下任总书记浮出水面，胡锦涛权力的边界是换掉习近平这个总书记吗？已经证明可以随便更换，中组部长了。内蒙古倒查20年是清算习仲勋秘书储波。是江胡狙击习近平三连任的前哨战
下任总书记浮出水面，胡锦涛权力的边界是换掉习近平这个总书记吗？已经证明可以随便更换，中组部长了。内蒙古倒查20年是清算习仲勋秘书储波。是江胡狙击习近平三连任的前哨战
大家好，我们还是围绕核心的问题，展开，总书记。我们今天讨论这几个话题，胡锦涛的权力边界在哪里，是不是可以换掉习近平这个总书记。第二，说一下内蒙古倒查20年。到底是查谁。把内蒙古13个党委书记，拿出来说一遍。到底这13个党委书记是哪个派系。就能看明白未来了。从历史，从过去，看见未来，如果历史就没有搞明白，过去就没有搞明白，就是一笔糊涂账，怎么可能看明白了未来呢？我们重点就是讨论一下，胡春华前面那一个内蒙古党委书记储波和习仲勋到底是什么关系？
第三，就是把内蒙古倒查20年这件事情搞清楚的话，自然就明白下一任总书记到底是谁？谁会今年8月8日的四中全会上接替习近平。
中组部长的更换，是更换总书记重新组合搭班子的前奏信号
这种调整在非换届期的发生，在中共历史上极为罕见。中组部掌控人事任命，是总书记稳固权力的核心工具。中办作为“大内总管”，直接服务于总书记的日常运作。石泰峰接替李干杰出任中组部长，李干杰转至统战部，这种政治局委员级别的互换，打破了常规换届节奏。历史上，类似变动往往伴随着最高领导层的更替，毛泽东死在1976年9月9日，第二年1977年12月，胡耀邦接替郭玉峰担任中组部长。1987年胡耀邦下台后，中央全会迅速重组领导层。胡耀邦1987年1月下台，1987年5月，宋平接替尉健行担任中组部长。如今，2025年3月的这次人事变动，结合政治局会议没有提“习近平为核心”的异常，强烈暗示习近平的总书记地位岌岌可危。
江泽民2002年选择退休，没有谋求终身连任，显示江蛤知道进退之道，保全了江派的政治根基。而习近平2018年修宪取消任期限制，2022年三连任，表明习近平缺乏这种政治智慧。这种“不知进退”的选择，使其政治集团暴露在风险之中。江泽民退休之后，经历了五次换届。也就是说江泽民在这5次的选择，都要通过博弈，让自己的派系存活下去。新任中组部长石泰峰，作为胡锦涛的“马仔”，可能借此机会全面清洗习近平派系，动摇习近平权力基础。这不仅是人事调整的信号，更是习近平政治命运的转折点。
既然中组部长在非换届期发生变动，那就说明“现在要换届了”。中共的正常换届周期为五年，下一次党代会应为2027年二十一大。然而，石泰峰和李干杰的职位互换发生在2025年3月，远非常规时间点。历史上，非换届期的重大人事变动往往与权力斗争相关，如1976年华国锋上位后的过渡调整，或1987年胡耀邦下台后的紧急重组。当前，军队清洗（何卫东等人被抓，习近平嫡系31军被团灭）、地方转向胡温路线（如“两个毫不动摇”），加上这次人事异动，指向一次非常规换届的可能性。
中央军委一半的都在秦城监狱呢，打个屁
对台湾军演，一天就收兵了。我觉得这名网友的评论很到位。中央军委一半的都在秦城监狱呢，打个屁。就是话糙理不糙。现在形容中国军队的状态呢，用这四个字来形容，最贴切，无心恋战。大清洗搞成这样了，人人自危，还有什么心思打仗呢。
江泽民的知进退，保持了江派的长期影响力。习近平却反其道而行，三连任打破党内的浅规则，激化内部矛盾，导致如今的非常态调整。石泰峰的上任，由胡锦涛推动，可能预示通过政治局会议或四中全会，迅速完成总书记更替和班子重组。这种“即刻换届”的迹象，正是习近平失势的直接后果。
石泰峰和李干杰互换职位指向习近平派系的覆灭。石泰峰和李干杰的职位互换是“习近平这个总书记要被换掉的信号”。中组部长历来是总书记的亲信，如曾庆红之于江泽民，贺国强之于胡锦涛，陈希、李干杰之于习近平。然而，石泰峰的背景却与胡锦涛紧密相连：他不仅是李克强和胡春华的北大同学，还曾在胡锦涛任中央党校校长期间担任10年下属。这种胡锦涛色彩十分鲜明的人物接管中组部，表明习近平已失去人事大权的掌控。
习近平三连任的“不知进退”，使习近平政治集团成为众矢之的。江泽民选择退休，保住了江派在胡锦涛时代的生存空间。而习近平的妄自尊大，却让“习家军”面临灭顶之灾。石泰峰作为胡锦涛的“马仔”，可能利用中组部长的职位，系统性清洗习近平派系的官员，为新领导层铺路。李干杰被调至统战部，则像是边缘化处理，避免其干扰胡锦涛的计划。这种人事变动，与其说是习近平的主动布局，不如说是其权力崩塌后的被动结果。
胡锦涛虽然有能力推动习近平下台，但是也不能只手遮天，胡锦涛需要与江泽民政治集团分享权力，形成“犄角之势”。江泽民退休后的战略忍耐，虽然未必出于本意，也是无奈之举，却为江泽民派系保留了长期影响力，如曾庆红掌控中组部，郭伯雄和徐才厚担任军委副主席。胡锦涛如果单独对抗习近平，可能早已被习近平完全吃掉，但江胡两派的合作，构成了对习近平的制约。石泰峰的上任是胡锦涛主导的结果，但是胡锦涛后续人事安排（比如政治局委员和常委人选）需让渡一半给江派，以维持平衡。
