幕式上，胡锦涛被“请离场”事件引发外界对其边缘化的猜测，但其作为胡锦涛卷土重来。此次疑似讲话如果属实，可能代表胡派借四中全会反攻，试图重塑党内路线。
该讲话文本最早通过X平台及海外中文媒体传播，内容以速记稿形式呈现，语气符合胡锦涛一贯低调务实的风格。然而，中共官方未予回应，官媒保持沉默，由于中共的黑箱操作，文本来源缺乏可验证渠道。X帖子质疑其为“境外势力伪造”，但也有网友认为其内容与当前胡派动态吻合。真伪争议为分析增添复杂性，但其内容仍值得深入探讨。
网传的胡锦涛疑似讲话内容涵盖历史回顾、政策批评、路线重申及人事建议，以下为要点解析：
讲话开篇回顾中共自1921年以来的奋斗史，特别强调1978年十一届三中全会后邓小平推动的改革开放，称其为“国家由贫困走向小康、由封闭走向开放的伟大转变”。胡锦涛自述为邓小平的“直接工作联系对象”，将其执政理念（与温家宝、李克强等）定位于继承邓小平路线，强调“改革、开放、实事求是、摸着石头过河”。此部分旨在为讲话定调，将改革开放作为中共合法性与成功的核心，暗指当前路线偏离邓小平遗产。
讲话直指“过去十年党的路线严重偏差”，列举四方面问题：
片面强调“集中统一”：批评无视集体领导制度与法定程序，暗指习近平强化个人权威。
个人崇拜与表忠文化：指责背离“人民至上”与集体领导原则，可能针对“习核心”宣传及忠诚文化。
对内活力受抑：指出社会活力受限、民营企业信心下挫，与2024年经济下行及民企投资萎缩相呼应。
对外外交失衡：批评战略误判积聚风险，美中关系紧张（美欧制裁加码）、亲俄立场导致孤立。
最尖锐的表述是“改革开放的路线被扭曲甚至背弃”，将当前政策定性为背离中共根本方向，语气罕见强硬。
胡锦涛宣称“改革开放不是哪一位领导人的私产，而是党和人民的共同选择”，并以“即使打内战也要把改革开放救回来”表达决心。此句既凸显其对改革开放的信念，也暗示党内路线斗争已白热化，可能涉及最高层权力博弈。结合X传言，比如称政治局扩大会议讨论习近平退位），此表述可能是胡派对习近平路线的公开挑战。
讲话提出将2025年四中全会转为“专门讨论人事安排的政治会议”，核心任务包括：
中央委员会人选：确保“忠于改革开放、脚踏实地、不搞个人崇拜”的干部在下届中央委员会占一定份额，暗指提拔胡派及温和派（如李强、胡春华）。
政治局常委构成：重新研判“七常委”格局，研究总书记职权与监督机制，强调“总书记不能凌驾于党组织或宪法之上”。
此建议直接挑战习近平的“核心”地位，呼应集体领导制回归，可能是胡派与退休常委现任常委联合逼宫的策略。
讲话以“老党员、老同志”身份呼吁“重拾改革开放之旗”，回归集体领导制与民主集中制，抵制“民主集中制不在、集体领导制不存”的歧路。结尾强调“历史将记住我们的选择”，呼应邓小平遗训，试图以历史责任感凝聚党内共识。
如果讲话属实，其公开放风标志着党内路线斗争从幕后走向前台。胡锦涛对习近平路线的直接批评（“严重偏差”“扭曲改革开放”）及人事调整建议，表明胡派试图通过四中全会重塑权力格局。结合习近平缺席关键会议（如全军军事理论工作会议、双拥大会）、张又侠派系崛起（单独会见印尼防长）、军委清洗（何卫东被查），胡派可能联合退休常委（比如李瑞环，温家宝，张德江）及部分现任常委（比如李强、赵乐际）发起反攻，目标是削弱习近平权威，恢复集体领导。
讲话将四中全会定位为“人事安排的政治会议”，提出调整中央委员会与政治局常委构成，可能引发高层人事地震。X传言称四中全会将讨论习近平退位，胡锦涛讲话可能是为人事变动造势，目标包括提拔胡派干部、限制总书记职权。
讲话批评民营企业信心下挫及外交失衡，与当前经济困境（2024年民企投资下降、外资撤离）及国际孤立（美欧制裁）相呼应。如果胡派路线获支持，可能推动经济开放（如放松民企管制、吸引外资）及外交调整（如温和对美政策），短期内提振市场信心，但也可能因党内分歧加剧政策不确定性。
讲话流出引发海外媒体热议，国际社会可能将其视为中共内部裂痕的证据。美欧可能借机加大对华压力，测试习近平政权稳定性。称讲话可能影响四中全会外交政策转向，需密切关注后续动向。
讲话真伪的可能性
从内容风格：讲话语气低调务实，强调集体领导与改革开放，符合胡锦涛一贯形象（如“科学发展观”时期讲话）。提及邓小平及个人经历（“直接工作联系对象”）具可信细节。
政治背景：习近平缺席关键会议（全军军事理论工作会议、双拥大会、联大）、军委清洗（何卫东、苗华）、胡派活跃（李强代行职责、胡春华露面）与讲话内容吻合，暗示胡派借四中全会反攻。
党内高层博弈可能导致放风造势炒作，类似2012年薄熙来事件。X平台传播渠道显示信息来源多样，可能是党内人士或海外情报机构放风。
当然也有任质疑讲话的真实性
缺乏官方证实：中共官媒没有回应，中共的官媒也不可能回应讲话来源未明，速记稿形式可能为伪造。
传播动机：海外媒体及X传言可能放大反共叙事，伪造讲话以动摇习近平政权。
综合判断
讲话真伪难以确认，但其内容与当前政治动态高度契合，可能是胡派或温和派有意放风的试探性文件，旨在为四中全会造势。即使为伪造，也反映了党内对习近平路线的不满及胡派重掌大权的舆论氛围。我们可以持续观察8月的四中全会及胡派动态（如汪洋、胡春华活动）以验证其真实性。
疑似胡锦涛在政治局扩大会议的讲话出现，无论是真是假，都揭示了中共高层在路线与权力上的深刻分歧。讲话以改革开放为旗帜，批评习近平十年政策偏差，提出四中全会人事调整，呼应集体领导制回归，契合当前习近平缺席会议（全军、双拥、联大）、军委清洗（何卫东）、张又侠及胡派崛起的背景。如果属实，其标志着胡派联合退休常委发起反攻，可能重塑四中全会权力格局；如果为伪造，则反映党内不满，中国民众不满的舆论放大，依然对习近平权威构成挑战。
我说过独裁国家也是有民意。中共一贯压制民众的表达，但是不等于没有民意，只是没有公开的表达的渠道的而已。
你认为讲话是党内逼宫的信号，还是海外舆论的渲染节目效果？欢迎留言
谢谢大家。
英文翻译
Analysis of the background, content and impact of the allegedly leaked speech of Hu Jintao at the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau
