大家好，2025年6月17日，习近平在中国-中亚峰会“大撒币”仅仅15亿人民币，相比2023年260亿暴跌94%，连零头都不剩。中国再穷也不至于缺这260亿，再说，习近平从来也不管韭菜的死活，习近平为何如此寒酸？这不是没钱，是习近平丧失大权。从毛泽东勒紧裤腰带援第三世界，到习近平昔日豪掷千亿，如今缩水表明习近平的下台危机，四中全会习近平必然下台。

地理参考信息

2025年6月17日，习近平在哈萨克斯坦阿斯塔纳中国-中亚峰会宣布向中亚国家提供15亿元人民币无偿援助，用于民生项目。宁予友邦，不予家奴，帮中亚国家发展民生。相比2023年5月19日西安峰会融资+无偿援助的260亿元，暴跌94%。“习近平连撒币的底气都没了，财政被 政治局卡死。”中国2024年财政收入21.3万亿，260亿仅占0.12%，绝非“没钱”。以前一次大撒币就是260亿，现在才15亿，够大撒币17次。规模相差太远了。

习近平军权崩塌（苗华5月31日被查、何卫东4月失踪、许其亮6月2日猝死），白俄6月9日删除习明泽报道、彭丽媛被边控，表明习近平权力的瓦解。现在习近平连大撒币的钱都没有了。

2023年5月19日，习近平在西安中国-中亚峰会承诺260亿元融资与无偿援助，支持中亚安全、互联互通。2025年6月17日，阿斯塔纳峰会仅承诺15亿元无偿援助，暴跌94%。网友称：“15亿连买个面子都不够，习近平被政治局架空。”网友讽刺：“共匪撒币买友好，8510亿美元砸中亚，如今15亿寒酸透顶。”

尽管中国经济承压，但260亿元仅仅占中国财政收入0.12%，远非不能负担。习近平以前也从来不管韭菜死活啊，中国再没钱也不能耽误习近平大撒币啊。

大撒币缩水94%那肯都输出经济原因，而是习近平失去大权，政治局削其外交影响力。习近平这次出国参加中国中亚峰会也就是演戏，维护中国在中亚的基本盘。

政治

毛泽东时代：1950-1970年代，毛泽东为争第三世界领导权，不惜让百姓勒紧裤腰带援外。1960-1978年，援外总计750亿元，约1978年GDP的20%，支持阿尔巴尼亚、越南、坦赞铁路20亿元。经济学家杨小凯估算：1960年代援外占财政10-20%，百姓挨饿，教育、医疗被挤压。“毛时代饿死人也要撒币，习近平连15亿都抠门。”

毛泽东以“输出革命”换国际支持，1976年经济濒临崩溃。习近平继承撒币传统，但2025年15亿寒酸，远不及毛时代气魄。

习近平2013-2022年“一带一路”大撒币万亿，2023年中亚大撒币260亿、2024年大撒币非洲3600亿，均碾压现在的15亿，如今缩水表明习近平无权延续豪掷， 政治局掐断习近平的外交野心。

2018年中非峰会：习近平大撒币600亿美元（约4200亿元人民币），涵盖贷款、投资、无偿援助，搞成“债务陷阱外交”。
2023年中国-中亚峰会：260亿元（融资+无偿），支持中亚安全、能源，“买影响力”。
2024年中非峰会：3600亿元（三年承诺），提升中非关系，网友批评“国内民生无望”。

2025年15亿仅为2023年的5.8%，2018年的0.36%。“万亿撒币换来中亚冷眼，习近平失势无钱可撒。”

习近平撒币从260亿暴跌至15亿，缩水94%，连零头都不剩。这不是没钱，是大权旁落。对比毛泽东饿死百姓援第三世界，习近平昔日4200亿、3600亿豪掷，如今15亿寒酸，政治局拍死习近平大撒币外交。习近平下台进入倒计时。

2025年6月18日，央视新闻高调报道习近平结束中国-中亚峰会回北京，还特意强调蔡奇、王毅同机返回。哈萨克总统托卡耶夫都到机场送行了，习近平不回国还能去哪儿？央视此举画蛇添足，欲盖弥彰。传言习近平要流亡哈萨克斯坦，也可能借道哈萨克斯坦流亡俄罗斯，如今伊朗被以色列重创，流亡路全断。

2025年6月18日，央视新闻报道习近平结束在哈萨克斯坦阿斯塔纳的中国-中亚峰会后返回北京，特意提及政治局常委蔡奇、外长王毅同机返回。哈萨克总统托卡耶夫亲自到机场送行，此行习近平仅仅访问一个国家，习近平回国理所当然，央视强调“同机返回”显得多余，是否回应流亡传言？网上早前传言习近平可能因失去大权流亡哈萨克斯坦，也可能借道哈萨克斯坦流亡俄罗斯。

伊朗因遭以色列袭击，局势动荡，习近平“流亡伊朗”的路被堵死。习近平军权崩塌（苗华、何卫东、许其亮倒台），央视报道就是在在掩盖流亡恐慌。新华社确认哈萨克斯坦总统托卡耶夫率高官送行，哈萨克斯坦是唯一访问国，回国是唯一去向。“托卡耶夫都送机了，央视还怕习近平跑了？这就是画蛇添足，说明央视知道习近平要流亡的传言。

央视以往报道出访回国（如2023年西安峰会）仅提领导人，未强调随行人员。蔡奇（ 政治局常委，习近平亲信）、王毅（外长）同机是惯例，特意提及似为证明习近平“正常回国”，反衬其欲盖弥彰，回应X平台流亡传言。

央视画蛇添足，特提蔡奇、王毅同机，间接证实其知悉流亡传言，试图平息国内恐慌。

习近平5月20日至6月3日“消失两周”，6月4日会见白俄总统卢卡申科，坐实了习近平已经被赶出了瀛台的总书记办公室，被赶到了丰泽园。6月16日，习近平访问哈萨克斯坦，高强度外交活动表明习近平并非是健康问题，而是政治斗争。6月13日的消息说，习近平被传心脏病恶化、遭逼宫，欲流亡哈萨克斯坦，甚至借道俄罗斯。
习近平6月16-18日访哈萨克托卡耶夫亲自接送，签署“永久睦邻友好条约”。哈萨克作为“一带一路”枢纽，可能为习近平流亡“中转站”。但托卡耶夫送行与15亿援款显示外交正常，流亡哈萨克可能性低。

俄罗斯：习近平5月8日访俄，与普京关系密切，习近平可能街道哈萨克流亡俄。

6月16日，伊朗遭以色列袭击，局势动荡。中国购买了90%伊朗出口石油，习近平谴责以色列，但是伊朗自顾不暇，习近平流亡之路被堵。

习近平失势，被架空，流亡传言因失权而生。”央视报道“画蛇添足”，意在掩盖体制内对习近平流亡的恐慌。

央视6月18日报道习近平回北京，特提蔡奇、王毅同机，画蛇添足。托卡耶夫机场送行，习近平不回国还能去哪儿？

这名网友说，
万里是周派的四个弱证据：1. 当年鲁豫有约先后采访了万宝宝和薄瓜瓜。2. 万宝宝和陈晓丹先后参加了同款豪华成年礼。3. 万宝宝被采访提及门当户对的候选时提到了薄瓜瓜（这个内容现在已经被删了）。4. 轮媒不爆万里黑料，还说万里好话，说江泽民怕他，至死不敢得罪，
我的回复是，我之前也有怀疑过万里。万里的儿子万伯翱好像和习近平家走的比较近。具体我也不清楚。万里的年代太久远了，不太容易说清楚。

这名网友说，
大包，李成林什么派系
我的回复是，你这么随口一问，我只能给你随便一下。应该是胡锦涛派系的马仔。

星期三（6月18日）才官宣出任中共北京市委常委的李成林，已任市委组织部部长。

据北京日报客户端星期三报道，近日中共中央批准，李成林任北京市委委员、常委。 北京市政府门户网站“首都之窗”后来更新显示，李成林已任市委组织部部长。此前，北京市委副书记游钧担任市委组织部部长。

公开资料显示，李成林今年57岁，吉林大安人。他早年在吉林工作，曾任吉林省纪委常委、省监察厅副厅长，吉林省高级法院党组副书记、副院长（正厅长级），吉林省纪委副书记、省监察委员会副主任等职。

李成林在2019年起先后担任辽宁省检察院副检察长、代理检察长、党组书记、省委政法委委员，辽宁省检察院党组书记、检察长、省委政法委委员。

2023年1月，李成林调任山西省副省长、省公安厅厅长，后于2024年2月出任最高法院党组成员、 政治部主任，至此番履新。

我们看李成林的晋升途径。大概率就不是习近平的人。正常的晋升途径是什么呢？地级市长，市委书记，副省长，省委常委

李成林一看就不是常规的晋升途径，省检察长，副省长，最高法政治部主任，省委常委。而且李成林这个省委常委还是一个份量挺重的省委常委，北京市，就是所谓的首都，组织部长。李成林的派系，难度很大，李成林的一个上级是天津出身的官员。天津的官员，就要考虑是不是和李瑞环有关系。

李瑞环和温家宝出来难道真的是陪习近平喝酒，那是要出来收拾习近平的。大外宣编了一个故事，习近平把温家宝硬架出来，给习近平捧场。习近平但凡大权在握，他能让温家宝出来吗？能让李瑞环出来吗？

李瑞环是邓小平的铁杆马仔，幕后黑手就是胡锦涛。胡锦涛继承的是邓小平军事政治集团。这是所谓改开之后最大的军事政治集团。李成林如果是李瑞环的马仔徒孙子辈分的，甚至是重孙子辈分的。那就说明幕后操盘的就是胡锦涛。毕竟北京市的组织部长，有那么一点点象征性的意义。

现在中组部长石泰峰，就是胡锦涛的马仔，当然都提拔自己人了。

好的，谢谢大家。

《原文链接》

英文翻译

Xi Jinping’s big money-spending has shrunk severely. CCTV strictly prevents Xi Jinping from going into exile in Kazakhstan. 26 billion has been reduced to 1.5 billion, and Xi cannot spend big money. The faction of Beijing Organization Minister Li Chenglin proves that he is the mastermind behind the scenes

Hello everyone, on June 17, 2025, Xi Jinping’s “big money-spending” at the China-Central Asia Summit was only 1.5 billion yuan, a 94% drop from 26 billion in 2023, not even a fraction left. No matter how poor China is, it will not lack this 26 billion. Besides, Xi Jinping never cares about the life and death of leeks. Why is Xi Jinping so shabby? This is not because of lack of money, but because Xi Jinping has lost power. From Mao Zedong tightening his belt to aid the third world to Xi Jinping’s lavish spending of hundreds of billions in the past, the current shrinkage shows that Xi Jinping is in crisis of stepping down. Xi Jinping will inevitably step down at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee.

On June 17, 2025, Xi Jinping announced at the China-Central Asia Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan that he would provide 1.5 billion yuan in free aid to Central Asian countries for livelihood projects. It is better to give to friendly countries than to domestic slaves, and help Central Asian countries develop people’s livelihood. Compared with the 26 billion yuan of financing + free aid at the Xi’an Summit on May 19, 2023, it plummeted by 94%. “Xi Jinping has lost the confidence to spend money, and the finances are blocked by the Politburo.” China’s fiscal revenue in 2024 is 21.3 trillion yuan, and 26 billion yuan only accounts for 0.12%, which is definitely not “no money”. In the past, a big money-spending was 26 billion, but now it is only 1.5 billion, enough to spend money 17 times. The scale is too far apart.

Xi Jinping’s military power collapsed (Miao Hua was investigated on May 31, He Weidong disappeared in April, and Xu Qiliang died suddenly on June 2), Belarus deleted the report on Xi Mingze on June 9, and Peng Liyuan was placed under border control, indicating the collapse of Xi Jinping’s power. Now Xi Jinping has no money to spend money.

On May 19, 2023, Xi Jinping pledged 26 billion yuan in financing and grants at the China-Central Asia Summit in Xi’an to support security and connectivity in Central Asia. On June 17, 2025, the Astana Summit only pledged 1.5 billion yuan in grants, a 94% drop. Netizens said: “1.5 billion is not even enough to buy face, Xi Jinping has been sidelined by the Politburo.” Netizens sarcastically said: “The Communist bandits spend money to buy friendship, 851 billion US dollars to Central Asia, and now 1.5 billion is shabby.”

Although China’s economy is under pressure, 26 billion yuan only accounts for 0.12% of China’s fiscal revenue, which is far from unaffordable. Xi Jinping never cared about the lives of leeks before. No matter how poor China is, it can’t delay Xi Jinping’s big spending.

The 94% reduction in big spending is not due to economic reasons, but Xi Jinping’s loss of power and the Politburo’s reduction of his diplomatic influence. Xi Jinping’s trip abroad to attend the China-Central Asia Summit is just a show to maintain China’s basic base in Central Asia.

Mao Zedong era: In the 1950s and 1970s, Mao Zedong did not hesitate to let the people tighten their belts to provide foreign aid in order to compete for the leadership of the Third World. From 1960 to 1978, foreign aid totaled 75 billion yuan, about 20% of the GDP in 1978, and 2 billion yuan was used to support Albania, Vietnam, and the Tanzania-Zambia Railway. Economist Yang Xiaokai estimated that foreign aid accounted for 10-20% of the fiscal budget in the 1960s, the people were starving, and education and medical care were squeezed. “In the Mao era, people were starving to death and they had to spend money. Xi Jinping is stingy even with 1.5 billion yuan.”

Mao Zedong exchanged international support for “exporting revolution”, and the economy was on the verge of collapse in 1976. Xi Jinping inherited the tradition of spending money, but 1.5 billion yuan in 2025 is shabby, far less than the spirit of the Mao era.

Xi Jinping spent trillions of dollars on the Belt and Road Initiative from 2013 to 2022, 26 billion dollars on Central Asia in 2023, and 360 billion dollars on Africa in 2024, all of which are much higher than the current 1.5 billion. The current reduction shows that Xi Jinping has no right to continue the lavish spending, and the Politburo has cut off Xi Jinping’s diplomatic ambitions.

2018 China-Africa Summit: Xi Jinping spent 60 billion US dollars (about 420 billion yuan), covering loans, investments, and grants, turning it into a “debt trap diplomacy”.

2023 China-Central Asia Summit: 26 billion yuan (financing + grants), supporting Central Asian security and energy, “buying influence”.

2024 China-Africa Summit: 360 billion yuan (three-year commitment), improving China-Africa relations, netizens criticized “domestic people’s livelihood hopeless”.

1.5 billion in 2025 is only 5.8% of 2023 and 0.36% of 2018. “Trillions of dollars spent in exchange for Central Asia’s cold eyes, Xi Jinping has lost power and has no money to spend.”

Xi Jinping’s spending has plummeted from 26 billion to 1.5 billion, a 94% decrease, not even a fraction left. This is not a lack of money, but a loss of power. Compared with Mao Zedong’s aid to the Third World, which starved people to death, Xi Jinping’s former 420 billion and 360 billion spent lavishly, but now 1.5 billion is shabby. The Politburo has killed Xi Jinping’s big-spending diplomacy. The countdown to Xi Jinping’s resignation has begun.

On June 18, 2025, CCTV News reported in a high-profile manner that Xi Jinping returned to Beijing after the China-Central Asia Summit, and specifically emphasized that Cai Qi and Wang Yi returned on the same plane. Kazakh President Tokayev went to the airport to see him off. Where else can Xi Jinping go if he doesn’t return to China? CCTV’s move is superfluous and makes things worse. It is rumored that Xi Jinping will go into exile in Kazakhstan, or he may go to Russia via Kazakhstan. Now Iran has been hit hard by Israel, and the road to exile has been completely cut off.

On June 18, 2025, CCTV News reported that Xi Jinping returned to Beijing after the China-Central Asia Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, and specifically mentioned that Political Bureau Standing Committee member Cai Qi and Foreign Minister Wang Yi returned on the same plane. Kazakh President Tokayev personally went to the airport to see him off. Xi Jinping only visited one country on this trip, so it was natural for Xi Jinping to return to China. CCTV emphasized that “returning on the same plane” seemed redundant. Is it responding to rumors of exile? Earlier rumors on the Internet said that Xi Jinping might go into exile in Kazakhstan due to the loss of power, or he might go into exile in Russia via Kazakhstan.

Iran was attacked by Israel and the situation was turbulent, and Xi Jinping’s way to “exile in Iran” was blocked. Xi Jinping’s military power collapsed (Miao Hua, He Weidong, and Xu Qiliang fell), and CCTV’s report was just covering up the panic of exile. Xinhua News Agency confirmed that Kazakh President Tokayev led senior officials to see him off. Kazakhstan was the only country he visited, and returning to China was the only destination. “Tokayev has already seen Xi Jinping off at the airport, is CCTV still afraid that Xi Jinping will run away? This is superfluous, indicating that CCTV knows about the rumor that Xi Jinping is going into exile.

CCTV used to report on visits and return to China (such as the 2023 Xi’an Summit) only mentioned the leaders, without emphasizing the accompanying personnel. It is customary for Cai Qi (a member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee, Xi Jinping’s confidant) and Wang Yi (foreign minister) to be on the same plane. The special mention seems to prove that Xi Jinping “returned to China normally”, which contrasts with its attempt to cover up the truth and respond to the exile rumors on the X platform.

CCTV added superfluous words, specifically mentioning that Cai Qi and Wang Yi were on the same plane, indirectly confirming that it knew about the exile rumors and trying to calm domestic panic.

Xi Jinping “disappeared for two weeks” from May 20 to June 3, and met with Belarusian President Lukashenko on June 4, confirming that Xi Jinping had been driven out of the General Secretary’s Office in Yingtai and driven to Fengze Garden. On June 16, Xi Jinping visited Kazakhstan. The high-intensity diplomatic activities showed that Xi Jinping’s health problem was not a political problem. Struggle. According to the news on June 13, Xi Jinping was rumored to have a worsening heart disease and was forced to abdicate. He wanted to go into exile in Kazakhstan, or even through Russia.
Xi Jinping visited Kazakhstan from June 16 to 18. Tokayev personally picked him up and signed the “Permanent Good-Neighborly Friendship Treaty”. As a hub of the “Belt and Road Initiative”, Kazakhstan may be a “transit station” for Xi Jinping’s exile. But Tokayev’s farewell and 1.5 billion in aid showed that diplomacy was normal and the possibility of exile in Kazakhstan was low.