习近平的“不知进退”打破了这种默契，三连任的妄自尊大激怒了两派，导致如今的联合反击。每个政治集团都有其权力边界，江泽民懂得退让，保全自身。胡锦涛借助江派支持，得以重掌大权。而习近平却无视权力边界，以为可以横行霸道，最终被现实“无情打脸”。石泰峰如果清洗习近平政治集团，胡锦涛仍需与江派妥协，确保新班子的稳定性。这种权力博弈，凸显习近平的孤立与失败。
习近平今天搞成这种局面，他的派系的老大，如果活到现在，看到习近平把陈云这个派系搞成这样，估计都会很无语。
今天我们就说内蒙古，就看看，内蒙古谁是陈云提拔的。其实邓小平对陈云是很不满的，但是很无奈。陈云作为邓小平时代的二号人物，掌握了相当大的人事权。邓小平为什么能够容忍陈云，就是陈云知道进退，不去跟邓小平争老大。陈云既然不跟邓小平争老大。陈云掌握了那么人事权，邓小平也没办法。
和周恩来一样，周恩来也不去跟毛泽东争老大。周恩来才是毛泽东时代的真正的二号人物。毛泽东文革折腾10年，就是为了把周恩来打倒，最后也没有实现。
这名网友说，为何蔡某某仍然说是习近平换上石泰峰？想不通。
这名网友回复说，因为他是大外宣。
这名网友说，老杜说石泰峰是习近平的国师，深得信任，主导了对小胡内蒙古的清算20年，认为反而是习近平增加权势的标志，大包老师怎么看呢？
这名网友回复说，可是小胡没有被清算，那不是说明石泰峰没有完成习近平的任务，结果反而被重用了？外宣说，李干杰就是任务完成的差才被调走的。结果两个人都是任务完成的差，反而一个高升一个低就？
我们从内蒙古这个省部级单位，来看整个中共的问题。这名网友回复说，那个杜某就是拿狗粮的大外宣。
杜某是岳福洪的马仔。岳福洪是内蒙古的副书记，岳福洪的秘书王中和已经抓了。岳福洪原来是的北京市长助理，就是当时的北京市长贾庆林提拔的岳福洪。贾庆林提拔的习近平。岳福洪和习近平都是贾庆林提拔的，同这里说岳福洪和习近平是同一个辈分的。如果说岳福洪是习近平的师弟。那么杜某就是习近平的侄子辈分的小马仔。
第二名网名的逻辑推理也很精彩，如果石泰峰真的失去清洗胡春华的话，那么石泰峰没有完成任务啊。
大家看，内蒙古历史上一共有13个党委书记。我给大家圈出来这3个时间是什么意思呢。就是只有这三个时间就足以把中共历史理解明白。内蒙古倒查20年，只从时间上看，就不是针对胡春华的呀。2020年往前倒20年就是储波啊。如果是针对胡春华应该倒查10年或者11年。
再说了胡春华一共在内蒙古待了3年，他能有什么事儿。储波在内蒙古8年呢。胡春华就算贪腐，他也是在西藏贪腐，在内蒙古一共就是3年，屁股还没坐热呢。
我们先看这13个党委书记都是什么派系的。
乌兰夫可能是邓小平，我不太确定，解学恭就完全不了解，而且跟今天也没有什么太多的联系。
尤太忠和现在有联系。尤太忠就是周恩来的人，不是邓小平，就看这个1971年这个时间点就明白了。把邓小平的时间节点拿出来一对照就明白了，邓小平是1973年3月复出担任副总理。尤太忠是1971年，当时邓小平正在被打倒呢，怎么可能任命呢。
邓小平吹嘘是三起三落，其实第三次，邓小平就没有落下去。邓小平是1976年4月7日，第三次被打倒，撤销一切职务。1977年7月16日，邓小平就恢复了中央副主席，以及军委副主席的职务。实际上1977年年初就恢复了，没有正式公布而已。
也就是说，邓小平第三次离开权力，还不到1年。也就说第三次邓小平的实力根本就没有受到损失。四五运动的第2天邓小平就被撤销了一切职务。实际上就是邓小平把周恩来推出去当炮灰。说明邓小平和周恩来不是一个派系的。
周惠应该就是邓小平派系的，张曙光我不清楚。
王群和刘明祖的派系，我不知道，但是光看时间就明白了。
王群1987年8月上位的时间正是胡耀邦下台的时间胡耀邦1987年1月下台，王群8月就上位了。所以王群大概率就是陈云的人。所有的省委书记不过是总书记或者总理，一把手或者二把手在地方的代理人而已。
刘明祖1994年8月上位的，陈云1994年5月住院的。
王群和刘明祖的时间线和胡耀邦和陈云完美的吻合。光凭时间线就能把中共的历史搞明白。胡耀邦下台了，陈云就掌权了。陈云住进北京医院，江泽民就掌权了。每个省都一样，每个省委书记不过是总书记的小马仔。湖南也是这样，王茂林和杨正午。就是触类旁通。每个省不过是中央政治斗争的一个缩影，一个映射，一个代理人之争而已。
就是大家先要明白王群是陈云派系的才能明白为什么储波是陈云习近平派系的。储波就是朱镕基提拔的呀，湖南老乡。胡春华后面的王君可能是江泽民派系的，我不太确定。李纪恒可能是习近平派系的。石泰峰是胡锦涛派系的，孙绍骋是江泽民派系的。孙绍骋和现在的总理李强在民政部有交集。