Recently, a shorthand transcript of Comrade Hu Jintao’s speech at the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee has been circulated on the Internet, which has attracted widespread attention. The content of the speech involves a review of the historical mission of the Communist Party of China, the defense of the reform and opening-up route, criticism of policy deviations in the past decade, and suggestions for personnel arrangements for the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee. Although the authenticity of the text is unknown, perhaps it is just a show effect, its content and the sensitivity of the current political situation have made it the focus of public opinion.
Since the Third Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee in July 2024, Xi Jinping’s public activity pattern has changed significantly. He has successively missed 10 important meetings, including the Military Theory Work Conference of the Whole Army in August 2024, the 79th United Nations General Assembly in September 2024, the China International Import Expo in November 2024, and the National Double Support Model City (County) Naming Conference in April 2025. If we cannot verify the authenticity of Hu Jintao’s speech, then it is a fact that Xi Jinping is absent from the event. And he was absent as many as 10 times. What is the difference between this and house arrest? Chinese food
It is different from house arrest: house arrest does not require acting. When Su Lin visited China, Baozi’s voice sounded so angry and panicked.
At the same time, the purge of the top leaders of the Central Military Commission (Miao Hua and He Weidong were investigated), the rise of Zhang Youxia (such as meeting with the Indonesian Defense Minister alone and participating in the Double Support Conference), and the activeness of Hu Jintao’s faction (Hu Chunhua and Shi Taifeng) all implied that the game at the top level was intensified. X platform rumors said that Xi Jinping had lost military power and was like “Hua Guofeng No. 2”, and might abdicate at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee. These signs provided political soil for the outflow of the suspected speech of Hu Jintao, reflecting the fierce debate within the party on the line and power.
As the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China from 2002 to 2012, Hu Jintao was known for his “scientific outlook on development” and moderate diplomacy. During his tenure, he continued Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening-up line, emphasizing collective leadership and economic priority. Although its influence has weakened since the 18th National Congress in 2012, the Hu faction (Li Keqiang, Hu Chunhua, Wang Yang, etc.) still occupies an important position in the Politburo and local key positions in recent years.