Russia: Xi Jinping visited Russia on May 8 and had a close relationship with Putin. Xi Jinping may go into exile in Russia through Kazakhstan.

On June 16, Iran was attacked by Israel and the situation was turbulent. China purchased 90% of Iran’s exported oil. Xi Jinping condemned Israel, but Iran was too busy to take care of itself, and Xi Jinping’s exile was blocked.

Xi Jinping lost power and was sidelined. Rumors of exile arose because of his loss of power. “CCTV’s report was “superfluous”, intended to cover up the panic within the system about Xi Jinping’s exile.

CCTV reported on Xi Jinping’s return to Beijing on June 18, and specifically mentioned that Cai Qi and Wang Yi were on the same plane, which was superfluous. Tokayev saw Xi Jinping off at the airport. Where else could Xi Jinping go if he didn’t return to China?

This netizen said,
Four weak evidences that Wan Li is a member of Zhou’s faction: 1. Lu Yu You Yue interviewed Wan Baobao and Bo Guagua successively. 2. Wan Baobao and Chen Xiaodan successively attended the same luxurious coming-of-age ceremony. 3. Wan Baobao mentioned Bo Guagua when he was interviewed about candidates for a good match (this content has been deleted now). 4. The media did not expose Wan Li’s black material, but said good things about Wan Li, saying that Jiang Zemin was afraid of him and dared not offend him until his death.
My reply was that I had doubted Wan Li before. Wan Li’s son Wan Bo’ao seemed to be close to Xi Jinping’s family. I don’t know the details. Wan Li’s era was too long ago, and it is not easy to say clearly.

This netizen said,
Da Bao, what faction does Li Chenglin belong to?
My reply was that since you asked so casually, I can only give you a random answer. He should be a lackey of Hu Jintao’s faction.

Li Chenglin, who was officially announced as a member of the Standing Committee of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China on Wednesday (June 18), has been appointed as the Minister of the Municipal Party Committee Organization Department.

According to the Beijing Daily client on Wednesday, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China recently approved Li Chenglin to serve as a member and standing member of the Beijing Municipal Committee. The Beijing Municipal Government Portal “Capital Window” later updated to show that Li Chenglin has been appointed as the Minister of the Municipal Party Committee Organization Department. Previously, Beijing Municipal Party Committee Deputy Secretary You Jun served as the Minister of the Municipal Party Committee Organization Department.

Public information shows that Li Chenglin is 57 years old and is from Da’an, Jilin. He worked in Jilin in his early years and served as a member of the Standing Committee of the Jilin Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection and Deputy Director of the Provincial Supervision Department, Deputy Secretary of the Party Group and Deputy President of the Jilin Provincial High Court (at the level of a full-time director), Deputy Secretary of the Jilin Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection, and Deputy Director of the Provincial Supervision Commission.

Li Chenglin has served as Deputy Prosecutor General, Acting Prosecutor General, Secretary of the Party Group, and Member of the Provincial Party Committee Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Liaoning Provincial Procuratorate since 2019, Secretary of the Party Group, Prosecutor General, and Member of the Provincial Party Committee Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Liaoning Provincial Procuratorate.

In January 2023, Li Chenglin was transferred to the post of Vice Governor of Shanxi Province and Director of the Provincial Public Security Department. Later, in February 2024, he became a member of the Party Leadership Group and Director of the Political Department of the Supreme Court until his new appointment.

Let’s look at Li Chenglin’s promotion path. It is highly likely that he is not Xi Jinping’s man. What is the normal promotion path? Mayor of a prefecture-level city, Party Secretary, Vice Governor, Member of the Standing Committee of the Provincial Party Committee

Li Chenglin’s promotion path is not a regular one. He is the Provincial Procurator General, Vice Governor, Director of the Political Department of the Supreme Court, and Member of the Standing Committee of the Provincial Party Committee. Moreover, Li Chenglin, a member of the Standing Committee of the Provincial Party Committee, is a very important member of the Standing Committee of the Provincial Party Committee. Beijing, the so-called capital, is the Minister of Organization. Li Chenglin’s faction is very difficult. One of Li Chenglin’s superiors is an official from Tianjin. Officials in Tianjin have to consider whether they have a relationship with Li Ruihuan.

Did Li Ruihuan and Wen Jiabao really come out to accompany Xi Jinping to drink? That was to come out to deal with Xi Jinping. The big foreign propaganda made up a story that Xi Jinping forced Wen Jiabao out to show his support for Xi Jinping. If Xi Jinping holds power, can he let Wen Jiabao come out? Can he let Li Ruihuan come out?

Li Ruihuan is Deng Xiaoping’s staunch henchman, and the mastermind behind the scenes is Hu Jintao. Hu Jintao inherited Deng Xiaoping’s military and political group. This is the largest military and political group after the so-called reform and opening up. If Li Chenglin is a grandson of Li Ruihuan’s henchman, or even a great-grandson, then it means that Hu Jintao is the one behind the scenes. After all, the head of the Organization Department of Beijing has a little symbolic significance.

Now the head of the Organization Department of the Central Committee, Shi Taifeng, is Hu Jintao’s henchman, and of course he promoted his own people.

OK, thank you everyone.

END

大家好，
这名网友说，
河北人事厅长，杨燕伟，6月17日官宣落马。
我的回复是
抓杨燕伟，可能是要抓李小鹏和倪岳峰大秘廉毅敏，赵一德等人。这个厅长不简单。

据微信公众号“浙江政协同心苑”消息，6月10日至13日，全国政协副主席王勇带领全国政协调研组赴浙江，围绕“优化重大生产力布局”开展专题调研。全国政协调研组成员苗圩、易会满、赵争平、戴东昌、黄玉治、赵凡、阎京华等参加。省领导张振丰、尹学群、王双全，杭州市领导马卫光、宁波市领导陈龙参加有关调研。

这也意味着，此前担任湖南省委常委、省纪委书记、省监委主任的王双全已重回浙江，出任浙江省领导。

首先这个消息就比较怪，王双全的岁数比较大，62岁，63岁退休。这个新闻是浙江政协发的，王双全要担任浙江政协副主席。但是之前王双全是湖南省纪委书记，纪委书记和政协副主席是一样的退休年龄。都是63岁退休，那么这样操作有什么意义呢？除非王双全是要接任浙江政协主席，政协主席是正部级，就可以65岁退居二线，70岁退休。可是现任浙江政协主席廉毅敏是61岁，还比王双全小一岁。那么只能推测要抓廉毅敏给王双全腾位置。

现在还没有抓廉毅敏，那么王双全是什么背景呢？王双全很明显和胡锦涛胡春华有交集，因为他是西藏官员。

2021年05月 – 2025年5月，王双全担任湖南省纪委书记。

王双全在这4年的湖南省纪委书记的任期之内，他干了什么呢？
2023年，郴州市委书记易鹏飞，湖南湘西州长龙晓华，湖南省政府秘书长王群被抓，其中王群是许达哲大秘。
2024年，郴州市委书记，湖南副省长戴道晋，徐守盛/杜家毫大秘被抓
湖南怀化市委书记，彭国甫被抓
湖南省永州市人，公安部副部长刘跃进被抓，刘跃进是郭声琨提拔的
湖南怀化市委书记，雷绍业被抓
湖南政协主席李微微被抓，李微微是薄熙来和朱镕基马仔
湖南书记许达哲被抓，暂未官宣
这其中，刘跃进，李微微，许达哲副部级，正部级，不是王双全有权限能够抓的。但是毕竟是湖南官员，或者湖南人。王双全在其中配合也是很有可能。中纪委派专案组去湖南省调查，湖南省纪委要配合啊。

2025年，张家界官员，湖南省委副秘书长龚文密被抓，龚文密是梅克保大秘
张家界官员，湖南省环保厅长邓立佳被抓，邓立佳是熊清泉秘书
湖北省委书记，湖南人蒋超良被抓，蒋超良的后台是戴相龙/王岐山/朱镕基
湖南常德书记，天津组织部长被抓，周德睿。周德睿的后台是秦光荣，熊清泉。熊清泉是宋任穷习仲勋提拔的，朱镕基的中学同学。
湖南副省长，发改委副主任徐宪平被抓，徐宪平的后台是马凯。马凯的后台是朱镕基和王岐山
湖南省永州市人，山西省长金湘军被抓。金湘军的后台是朱镕基和曹伯纯。
蒋超良，周德睿，徐宪平，金湘军不是王双全的权限能够抓的，只可能是王双全配合中纪委。
龚文密和邓立佳是正局级官员，就是王双全抓的。

就这么看，王双全是灭包主力，他就不可能是习近平的人。

王双全是西藏官员，和胡锦涛胡春华有交集。

1993年11月至1995年07月，30岁的王双全任西藏高级法院党组成员、办公室主任。院长白钊 （1993年1月 – 2003年1月）。白钊到底是谁提拔的，不知道，但是邓小平1973年复出。毛泽东死的时候邓小平短暂被打倒。实际不到一年，毛泽东一死，邓小平就复出了。胡锦涛去西藏当党委书记的时候，只是邓小平的一个小马仔而已。邓小平为什么安排胡锦涛去西藏，就是因为邓小平之前在西藏就有马仔，就有代理人。

白钊和胡春华有直接的交集。西藏农村工作会议2006年2月16日下午和2月17日上午举行分组讨论，与会人员围绕会议精神，根据各自工作实际，踊跃发言，谈发展，谈体会，谈思路，气氛非常热烈，参加讨论的代表纷纷表示，要扎实工作，开拓创新，努力建设社会主义新农村。自治区党委常务副书记胡春华、自治区人大常委会副主任白钊、自治区副主席次仁、自治区政协副主席加保参加了分组讨论。

2003年08月至2005年07月，40岁的王双全任西藏自治区高级人民法院常务副院长、党组副书记（正厅级）。当时的西藏党委书记是郭金龙（2000年9月 – 2004年12月），西藏党委常委秘书长是胡春华（2001年7月 – 2003年11月）。也就是说，王双全的正局级很可能是胡春华提拔的或者说，郭金龙提拔的。胡春华就是郭金龙的大秘。

杨松最早就是胡锦涛的下属

2005年07月至2010年09月，42岁的王双全任西藏自治区党委政法委常务副书记，区维稳办第一副主任。当时的西藏政法委书记是杨松 (2002年12月 – 2005年11月）。

我们看杨松的前任就行，杨松接任陈训秋担任湖北省委副书记。陈训秋应该是李克强的背景。杨松接替苗圩担任武汉市委书记。苗圩据说是李克强中学同班同学。杨松接替胡春华担任西藏政府常务副主席。

1990年12月 – 1993年1月，40岁的杨松任西藏自治区“一江两河”开发建设委员会办公室副主任、党组副书记。1989年，胡锦涛在向中央汇报工作时提出“在经济建设方面突出抓好农牧业的开发和能源、交通建设、首先要抓好一江两河流域的综合大开发”。也就是说杨松最早就是胡锦涛的下属。

1991年初，西藏自治区“一江两河”开发建设委员会成立。经国务院批准的雅鲁藏布江、年楚河、拉萨河综合开发建设工程开工，这是西藏当时规模最大、投资最多、历时最长、涉及多行业、多学科的浩大工程。

胡锦涛在清华学的就是水利工程。河南省委书记刘宁就是胡锦涛马仔，也是搞水利出身的。杨松就是西藏一江两河办公室副主任出身。综合来看，王双全就是胡锦涛，胡春华的马仔。

这名网友说，
大包啊，如果你属于胡锦涛集团的宣传系统，麻烦你给胡锦涛带个话，让他把蔡奇或者丁薛祥甚至习远平给抓了，这样大家就放心了。
我的回复是，你是在搞节目效果吗？我还有这本事，给胡锦涛带话呢，指挥胡锦涛呢。我还能指挥胡春华呢？再说蔡奇和丁薛祥也不能说抓就抓，胡春华如果听我指挥，那我就让他抓习近平。他如果这个月把浙江政协主席廉毅敏抓了，说明胡春华听我指挥。还有河北省委书记倪岳峰和陕西省委书记赵一德。

我们看一下廉毅敏。
2013年3月，49岁的廉毅敏任山西省人民政府秘书长、党组成员，省人民政府办公厅党组书记，兼任省人民政府应急办主任。当时的山西省长是李小鹏（2013年1月 – 2016年8月）。

2016年11月，52岁的廉毅敏升任中共山西省委常委、统战部部长。廉毅敏给山西省长李小鹏当过4年的大秘。

这名网友说，
李鹏不是江派人马吗？
我的回复是，你真的不是来搞笑的吗？1988年李鹏已经是中国总理，当时江蛤还只是上海市委书记一个小马仔。按照你的说法，那么中国总理温家宝就是上海市委书记韩正的马仔。现在的中国总理李强就是上海市委书记陈吉宁的马仔呗。

李鹏是陈云的马仔李鹏是习近平干爹。习近平带着彭丽媛多次和李鹏合影。带老婆说明这是私人场合。而江绵恒没有出席陈云120周年纪念会。大外宣天天在洗脑，不能是我不让江绵恒去的吧。陈云如果提拔过江泽民，江绵恒能不去吗？

2021年9月，57岁的廉毅敏任中共河北省委副书记。
2022年6月，58岁的廉毅敏兼任省委秘书长。当时的河北省委书记是倪岳峰 （2022年4月22日 – ）

也就是说廉毅敏以省委副书记的省份给倪岳峰兼任大秘，这也是很罕见的。我们看河北省委副书记，李干杰，赵一德，陈刚，廉毅敏都是河北省委副书记。
陈刚仅仅担任了两个月的河北省委副书记。前后李干杰，赵一德，廉毅敏。如果都是习近平的铁杆马仔的话，那么陈刚很可能就是排挤走的。这个赵一德，浙江官员什么跑到河北去当副书记。廉毅敏一个河北官员，为什么去浙江当政协主席呢。廉毅敏和赵一德的经历有互换浙江和河北。

赵一德我一直不能确定他是不是习近平的铁杆马仔，看样子很可能是。

我们看最新抓的杨燕伟。
2018年10月 – 2020年8月，51岁的杨燕伟任河北省委副秘书长（兼）、省信访局局长。当时的河北省委书记是王东峰 （2017年10月 – 2022年4月），副书记是赵一德 （2018年3月 – 2020年7月）

我不确定杨燕伟是不是就是赵一德的大秘。但是时间线比较吻合。赵一德当上省委副书记之后半年，杨燕伟担任河北省委副秘书长。赵一德离开河北之后1个月，杨燕伟也离开，去廊坊当市长。时间线还挺吻合的。

2022年9月 – 2022年12月，55岁的杨燕伟任河北省人力资源和社会保障厅党组副书记、厅长。当时的河北省委书记是倪岳峰 （2022年4月 – ），河北省委副书记兼秘书长是廉毅敏 （2021年9月 – 2023年1月）

我给大家总结一下，杨燕伟已经抓了。杨燕伟可能有赵一德的背景，可能有倪岳峰和廉毅敏的背景。廉毅敏曾经给李小鹏当过4年的大秘。李小鹏和习近平是一家人。廉毅敏浙江这头，已经有人在堵他了，两头堵。王双全疑似在等着接替廉毅敏。赵一德是从浙江去河北，廉毅敏是从河北去浙江。王双全和胡春华在西藏有直接的交集，王双全在湖南抓了习近平大批马仔。胡春华还曾经担任过河北省长，幕后黑手呼之欲出。

如果胡春华把浙江政协主席廉毅敏，河北省委书记倪岳峰，陕西省委书记赵一德，这三个人抓了，就说明幕后黑手就是他。就是胡春华要接替习近平担任总书记。胡春华如果把廉毅敏倪岳峰赵一德三个人抓了，说明他听我指挥。
好的，谢谢大家。

《原文链接》

英文翻译

Hu Chunhua succeeded Xi Jinping with three indicators: arrest Zhao Yide, Zhao Gang took over. Arrest Ni Yuefeng, Wang Zhengpu took over. Arrest Lian Yimin, Wang Shuangquan became the chairman of the Zhejiang CPPCC. These three can be used as observation indicators

Hello everyone,
This netizen said,
Hebei Personnel Director, Yang Yanwei, was officially announced to be dismissed on June 17.
My reply is
Arresting Yang Yanwei may mean arresting Li Xiaopeng and Ni Yuefeng’s chief secretary Lian Yimin, Zhao Yide and others. This director is not simple.

According to the WeChat public account “Zhejiang CPPCC Tongxinyuan”, from June 10 to 13, Vice Chairman Wang Yong of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference led the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Research Group to Zhejiang to conduct a special research on “optimizing the layout of major productive forces”. Members of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Research Group Miao Wei, Yi Huiman, Zhao Zhengping, Dai Dongchang, Huang Yuzhi, Zhao Fan, Yan Jinghua and others participated. Provincial leaders Zhang Zhenfeng, Yin Xuequn, Wang Shuangquan, Hangzhou leader Ma Weiguang, and Ningbo leader Chen Long participated in the relevant research.

This also means that Wang Shuangquan, who previously served as a member of the Standing Committee of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, Secretary of the Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection, and Director of the Provincial Supervisory Commission, has returned to Zhejiang and served as a leader of Zhejiang Province.

First of all, this news is quite strange. Wang Shuangquan is relatively old, 62 years old, and he retires at 63. This news was issued by the Zhejiang CPPCC, and Wang Shuangquan will serve as Vice Chairman of the Zhejiang CPPCC. But Wang Shuangquan was previously the Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection, and the Secretary of the Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Vice Chairman of the CPPCC have the same retirement age. They both retire at 63, so what is the point of this operation? Unless Wang Shuangquan is to take over as Chairman of the Zhejiang CPPCC, the Chairman of the CPPCC is at the ministerial level, and he can retire at the age of 65 and retire at the age of 70. But the current Chairman of the Zhejiang CPPCC, Lian Yimin, is 61 years old, one year younger than Wang Shuangquan. So we can only speculate that Lian Yimin will be arrested to make room for Wang Shuangquan.