储波和习仲勋的秘书曹志斌到底是什么关系呢？
我们先看徐宪平。
刚刚被抓的发改委副主任。徐宪平和李干杰都曾经是王茂林的下属，
王茂林是薄熙来老爸薄一波的马仔，王茂林提拔的习仲勋的秘书曹志斌。
1985年10月 – 1987年1月，31岁的徐宪平任湖南省岳阳市人事局党组书记、局长。当时的岳阳市长是储波 (1984年7月 – 1986年2月)
1998年2月 – 2003年1月，44岁的徐宪平任湖南省计划委员会主任、党组书记。当时的湖南省长是储波（1998年9月 – 2001年8月）
也就是说徐宪平曾经给储波当过两次下属，一次是在岳阳市，人事局长这么重要的职位，就是在储波担任岳阳市长任期内提拔的徐宪平。第二次徐宪平担任计划委员会主任，现在发改委主任这么重要的职位。虽然不是储波提拔的，但是储波担任两年湖南省长，也没有更换徐宪平。
2000年4月，42岁的李微微任中国国际贸易促进委员会湖南省分会会长。当时湖南省长就是储波（1998年9月 – 2001年8月）。
2008年2月 – 2011年1月，贾庆林马仔岳福洪的秘书王中和任内蒙古自治区赤峰市委副书记、市长。当时的内蒙古书记是储波（2001年8月 – 2009年11月）。
2008年11月 – 2008年12月，53岁的杜梓任内蒙古自治区鄂尔多斯市委书记。当时的内蒙古书记是储波（2001年8月 – 2009年11月）。
也就是说储波曾经是徐宪平，李微微，王中和，杜梓4个被抓官员的上级。不能是巧合吧？这4个官员其实都是储波提拔的。储波都已经80岁了，那么储波到底是谁？习仲勋的秘书曹志斌1995年4月曾经担任湖南省委副秘书长，但是只有几个月，被调到了黑龙江。当时的湖南省委副书记就这么几个人。从时间线上说，曹志斌很可能是给储波当秘书的。因为涉及到习近平老爸习仲勋，习近平做贼心虚，把曹志斌的东西都删掉了。
也就是说，石泰峰在内蒙古倒查20年不是查胡春华，而是查习仲勋秘书曹志斌的老板储波。从时间线上也就看明白了，查胡春华倒查10年就行了，干嘛要倒查20年呢。胡春华去内蒙古之前10年的事情，就算是胡锦涛的马仔，也很难扯得上胡春华吧？
内蒙古第七届第八届党委书记储波和副书记岳福洪都是习近平派系的。石泰峰在内蒙古倒查20年就是要查习仲勋习近平的马仔储波，这是江泽民胡锦涛试图阻止习近平三连任行动的一部分。大外宣就是被石泰峰查的岳福洪的马仔，最终被迫躲到海外去了。的确是有私人恩怨。
石泰峰在内蒙古倒查20年不是查胡春华而是查胡春华的政敌储波。储波的秘书曹志斌就是习仲勋的秘书。石泰峰在内蒙古是给胡春华护盘的。保护胡春华的基本盘。现在石泰峰已经当上中组部长了，那么下一任总书记是谁。这不是明摆着是胡春华吗？
好的，谢谢大家。
英文翻译
The next general secretary has surfaced. Is the limit of Hu Jintao’s power to replace Xi Jinping as general secretary? It has been proved that the head of the Organization Department can be replaced at will. The 20-year investigation in Inner Mongolia is to liquidate Xi Zhongxun’s secretary Chu Bo. It is the outpost of Jiang and Hu’s attack on Xi Jinping’s third term
Hello everyone, let’s focus on the core issue, the general secretary. Today we discuss these topics: where is the limit of Hu Jintao’s power, and whether Xi Jinping can be replaced as general secretary. Second, let’s talk about the 20-year investigation in Inner Mongolia. Who is being investigated? Let’s talk about the 13 party secretaries in Inner Mongolia. Which faction do these 13 party secretaries belong to? You can see the future clearly. From history, from the past, see the future. If the history is not clear, the past is not clear, it is a mess. How can we see the future clearly? Our focus is to discuss what the relationship is between Chu Bo, the Inner Mongolia party secretary before Hu Chunhua, and Xi Zhongxun?