Li Keqiang is not eliminated by Xi Jinping because he has fought with Xi Jinping for 10 years
At the closing ceremony of the 20th National Congress in 2022, Hu Jintao was “asked to leave” and caused speculation about his marginalization, but he made a comeback as Hu Jintao. If the suspected speech is true, it may represent the Hu faction’s counterattack through the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee and try to reshape the party’s line.
The text of the speech was first circulated through the X platform and overseas Chinese media. The content was presented in the form of shorthand transcripts, and the tone was consistent with Hu Jintao’s usual low-key and pragmatic style. However, the official Chinese Communist Party did not respond, and the official media remained silent. Due to the black box operation of the Chinese Communist Party, the source of the text lacks a verifiable channel. The X post questioned that it was “forged by foreign forces”, but some netizens believed that its content was consistent with the current dynamics of the Hu faction. The authenticity dispute adds complexity to the analysis, but its content is still worth further discussion.
The content of Hu Jintao’s alleged speech, which was circulated online, includes historical review, policy criticism, line reaffirmation and personnel suggestions. The following is an analysis of the key points:
The speech begins with a review of the CPC’s struggle since 1921, with special emphasis on the reform and opening up promoted by Deng Xiaoping after the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in 1978, calling it “the great transformation of the country from poverty to moderate prosperity and from closed to open”. Hu Jintao described himself as Deng Xiaoping’s “direct work contact”, and positioned his governing philosophy (with Wen Jiabao, Li Keqiang, etc.) as inheriting Deng Xiaoping’s line, emphasizing “reform, opening up, seeking truth from facts, and crossing the river by feeling the stones”. This part aims to set the tone for the speech, taking reform and opening up as the core of the CPC’s legitimacy and success, and implying that the current line has deviated from Deng Xiaoping’s legacy.
The speech directly pointed out that “the party’s line has seriously deviated in the past decade” and listed four problems:
One-sided emphasis on “centralization and unity”: Criticizing the disregard of the collective leadership system and legal procedures, implying that Xi Jinping has strengthened his personal authority.
Personal worship and loyalty culture: accusations of deviation from the principle of “people first” and collective leadership, possibly targeting the “Xi core” propaganda and loyalty culture.
Internal vitality is suppressed: points out that social vitality is limited and private enterprise confidence is declining, which echoes the economic downturn and shrinking private enterprise investment in 2024.
External diplomatic imbalance: criticism of strategic misjudgment accumulation of risks, tensions in US-China relations (increased US and European sanctions), and pro-Russian stance leading to isolation.
The most pointed statement is “the line of reform and opening up has been distorted or even abandoned”, characterizing the current policy as a deviation from the fundamental direction of the Communist Party of China, with a rare tough tone.
Hu Jintao declared that “reform and opening up is not the private property of any leader, but the common choice of the party and the people”, and expressed his determination to “save reform and opening up even if there is a civil war.” This sentence not only highlights his belief in reform and opening up, but also implies that the struggle for the line within the party has become fierce, which may involve the highest level of power game. Combined with the X rumor, such as the enlarged meeting of the Politburo discussing Xi Jinping’s abdication), this statement may be an open challenge to Xi Jinping’s line by the Hu faction.
The speech proposed to turn the Fourth Plenary Session of the 2025 Central Committee into a “political meeting specifically discussing personnel arrangements”, with the core tasks including:
Central Committee candidates: ensure that cadres who are “loyal to reform and opening up, down-to-earth, and not engaged in personality cult” account for a certain proportion of the next Central Committee, implying the promotion of Hu’s faction and moderates (such as Li Qiang and Hu Chunhua).
Composition of the Political Bureau Standing Committee: re-evaluate the “seven standing committee members” pattern, study the powers and supervision mechanism of the general secretary, and emphasize that “the general secretary cannot override the party organization or the constitution.”
This suggestion directly challenges Xi Jinping’s “core” status and echoes the return of the collective leadership system. It may be a strategy for the Hu faction and the retired and current standing committee members to jointly force the palace.
The speech called for “re-taking up the flag of reform and opening up” as an “old party member and old comrade”, returning to the collective leadership system and democratic centralism, and resisting the wrong path of “the absence of democratic centralism and the non-existence of collective leadership.” At the end, it emphasized that “history will remember our choice”, echoing Deng Xiaoping’s legacy, and trying to build consensus within the party with a sense of historical responsibility.