Lian Yimin has not been arrested yet, so what is Wang Shuangquan’s background? Wang Shuangquan obviously has intersections with Hu Jintao and Hu Chunhua because he is a Tibetan official.

From May 2021 to May 2025, Wang Shuangquan served as the Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection.

What did Wang Shuangquan do during his four-year term as the Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection?

In 2023, Chenzhou Municipal Party Committee Secretary Yi Pengfei, Hunan Xiangxi Governor Long Xiaohua, and Hunan Provincial Government Secretary General Wang Qun were arrested, among whom Wang Qun was Xu Dazhe’s chief secretary.
In 2024, Chenzhou Municipal Party Committee Secretary, Hunan Vice Governor Dai Daojin, and Xu Shousheng/Du Jiahao’s chief secretary were arrested
Hunan Huaihua Municipal Party Committee Secretary Peng Guofu was arrested
Hunan Yongzhou City, Deputy Minister of Public Security Liu Yuejin was arrested. Liu Yuejin was promoted by Guo Shengkun
Hunan Huaihua Municipal Party Committee Secretary Lei Shaoye was arrested
Hunan CPPCC Chairman Li Weiwei was arrested. Li Weiwei is a henchman of Bo Xilai and Zhu Rongji
Hunan Secretary Xu Dazhe was arrested. No official announcement has been made yet
Among them, Liu Yuejin, Li Weiwei, and Xu Dazhe are deputy ministerial and ministerial level. Wang Shuangquan is not within his authority to arrest them. But after all, they are Hunan officials or Hunanese. It is also very likely that Wang Shuangquan cooperated in this. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection sent a special task force to Hunan Province to investigate, and the Hunan Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection must cooperate.

In 2025, Zhangjiajie official, Hunan Provincial Party Committee Deputy Secretary-General Gong Wenmi was arrested. Gong Wenmi was Mei Kebao’s secretary
Zhangjiajie official, Hunan Provincial Environmental Protection Department Director Deng Lijia was arrested. Deng Lijia was Xiong Qingquan’s secretary
Hubei Provincial Party Committee Secretary, Hunan native Jiang Chaoliang was arrested. Jiang Chaoliang’s backers were Dai Xianglong/Wang Qishan/Zhu Rongji
Hunan Changde Secretary, Tianjin Organization Minister was arrested, Zhou Derui. Zhou Derui’s backers were Qin Guangrong and Xiong Qingquan. Xiong Qingquan was promoted by Song Renqiong and Xi Zhongxun, and was Zhu Rongji’s middle school classmate.
Hunan Vice Governor, Development and Reform Commission Deputy Director Xu Xianping was arrested. Xu Xianping’s backer was Ma Kai. Ma Kai’s backers were Zhu Rongji and Wang Qishan
Shanxi Governor Jin Xiangjun, a native of Yongzhou City, Hunan Province, was arrested. Jin Xiangjun’s backers were Zhu Rongji and Cao Bochun.
Jiang Chaoliang, Zhou Derui, Xu Xianping, and Jin Xiangjun were not arrested by Wang Shuangquan, and it was only possible that Wang Shuangquan cooperated with the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.
Gong Wenmi and Deng Lijia were bureau-level officials, and they were arrested by Wang Shuangquan.

From this point of view, Wang Shuangquan was the main force in eliminating Bao, and he could not be Xi Jinping’s man.

Wang Shuangquan was a Tibetan official and had connections with Hu Jintao and Hu Chunhua.

From November 1993 to July 1995, 30-year-old Wang Shuangquan served as a member of the Party Leadership Group and Director of the Office of the Tibet Higher People’s Court. The president was Bai Zhao (January 1993-January 2003). It is unknown who promoted Bai Zhao, but Deng Xiaoping returned to power in 1973. Deng Xiaoping was briefly overthrown when Mao Zedong died. In fact, less than a year later, as soon as Mao Zedong died, Deng Xiaoping returned to power. When Hu Jintao went to Tibet to serve as the Party Secretary, he was just a small henchman of Deng Xiaoping. The reason why Deng Xiaoping arranged Hu Jintao to go to Tibet was because Deng Xiaoping had henchmen and agents in Tibet before.

Bai Zhao and Hu Chunhua had direct contact. The Tibet Rural Work Conference held group discussions on the afternoon of February 16, 2006 and the morning of February 17. The participants spoke enthusiastically about the spirit of the meeting and their respective work realities, talking about development, experience, and ideas. The atmosphere was very warm. The representatives who participated in the discussion expressed that they should work hard, innovate, and strive to build a new socialist countryside. Hu Chunhua, executive vice secretary of the Autonomous Region Party Committee, Bai Zhao, deputy director of the Standing Committee of the Autonomous Region People’s Congress, Tsering, vice chairman of the Autonomous Region, and Jiabao, vice chairman of the Autonomous Region CPPCC, participated in the group discussions.

From August 2003 to July 2005, 40-year-old Wang Shuangquan served as executive vice president and deputy secretary of the Party Group of the Higher People’s Court of the Tibet Autonomous Region (at the level of a full-time department head). The Party Secretary of Tibet at that time was Guo Jinlong (September 2000 – December 2004), and the Secretary General of the Standing Committee of the Tibet Party Committee was Hu Chunhua (July 2001 – November 2003). In other words, Wang Shuangquan’s bureau-level position was probably promoted by Hu Chunhua or Guo Jinlong. Hu Chunhua is Guo Jinlong’s chief secretary.

Yang Song was Hu Jintao’s subordinate at first.

From July 2005 to September 2010, 42-year-old Wang Shuangquan served as the Standing Deputy Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Tibet Autonomous Region Party Committee and the First Deputy Director of the Regional Stability Maintenance Office. The Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission of Tibet at that time was Yang Song (December 2002 – November 2005).

Let’s just look at Yang Song’s predecessor. Yang Song succeeded Chen Xunqiu as the Deputy Secretary of the Hubei Provincial Party Committee. Chen Xunqiu should be Li Keqiang’s background. Yang Song succeeded Miao Wei as the Secretary of the Wuhan Municipal Party Committee. Miao Wei is said to be Li Keqiang’s middle school classmate. Yang Song succeeded Hu Chunhua as the executive vice chairman of the Tibet government.

From December 1990 to January 1993, 40-year-old Yang Song served as deputy director and deputy secretary of the Party Group of the Office of the Tibet Autonomous Region “One River and Two Rivers” Development and Construction Committee. In 1989, when Hu Jintao reported to the central government, he proposed “in terms of economic construction, we should focus on the development of agriculture and animal husbandry, energy and transportation construction, and first of all, we should focus on the comprehensive development of the one river and two river basins.” In other words, Yang Song was Hu Jintao’s subordinate at the beginning.

In early 1991, the Tibet Autonomous Region “One River and Two Rivers” Development and Construction Committee was established. The comprehensive development and construction project of the Yarlung Zangbo River, Nianchu River and Lhasa River, approved by the State Council, started. This was the largest, most invested, longest-lasting, multi-industry and multi-disciplinary project in Tibet at that time.

Hu Jintao studied water conservancy engineering at Tsinghua University. Liu Ning, secretary of the Henan Provincial Party Committee, is Hu Jintao’s henchman and also came from water conservancy. Yang Song was originally the deputy director of the Tibet One River and Two Rivers Office. Overall, Wang Shuangquan is Hu Jintao and Hu Chunhua’s lackey.

This netizen said,
Dabao, if you belong to the propaganda system of Hu Jintao’s group, please tell Hu Jintao to arrest Cai Qi or Ding Xuexiang or even Xi Yuanping, so that everyone can rest assured.
My reply is, are you trying to create a show effect? I still have the ability to tell Hu Jintao and command him. Can I still command Hu Chunhua? Besides, Cai Qi and Ding Xuexiang cannot be arrested at will. If Hu Chunhua listens to my command, then I will let him arrest Xi Jinping. If he arrests Lian Yimin, chairman of the Zhejiang CPPCC this month, it means that Hu Chunhua listens to my command. There are also Ni Yuefeng, secretary of the Hebei Provincial Party Committee, and Zhao Yide, secretary of the Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee.

Let’s take a look at Lian Yimin.
In March 2013, 49-year-old Lian Yimin served as secretary-general and member of the party group of the Shanxi Provincial People’s Government, secretary of the party group of the Provincial People’s Government Office, and director of the Provincial People’s Government Emergency Office. The governor of Shanxi at that time was Li Xiaopeng (January 2013 – August 2016).

In November 2016, 52-year-old Lian Yimin was promoted to member of the Standing Committee of the Shanxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China and Minister of the United Front Work Department. Lian Yimin served as the chief secretary of Shanxi Governor Li Xiaopeng for 4 years.

This netizen said,
Isn’t Li Peng a member of Jiang’s faction?
My reply was, are you really not here to make fun of me? In 1988, Li Peng was already the Chinese Premier, and Jiang He was just a henchman of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee Secretary at that time. According to your statement, then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao is the henchman of Shanghai Municipal Party Committee Secretary Han Zheng. The current Chinese Premier Li Qiang is the henchman of Shanghai Municipal Party Committee Secretary Chen Jining.

Li Peng is Chen Yun’s henchman Li Peng is Xi Jinping’s godfather. Xi Jinping took photos with Li Peng many times with Peng Liyuan. Bringing his wife means that this is a private occasion. Jiang Mianheng did not attend the 120th anniversary of Chen Yun. The big foreign propaganda is brainwashing every day. It can’t be that I didn’t let Jiang Mianheng go. If Chen Yun had promoted Jiang Zemin, could Jiang Mianheng not go?

In September 2021, 57-year-old Lian Yimin was appointed as the deputy secretary of the Hebei Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China.
In June 2022, 58-year-old Lian Yimin served as the secretary-general of the provincial committee. The secretary of the Hebei Provincial Committee at that time was Ni Yuefeng (April 22, 2022 -)

That is to say, Lian Yimin served as the chief secretary of Ni Yuefeng with the province of the deputy secretary of the provincial committee, which is also very rare. Let’s look at the deputy secretary of the Hebei Provincial Committee, Li Ganjie, Zhao Yide, Chen Gang, Lian Yimin are all deputy secretaries of the Hebei Provincial Committee.
Chen Gang served as the deputy secretary of the Hebei Provincial Committee for only two months. Li Ganjie, Zhao Yide, Lian Yimin. If they are all Xi Jinping’s iron-clad henchmen, then Chen Gang is likely to be squeezed out. This Zhao Yide, a Zhejiang official, went to Hebei to be the deputy secretary. Lian Yimin, a Hebei official, why did he go to Zhejiang to be the chairman of the CPPCC? Lian Yimin and Zhao Yide have exchanged Zhejiang and Hebei.

I have never been sure whether Zhao Yide is Xi Jinping’s staunch henchman, but it seems very likely.

Let’s look at the latest arrest, Yang Yanwei.
From October 2018 to August 2020, 51-year-old Yang Yanwei served as deputy secretary-general of the Hebei Provincial Party Committee (concurrently) and director of the Provincial Bureau of Letters and Calls. The then secretary of the Hebei Provincial Party Committee was Wang Dongfeng (October 2017-April 2022), and the deputy secretary was Zhao Yide (March 2018-July 2020)

I am not sure whether Yang Yanwei is Zhao Yide’s chief secretary. But the timeline is quite consistent. Half a year after Zhao Yide became the deputy secretary of the provincial party committee, Yang Yanwei served as the deputy secretary-general of the Hebei Provincial Party Committee. One month after Zhao Yide left Hebei, Yang Yanwei also left and went to Langfang to become the mayor. The timeline is quite consistent.

From September 2022 to December 2022, 55-year-old Yang Yanwei served as the deputy secretary of the party group and director of the Hebei Provincial Department of Human Resources and Social Security. At that time, the Secretary of the Hebei Provincial Party Committee was Ni Yuefeng (April 2022-), and the Deputy Secretary and Secretary of the Hebei Provincial Party Committee was Lian Yimin (September 2021-January 2023)

Let me summarize for everyone. Yang Yanwei has been arrested. Yang Yanwei may have the background of Zhao Yide, or the background of Ni Yuefeng and Lian Yimin. Lian Yimin once served as Li Xiaopeng’s chief secretary for 4 years. Li Xiaopeng and Xi Jinping are a family. Lian Yimin has been blocked on the Zhejiang side, blocking both ends. Wang Shuangquan is suspected to be waiting to replace Lian Yimin. Zhao Yide went from Zhejiang to Hebei, and Lian Yimin went from Hebei to Zhejiang. Wang Shuangquan and Hu Chunhua had direct intersections in Tibet, and Wang Shuangquan arrested a large number of Xi Jinping’s lackeys in Hunan. Hu Chunhua also served as the governor of Hebei Province, and the mastermind behind the scenes is about to be revealed.

If Hu Chunhua arrested Lian Yimin, Chairman of the Zhejiang CPPCC, Ni Yuefeng, Secretary of the Hebei Provincial Party Committee, and Zhao Yide, Secretary of the Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee, it means that he is the mastermind behind the scenes. It means that Hu Chunhua wants to replace Xi Jinping as General Secretary. If Hu Chunhua arrested Lian Yimin, Ni Yuefeng, and Zhao Yide, it means that he is under my command.
Okay, thank you everyone.

END

大家好，
正义的中国网友质问内塔尼亚胡，为什么要侵略伊朗。
内塔尼亚胡说:“打得一拳开，免得百拳来。”
这个内塔尼亚胡的味儿有点不对啊。

内塔尼亚胡又说:“尊严只在剑锋之上，真理只在大炮射程之内。”

内塔尼亚胡还说:“犯我以色列者，虽远必诛。义武奋扬，跳梁者虽强必戮。”

内塔尼亚胡稍后说:“胡塞武装看好了，我只示范一次。”

内塔尼亚胡继续说:“伊朗国小而不处卑，力少而不畏强，无礼而侮美以，可亡也。”

内塔尼亚胡然后说:“F35方至，毋敢动!动，灭国矣!”

内塔尼亚胡同时说:“以色列这么流氓我就放心了。”

内塔尼亚胡提了提衣领说:“伊朗神权政府一意孤行，只会搬起石头砸了自己的脚。”

内塔尼亚胡停顿了一会说:“伊朗革命卫队不过是纸老虎。”
革命卫队只是外围武装，真正的是圣城旅。

内塔尼亚胡想了想说:“宁可以色列不长草，也要教训神棍佬。”

内塔尼亚胡摸了摸头说:“俄罗斯想让伊朗战斗到最后一个波斯人。”

内塔尼亚胡最后说:“落后就要挨打。”

内塔尼亚胡意犹未尽又填了一句:“要是没有以色列，还要地球做什么!”

当地时间16日，位于首都德黑兰的伊朗伊斯兰共和国广播电视台大楼遭以色列袭击。一名员工因伤势过重不幸身亡。初步估计，多名电视台员工受伤。袭击导致该电视台电视直播中断，直播画面显示，从电视台演播室内传出爆炸巨响并升起浓烟。

17日，中国记协针对伊朗电视台遭袭发表声明。声明称，伊朗国家电视台在直播中遭遇袭击，是对新闻机构的蓄意攻击。袭击者无论冠以何种名目，将新闻机构置于炮火之下，其行径已越过文明底线。这不仅摧毁建筑、危及记者生命，更是对全球媒体安全性和公信力的践踏。新闻机构承载着公众知情权这一基本人权。当暴力企图抹杀和掩盖真相时，捍卫媒体安全就是阻止社会坠入黑洞的关键闸门。中国记协呼吁，停止制造真相黑洞，立即保护冲突区记者安全。

网友们讽刺，居然还存在这么一个东西，它们是干嘛的？

中国记协厚颜无耻，谴责伊朗电视台遭袭，口口声声“公众知情权是基本人权”。中共统治下的中国，竟敢谈人权？真是天大笑话。中共一贯封锁真相，抓捕记者，打造全球最大“记者监狱”。从张展到董宇宇，多少记者因揭露真相被失踪、判刑？中南海还敢假惺惺谈“媒体安全”？

名胜古迹和建筑

2025年6月17日，中国记协针对6月16日伊朗伊斯兰共和国广播电视台遭以色列袭击发表声明，称袭击是对“新闻机构的蓄意攻击”，践踏“公众知情权这一基本人权”，呼吁捍卫媒体安全。中共治下中国，记者被抓、新闻被封，哪来的脸谈知情权？

中共自1949年起，以“国家安全”“颠覆政权”为由，系统性压制言论自由。2024年，记者无国界（RSF）报告显示，中国拘押至少127名记者，全球四分之一的在押记者在中国。从武汉疫情到新疆人权，揭露真相的记者如张展、董宇宇被重判，公民记者失踪成常态。习近平“以党代法”，打造全球最严审查机器，中国记协的声明不过是掩盖独裁的遮羞布。

中国记协称“公众知情权是基本人权”，纯属虚伪。中共宪法虽列“言论自由”，但《国家安全法》《反间谍法》赋予当局无限权力，以“寻衅滋事”“颠覆国家政权”罪名打压记者。2024年人权观察报告：习近平治下，审查制度全球最严，记者动辄被控“泄露国家机密”。

中共从不公认真相，宣传部每日下发“敏感话题”禁令，封杀新疆、香港、疫情报道。 记者非但无自由，还成监控对象，社交媒体被审查，护照被没收，家人被骚扰。

公民记者张展,2020年5月，因报道武汉疫情被捕，罪名“寻衅滋事”，判刑4年。2024年5月释放后仍遭监控，健康恶化，再次被以寻衅滋事罪刑事拘留。2021年获记者无国界“勇气奖”，律师称其绝食抗议，体重不足40公斤。

光明日报编辑董郁玉：2022年2月，因与日本外交官共餐被控“间谍罪”，2024年11月判刑7年。哈佛尼曼学者、30年资深记者，因批评中共被构陷，家人称其“为改革发声无罪”。