Third, if we can figure out the 20-year investigation in Inner Mongolia, we will naturally understand who the next general secretary is. Who will replace Xi Jinping at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee on August 8 this year?
The replacement of the head of the Organization Department of the Central Committee is a prelude to the replacement of the general secretary and the reorganization of the team
This kind of adjustment is extremely rare in the history of the Communist Party of China during the non-term change period. The Organization Department of the Central Committee controls personnel appointments and is the core tool for the general secretary to consolidate power. As the “chief steward”, the General Office of the Central Committee directly serves the daily operation of the general secretary. Shi Taifeng replaced Li Ganjie as the head of the Organization Department of the Central Committee, and Li Ganjie transferred to the United Front Work Department. This exchange of Politburo members broke the regular rhythm of term change. Historically, similar changes are often accompanied by the replacement of the top leadership. Mao Zedong died on September 9, 1976. The following year, in December 1977, Hu Yaobang replaced Guo Yufeng as the head of the Organization Department of the Central Committee. After Hu Yaobang stepped down in 1987, the Central Plenary Session quickly reorganized the leadership. Hu Yaobang stepped down in January 1987, and Song Ping replaced Wei Jianxing as the Minister of the Organization Department in May 1987. Now, this personnel change in March 2025, combined with the abnormality that the Politburo meeting did not mention “Xi Jinping as the core”, strongly suggests that Xi Jinping’s position as general secretary is in jeopardy.