If the speech is true, its public release marks the transition of the struggle for party lines from behind the scenes to the front stage. Hu Jintao’s direct criticism of Xi Jinping’s line (“serious deviation” and “distortion of reform and opening up”) and his suggestions for personnel adjustments indicate that the Hu faction is trying to reshape the power structure through the Fourth Plenary Session. Combined with Xi Jinping’s absence from key meetings (such as the All-Army Military Theory Work Conference and the Double Support Conference), the rise of Zhang Youxia’s faction (a separate meeting with the Indonesian Defense Minister), and the purge of the Military Commission (He Weidong was investigated), the Hu faction may join forces with retired Standing Committee members (such as Li Ruihuan, Wen Jiabao, and Zhang Dejiang) and some current Standing Committee members (such as Li Qiang and Zhao Leji) to launch a counterattack, with the goal of weakening Xi Jinping’s authority and restoring collective leadership.
The speech positioned the Fourth Plenary Session as a “political meeting for personnel arrangements” and proposed adjustments to the composition of the Central Committee and the Politburo Standing Committee, which may trigger a high-level personnel earthquake. X Rumor has it that the Fourth Plenary Session will discuss Xi Jinping’s abdication, and Hu Jintao’s speech may be to build momentum for personnel changes, with the goals of promoting Hu faction cadres and limiting the powers of the general secretary.
The speech criticized the decline in confidence of private enterprises and diplomatic imbalance, which echoes the current economic difficulties (decline in private enterprise investment and withdrawal of foreign capital in 2024) and international isolation (US and European sanctions). If the Hu faction’s line is supported, it may promote economic openness (such as relaxing private enterprise controls and attracting foreign investment) and diplomatic adjustments (such as moderate policies toward the United States), boosting market confidence in the short term, but it may also increase policy uncertainty due to intra-party differences.
The leak of the speech has caused heated discussions in overseas media, and the international community may regard it as evidence of internal cracks in the Communist Party of China. The United States and Europe may take the opportunity to increase pressure on China and test the stability of Xi Jinping’s regime. It is said that the speech may affect the foreign policy shift of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee, and subsequent trends need to be closely monitored.
The possibility of authenticity of the speech
From the content style: the speech is low-key and pragmatic, emphasizing collective leadership and reform and opening up, which is in line with Hu Jintao’s consistent image (such as speeches during the “Scientific Outlook on Development” period). The mention of Deng Xiaoping and personal experience (“direct work contact objects”) is credible details.
Political background: Xi Jinping’s absence from key meetings (military theory work conference, support-support conference, UN General Assembly), CMC purge (He Weidong, Miao Hua), and active Hu faction (Li Qiang acting as deputy, Hu Chunhua showing up) are consistent with the content of the speech, suggesting that the Hu faction is using the Fourth Plenary Session to counterattack.
The game among high-level party members may lead to the release of information and hype, similar to the Bo Xilai incident in 2012. The X platform’s dissemination channels show that the sources of information are diverse, which may be leaked by party members or overseas intelligence agencies.
Of course, there are also people who question the authenticity of the speech.
Lack of official confirmation: The official media of the Chinese Communist Party did not respond, and the official media of the Chinese Communist Party could not respond. The source of the speech is unknown, and the shorthand transcript may be forged.
Motives for dissemination: Overseas media and X rumors may amplify anti-communist narratives and forge speeches to shake Xi Jinping’s regime.
Comprehensive judgment
The authenticity of the speech is difficult to confirm, but its content is highly consistent with the current political dynamics. It may be a tentative document deliberately released by the Hu faction or moderates to build momentum for the Fourth Plenary Session. Even if it is a forgery, it reflects the dissatisfaction within the party with Xi Jinping’s line and the public opinion atmosphere of the Hu faction regaining power. We can continue to observe the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee in August and the dynamics of the Hu faction (such as the activities of Wang Yang and Hu Chunhua) to verify its authenticity.
The appearance of a speech suspected to be Hu Jintao at the enlarged meeting of the Politburo, whether true or false, reveals the profound differences among the top leaders of the Communist Party of China on the line and power. The speech, with reform and opening up as the banner, criticized Xi Jinping’s policy deviations in the past ten years, proposed personnel adjustments at the Fourth Plenary Session, echoed the return of the collective leadership system, and fit the current background of Xi Jinping’s absence from meetings (the whole army, the support of the army and the army, and the United Nations General Assembly), the purge of the Military Commission (He Weidong), Zhang Youxia and the rise of the Hu faction. If it is true, it means that the Hu faction has launched a counterattack with retired Standing Committee members, which may reshape the power structure of the Fourth Plenary Session; if it is a forgery, it reflects the dissatisfaction within the party and the amplification of public opinion of the Chinese people’s dissatisfaction, which still poses a challenge to Xi Jinping’s authority.
I said that there is public opinion in dictatorships. The Communist Party of China has always suppressed the expression of the people, but it does not mean that there is no public opinion, but there is no public channel for expression.
Do you think the speech is a signal of a palace coup within the party, or is it an exaggeration by overseas media? Welcome to leave a message
Thank you everyone.
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