中共以“国家安全”为幌子，系统性抓捕记者，知情权在独裁铁拳下荡然无存。中国记协的声明是赤裸裸的谎言。

中共治下，记者不仅是职业风险，更是“ 政治敌人”。2024年，中共驱逐13名美国记者（纽约时报、华盛顿邮报等），报复美限制中国官媒。 新疆维吾尔记者被控“两面人”，西藏记者因抗议水电站被捕，香港《苹果日报》编辑被以“国安法”判刑。

政治

中国记协厚颜无耻，谈“公众知情权”。中共治下，张展、董郁玉、陈杰人、黄雪琴、李翔、高瑜等记者因揭真相被抓、判刑、遇害，铁证表明习近平独裁黑暗。全球127名在押记者，中国占四分之一，打造“记者监狱”。从新疆到香港，中共封杀真相，践踏人权，远超伊朗。

这名网友说，
不是传言习培养有太子吗大包什么时候曝光一下

齐明正，这名字听着挺正派，可背后藏的秘密能把人吓一跳。他1992年出生，官方说是习近平弟弟习远平跟前妻胡天翎的儿子，香港籍，毕业于美国乔治城大学。但八卦圈里炸开了锅，有人说他压根儿不是习远平的种，是习近平的私生子，寄养在弟弟名下，姓“齐”是随奶奶齐心的姓。反正红三代的身份够乱，咱就当侄子聊，乐呵乐呵。

谢国民的亲家关系：齐明正的“豪门联姻”

谢国民，泰国正大集团的大佬，跟习远平是亲家。谢国民的闺女谢其润嫁给了齐明正，这不就把习近平、习远平、谢家绑一块儿了？齐明正是习近平的侄子还是儿子没人知道，但不管咋算，谢国民这亲家身份坐实了，齐明正成了连接中泰权贵的关键一环。网友调侃：“这家族树比三国还乱，齐明正到底谁的种啊？”

从清华到基层：镀金还是背锅？

齐明正的履历挺神秘。2019年7月，中国媒体报道，清华大学宜宾骨干研修班的基层实践支队队长齐明正（博士头衔）跑去临港经开区调研消防，区管委会的杨剑全程陪着。这架势不像普通博士，八卦说他是“红三代下基层镀金”。2022年4月，河北承德县文件又爆他当了县农业农村局副局长（挂职），2023年3月传言“历练”完事儿，有人酸他：“历练个屁，早没戏了。”这路子看着像家族安排，可没爬高，像是半路卡住了。

央视篮球公元现身：跟谢其润的“亲家秀”

2023年，央视《篮球公元》播了个画面，齐明正跟正大集团的谢其润一块儿看球，俩人聊得挺嗨。据说是央视台长慎海雄安排的，背后还有习近平小姨子彭丽娟和网信办庄荣文的戏码——小姨子彭丽娟造谣慎海雄老婆是佟丽娅，转移张高丽彭帅事件的视线，洗地。其实慎海雄老婆是曾小敏。这次现身不简单，谢其润是齐明正的老婆的哥，亲家关系摆上台面，网友炸了：“这不就是家族联盟的公开秀吗？”

割腰子阴谋：齐明正的“后台老板”

佘智江，缅甸诈骗割腰子的头子，是谢国民的下属，而谢国民是习远平的亲家，等于佘智江的后台是习远平家。八卦说佘智江是习近平的私生子，割腰子这脏活儿是习近平“亲自指挥、亲自部署”的。齐明正呢？作为习远平的儿子（或侄子），也掺和这家族生意。2017年12月，佘智江在海南中国侨商联合会当上常务副会长，李卓彬（习近平马仔）捧场，这关系网直指习家。网友惊呼：“割腰子都成家族产业了？”

2025年的齐明正：低调还是失势？
到2025年3月，齐明正消息少了，有人说他被家族边缘化，有人说他故意低调。习远平给习近平背黑锅，齐明正这“红三代”可能也背了点锅。佘智江被抓说是反习搞的，齐明正却没事儿。

这是2019年的报道，这个齐明正看着就唐，像是习近平的种。

清华大学宜宾骨干研修班基层实践支队队长齐明正博士深入临港经开区调研消防工作

（来源：宜宾临港消防大队）

2019年7月11日，清华大学宜宾骨干研修班基层实践支队队长、清华大学经济管理学院领导力与组织管理博士齐明正深入临港消防大队进行考察调研。考察期间，区管委会党政办主任杨剑全程陪同调研。

临港消防大队教导员首先向调研组介绍了全区的消防安全形势。随后，临港大队与调研组一行先后到恒旭国际大酒店、智能终端产业园、凯旋城小区等地实地考察调研。每到一处，都认真听取相关单位负责人的情况汇报，与相关负责人进行了深入的交流探讨，详细了解了各企业的消防设施设备、消防器材、疏散通道等存在的一些问题以及员工的逃生自救能力。实地考察结束后，调研组一行人回到临港消防大队参观了廉政文化和法治教育基地。最后，大队教导员向调研组详细介绍了临港消防救援队伍的执勤战备情况以及队伍管理情况。

齐明正博士高度赞扬了全区消防救援队伍为保护群众生命财产安全、维护社会稳定作出的突出贡献。消防安全，事关社会稳定和长治久安，希望消防大队一如既往的发扬敢打敢拼、能征善战的优良作风，保驾护航好我区社会经济发展。通过此次调研，让大队全体人员更加明确了全区消防工作的方向，更好的为地方经济建设服务提供了动力。

废太子齐明正折戟沉沙，烂尾帝习近平败走麦城，新江青彭丽媛女皇梦碎，习明泽接班梦空留幻影。

好的，谢谢大家。

《原文链接》

英文翻译

The abandoned crown prince Qi Mingzheng was defeated, the unfinished emperor Xi Jinping was defeated, the dream of the new Jiang Qing and Peng Liyuan to become empresses was shattered, and Xi Mingze’s dream of succession was left with an illusion

Hello everyone,
Justice-minded Chinese netizens questioned Netanyahu, why did he invade Iran.
Netanyahu said: “It is better to strike with one punch to avoid a hundred punches.”
This Netanyahu tastes a bit wrong.

Netanyahu added: “Dignity is only on the edge of the sword, and truth is only within the range of the cannon.”

Netanyahu also said: “Those who offend Israel will be punished no matter how far away they are. The righteous and military will be vigorous, and those who jump on the beams will be killed no matter how strong they are.”

Netanyahu said later: “Watch out, Houthi armed forces, I will only demonstrate once.”

Netanyahu continued: “Iran is a small country but does not humble itself, it has little strength but does not fear the strong, it is rude and insults the United States and Israel, it will perish.”

Netanyahu then said: “F35 is coming, don’t dare to move! If you move, the country will be destroyed!”

Netanyahu also said: “I am relieved that Israel is so rogue.”

Netanyahu lifted his collar and said: “The theocratic government of Iran will only shoot itself in the foot if it insists on its own way.”

Netanyahu paused for a while and said: “The Iranian Revolutionary Guard is just a paper tiger.”

The Revolutionary Guard is only an external armed force, and the real one is the Quds Force.

Netanyahu thought for a while and said: “I would rather Israel not grow grass than teach the charlatans a lesson.”

Netanyahu touched his head and said: “Russia wants Iran to fight to the last Persian.”

Netanyahu finally said: “If you fall behind, you will be beaten.”

Netanyahu was still not satisfied and added another sentence: “If there is no Israel, what is the use of the earth!”

On the 16th local time, the Islamic Republic of Iran Radio and Television building in the capital Tehran was attacked by Israel. An employee died due to serious injuries. Preliminary estimates show that several TV station employees were injured. The attack caused the TV station’s live broadcast to be interrupted. The live broadcast showed that a loud explosion and thick smoke were heard from the TV station studio.

On the 17th, the China Journalists Association issued a statement on the attack on the Iranian TV station. The statement said that the Iranian National Television was attacked during the live broadcast, which was a deliberate attack on the news organization. No matter what the attackers called it, they put the news organization under fire, and their actions have crossed the bottom line of civilization. This not only destroyed buildings and endangered the lives of journalists, but also trampled on the safety and credibility of the global media. News organizations bear the basic human right of the public to know. When violence attempts to obliterate and cover up the truth, defending media safety is the key gate to prevent society from falling into a black hole. The China Journalists Association called for an end to the creation of truth black holes and immediate protection of the safety of journalists in conflict zones.

Netizens sarcastically said that there is such a thing, what are they for?

The China Journalists Association shamelessly condemned the attack on the Iranian TV station and kept saying that “the public’s right to know is a basic human right.” How dare China under the rule of the Communist Party of China talk about human rights? What a joke. The Communist Party of China has always blocked the truth, arrested journalists, and created the world’s largest “journalist prison.” From Zhang Zhan to Dong Yuyu, how many journalists have disappeared and been sentenced for revealing the truth? Zhongnanhai still dares to talk about “media safety” in a hypocritical way?

名胜古迹和建筑

On June 17, 2025, the All-China Journalists Association issued a statement in response to the Israeli attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting and Television on June 16, calling the attack a “deliberate attack on news organizations” and trampling on “the basic human right of the public to know”, calling for the protection of media safety. In China under the rule of the Communist Party of China, journalists are arrested and news is blocked. How can they talk about the right to know?

Since 1949, the Communist Party of China has systematically suppressed freedom of speech on the grounds of “national security” and “subversion of the regime”. In 2024, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) reported that China detained at least 127 journalists, and a quarter of the world’s detained journalists were in China. From the Wuhan epidemic to Xinjiang human rights, journalists who revealed the truth, such as Zhang Zhan and Dong Yuyu, were sentenced to heavy sentences, and citizen journalists disappeared as a normal occurrence. Xi Jinping “replaced the law with the party” and created the world’s most stringent censorship machine. The statement of the All-China Journalists Association is nothing more than a fig leaf to cover up the dictatorship.

The All-China Journalists Association’s claim that “the public’s right to know is a basic human right” is pure hypocrisy. Although the Chinese Communist Party’s constitution lists “freedom of speech”, the National Security Law and the Anti-Espionage Law give the authorities unlimited power to suppress journalists on charges of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” and “subverting state power”. Human Rights Watch Report 2024: Under Xi Jinping’s rule, the censorship system is the strictest in the world, and journalists are often accused of “leaking state secrets”.

The Chinese Communist Party never disregards the truth. The Propaganda Department issues “sensitive topic” bans every day, banning reports on Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and the epidemic. Not only do journalists have no freedom, they are also subject to surveillance, their social media is censored, their passports are confiscated, and their families are harassed.

Citizen journalist Zhang Zhan was arrested in May 2020 for reporting on the Wuhan epidemic, charged with “picking quarrels and provoking trouble”, and sentenced to 4 years in prison. After being released in May 2024, he was still under surveillance, his health deteriorated, and he was again criminally detained for the crime of picking quarrels and provoking trouble. In 2021, he won the “Courage Award” from Reporters Without Borders. His lawyer said that he was on a hunger strike in protest and weighed less than 40 kilograms.

Dong Yuyu, editor of Guangming Daily: In February 2022, he was charged with “espionage” for dining with Japanese diplomats, and was sentenced to seven years in prison in November 2024. A Harvard Nieman scholar and 30-year veteran journalist, he was framed for criticizing the CCP, and his family said he was “not guilty of speaking out for reform.”

The CCP systematically arrested journalists under the guise of “national security”, and the right to know was wiped out under the iron fist of dictatorship. The statement of the China Journalists Association is a naked lie.

Under the rule of the CCP, journalists are not only a professional risk, but also a “ political enemy.” In 2024, the CCP expelled 13 American journalists (New York Times, Washington Post, etc.) in retaliation for the US restrictions on Chinese official media. Xinjiang Uyghur journalists were accused of “two-faced people”, Tibetan journalists were arrested for protesting against hydropower stations, and the editor of Hong Kong’s Apple Daily was sentenced under the “National Security Law”.

政治

The China Journalists Association is shameless and talks about the “public’s right to know.” Under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, journalists such as Zhang Zhan, Dong Yuyu, Chen Jieren, Huang Xueqin, Li Xiang, and Gao Yu were arrested, sentenced, and killed for revealing the truth. This is ironclad evidence that Xi Jinping’s dictatorship is dark. Of the 127 journalists in custody worldwide, one quarter are in China, creating a “journalist prison.” From Xinjiang to Hong Kong, the Chinese Communist Party has suppressed the truth and trampled on human rights, far exceeding Iran.

This netizen said,
Isn’t it rumored that Xi has cultivated a prince? When will the big bag be exposed?

Qi Mingzheng, this name sounds quite decent, but the secrets behind it can scare people. He was born in 1992. Officially, he is the son of Xi Jinping’s younger brother Xi Yuanping and his ex-wife Hu Tianling. He is a Hong Kong citizen and graduated from Georgetown University in the United States. But the gossip circle exploded. Some people said that he was not Xi Yuanping’s child at all, but Xi Jinping’s illegitimate child, fostered under his younger brother’s name, and his surname “Qi” was taken from his grandmother Qi Xin’s surname. Anyway, the identity of the third generation of the red family is confusing enough, so let’s just talk about it as a nephew and have fun.

Xie Guomin’s in-laws: Qi Mingzheng’s “wealthy marriage”
Xian Guomin, the boss of Thailand’s CP Group, is a relative of Xi Yuanping. Xie Guomin’s daughter Xie Qirun married Qi Mingzheng, which tied Xi Jinping, Xi Yuanping, and the Xie family together? No one knows whether Qi Mingzheng is Xi Jinping’s nephew or son, but no matter how it is calculated, Xie Guomin’s in-law status has been confirmed, and Qi Mingzheng has become a key link connecting the Chinese and Thai dignitaries. Netizens joked: “This family tree is more chaotic than the Three Kingdoms. Whose seed is Qi Mingzheng?”

From Tsinghua to the grassroots: gilding or taking the blame?
Qi Mingzheng’s resume is quite mysterious. In July 2019, Chinese media reported that Qi Mingzheng (doctoral title), the captain of the grassroots practice detachment of Tsinghua University’s Yibin backbone training class, went to the Lingang Economic Development Zone to investigate fire protection, and Yang Jian of the district management committee accompanied him throughout the whole process. This posture is not like an ordinary doctor. Gossip says that he is “the third generation of the red family going to the grassroots to gild.” In April 2022, a document from Chengde County, Hebei Province revealed that he was appointed as the deputy director of the County Agriculture and Rural Affairs Bureau (on a temporary basis). In March 2023, it was rumored that he had finished his “training”. Some people said to him: “What a fart of training, it’s long gone.” This path looks like a family arrangement, but it didn’t climb high, as if it was stuck halfway.

CCTV Basketball Gongyuan appeared: “In-laws Show” with Xie Qirun
In 2023, CCTV’s “Basketball Gongyuan” broadcast a scene where Qi Ming was watching a game with Xie Qirun of the Zhengda Group, and the two had a great chat. It is said that it was arranged by CCTV Director Shen Haixiong, and there was also a drama behind it involving Xi Jinping’s sister-in-law Peng Lijuan and the Cyberspace Administration of China Zhuang Rongwen – sister-in-law Peng Lijuan spread rumors that Shen Haixiong’s wife was Tong Liya, diverting attention from the Zhang Gaoli-Peng Shuai incident and washing her name. In fact, Shen Haixiong’s wife is Zeng Xiaomin. This appearance is not simple. Xie Qirun is the brother of Qi Mingzheng’s wife. The in-law relationship is exposed. Netizens are shocked: “Isn’t this an open show of family alliance?”

Kidney-cutting conspiracy: Qi Mingzheng’s “backstage boss”
She Zhijiang, the leader of the Myanmar kidney-cutting scam, is a subordinate of Xie Guomin, and Xie Guomin is Xi Yuanping’s in-law, which means that She Zhijiang’s backstage is Xi Yuanping’s family. Gossip says that She Zhijiang is Xi Jinping’s illegitimate son, and Xi Jinping “personally directed and personally deployed” the dirty work of kidney-cutting. What about Qi Mingzheng? As Xi Yuanping’s son (or nephew), he also got involved in this family business. In December 2017, She Zhijiang became the executive vice president of the Hainan Chinese Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs Association, and Li Zhuobin (Xi Jinping’s henchman) showed his support. This network of relationships directly pointed to the Xi family. Netizens exclaimed: “Has kidney-cutting become a family business?”

Qi Mingzheng in 2025: Low-key or losing power?
By March 2025, there was less news about Qi Mingzheng. Some people said that he was marginalized by his family, and some people said that he deliberately kept a low profile. Xi Yuanping took the blame for Xi Jinping, and Qi Mingzheng, a “third generation of red”, may have also taken some of the blame. She Zhijiang was arrested for being against Xi, but Qi Mingzheng was fine.

This was a report in 2019. This Qi Mingzheng looked like a descendant of Xi Jinping.

Dr. Qi Mingzheng, leader of the grassroots practice detachment of the backbone training class of Yibin, Tsinghua University, went deep into the Lingang Economic Development Zone to investigate firefighting

(Source: Yibin Lingang Fire Brigade)

On July 11, 2019, Qi Mingzheng, leader of the grassroots practice detachment of the backbone training class of Yibin, Tsinghua University, and a doctor of leadership and organizational management at the School of Economics and Management of Tsinghua University, went deep into the Lingang Fire Brigade for investigation and research. During the investigation, Yang Jian, director of the Party and Government Office of the District Management Committee, accompanied the investigation throughout the investigation.

The instructor of the Lingang Fire Brigade first introduced the fire safety situation of the entire district to the investigation team. Afterwards, the Lingang Brigade and the research team visited Hengxu International Hotel, Smart Terminal Industrial Park, Kaixuancheng Community and other places for field investigations and research. Every time they went to a place, they listened carefully to the situation reports of the heads of relevant units, had in-depth exchanges and discussions with the relevant heads, and learned in detail about some problems in the fire protection facilities and equipment, fire equipment, evacuation passages, etc. of each enterprise, as well as the escape and self-rescue capabilities of employees. After the field investigation, the research team returned to the Lingang Fire Brigade to visit the clean government culture and rule of law education base. Finally, the brigade instructor gave a detailed introduction to the research team on the duty and combat readiness of the Lingang fire rescue team and the team management.