Jiang Zemin chose to retire in 2002 and did not seek lifelong re-election, showing that Jiang knew how to advance and retreat and preserved the political foundation of the Jiang faction. However, Xi Jinping amended the constitution in 2018 to abolish term limits and was re-elected for the third time in 2022, indicating that Xi Jinping lacks this political wisdom. This “unsure of advance and retreat” choice exposes his political group to risks. After Jiang Zemin retired, he experienced five changes of leadership. In other words, Jiang Zemin’s choices in these five times all had to be played to keep his faction alive. The new Minister of the Organization Department, Shi Taifeng, as Hu Jintao’s “henchman”, may take this opportunity to completely purge Xi Jinping’s faction and shake Xi Jinping’s power base. This is not only a signal of personnel adjustment, but also a turning point in Xi Jinping’s political destiny.
Since the head of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee has changed during the non-term change period, it means that “the term change is coming now”. The normal term change cycle of the CPC is five years, and the next party congress should be the 21st Party Congress in 2027. However, the position exchange between Shi Taifeng and Li Ganjie occurred in March 2025, which is far from the normal time point. Historically, major personnel changes during the non-term change period are often related to power struggles, such as the transition adjustment after Hua Guofeng came to power in 1976, or the emergency reorganization after Hu Yaobang stepped down in 1987. At present, the military purge (He Weidong and others were arrested, and Xi Jinping’s 31st Army was wiped out), the local government turned to the Hu-Wen line (such as “two unshakable”), and this personnel change, point to the possibility of an unconventional term change.
Half of the Central Military Commission is in Qincheng Prison, what a fight
The military exercise against Taiwan was withdrawn in one day. I think this netizen’s comment is very accurate. Half of the Central Military Commission is in Qincheng Prison, what a fight. It’s just that the words are rough but the truth is not rough. The most appropriate way to describe the current state of the Chinese military is to use these four words: no desire to fight. The Great Purge has become so bad that everyone is in danger. How can they still have the heart to fight?
Jiang Zemin’s ability to know when to advance and when to retreat has maintained the long-term influence of the Jiang faction. Xi Jinping, on the other hand, has gone the other way. His three consecutive terms have broken the shallow rules within the party, intensified internal contradictions, and led to the current abnormal adjustment. Shi Taifeng’s appointment, promoted by Hu Jintao, may indicate that the replacement of the general secretary and the reorganization of the team will be completed quickly through the Politburo meeting or the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee. This sign of “immediate change of power” is the direct consequence of Xi Jinping’s loss of power.
The exchange of positions between Shi Taifeng and Li Ganjie points to the collapse of Xi Jinping’s faction. The exchange of positions between Shi Taifeng and Li Ganjie is a “signal that Xi Jinping, the general secretary, will be replaced.” The head of the Organization Department has always been a close confidant of the general secretary, such as Zeng Qinghong to Jiang Zemin, He Guoqiang to Hu Jintao, and Chen Xi and Li Ganjie to Xi Jinping. However, Shi Taifeng’s background is closely linked to Hu Jintao: he is not only a classmate of Li Keqiang and Hu Chunhua at Peking University, but also served as Hu Jintao’s subordinate for 10 years when he was the president of the Central Party School. The fact that such a person with a very distinct Hu Jintao color took over the Organization Department shows that Xi Jinping has lost control of personnel power.
Xi Jinping’s “not knowing when to advance or retreat” in his three consecutive terms has made Xi Jinping’s political group a target of public criticism. Jiang Zemin chose to retire, which saved the Jiang faction’s living space in the Hu Jintao era. However, Xi Jinping’s arrogance has put the “Xi Family Army” in a state of annihilation. As Hu Jintao’s “henchman”, Shi Taifeng may use his position as the Minister of the Organization Department to systematically purge officials from Xi Jinping’s faction and pave the way for the new leadership. Li Ganjie’s transfer to the United Front Work Department seems to be a marginalization to prevent him from interfering with Hu Jintao’s plan. This personnel change is more of a passive result after the collapse of his power than an active layout by Xi Jinping.
Although Hu Jintao has the ability to push Xi Jinping to step down, he cannot cover the sky with one hand. Hu Jintao needs to share power with Jiang Zemin’s political group to form a “horn”. Jiang Zemin’s strategic patience after retirement, although not necessarily out of his own will, is also a helpless move, but it has preserved the long-term influence of Jiang Zemin’s faction, such as Zeng Qinghong’s control of the Organization Department of the Central Committee, Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou as vice chairmen of the Military Commission. If Hu Jintao had confronted Xi Jinping alone, he might have been completely swallowed up by Xi Jinping, but the cooperation between Jiang and Hu constituted a constraint on Xi Jinping. Shi Taifeng’s appointment was the result of Hu Jintao’s leadership, but Hu Jintao’s subsequent personnel arrangements (such as the selection of Politburo members and Standing Committee members) needed to be transferred to Jiang’s faction in half to maintain balance.
Xi Jinping’s “not knowing how to advance or retreat” broke this tacit understanding. The arrogance of being re-elected for three consecutive terms angered the two factions, leading to the current joint counterattack. Each political group has its power boundary, and Jiang Zemin knows how to give in and preserve himself. Hu Jintao was able to regain power with the support of the Jiang faction. However, Xi Jinping ignored the boundaries of power and thought he could run rampant, but was eventually “ruthlessly slapped in the face” by reality. If Shi Taifeng cleans up Xi Jinping’s political group, Hu Jintao will still need to compromise with the Jiang faction to ensure the stability of the new team. This power game highlights Xi Jinping’s isolation and failure.
Xi Jinping has become such a situation today. If the boss of his faction were alive today, he would probably be speechless to see Xi Jinping make Chen Yun’s faction like this.
Today we will talk about Inner Mongolia and see who was promoted by Chen Yun in Inner Mongolia. In fact, Deng Xiaoping was very dissatisfied with Chen Yun, but he was helpless. As the second-in-command of the Deng Xiaoping era, Chen Yun had considerable personnel power. The reason why Deng Xiaoping could tolerate Chen Yun was that Chen Yun knew how to advance and retreat and did not compete with Deng Xiaoping for the top position. Since Chen Yun did not compete with Deng Xiaoping for the top position. Deng Xiaoping had no choice but to do so since Chen Yun had so much personnel power.
Like Zhou Enlai, Zhou Enlai did not compete with Mao Zedong for the top position. Zhou Enlai was the real second-in-command of the Mao Zedong era. Mao Zedong spent 10 years in the Cultural Revolution just to bring down Zhou Enlai, but he didn’t achieve it in the end.
The netizen said, why does Cai still say that Xi Jinping replaced Shi Taifeng? I can’t figure it out.
The netizen replied that it’s because he is a big foreign propaganda.
The netizen said that Lao Du said Shi Taifeng is Xi Jinping’s national teacher, who is deeply trusted and has led the liquidation of Xiao Hu in Inner Mongolia for 20 years. He thinks it is a sign of Xi Jinping’s increased power. What does Teacher Da Bao think?
The netizen replied that Xiao Hu was not liquidated, so doesn’t it mean that Shi Taifeng did not complete Xi Jinping’s task, but was reused? Foreign propaganda said that Li Ganjie was transferred because he did not complete the task well. As a result, both of them did not complete the task well, but one was promoted and the other was demoted?
Let’s look at the problems of the entire CCP from the perspective of Inner Mongolia, a provincial and ministerial unit. The netizen replied that Du is a big foreign propaganda who gets dog food.
Du is Yue Fuhong’s henchman. Yue Fuhong is the deputy secretary of Inner Mongolia. Wang Zhonghe, Yue Fuhong’s secretary, has been arrested. Yue Fuhong was originally the assistant to the mayor of Beijing. It was Jia Qinglin, the mayor of Beijing at that time, who promoted Yue Fuhong. Jia Qinglin promoted Xi Jinping. Yue Fuhong and Xi Jinping were both promoted by Jia Qinglin, which means that Yue Fuhong and Xi Jinping are of the same generation. If Yue Fuhong is Xi Jinping’s junior, then Du is Xi Jinping’s nephew.