Dr. Qi Mingzheng highly praised the outstanding contributions made by the fire rescue team in the district to protect the lives and property of the people and maintain social stability. Fire safety is related to social stability and long-term peace. It is hoped that the fire brigade will continue to carry forward the fine style of daring to fight and being able to fight well, and escort the social and economic development of our district. Through this investigation, all the staff of the brigade have a clearer direction for the fire protection work in the district, and better serve the local economic construction.

The abandoned crown prince Qi Mingzheng was defeated, the unfinished emperor Xi Jinping was defeated, the new Jiang Qing and Peng Liyuan’s dream of becoming empresses was shattered, and Xi Mingze’s dream of succession was left with only an illusion.

Okay, thank you everyone.

END

大家好，

2025年6月17日，中国荔枝价格暴跌七成，果农血本无归，消息冲上热搜。从每斤10多元跌到1元无人问津，茂名果农宁可让荔枝烂树上也不摘，批发商卖一车亏一车。这背后是习近平经济政策的彻底崩盘？产量暴增、电商乱战、物流降本，果农却哭不出泪。中南海还在“演戏”维稳，荔枝危机是否预示更大经济风暴？习近平经济还能撑多久？

名胜古迹和建筑

2025年6月17日，热搜被“荔枝价格暴跌七成”刷屏。媒体报道，杭州勾庄水果批发市场荔枝价格崩盘：5月初一箱（5斤）火山岩荔枝180元，如今90元；6斤白糖罌荔枝仅50元。苏州南环桥市场监测显示，妃子笑荔枝批发价跌至5-5.5元/500克，白糖罌5.5-6.5元/500克，较5月暴跌70%。批发商感叹：“往年10多元一斤，现在5元多，次品更低。”

广東茂名果农在X平台痛诉，荔枝收购价从去年12元/500克跌至3元，扣除人工、农资成本，利润几近为零。部分果农放弃采摘，荔枝烂树上；批发商王先生仓库积压数十吨，称“卖一车亏一车”。 习近平经济政策下，荔枝危机是否预示更深经济裂痕？

荔枝价格暴跌七成登热搜，果农血亏，批发商绝望，这场农业危机直指习近平经济政策的失败。

1. 荔枝暴跌的表面原因：供过于求与电商乱战

专家称，荔枝价格“跳水”因产量激增与物流成本降低。2025年中国荔枝产量预计365万吨，同比暴增111%，广东、广西、海南三大产区总产量超212万吨，占总产量接近60%，增加37.5%。 妃子笑、白糖罌等主力品种供过于求，市场饱和。

什么东西到了东大国这里，都得卷死。

电商平台与社区团购加剧价格战，市民可以以“地头价”直购荔枝，平台推出“荔枝补贴”引流，压低批发价。荔枝保鲜期短，“一日色变，二日香变、三日味变”，批发商为清库存竞相降价，茂名果农排队4-5米卖1.6元/斤仍然没有收购。 部分果农将荔枝喂猪或倒地，甚至烧毁。

中国有说法谷贱伤农，这是果贱伤农

果农利润被挤压，茂名果农算账：3元/500克收购价扣除成本，远低于去年减产时的12元/500克。批发商王先生“卖一车亏一车”，冻干加工杯水车薪，提前采摘未熟果抢占市场更恶化品质。说白了，还是不正当竞争。

供过于求与电商乱战是暴跌直接原因，但背后是习近平经济政策失控的缩影。

2. 习近平经济崩盘：农业危机与体制失灵

习近平“乡村振兴”战略下，盲目扩大荔枝种植面积，没有配套市场需求预测与调控，导致2025年产量创历史新高，供需失衡。X平台批评：中南海“拍脑袋”决策，忽视果农生存。 物流降低成本，冷链优化，本来应该惠农，却因为电商压价让果农与批发商双输。

体制内腐败加剧危机。X平台热议：产地1元/斤，市面10多元/斤，中间差价被“渠道商”与“关系户”吞噬，果农与消费者双重受害。 习近平反腐只是用来争夺权力，实现三连任，没有触及农业供应链黑幕，凸显体制失灵。

荔枝暴跌反映习近平独裁统治之下，中国经济全面承压。农业危机与经济疲软叠加，果农血亏预示更大社会不满。

荔枝暴跌是习近平经济政策失误的冰山一角，农业危机暴露体制弊端，酝酿更大动荡。

2025年6月24日至27日，中共人大常委会将召开第十六次会议，审议神秘的“任免案”。习近平岌岌可危，军权崩塌，三大支柱苗华、何卫东、许其亮全军覆没。习近平国家主席宝座还能坐几天？是6月28日被官宣罢免，还是7月18日或者8月8日四中全会彻底下台？中南海权力风暴即将来袭，习近平权力宝座倒计时已开启。习近平还能撑多久？

核心背景：习近平失军权，权力危机全面爆发

2025年6月16日，新华社宣布全国人大常委会将于6月24日至27日召开第十六次会议，审议“有关任免案”和代表资格审查报告。赵乐际主持，副委员长张庆伟等出席，议程暗藏杀机。习近平已失去军权，军中三大支柱全线崩塌——苗华2024年11月被查、何卫东3月失踪、许其亮6月2日猝死。“习家军”31集团军派系瓦解，胡锦涛、胡春华，张又侠等人蠢蠢欲动。

习近平近期出访，参加哈萨克斯坦中国中亚峰会，维持“演戏”假象，但白俄删除习明泽家宴报道，表明习近平权威崩塌。彭丽媛被边控。6月24日的人大会议或成为习近平国家主席命运的审判日，四中全会（7月18日或8月8日）更可能终结习近平总书记与军委主席职务。

习近平失军权，权力根基动摇，6月24日人大会议与四中全会成为习近平下台关键节点。

6月24日人大会议：罢免习近平国家主席的惊天伏笔

6月24日至27日人大常委会审议“有关任免案”，没有具体说明对象，但是X平台热议矛头直指习近平。全国人大有权根据《宪法》第79条罢免国家主席，程序需人大常委会提请、全体代表投票通过。 政治局常委赵乐际主持会议，鸿忠、王东明、肖捷等人参会，显示政治局的操控意图。

政治

习近平军权崩塌：中央军委政治工作部主任苗华被查，定性“严重违纪违法”。军委副主席何卫东失踪，被叼查；前军委副主席许其亮猝死。31集团军派系覆灭，军方不再是习近平的坚强后盾。白俄6月9日删除习明泽报道引发体制内习近平“失权”猜测，政治局可能借6月24日会议“顺势”罢免习近平国家主席，提前为四中全会清场。

这名网友说，
“悲情”我看了其他语言版本，白通社有五六种语言可选，其他语言版本翻译的是“夸张”
我的回复是，
那不更是故意的，这是去中国访问，中文原来也是夸张，后来改成悲情的。不管怎么洗地，白俄官网原来的版本是夸张，之后改成悲情这是一个事实。再之后，直接删掉404，也是一个事实。白俄总统卢卡申科，只是知道习近平下台了。又不是卢卡申科把习近平赶下台的。卢卡申科只是一个外因，不是内因，只是我们观察中共这个黑箱的一个指标。又不是卢卡申科决定习近平是否下台。拿卢卡申科洗地也没用。

肯定也有洗地的说法，
罢免国家主席需要2/3人大代表同意，程序复杂，政治局未必冒险。但是，有可能习近平主动辞去中国国家主席，由人大任命临时的代理国家主席。反正中国人大也是橡皮图像。
任免案可能针对其他官员，比如要罢免2023年3月当选的何卫东人大代表资格。习近平近期访哈萨克斯坦，公开现身，表面权威仍在，还在演戏，6月24日未必直接罢免。

这名网友说，
国防部官网已经搜不到何卫东的新闻了。
我的回复是应该要对何卫东动手，官宣了。

6月28日官宣罢免习近平国家主席的可能性存在，因为军权丧失使习近平毫无还手之力，但政治局也可能选择低调过渡，保留习近平主席头衔到四中全会。

如果2025年6月28日没有官宣罢免习近平国家主席，习近平仍然难逃7月18日或8月8日，马上召开的四中全会的终极清算。总书记与军委主席由中央全会选举产生，四中全会可通过“辞职”或“健康原因”免除习近平职务，胡锦涛、胡春华，张又侠与习近平敌对派系已掌控局面。

苗华、何卫东、许其亮倒台标志军权归团派，31集团军派系覆灭，习近平无法翻盘。X平台称胡春华（胡派）将在四中全会接任总书记，蔡奇操控宣传封锁习近平动态（如白俄报道删除）。彭丽媛边控、习明泽曝光，显示习家失势，体制内已经视习近平为“昨日黄花”。四中全会将以“党内团结”为名，逼习近平交出总书记与军委主席。

四中全会罢免习近平总书记与军委主席的概率极高，失军权使习近平无还手之力。即便保留名誉，让习近平体面下台，习近平实际权力已经清零。

习近平失军权是下台导火索。苗华、何卫东、许其亮倒台，31集团军派系崩塌，军方不再效忠。出访抓人规律（2024-2025年苗华、何卫东、于忠福落马）显示胡锦涛或 政治局操盘，习近平每次出国都成清洗窗口。彭丽媛边控、白俄报道删除，暴露政治局全面封锁习家动态，防止“托孤”或“接班”猜测。

你认为习近平6月28日会官宣被罢免国家主席吗？四中全会谁将接班？请订阅，点赞，评论区大胆预测。

这名网友说，
陕西访民代表上书胡汪的联名信，以及信中提到的政治改革要求，是人民逐渐觉醒的标志，要坚持改革开放可以以平反冤假错案为切入点，应该让人民对公平正义的希望渴求变成现实。
我的回复是，觉醒的有点晚，英国大宪章到现在已经800年，世界上大部分国家也都民主化，或者至少有一个民主化框架，装装样子，中国什么都没有。不管怎么说，提出政治改革的要求，总比不提强。

这名网友说，
大小胡怎麼還不抓緊安排人馬籌備四中全會召開呀，看得我直著急，不要耽誤大事啊
我的回复是，我们看热闹着什么急，你这入戏太深。习近平该下台，他肯定要下台，稍安勿躁。

这名网友说，
胡锦涛优柔寡断害死多少人。
我的回复是，胡锦涛就是这样的人，这世界上没有既要又要。他要是真的那么杀伐果断。三下五除二，直接习近平挂路灯。他也不会有不折腾的这种经济外交内政的路线。肯定要穷折腾。

好的，谢谢大家。

《原文链接》

英文翻译

Xi Jinping lost his military power, and the power crisis broke out. The price of Chinese lychees plummeted by 70%. Why is Hu Jintao so slow?

Hello everyone,

On June 17, 2025, the price of Chinese lychees plummeted by 70%, and fruit farmers lost all their money. The news rushed to the hot search. From more than 10 yuan per catty to 1 yuan, no one cares about it. Maoming fruit farmers would rather let the lychees rot on the trees than pick them, and wholesalers lose money every time they sell a truck. Is this the complete collapse of Xi Jinping’s economic policy? Production has skyrocketed, e-commerce is in chaos, and logistics costs have been reduced, but fruit farmers can’t cry. Zhongnanhai is still “acting” to maintain stability. Does the lychee crisis foreshadow a bigger economic storm? How long can Xi Jinping’s economy last?

On June 17, 2025, the hot search was dominated by “lychee prices plummeted by 70%.” According to media reports, the price of lychees in Gouzhuang Fruit Wholesale Market in Hangzhou has collapsed: a box of volcanic rock lychees (5 jin) cost 180 yuan in early May, but now it costs 90 yuan; 6 jin of white sugar lychees only cost 50 yuan. Monitoring of the Suzhou Nanhuanqiao market shows that the wholesale price of Feizixiao lychees has fallen to 5-5.5 yuan/500 grams, and white sugar lychees cost 5.5-6.5 yuan/500 grams, a 70% drop from May. Wholesalers lamented: “In previous years, it was more than 10 yuan per jin, but now it is more than 5 yuan, and inferior products are even lower.”

Fruit farmers in Maoming, Guangdong complained on the X platform that the purchase price of lychees has fallen from 12 yuan/500 grams last year to 3 yuan. After deducting the cost of labor and agricultural materials, the profit is almost zero. Some fruit farmers gave up picking, and lychees rotted on the trees; wholesaler Mr. Wang’s warehouse was overstocked with dozens of tons, saying that “one truck sold loses one truck.” Under Xi Jinping’s economic policy, does the lychee crisis foreshadow a deeper economic rift?

The price of lychees plummeted by 70% and became a hot topic. Fruit farmers suffered heavy losses and wholesalers were desperate. This agricultural crisis directly pointed to the failure of Xi Jinping’s economic policies.

The superficial reason for the lychee plummet: oversupply and e-commerce chaos
Experts said that the “diving” of lychee prices was due to a surge in production and reduced logistics costs. China’s lychee production is expected to reach 3.65 million tons in 2025, a year-on-year increase of 111%. The total production of the three major production areas of Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan will exceed 2.12 million tons, accounting for nearly 60% of the total production, an increase of 37.5%. The main varieties such as Feizixiao and Baitangbao are in oversupply and the market is saturated.

Everything that comes to Dongda will be killed.

E-commerce platforms and community group purchases have intensified price wars. Citizens can buy lychees directly at “field prices”. The platform has launched a “lychee subsidy” to attract traffic and lower wholesale prices. Lychees have a short shelf life, “the color changes in one day, the fragrance changes in two days, and the taste changes in three days”. Wholesalers are competing to lower prices to clear inventory. Maoming fruit farmers line up 4-5 meters to sell lychees at 1.6 yuan per catty, but still no one buys them. Some fruit farmers feed lychees to pigs or throw them to the ground, or even burn them.

There is a saying in China that low grain prices hurt farmers, but this is low fruit prices that hurt farmers

Fruit farmers’ profits are squeezed, and Maoming fruit farmers are doing the math: the purchase price of 3 yuan/500 grams minus the cost is far lower than the 12 yuan/500 grams when production was reduced last year. Wholesaler Mr. Wang “loses money on every truck he sells”, freeze-drying processing is a drop in the bucket, and picking unripe fruits in advance to seize the market further deteriorates the quality. To put it bluntly, it is still unfair competition.

Oversupply and e-commerce chaos are the direct causes of the plunge, but behind it is a microcosm of Xi Jinping’s out-of-control economic policies.

Xi Jinping’s economic collapse: agricultural crisis and system failure
Under Xi Jinping’s “rural revitalization” strategy, the lychee planting area was blindly expanded without supporting market demand forecasting and regulation, resulting in a record high output in 2025 and an imbalance between supply and demand. X platform criticism: Zhongnanhai made decisions “on the spur of the moment” and ignored the survival of fruit farmers. Logistics reduced costs and optimized cold chains, which should have benefited farmers, but because of the price cuts by e-commerce, fruit farmers and wholesalers both lost.

Corruption within the system exacerbated the crisis. X platform hot discussion: 1 yuan/jin in the production area, more than 10 yuan/jin in the market, the difference in the middle was swallowed up by “channel merchants” and “relationship households”, and fruit farmers and consumers suffered. Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption was only used to fight for power and achieve three consecutive terms. It did not touch on the dark side of the agricultural supply chain, highlighting the system failure.

The sharp drop in lychee prices reflects that China’s economy is under pressure under Xi Jinping’s dictatorship. The superposition of agricultural crisis and economic weakness, the blood loss of fruit farmers foreshadows greater social dissatisfaction.

The sharp drop in lychee prices is just the tip of the iceberg of Xi Jinping’s economic policy mistakes. The agricultural crisis exposes the shortcomings of the system and brews greater turmoil.

From June 24 to 27, 2025, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress will hold its 16th meeting to review the mysterious “appointment and removal case”. Xi Jinping is in danger, his military power has collapsed, and the three pillars Miao Hua, He Weidong, and Xu Qiliang have been wiped out. How many days can Xi Jinping sit on the throne of the President? Will he be officially dismissed on June 28, or will he step down completely at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee on July 18 or August 8? The power storm in Zhongnanhai is about to hit, and the countdown to Xi Jinping’s throne of power has begun. How long can Xi Jinping hold on?

Core background: Xi Jinping loses military power, and the power crisis breaks out

On June 16, 2025, Xinhua News Agency announced that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress will hold its 16th meeting from June 24 to 27 to review the “relevant appointment and removal case” and the representative qualification review report. Zhao Leji presided over the meeting, and Vice Chairman Zhang Qingwei and others attended, and the agenda was full of murderous intent. Xi Jinping has lost his military power, and the three pillars of the military have collapsed across the board – Miao Hua was investigated in November 2024, He Weidong disappeared in March, and Xu Qiliang died suddenly on June 2. The 31st Group Army faction of the “Xi Family Army” has collapsed, and Hu Jintao, Hu Chunhua, Zhang Youxia and others are ready to move.

Xi Jinping recently visited and attended the China-Central Asia Summit in Kazakhstan to maintain the illusion of “acting”, but Belarus deleted the report on Xi Mingze’s family dinner, indicating that Xi Jinping’s authority has collapsed. Peng Liyuan was placed under border control. The National People’s Congress on June 24 may become the day of judgment on Xi Jinping’s fate as President of the People’s Republic of China, and the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee (July 18 or August 8) is more likely to end the positions of General Secretary Xi Jinping and Chairman of the Central Military Commission.

Xi Jinping has lost his military power, and the foundation of his power has been shaken. The National People’s Congress on June 24 and the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee have become key nodes for Xi Jinping to step down.

The NPC meeting on June 24: A shocking foreshadowing of the removal of President Xi Jinping

From June 24 to 27, the NPC Standing Committee reviewed the “appointment and removal case”. No specific targets were specified, but the hot discussion on the X platform was directed at Xi Jinping. The NPC has the right to remove the President in accordance with Article 79 of the Constitution. The procedure requires the NPC Standing Committee to propose and all representatives to vote. Zhao Leji, a member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee, presided over the meeting. Hongzhong, Wang Dongming, Xiao Jie and others attended the meeting, showing the Political Bureau’s manipulation intention.

Xi Jinping’s military power collapsed: Miao Hua, director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, was investigated and classified as “serious violations of discipline and law”. Vice Chairman of the Military Commission He Weidong disappeared and was investigated; former Vice Chairman of the Military Commission Xu Qiliang died suddenly. The 31st Group Army faction was destroyed, and the military is no longer Xi Jinping’s strong backing. Belarus’s deletion of the report on Xi Mingze on June 9 triggered speculation within the system that Xi Jinping had “lost power”. The Political Bureau may take advantage of the June 24 meeting to “take advantage of the situation” to remove President Xi Jinping and clear the venue for the Fourth Plenary Session in advance.

This netizen said, “Sadness” I looked at other language versions. BelTA has five or six languages to choose from. Other language versions translate as “exaggeration”. My reply is, “That’s even more intentional. This is a visit to China. The original Chinese version was also exaggerated, and then it was changed to sadness. No matter how to whitewash it, the original version of the Belarusian official website was exaggerated, and then it was changed to sadness. This is a fact. After that, it was directly deleted 404, which is also a fact. Belarusian President Lukashenko only knows that Xi Jinping has stepped down. It is not Lukashenko who drove Xi Jinping out of office. Lukashenko is just an external factor, not an internal factor, but just an indicator for us to observe the black box of the CCP. It is not Lukashenko who decides whether Xi Jinping will step down. It is useless to whitewash Lukashenko. There must be whitewashing sayings. The removal of the president requires the consent of 2/3 of the NPC deputies. The procedure is complicated, and the Politburo may not take risks. However, it is possible that Xi Jinping will take the initiative to resign as the President of China, and the NPC will appoint a temporary acting president. Anyway, the Chinese National People’s Congress is also an eraser image. The appointment and removal case may target other officials, such as the removal of He Weidong, who was elected in March 2023, from the NPC representative qualification. Xi Jinping recently visited Kazakhstan and appeared publicly. On the surface, his authority is still there and he is still acting. He may not be directly removed on June 24.

This netizen said,
The Ministry of National Defense’s official website can no longer find news about He Weidong.

My reply is that He Weidong should be taken action and officially announced.

There is a possibility that Xi Jinping will be officially removed from office on June 28, because the loss of military power has left Xi Jinping powerless to fight back, but the Politburo may also choose a low-key transition and retain Xi Jinping’s title of President until the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee.

If Xi Jinping is not officially removed from office on June 28, 2025, Xi Jinping will still not escape the ultimate liquidation of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee, which will be held on July 18 or August 8. The general secretary and the chairman of the CMC are elected by the Central Plenary Session. The Fourth Plenary Session can remove Xi Jinping from his post through “resignation” or “health reasons”. Hu Jintao, Hu Chunhua, Zhang Youxia and Xi Jinping’s hostile factions have taken control of the situation.

The fall of Miao Hua, He Weidong and Xu Qiliang marks the return of military power to the Youth League faction. The 31st Group Army faction has been destroyed and Xi Jinping cannot turn the tables. X platform claims that Hu Chunhua (Hu faction) will take over as general secretary at the Fourth Plenary Session. Cai Qi manipulates propaganda to block Xi Jinping’s dynamics (such as the deletion of Belarusian reports). Peng Liyuan’s border control and Xi Mingze’s exposure show that the Xi family has lost power and the system has already regarded Xi Jinping as “yesterday’s flower”. The Fourth Plenary Session will force Xi Jinping to hand over the general secretary and the chairman of the CMC in the name of “unity within the party”.

The probability of the Fourth Plenary Session removing General Secretary Xi Jinping and the chairman of the CMC is extremely high. The loss of military power has left Xi Jinping powerless to fight back. Even if the reputation is retained and Xi Jinping is allowed to step down decently, Xi Jinping’s actual power has been cleared.

Xi Jinping’s loss of military power is the fuse for his resignation. Miao Hua, He Weidong, and Xu Qiliang fell, the 31st Group Army faction collapsed, and the military no longer pledged allegiance. The pattern of arrests during visits abroad (Miao Hua, He Weidong, and Yu Zhongfu fell in 2024-2025) shows that Hu Jintao or the Politburo is in control, and Xi Jinping’s every trip abroad has become a window for cleansing. Peng Liyuan’s border control and the deletion of reports on Belarus reveal that the Politburo has completely blocked the dynamics of the Xi family to prevent speculation about “entrustment” or “succession”.

Do you think Xi Jinping will officially announce his removal as president on June 28? Who will take over at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee? Please subscribe, like, and make bold predictions in the comment area.

This netizen said,
The joint letter from Shaanxi petitioners to Hu and Wang, as well as the political reform requirements mentioned in the letter, are signs that the people are gradually awakening. We must insist that reform and opening up can be based on the redress of unjust, false, and wrong cases, and we should make the people’s hope and desire for fairness and justice a reality.
My reply is that it is a bit late to wake up. The Magna Carta has been in place for 800 years. Most countries in the world have also been democratized, or at least have a democratic framework, but China has nothing. In any case, it is better to raise the demand for political reform than not to raise it.

This netizen said,
Why don’t Hu and Hu Jintao arrange people to prepare for the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee? It makes me anxious. Don’t delay the important things
My reply is, why are we so anxious to watch the excitement? You are too immersed in the drama. Xi Jinping should step down. He must step down. Don’t be impatient.

This netizen said,
How many people have been killed by Hu Jintao’s indecision.
My reply is that Hu Jintao is such a person. There is no such thing as having both in this world. If he is really so decisive, he will hang Xi Jinping on the street lamp in a few seconds. He will not have such a route of economic, diplomatic and domestic affairs without tossing. He must toss and turn.

Okay, thank you everyone.

END

大家好。2025年6月，白俄突然删除关于习明泽出席家宴的报道，恰逢中国人大常委会副委员长张庆伟访问白俄。删除报道是否为张庆伟所要求。访问后，张庆伟迅速参加6月16日人大会议，预告将于6月24日，审议代表资格审查报告，矛头是否指向军委副主席何卫东。习近平早已失去大权，只待官宣下台的传言已久，白俄此举是否泄露天机。今天，我们分析这一连串事件。

核心背景：白俄删除报道与张庆伟访问的巧合

2025年6月4日，习近平在中南海以所谓的家宴接待白俄罗斯总统卢卡申科。实际上这是一次穿帮的表演，卢卡申科根本就没有吃饭就去首都机场走了。6月9日，白俄国家通讯社（白通社）报道，第一副总理斯诺普科夫接受采访称彭丽媛与习明泽出席晚宴，习近平称“这是我女儿首次与外国领导人共进晚餐”。此消息引发热议，传言习近平权力旁落。然而，数天后白通社删除报道，谷歌链接显示“404”。此举“此地无银三百两”，显示中共试图掩盖习近平已经下台。

这篇报道标题就是《斯诺普科夫分享卢卡申科与习近平会晤非公开部分细节》。正是这篇报道被删除的。这篇报道里面最关键的一句就是《这并非悲情》

巧合的是，6月12日至14日，全国人大常委会副委员长张庆伟访问白俄，会见卢卡申科，讨论中白战略伙伴关系。访问期间，白通社删除习明泽报道，说明中国的长臂管辖，手都伸到白俄去了，是否是张庆伟代表中方要求删除的呢。

访问后，张庆伟参加6月16日全国人大会议，这次会议预告将于6月24日至27日召开常委会第十六次会议，审议代表资格审查报告和任免案，是否涉及何卫东，备受关注。白俄删除习明泽报道与张庆伟访问的时机高度重合，结合人大会议议程，可能反映习近平权力崩塌，但是却仍然在演戏。

张庆伟（1961年生，河北人），全国人大常委会副委员长，曾任黑龙江省委书记（2017-2021）。2025年6月12日至14日，张庆伟访问白俄，与卢卡申科会谈，强调“两国元首共识”。白通社在此期间删除习明泽报道，时间点敏感。

有传言称习近平不满习明泽曝光，亲自要求白俄删除，因报道引发“权力旁落”猜测，传回国内体制内，威胁其权威。这就是脑补的说法，根本就不因为提到习明泽才让删除了，是因为提到了《这并非悲情》，显示白俄官方背书，习近平已经下台。

张庆伟可能受中共的指示，在访问中施压白俄删除。白通社立刻又发了一个新的标题称“暴风雨和暴雪不会破坏团结”，暗示中国“ 政治风暴”（比如政变）不影响中白关系，间接佐证删除或为政治因素。张庆伟要求删除的可能性较高，因访问时机与删除重合，但是需要外交记录确认。外交记录短期内不会公开。十年20年之后才有可能解密。

张庆伟访问白俄后，参加中国人大会议

十四届全国人大常委会第四十五次委员长会议16日上午在北京人民大会堂举行。赵乐际委员长主持会议。会议决定，十四届全国人大常委会第十六次会议6月24日至27日在北京举行。审议全国人大常委会代表资格审查委员会关于个别代表的代表资格的报告；审议有关任免案等。

何卫东（1957年生，中央军委副主席，东部战区出身）自2025年3月11日全国人大闭幕后再也没有公开锅，传言被查。3月31日政治局会议、4月8日中央周边工作会议等均缺席，海外媒体（比如《华盛顿时报》）称其可能被免职。

何卫东被查，涉及军队派系斗争。全国人大有权终止何卫东的代表资格，6月24日会议审议“个别代表资格”引发猜测：是否包括何卫东。

中共黑箱政治下，信息扑朔迷离，一般认为苗华、何卫东是习近平军中两大支柱，掌控军委要职。但是如果前军委副主席许其亮也是习近平嫡系，习近平的军队支柱可能是“三大支柱”而非“两大支柱”。许其亮与习近平在福建福州有深交，曾任军委副主席（2012-2022），是军改操盘手，地位显赫。然而，2025年三大支柱全线崩塌：许其亮猝死，苗华被查，何卫东失踪。“习近平军权清零。”军队大局已定，胡锦涛、胡春华掌控军方，摊牌时刻来临。

何卫东如果被查，终止其2023年3月的第十四届全国人大代表资格符合程序。何卫东代表资格被开除的可能性存在，但是需要2025年6月24日人大会议结果确认。如果何卫东被终止人大代表资格，将最终证实习近平军中三大支柱，全部崩塌。

白俄删除习明泽报道被解读为“此地无银三百两”，暗示习近平权力危机，而非健康问题。习近平最近访问哈萨克斯坦，证明其身体健康暂时没有太大问题，驳斥5月25日至6月心梗传言。习近平最大的问题不是健康问题，危机根源在于权力丧失：海外媒体称习近平早已失去大权，只待官宣下台，一切外交动作均为“演戏”维稳。

习明泽首次外交登场被某些人解读为想要接班，或者习近平丧失大权不再需低调。习明泽接班的可能性，完全不存在。即便以前习近平大权在握。想要培养习明泽接班，没有5到10年也不行。习近平为什么一直不培养习明泽接班。证明习近平心知肚明，他没有大外宣吹嘘的那么大的权力。习近平如果真的像这些海外孤忠吹嘘的，手握一切生杀大权，那么习近平早就应该培养习明泽，既然习近平没有培养习明泽接班，那就说明，习近平一直就没有完全搞定。

白俄标题“暴风雨和暴雪”暗示中国“ 政治风暴”不影响关系，暗指习近平失势。 何卫东失踪与报道删除同属权力危机。

白俄删除报道凸显习近平权力崩塌，张庆伟可能为“灭火”。习近平健康不是最大的问题，但是丧失大权，演戏维稳。何卫东代表资格审议将是观察习近平下台的下一个关键信号。

2025年，习近平出访维持两大规律：每次出国必有亲信被抓，彭丽媛长期被边控无法出境。从阿根廷到越南，从苗华到何卫东，习近平的“习家军”接连倒台，南京军区几乎被连根拔起。这不是巧合，而是精心策划的政治清洗。彭丽媛为何被困国内？出访抓人背后谁在操盘？

2024-2025年，习近平出访形成诡异规律：一出国，国内必有亲信被抓，涉及南京军区31集团军派系的“习家军”核心成员，如苗华、何卫东、于忠福。这不是巧合，而是胡锦涛和胡春华的清洗行动，习近平早已失权，演戏维稳。同时，彭丽媛长期被边控，无法随习近平出访，2025年6月白俄家宴报道删除习明泽与彭丽媛出席信息，暗示彭丽媛行动受限。

习近平每次出访，国内亲信接连被抓，集中在南京军区31集团军派系：
2024年11月，阿根廷行：中央军委政治工作部主任苗华被“停职检查”。苗华（1955年生）通过岳父叶汉林（福州军区）与空军系统（乔清晨、于忠福）关联，掌控“习家军”军方命脉。

2025年3月，习近平云南行：何卫东被查，何卫东，1957年生，中央军委副主席，南京军区出身。何卫东由2007-2010的南京军区司令赵克石提拔，与31集团军关系深厚。

2025年4月，习近平越南行：于忠福（1956年生，前空军政委，南京军区任职2006、2014）被抄家。于忠福与赵克石、乔清晨交集，属“习家军”空军系统。当时没有想到这就是冲着许其亮去的。乔清晨66岁，没到七上八下的退休年龄，提前退休，把军委委员让给了许其亮。

2025年4月，习近平上海行：苗华被官宣罢免人大代表，定性“严重违纪违法”，可能面临无期徒刑。

海外媒体称习近平早已丧失大权，胡锦涛和胡春华借出访空窗期清洗“习家军”，动摇其军权根基。南京军区31集团军（驻厦门，习近平福建任职时发迹）是“习家军”核心，苗华、何卫东、于忠福因派系关联成目标。中共“以党代法”，苗华被定性违纪，显示清洗由党主导，绕过法律程序。

出访抓人规律指向胡锦涛或 政治局清洗“习家军”，习近平失权可能性高。苗华、何卫东、于忠福倒台，31集团军派系几近瓦解。

彭丽媛（1962年生）自2024年5月起，在没有离开过中国。2025年6月白俄家宴报道称其与习明泽出席，但迅速被删除，谷歌链接显示“404”。彭丽媛被边控，行动受限，无法出境。2025年6月习近平访哈萨克斯坦（上合峰会），彭丽媛未现身，强化边控传言。彭丽媛边控可能因习近平丧失大权，政治局限制其曝光，避免习家动态引发体制内猜测。要么就是涉及李克强案，想不出别的理由。

白通社报道删除显示中方可能通过张庆伟6月12-14日访白俄施压，刻意掩盖彭丽媛与习明泽行踪，防止“接班”或“托孤”传言扩散。习近平权力崩塌，彭丽媛不再“金贵”，被边控以削弱习家影响。彭丽媛长期边控与习近平失权高度关联，删除白俄报道反映中方掩盖危机。边控削弱习家形象，凸显政治局操控。

这次习近平去哈萨克，当天广西政协副主席彭晓春就抓了。彭晓春是郭声琨的大秘。大外宣天天拿着习近平的黑钱给习近平洗地。郭声琨给习近平当了10年的刀把子。郭声琨如果不是习近平的人，那么习近平有没有当过总书记，他怎么大权在握的？

习近平出访抓人与彭丽媛边控同属权力清洗的连环布局。习近平2025年6月访哈萨克斯坦，身体健康无大问题，驳斥心梗传言，但习近平早已失权，外交为“演戏”维稳。胡锦涛和胡春华借习近平出访清洗“习家军”（苗华、何卫东、于忠福），同时边控彭丽媛，切断习近平军权与家庭影响。

6月24日人大会议审议代表资格审查报告，可能涉及何卫东（2023年3月当选人大代表）。也就是说习近平这次出国访问，确定打掉了郭声琨的大秘彭晓春。如果何卫东也被终止人大代表资格，将证实清洗深入军委核心。白通社标题“暴风雨和暴雪”暗示中国“ 政治风暴”不影响中白关系，暗指习近平下台在即。

赵乐际天天也不咸不淡的吹捧习近平。赵乐际的舔包分数的确不高。也就是李强高。这都是演戏，习近平一离开中国，赵乐际就在家开会，准备收拾习近平的人。

好的，谢谢大家。

《原文链接》

英文翻译

Two things have not changed when Xi Jinping went abroad. Zhang Qingwei asked to delete the report on Xi Mingze. Will He Weidong’s qualification as a NPC representative be revoked?

Hello everyone. In June 2025, Belarus suddenly deleted the report on Xi Mingze’s attendance at the family dinner, which coincided with the visit of Zhang Qingwei, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China, to Belarus. Was the deletion of the report requested by Zhang Qingwei? After the visit, Zhang Qingwei quickly attended the NPC meeting on June 16, and announced that the report on the review of the qualifications of the representatives would be reviewed on June 24. Is the spearhead directed at He Weidong, Vice Chairman of the Military Commission? Xi Jinping has long lost power, and it has been rumored for a long time that he will step down. Did Belarus’s move reveal the secret? Today, we analyze this series of events.

Core background: The coincidence of Belarus’s deletion of the report and Zhang Qingwei’s visit
On June 4, 2025, Xi Jinping received Belarusian President Lukashenko at a so-called family dinner in Zhongnanhai. In fact, this was a show of goofing. Lukashenko went to the Capital Airport without eating at all. On June 9, the Belarusian State News Agency (BelTA) reported that First Deputy Prime Minister Snopkov said in an interview that Peng Liyuan and Xi Mingze attended the dinner, and Xi Jinping said, “This is the first time my daughter has dinner with a foreign leader.” This news sparked heated discussions, and rumors that Xi Jinping’s power has fallen. However, a few days later, BelTA deleted the report, and the Google link showed “404”. This move is “covering the truth here”, showing that the CCP is trying to cover up that Xi Jinping has stepped down.

The title of this report is “Snopkov shares some non-public details of Lukashenko’s meeting with Xi Jinping.” It was this report that was deleted. The most critical sentence in this report is “This is not tragic”

Coincidentally, from June 12 to 14, Zhang Qingwei, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, visited Belarus and met with Lukashenko to discuss the China-Belarus strategic partnership. During the visit, BelTA deleted the Xi Mingze report, indicating that China’s long-arm jurisdiction has reached Belarus. Did Zhang Qingwei request the deletion on behalf of the Chinese side?