The logical reasoning of the second netizen is also very interesting. If Shi Taifeng really failed to purge Hu Chunhua, then Shi Taifeng did not complete his mission.
You see, there have been 13 party secretaries in the history of Inner Mongolia. What do I mean by circling these three times for you? Just these three times are enough to understand the history of the Communist Party of China. Inner Mongolia’s 20-year retrospective investigation is not aimed at Hu Chunhua. 20 years ago in 2020 is Chu Bo. If it is aimed at Hu Chunhua, it should be investigated 10 or 11 years.
Besides, Hu Chunhua has been in Inner Mongolia for a total of 3 years. What could he have done? Chu Bo has been in Inner Mongolia for 8 years. Even if Hu Chunhua was corrupt, he was corrupt in Tibet. He has been in Inner Mongolia for a total of 3 years. He hasn’t even had time to get comfortable.
Let’s first look at what factions these 13 party secretaries belong to.
Ulanhu may be Deng Xiaoping, I’m not sure. Xie Xuegong knows nothing about him, and he has no much connection with today.
You Taizhong is connected with the present. You Taizhong is Zhou Enlai’s man, not Deng Xiaoping. Just look at the time point of 1971 and you will understand. If you compare the time points of Deng Xiaoping, you will understand that Deng Xiaoping returned to serve as vice premier in March 1973. You Taizhong was in 1971, when Deng Xiaoping was being overthrown. How could he have been appointed?
Deng Xiaoping boasted that he had three ups and downs, but in fact, the third time, Deng Xiaoping did not fall. Deng Xiaoping was overthrown for the third time on April 7, 1976, and all his posts were dismissed. On July 16, 1977, Deng Xiaoping resumed his posts as Vice Chairman of the Central Committee and Vice Chairman of the Military Commission. In fact, he resumed his posts in early 1977, but it was not officially announced.
In other words, it was less than a year since Deng Xiaoping left power for the third time. In other words, Deng Xiaoping’s strength was not damaged at all the third time. Deng Xiaoping was dismissed from all his posts on the second day of the April 5th Movement. In fact, Deng Xiaoping pushed Zhou Enlai out as cannon fodder. This shows that Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai were not from the same faction.
Zhou Hui should be from Deng Xiaoping’s faction, but I don’t know about Zhang Shuguang.
I don’t know the factions of Wang Qun and Liu Mingzu, but I can tell by looking at the time.
Wang Qun took office in August 1987, which was exactly when Hu Yaobang stepped down. Hu Yaobang stepped down in January 1987, and Wang Qun took office in August. So Wang Qun is most likely Chen Yun’s man. All provincial party secretaries are nothing but agents of the general secretary or premier, the top or second in command in the local area.
Liu Mingzu took office in August 1994, and Chen Yun was hospitalized in May 1994.
The timeline of Wang Qun and Liu Mingzu perfectly matches that of Hu Yaobang and Chen Yun. The history of the CCP can be understood just by the timeline. Hu Yaobang stepped down, and Chen Yun took power. Chen Yun was hospitalized in Beijing, and Jiang Zemin took power. Every province is the same, and every provincial party secretary is nothing but a lackey of the general secretary. The same is true in Hunan, Wang Maolin and Yang Zhengwu. It is just a matter of analogy. Every province is nothing but a microcosm of the central political struggle, a reflection, a struggle of agents.
Everyone must first understand that Wang Qun is from Chen Yun’s faction before they can understand why Chu Bo is from Chen Yun and Xi Jinping’s faction. Chu Bo was promoted by Zhu Rongji, a fellow Hunanese. Wang Jun behind Hu Chunhua may be from Jiang Zemin’s faction, but I am not sure. Li Jiheng may be from Xi Jinping’s faction. Shi Taifeng is from Hu Jintao’s faction, and Sun Shaocheng is from Jiang Zemin’s faction. Sun Shaocheng and the current Prime Minister Li Qiang have intersections in the Ministry of Civil Affairs.
What is the relationship between Chu Bo and Xi Zhongxun’s secretary Cao Zhibin?