After the visit, Zhang Qingwei attended the National People’s Congress on June 16. The meeting was expected to hold the 16th meeting of the Standing Committee from June 24 to 27 to review the representative qualification review report and appointment and removal case. Whether He Weidong is involved has attracted much attention. The timing of Belarus’s deletion of the Xi Mingze report and Zhang Qingwei’s visit is highly coincidental. Combined with the agenda of the National People’s Congress, it may reflect that Xi Jinping’s power has collapsed, but he is still acting.

Zhang Qingwei (born in 1961, from Hebei), Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, was the Secretary of the Heilongjiang Provincial Party Committee (2017-2021). From June 12 to 14, 2025, Zhang Qingwei visited Belarus and held talks with Lukashenko, emphasizing the “consensus of the two heads of state.” BelTA deleted the Xi Mingze report during this period, and the timing was sensitive.

There are rumors that Xi Jinping was dissatisfied with the exposure of Xi Mingze and personally asked Belarus to delete it because the report triggered speculation that “power was lost” and was transmitted back to the domestic system, threatening his authority. This is a made-up statement. It was not because of the mention of Xi Mingze that the deletion was made. It was because of the mention of “This is Not Tragedy”, which shows that the Belarusian government endorsed it and Xi Jinping has stepped down.

Zhang Qingwei may have been instructed by the CCP to pressure Belarus to delete the video during his visit. BelTA immediately issued a new headline saying “Storms and blizzards will not destroy unity”, implying that China’s “political storms” (such as coups) will not affect China-Belarus relations, indirectly proving that the deletion may be due to political factors. Zhang Qingwei’s request for deletion is more likely because the timing of the visit coincides with the deletion, but diplomatic records are needed to confirm. Diplomatic records will not be made public in the short term. It may be declassified only after ten or twenty years.

After Zhang Qingwei visited Belarus, he attended the Chinese National People’s Congress
The 45th Chairman’s Meeting of the 14th National People’s Congress Standing Committee was held in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on the morning of the 16th. Chairman Zhao Leji presided over the meeting. The meeting decided that the 16th meeting of the 14th National People’s Congress Standing Committee will be held in Beijing from June 24 to 27. Review the report of the Qualification Review Committee of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee on the qualifications of individual representatives; review relevant appointment and removal cases, etc.

He Weidong (born in 1957, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, from the Eastern Theater Command) has not made public his position since the closing of the National People’s Congress on March 11, 2025, and there are rumors that he is under investigation. He was absent from the Politburo meeting on March 31 and the Central Peripheral Work Conference on April 8. Overseas media (such as The Washington Times) said that he might be removed from office.

He Weidong was investigated, involving factional struggles in the military. The National People’s Congress has the right to terminate He Weidong’s representative qualifications. The meeting on June 24 to review the “individual representative qualifications” triggered speculation: whether He Weidong was included.

Under the black box politics of the Chinese Communist Party, information is confusing. It is generally believed that Miao Hua and He Weidong are the two pillars of Xi Jinping’s military and control important positions in the Military Commission. However, if former Vice Chairman of the Military Commission Xu Qiliang is also Xi Jinping’s direct line, Xi Jinping’s military pillars may be “three pillars” rather than “two pillars.” Xu Qiliang has a deep relationship with Xi Jinping in Fuzhou, Fujian. He served as Vice Chairman of the Military Commission (2012-2022) and is a military reform operator with a prominent position. However, in 2025, the three pillars collapsed across the board: Xu Qiliang died suddenly, Miao Hua was investigated, and He Weidong disappeared. “Xi Jinping’s military power has been cleared.” The overall situation of the military has been determined, Hu Jintao and Hu Chunhua control the military, and the moment of showdown has come.

If He Weidong is investigated, it is in accordance with procedures to terminate his qualifications as a representative of the 14th National People’s Congress in March 2023. There is a possibility that He Weidong’s representative qualifications will be expelled, but it needs to be confirmed by the results of the National People’s Congress meeting on June 24, 2025. If He Weidong’s qualifications as a representative of the National People’s Congress are terminated, it will finally confirm that the three pillars of Xi Jinping’s military have collapsed.

Belarus’s deletion of the report on Xi Mingze was interpreted as “there is no silver here”, implying Xi Jinping’s power crisis, not health problems. Xi Jinping recently visited Kazakhstan, proving that there is no major problem with his health for the time being, and refuted the rumors of a heart attack from May 25 to June. Xi Jinping’s biggest problem is not health, the root of the crisis is the loss of power: overseas media said that Xi Jinping had already lost power and was just waiting to be officially announced to step down, and all diplomatic actions were “acting” to maintain stability.

Some people interpreted Xi Mingze’s first diplomatic appearance as wanting to take over, or Xi Jinping no longer needs to keep a low profile after losing power. The possibility of Xi Mingze taking over is completely non-existent. Even if Xi Jinping was in power before. It would take 5 to 10 years to train Xi Mingze to take over. Why didn’t Xi Jinping train Xi Mingze to take over? It proves that Xi Jinping knows very well that he does not have as much power as the big foreign propaganda boasts. If Xi Jinping really holds all the power of life and death as these overseas loyalists boast, then Xi Jinping should have trained Xi Mingze long ago. Since Xi Jinping did not train Xi Mingze to take over, it means that Xi Jinping has never been completely settled.

The Belarusian title “Storm and Blizzard” implies that China’s “political storm” does not affect relations, implying that Xi Jinping has lost power. The disappearance of He Weidong and the deletion of the report are both power crises.

Belarus’s deletion of reports highlights Xi Jinping’s power collapse, and Zhang Qingwei may be “extinguishing the fire”. Xi Jinping’s health is not the biggest problem, but he has lost power and is acting to maintain stability. The review of He Weidong’s representative qualifications will be the next key signal to observe Xi Jinping’s resignation.

In 2025, Xi Jinping’s visits will maintain two major rules: every time he goes abroad, his confidants will be arrested, and Peng Liyuan has been under border control for a long time and cannot leave the country. From Argentina to Vietnam, from Miao Hua to He Weidong, Xi Jinping’s “Xi Family Army” has fallen one after another, and the Nanjing Military Region has been almost uprooted. This is not a coincidence, but a carefully planned political purge. Why is Peng Liyuan trapped in China? Who is behind the arrest of people during visits?

In 2024-2025, Xi Jinping’s visits will form a strange rule: once he goes abroad, his confidants will be arrested in China, involving core members of the “Xi Family Army” of the 31st Group Army faction of the Nanjing Military Region, such as Miao Hua, He Weidong, and Yu Zhongfu. This is not a coincidence, but a purge by Hu Jintao and Hu Chunhua. Xi Jinping has long lost power and is acting to maintain stability. At the same time, Peng Liyuan has been under border control for a long time and cannot accompany Xi Jinping on visits. The report of the Belarusian family dinner in June 2025 deleted the information about Xi Mingze and Peng Liyuan’s attendance, suggesting that Peng Liyuan’s movements were restricted.

Every time Xi Jinping visits, domestic confidants are arrested one after another, concentrated in the 31st Group Army faction of the Nanjing Military Region:
In November 2024, during the trip to Argentina: Miao Hua, director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, was “suspended for inspection”. Miao Hua (born in 1955) is connected to the Air Force system (Qiao Qingchen, Yu Zhongfu) through his father-in-law Ye Hanlin (Fuzhou Military Region), and controls the military lifeline of the “Xi Family Army”.

In March 2025, during Xi Jinping’s trip to Yunnan: He Weidong was investigated. He Weidong, born in 1957, is the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and was born in the Nanjing Military Region. He Weidong was promoted by Zhao Keshi, the commander of the Nanjing Military Region from 2007 to 2010, and has a deep relationship with the 31st Group Army.

In April 2025, Xi Jinping visited Vietnam: Yu Zhongfu (born in 1956, former political commissar of the Air Force, served in the Nanjing Military Region in 2006 and 2014) was raided. Yu Zhongfu intersected with Zhao Keshi and Qiao Qingchen, and belonged to the “Xi Family Army” Air Force system. At that time, I didn’t think that this was aimed at Xu Qiliang. Qiao Qingchen was 66 years old and had not reached the retirement age of 70 years old. He retired early and gave up the membership of the Military Commission to Xu Qiliang.

In April 2025, Xi Jinping visited Shanghai: Miao Hua was officially announced to be removed from the National People’s Congress representative, and was characterized as “serious violations of discipline and law” and may face life imprisonment.

Overseas media said that Xi Jinping had long lost power, and Hu Jintao and Hu Chunhua took advantage of the window period of his visit to clean up the “Xi Family Army” and shake the foundation of his military power. The 31st Group Army of the Nanjing Military Region (stationed in Xiamen, which was established when Xi Jinping was in office in Fujian) is the core of the “Xi Family Army”. Miao Hua, He Weidong, and Yu Zhongfu have become targets due to factional connections. The CCP “replaces the law with the party”, and Miao Hua was identified as a violation of discipline, indicating that the purge was led by the party and bypassed legal procedures.

The pattern of arresting people during visits abroad points to Hu Jintao or the Politburo’s purge of the “Xi Family Army”, and Xi Jinping is likely to lose power. Miao Hua, He Weidong, and Yu Zhongfu fell, and the 31st Group Army faction almost collapsed.

Peng Liyuan (born in 1962) has not left China since May 2024. In June 2025, the Belarusian family dinner was reported to be attended by Xi Mingze, but it was quickly deleted, and the Google link showed “404”. Peng Liyuan was under border control, her movements were restricted, and she could not leave the country. In June 2025, Xi Jinping visited Kazakhstan (SCO Summit), and Peng Liyuan did not show up, reinforcing the rumors of border control. Peng Liyuan’s border control may be due to Xi Jinping’s loss of power, and the Politburo has restricted her exposure to avoid speculation within the system about the Xi family’s dynamics. Or it may be related to the Li Keqiang case, and there is no other reason.

The deletion of the Belatong News Agency report shows that China may have exerted pressure through Zhang Qingwei’s visit to Belarus from June 12 to 14, deliberately covering up the whereabouts of Peng Liyuan and Xi Mingze to prevent the spread of rumors of “succession” or “entrustment”. Xi Jinping’s power collapsed, Peng Liyuan is no longer “precious”, and she was placed under border control to weaken the influence of the Xi family. Peng Liyuan’s long-term border control is highly related to Xi Jinping’s loss of power. The deletion of the Belarus report reflects China’s cover-up of the crisis. Border control weakens the image of the Xi family and highlights the manipulation of the Politburo.

This time when Xi Jinping went to Kazakhstan, Peng Xiaochun, vice chairman of the Guangxi CPPCC, was arrested on the same day. Peng Xiaochun is Guo Shengkun’s chief secretary. The big foreign propaganda uses Xi Jinping’s black money every day to whitewash Xi Jinping. Guo Shengkun has been Xi Jinping’s knife handle for 10 years. If Guo Shengkun is not Xi Jinping’s man, then has Xi Jinping ever been the general secretary? How did he hold so much power?

Xi Jinping’s arrests during visits abroad and the border control of Peng Liyuan are both part of a series of power cleansing arrangements. Xi Jinping visited Kazakhstan in June 2025 and had no major health problems, refuting rumors of a heart attack, but Xi Jinping had long lost power and diplomacy was a “show” to maintain stability. Hu Jintao and Hu Chunhua used Xi Jinping’s visit abroad to clean up the “Xi Family Army” (Miao Hua, He Weidong, Yu Zhongfu), while controlling Peng Liyuan at the border to cut off Xi Jinping’s military power and family influence.

On June 24, the National People’s Congress reviewed the report on the qualification review of representatives, which may involve He Weidong (elected as a representative of the National People’s Congress in March 2023). In other words, Xi Jinping’s visit abroad this time has definitely eliminated Peng Xiaochun, Guo Shengkun’s chief secretary. If He Weidong’s qualifications as a representative of the National People’s Congress are also terminated, it will confirm that the cleansing has penetrated into the core of the Military Commission. The title of BelTA “Storm and Blizzard” implies that China’s “political storm” does not affect China-Belarus relations, implying that Xi Jinping is about to step down.

Zhao Leji flatters Xi Jinping every day. Zhao Leji’s score of flattery is indeed not high. That is, Li Qiang is high. This is all acting. As soon as Xi Jinping left China, Zhao Leji held a meeting at home to prepare to deal with Xi Jinping’s people.

Okay, thank you everyone.

END

大家好,2025年，中南海暗流涌动，习近平下台传言席卷网络。胡锦涛为何隐瞒真相，是不是想力保四中全会胡春华接班？陕西500多访民上书揭开惊天秘密。更棘手的是李克强遇刺案，到底如何处理，这次习近平去哈萨克斯坦，果不其然，彭丽媛又没有随行。
只有一种解释，彭丽媛涉及李克强案，而且习近平指使彭丽媛，彭丽媛亲自下手的，如今“洗地”舆论四起。中共如何应对？我们分析处理彭丽媛和习近平的六种组合，揭秘胡春华接班布局。

核心背景：为何隐瞒习近平下台？

中共为何一直隐瞒习近平下台消息？陕西访民给出我们答案。中共政权十分脆弱，有一点风吹草动。就是草木皆兵，风声鹤唳，吓得要命。
2025年6月9日，陕西500多访民上书胡锦涛、汪洋，痛斥习近平家乡富平成“法外之地”，冤案暴增，信访窗口暴力截访。信中指习近平“扫黑除恶”“依法治国”是空话，要求废除维稳产业链、寻衅滋事罪，成立宪法法院，试点民主改革。“民怨总爆发。”

胡锦涛、胡春华隐瞒习近平下台的消息，就是害怕民意要求清算习近平政策，连带追责中共体制，收不住，直接动摇中共独裁统治的根基。胡春华计划四中全会接班，如果民怨失控，接班将泡汤。李克强之死更添危机：2023年10月27日去世，官方称“心梗”，大家都认为是习近平指使的。但是真相是什么，没人知道，我们今天分析传言的这些消息。

所谓的李克强案的李松是真是假？

李克强遇刺传言是中共的危机，处理方式决定胡春华接班成败。

到底如何处理呢，第一种方式是不处理彭丽媛，也不处理习近平

处理方式：否认遇刺，维持“心梗”说法。官媒宣传李克强“自然死亡”，淡化这些消息传言。习近平下台继续保密，直到胡春华四中全会接班。

墙内审查删帖，官媒强调“稳定”。短期保稳定，胡春华接班顺利；长期如果真相被公布，执政合法性受损。

第二种处理方式是处理彭丽媛、不处理习近平
处理方式：承认彭丽媛涉案，比如“个人行为”切割习近平，把彭丽媛低调软禁，不公开审判。习近平下台继续保密，官媒称“健康原因退休”。胡春华接班。

墙内彭丽媛被查可以稍微平息民怨，但是不处理习近平肯定会引发猜测。被质疑是找“替罪羊”，海外媒体挖派系斗争。如果证据指向习近平，压力还是会增大。

对胡春华接班的影响呢，短期有助于胡春华接班，长期如果真相公开，胡春华会被职责“护短”。

第三种处理方式是不处理彭丽媛、软切割处理习近平
处理方式：习近平“软切割”，低调下台，官媒称“健康原因”，定性为“领导失误”，不涉及李克强遇刺案。彭丽媛不受处理。胡春华接班。

墙内缓解民怨，但指“软着陆”无疑就是包庇习近平罪行，海外媒体会质疑胡春华的改革诚意。如果证据流出，胡春华信任下降。

对胡春华接班的影响呢，短期顺利接班，长期真相未解威胁信誉。

第4种处理方式是不处理彭丽媛、硬切割处理习近平
一人做事一人当，主谋站出来承担责任，不要把锅甩给别人。
处理方式：习近平“硬切割”，公开承认遇刺罪行，党内惩处，不公开审判。彭丽媛不受处理。胡春华接班，强调“清除腐败”。

习近平和毛泽东还是差距很大的

彻底走四人帮模式，习近平和毛泽东还是差距很大的，毛泽东是中共的创始人。习近平不过是一个中共总书记而已，胡耀邦赵紫阳都打到了。中共照样维持独裁统治。

当然这样处理，墙内肯定是震撼性的，官媒肯定会严控讨论。也会有质疑彭丽媛未受处罚，也可能导致习近平余党的反弹。对胡春华接班的影响呢，短期增强合法性，长期清算风险可能会威胁稳定。

第5种处理方式是处理彭丽媛、软切割处理习近平
处理方式：彭丽媛低调软禁，习近平“软切割”下台，不承认涉及李克强遇刺。胡春华接班，强调“团结”。

习近平彭丽媛双双被处理平息民怨，但是模糊态度会引发猜测。只能是“权宜之计”，海外媒体质疑改革决心。如果证据流出，信誉受损。

对胡春华接班的影响呢，短期助接班，长期真相未揭威胁稳定。

组合6：处理彭丽媛、硬切割处理习近平
处理方式：彭丽媛公开处理（如党内通报），习近平“硬切割”，承认遇刺罪行，党内惩处。胡春华接班，强调“清腐败”。

就是彻底清算。其实彭丽媛不是核心问题，核心是习近平的问题。

这样处理党内的分裂的风险很高，需要一个强有力政治强人出现，才会有这样的结果。

李克强遇刺案是中共烫手山芋，处理方式的将决定胡春华接班问题。不处理习近平彭丽媛两人保短期稳定，但真相浮出水面，信誉会崩塌；处理彭丽媛转移视线，助接班，但习近平未罚引质疑；软切割习近平平稳过渡，硬切割增强合法性，但风险动荡。最佳策略：处理彭丽媛、硬切割习近平，树立胡春华“正义”形象，但是需要严控清算范围。