Let’s look at Xu Xianping first.
The deputy director of the Development and Reform Commission who was just arrested. Xu Xianping and Li Ganjie were both subordinates of Wang Maolin.
Wang Maolin is a henchman of Bo Xilai’s father Bo Yibo, and Wang Maolin promoted Xi Zhongxun’s secretary Cao Zhibin.
From October 1985 to January 1987, 31-year-old Xu Xianping served as the party secretary and director of the Personnel Bureau of Yueyang City, Hunan Province. The mayor of Yueyang at that time was Chu Bo (July 1984-February 1986)
From February 1998 to January 2003, 44-year-old Xu Xianping served as the director and party secretary of the Hunan Provincial Planning Commission. The governor of Hunan at that time was Chu Bo (September 1998 – August 2001)
That is to say, Xu Xianping had been Chu Bo’s subordinate twice. Once in Yueyang City, Xu Xianping was promoted to such an important position as the director of the Personnel Bureau during Chu Bo’s term as the mayor of Yueyang. The second time, Xu Xianping served as the director of the Planning Commission, and now the director of the Development and Reform Commission. Although he was not promoted by Chu Bo, Chu Bo served as the governor of Hunan for two years and did not replace Xu Xianping.
In April 2000, 42-year-old Li Weiwei was appointed as the chairman of the Hunan Branch of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade. The governor of Hunan at that time was Chu Bo (September 1998 – August 2001).
From February 2008 to January 2011, Wang Zhonghe, the secretary of Jia Qinglin’s henchman Yue Fuhong, served as the deputy secretary and mayor of Chifeng Municipal Party Committee of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. The secretary of Inner Mongolia at that time was Chu Bo (August 2001 – November 2009).
From November 2008 to December 2008, 53-year-old Du Zi served as the secretary of the Ordos Municipal Party Committee of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. The secretary of Inner Mongolia at that time was Chu Bo (August 2001-November 2009).
In other words, Chu Bo was the superior of the four arrested officials Xu Xianping, Li Weiwei, Wang Zhonghe, and Du Zi. It can’t be a coincidence, right? These four officials were actually promoted by Chu Bo. Chu Bo is already 80 years old, so who is Chu Bo? Xi Zhongxun’s secretary Cao Zhibin served as the deputy secretary-general of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee in April 1995, but only for a few months, he was transferred to Heilongjiang. At that time, there were only a few deputy secretaries of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee. From the timeline, Cao Zhibin was likely to be Chu Bo’s secretary. Because it involved Xi Jinping’s father Xi Zhongxun, Xi Jinping was guilty and deleted all of Cao Zhibin’s things.
In other words, Shi Taifeng’s 20-year investigation in Inner Mongolia was not to investigate Hu Chunhua, but to investigate Chu Bo, the boss of Xi Zhongxun’s secretary Cao Zhibin. It is clear from the timeline that it would be enough to investigate Hu Chunhua 10 years ago, why do we have to investigate 20 years ago? What happened 10 years before Hu Chunhua went to Inner Mongolia, even if he was Hu Jintao’s lackey, it would be difficult to link Hu Chunhua, right?
Chu Bo, the secretary of the 7th and 8th Party Committees of Inner Mongolia, and Yue Fuhong, the deputy secretary, were both from Xi Jinping’s faction. Shi Taifeng’s 20-year investigation in Inner Mongolia was to investigate Xi Zhongxun and Xi Jinping’s lackey Chu Bo. This was part of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s attempt to prevent Xi Jinping from being re-elected for a third term. The big foreign propaganda was Yue Fuhong’s lackey investigated by Shi Taifeng, and in the end He was forced to hide overseas. There is indeed a personal grudge.
Shi Taifeng’s investigation in Inner Mongolia for 20 years was not to investigate Hu Chunhua but Hu Chunhua’s political enemy Chu Bo. Chu Bo’s secretary Cao Zhibin was Xi Zhongxun’s secretary. Shi Taifeng was protecting Hu Chunhua in Inner Mongolia. He was protecting Hu Chunhua’s base. Now that Shi Taifeng has become the Minister of Organization, who will be the next general secretary? Isn’t it obvious that it will be Hu Chunhua?
Okay, thank you everyone.
END