胡春华有没有这样的政治手腕，的确是让人怀疑，因为胡春华毕竟从来没有真正当过总书记或者核心，放在聚光灯，供大家检验和评头论足。没人真正知道他到底是什么人？

要揭开李克强遇刺案，也需要时机。

这名网友的说法很好
放开也恢复不了了，具体原因有：公信力被玩崩了、人口红利也吃不了多久了和出口贸易也黄了，怎么恢复？
公信力崩塌，人口红利丧失，出口贸易黄了。
我觉得这名网友说的这个点都很好。接过习近平这个烂摊子。完全可以用百废待兴来形容。稳住经济，稳住政权才是核心议题。李克强遇刺案和这些议题相比算不上核心议题，无非就是表明态度。

我看这个所谓爆料，我看就想笑啊。

我们看这一段，李玉强，一共112个字，写得假的不能再假的，唐的不能再唐了，傻叉的不能再傻叉了。
第一个穿帮，李玉强47岁，那就是1978年出生，李玉强18岁参军就是1996年，28岁就是2006关键是1996年到2006年中国和谁打过仗？和哪个国家打仗。中国最后一次大规模战争是1979年对越战争，李玉强那时才1岁，正在吃奶呢。2006年，解放军主要进行训练和维稳任务，哪来的“敌后斩首”？即使是特种部队，也没有任何公开记录显示此类任务。离开中国国境，解放军敢去斩首谁啊，斩首谁不得引起重要的外交纠纷。

你要是张又侠这岁数，参加过越战，玩个敌后斩首还说的过去，2006年，中国跟谁打仗的，解放军都多少年没有打过仗。去斩谁的首，这不就是纯纯扯淡吗？。

第二个穿帮，南部战区特种作战旅，
南部战区成立于2016年，南部战区有两个特种作战旅第74集团军特种作战第74旅（南国利剑）和第75集团军特种作战第75旅（丛林猛虎）。2017年才组建。 李玉强如果1996年参军，2006年28岁，2017年已39岁。特种作战旅以年轻、体能强的高素质士兵为主，39岁还能在特种部队服役？更别说2017年前根本不存在南部战区。如果编出一个“广州军区”还稍微可信，但是广州军区2016年撤销，南部战区接管。 编小说的连基本时间线都搞错，硬生生把李玉强塞进不存在的部队，简直是历史盲。
2017年李玉强39岁，一般是少校营长或者副团长。也就是说39岁没有提干就退伍了，提干呢，级别高很可能有公开报道。李玉强能不能找到公开报道，肯定没有啊。

第三个穿帮，退役后转入国防部情报局。

这太搞笑了。中国国防部压根没有“情报局”。中国军队实行“党指挥枪”，中共最忌讳的就是军队国家化。国防部是空架子，主要职能是对外宣传和新闻发布，实际军事指挥权在中央军委。情报工作由军委联合参谋部（原总参谋部）的情报局负责，而且均为现役军官。 李玉强如果退役，怎可能转入军委情报局？更别说国防部情报局压根就不存在。退役军人通常转地方工作（比如公安、民政），而不是进入核心军事情报机构。编小说这个人脑子抽了，连中国军队架构都不懂，硬编一个“国防部情报局”，脑洞大到离谱。

第四个穿帮，对内 “战时维稳 ” 特别行动
哈哈，乌克兰特别行动听多了吧，中共就没有特别行动这个词。
这完全是乌克兰剧本翻版。中共话语体系从不用“战时维稳”或“特别行动”这种术语。“维稳”在中共党八股中通常称“维护社会稳定”或“社会治安综合治理”，如2011年中央维稳工作会议提出的“加强和创新社会管理”。2023年中国无战时状态，李克强去世时国内稳定，哪来的“战时”？维稳任务由武警、公安负责，非特种部队或情报局。至于“特别行动”，中共更偏好“专项行动”或“专项整治”，如“扫黑除恶专项斗争”。“特别行动”明显受“乌克兰特别军事行动”启发，套用外国术语，显得不伦不类。“现场总指挥”更是空洞，连地点、时间、方式都没提，纯属玄幻。

这完全是乌克兰剧本翻版。中共话语体系从不用“战时维稳”或“特别行动”。“维稳”在党八股中通常称“维护社会稳定”或“社会治安综合治理”，如2011年中央维稳工作会议提出的“加强和创新社会管理”。2023年中国没有战时状态，李克强死的时候中国没有打仗，哪来的“战时”。维稳任务由武警、公安负责，而非特种部队或情报局。中国总参情报局的确，有时候会发一些维稳的情报。但是总参他们从来不参加行动。这个傻叉，懂不懂，太唐了。他懂不懂情报和行动的区别是什么呀？“特别行动”更像“乌克兰特别军事行动”的生搬硬套，中共常用“专项行动”或“专项整治”，比如“扫黑除恶专项斗争”。“现场总指挥”空洞无比，连地点、时间、方式都没提，纯属虚构。

太二了，多演穿帮啊。大外宣把这个内容现在改成这个版本了。
李XX（队长）：主要负责整个任务实施，确保每一步都能按计划执行。
原来112个字，现在改成31个字，就说他连100个字都说不明白。

我们看另外一个人，他瞎编的，赵烨晨，男，32岁，浙江杭州人，于2015年毕业于清华大学计算机系，拥有硕士学位，并于2016年进入国家安全部技术部门，赵烨晨专攻网络安全与信号干扰。32岁就是1993年出生，2015年毕业于清华大学计算机系，22岁硕士毕业。又是神童啊， 连跳三级，一般硕士24岁25岁毕业。清华神童硕士搞暗杀，清华都混成这样了。怪不得习近平混到下台了。清华大学不行啊。

据清华大学研究生院消息，2015年清华大学计算机系考研拟录取名单已公布，详情如下：
有49个人，我们找找看，里面有没有叫做赵烨晨的人，对不对。

多演穿帮，编的细节太详细了，但是漏洞百出，全是假的。清华研究生计算机系2015年录取的49个人里面还真的有7个人备注强军计划，可能和解放军有关系。哎，赵烨晨是国家安全部的，不是军队的，有穿帮了。而且一会儿任职中国电子科技集团，一会儿任职国家安全部。这是一个部门还是两个部门啊？

国家安全部是情报机构，负责国内外安全事务，技术部门聚焦网络安全、信号监听等。中国电子科技集团公司是国企，专注军工电子和通信设备研发，如雷达、干扰系统。两者性质完全不同：国安部是政府机关，电科集团是企业。这人说赵烨晨在两个单位任职，2016年23岁进入国安部，之前还挤时间在电科集团参与军用项目，时间线和资历都不合理。23岁刚毕业的硕士，怎可能在两个高安全机构身兼要职。这不是瞎编是什么。

学位和专业不符。清华大学计算机系硕士通常授予工学硕士学位，聚焦计算机科学与技术，如算法、软件开发、网络安全。他说赵烨晨专攻信号干扰与通信屏蔽，这属于电子工程或通信工程领域，与计算机系课程不匹配。清华大学电子工程系（而非计算机系）才涉及信号干扰相关研究，而且授予工学硕士。

就是不管念计算机系还是念的电子工程系，最后都是授予工学硕士。没有电子工程硕士这个说法。他混淆计算机系与电子工程系学位，硬把网络安全专长扯到信号干扰，只能说这个人没有上过大学。

这名网友说，
不可能是真的，因为他知道的太多了。即便亲身参与，也只可能了解很有限的一部分，例如刺杀金正男事件，行刺者不知道自己在行刺，策划者在事发前逃离现场，也就不知道现场细节。如果全程参与，必遭灭口。

我的回复是，痕迹再消灭也不可能完全消灭的，最保险的方法就是死人不会不说话。再说当时都敢灭了李克强，还怕人发现吗？那就是在给彭少将打掩护了。刚刚都爆出全部内容。多演穿帮。

目的就是为真凶打掩护，洋洋洒洒几千字。但有价值的一个字也没有。比如他们是如何替换了原有李克强的安保团队，又比如上海地方介入的具体时间及人物，地方不介入是不可能的。

好的，谢谢大家。

《原文链接》

英文翻译

A Six-Person Analysis of the Li Keqiang Assassination Case: Who is the Mastermind, Xi Jinping or Peng Liyuan? Why Has Peng Liyuan Been Under Border Control?

Hello everyone, in 2025, undercurrents are swirling in Zhongnanhai, and rumors of Xi Jinping’s resignation are sweeping the internet. Why is Hu Jintao concealing the truth? Is he trying to ensure Hu Chunhua’s succession at the Fourth Plenary Session? More than 500 petitioners from Shaanxi have revealed a shocking secret. Even more thorny is the Li Keqiang assassination case. How should it be handled? This time, when Xi Jinping went to Kazakhstan, as expected, Peng Liyuan did not accompany him.

There is only one explanation: Peng Liyuan is involved in the Li Keqiang case, and Xi Jinping instructed Peng Liyuan, who personally carried out the assassination. Now, there is widespread “whitewashing” rhetoric. How will the CCP respond? We analyze six possible combinations of Peng Liyuan and Xi Jinping, revealing the Hu Chunhua succession plan.

Core Background: Why Conceal Xi Jinping’s Resignation?

Why has the CCP been concealing the news of Xi Jinping’s resignation? The Shaanxi petitioners provide the answer. The CCP regime is extremely fragile; the slightest disturbance triggers a climate of fear and paranoia.

On June 9, 2025, over 500 petitioners from Shaanxi Province wrote to Hu Jintao and Wang Yang, denouncing Xi Jinping’s hometown of Fuping as a “lawless zone,” with a surge in wrongful convictions and violent interception at petition offices. The letter accused Xi Jinping’s “anti-gang and anti-crime” and “rule of law” pronouncements as empty rhetoric, demanding the abolition of the “stability maintenance industry chain” and the crime of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” the establishment of a constitutional court, and pilot democratic reforms. “Public resentment is about to erupt.”

Hu Jintao and Hu Chunhua concealed news of Xi Jinping’s potential resignation because they feared public pressure to hold him accountable for his policies and the CCP system itself, which, if unchecked, would directly shake the foundations of the CCP’s authoritarian rule. Hu Chunhua planned to succeed Xi at the Fourth Plenary Session; if public resentment spiraled out of control, his succession would be jeopardized. The death of Li Keqiang further exacerbated the crisis: he died on October 27, 2023, officially attributed to a “heart attack,” but many believe it was orchestrated by Xi Jinping. But the truth remains unknown. Today, we’ll analyze these rumors.

Is the alleged Li Song in the Li Keqiang case real or fake?

The rumors of Li Keqiang’s assassination attempt are a crisis for the CCP, and how they are handled will determine the success or failure of Hu Chunhua’s succession.

How should it be handled? The first option is to neither punish Peng Liyuan nor Xi Jinping.

The approach: Deny the assassination attempt, maintain the “heart attack” explanation. State media publicizes Li Keqiang’s “natural death,” downplaying these rumors. Xi Jinping’s resignation remains secret until Hu Chunhua takes over at the Fourth Plenary Session.

Censorship and deletion of posts within the Great Firewall, state media emphasizes “stability.” This ensures short-term stability and a smooth succession for Hu Chunhua; in the long term, if the truth is revealed, the legitimacy of the regime will be damaged.

The second option is to punish Peng Liyuan, not Xi Jinping.

The approach: Acknowledge Peng Liyuan’s involvement, for example, by severing ties with Xi Jinping through “personal actions,” place Peng Liyuan under house arrest discreetly, and hold no public trial. Xi Jinping’s resignation remains secret, with state media stating “retirement for health reasons.” Hu Chunhua succeeds.

The investigation of Peng Liyuan within China might slightly quell public anger, but leaving Xi Jinping unpunished will inevitably fuel speculation. It could be seen as a scapegoat, with overseas media digging into factional infighting. If evidence points to Xi Jinping, the pressure will increase.

Regarding the impact on Hu Chunhua’s succession, in the short term it might facilitate his transition, but in the long term, if the truth comes out, Hu Chunhua will be accused of “protecting his own.”

The third approach is to leave Peng Liyuan unpunished and handle Xi Jinping with a “soft landing.”

Approach: Xi Jinping “softly” steps down, citing “health reasons” in state media, characterizing it as a “leadership error,” and excluding the assassination attempt on Li Keqiang. Peng Liyuan remains unpunished. Hu Chunhua succeeds him.

This approach alleviates public anger within China, but a “soft landing” would undoubtedly be seen as protecting Xi Jinping’s crimes, leading overseas media to question Hu Chunhua’s sincerity in reform. If evidence leaks, Hu Chunhua’s credibility will decline.

Regarding the impact on Hu Chunhua’s succession, in the short term it would ensure a smooth transition, but in the long term, the unresolved truth threatens his credibility.

The fourth approach is to leave Peng Liyuan alone and completely sever ties with Xi Jinping.

One person should take responsibility for their actions; the mastermind should step forward and not try to shift the blame.

Approach: Xi Jinping completely severes ties, publicly admitting to the assassination attempt, receiving internal party punishment, and undergoing a closed trial. Peng Liyuan is not punished. Hu Chunhua succeeds him, emphasizing “anti-corruption.”

Xi Jinping and Mao Zedong are still very different. Completely following the Gang of Four model, Xi Jinping and Mao Zedong are still very different. Mao Zedong was the founder of the CCP. Xi Jinping is merely the General Secretary of the CCP; even though Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were overthrown, the CCP still maintains its dictatorial rule.

Of course, this approach would be shocking within China, and state media would strictly control discussion. There would also be questions about Peng Liyuan’s lack of punishment, and it could lead to a backlash from Xi Jinping’s remaining supporters. Regarding the impact on Hu Chunhua’s succession, in the short term, it would enhance legitimacy, but in the long term, the potential for political maneuvering could threaten stability.

The fifth approach is to deal with Peng Liyuan and completely sever ties with Xi Jinping.

Approach: Peng Liyuan is placed under house arrest in a low-key manner; Xi Jinping completely severes ties and steps down, denying any involvement in Li Keqiang’s assassination attempt. Hu Chunhua’s succession emphasizes “unity.”

The handling of Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan has quelled public discontent, but the ambiguous stance will fuel speculation. It can only be a “stopgap measure,” with overseas media questioning the determination to reform. If evidence leaks, credibility will be damaged.

As for the impact on Hu Chunhua’s succession, it will facilitate the succession in the short term, but in the long term, the unresolved truth threatens stability.

Combination 6: Handling Peng Liyuan, a hard separation from Xi Jinping

Handling method: Peng Liyuan is publicly dealt with (e.g., an internal party announcement), Xi Jinping “hard-severes ties,” admitting to the assassination attempt, and receiving internal party punishment. Hu Chunhua’s succession emphasizes “cleaning up corruption.”

This is a thorough purge. In fact, Peng Liyuan is not the core issue; the core issue is Xi Jinping.

This approach carries a high risk of internal party division and requires the emergence of a strong political leader to achieve such an outcome.

The Li Keqiang assassination case is a hot potato for the CCP; how it is handled will determine Hu Chunhua’s succession. Not dealing with Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan could maintain short-term stability, but the truth would surface, and their credibility would collapse. Dealing with Peng Liyuan could divert attention and facilitate succession, but Xi Jinping’s lack of punishment would raise questions. A soft approach would allow for a smooth transition for Xi Jinping, while a hard approach would enhance legitimacy, but this carries risks and instability. The best strategy: deal with Peng Liyuan, hard-sever ties with Xi Jinping, and establish Hu Chunhua’s “righteous” image, but the scope of the purge needs strict control.

Whether Hu Chunhua possesses such political skill is indeed questionable, because he has never truly served as General Secretary or a core figure, nor has he been placed under the spotlight for public scrutiny and judgment. No one truly knows who he really is.

Uncovering the Li Keqiang assassination attempt also requires the right opportunity.

This netizen’s point is excellent: Even if things are allowed to continue, they can’t be restored. Specific reasons include: public trust has been completely destroyed, the demographic dividend won’t last much longer, and export trade has collapsed. How can it be restored? Public trust has collapsed, the demographic dividend has been lost, and export trade has collapsed.

I think this netizen’s points are all very good. He inherited Xi Jinping’s mess. The situation can only be described as one of utter devastation. Stabilizing the economy and the regime are the core issues. The assassination attempt on Li Keqiang is not a core issue compared to these; it’s merely a statement of intent.

I just want to laugh at this so-called “revelation.”

Look at this passage: Li Yuqiang, a total of 112 characters, written so obviously fake, so ridiculously absurd, so utterly idiotic.

The first major flaw: Li Yuqiang is 47 years old, meaning he was born in 1978. He joined the army at 18 in 1996, and at 28 in 2006. The crucial question is, between 1996 and 2006, who did China fight? Which country? China’s last large-scale war was the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979. Li Yuqiang was only one year old then, still breastfeeding. In 2006, the PLA was mainly conducting training and maintaining stability; where did this “decapitation strike behind enemy lines” come from? Even special forces have no publicly available records of such missions. Outside of China’s borders, who would the PLA dare to decapitate? Such an operation would cause a major diplomatic incident.

If you were Zhang Youxia’s age and had participated in the Vietnam War, a decapitation strike behind enemy lines might be plausible. But in 2006, who was China fighting? The PLA hadn’t fought a war in years. Decapitating someone? That’s pure nonsense.

The second inconsistency: the Southern Theater Command Special Operations Brigade. The Southern Theater Command was established in 2016 and has two special operations brigades: the 74th Special Operations Brigade of the 74th Group Army (Southern Sword) and the 75th Special Operations Brigade of the 75th Group Army (Jungle Tiger). They were only formed in 2017. If Li Yuqiang joined the army in 1996, he would be 28 years old in 2006 and 39 years old in 2017. Special operations brigades primarily consist of young, physically strong, and highly qualified soldiers. Could a 39-year-old still be serving in special forces? Not to mention, the Southern Theater Command didn’t even exist before 2017. If a “Guangzhou Military Region” had been fabricated, it might be somewhat believable, but the Guangzhou Military Region was abolished in 2016 and taken over by the Southern Theater Command. The novelist got even the basic timeline wrong, forcibly placing Li Yuqiang in a non-existent unit—a clear case of historical illiteracy.

In 2017, Li Yuqiang was 39 years old, typically a major battalion commander or deputy regimental commander. This means he retired at 39 without being promoted. Promotion to a higher rank would likely be publicly reported. Could you find any publicly reported information about Li Yuqiang? Certainly not.

The third plot hole is that he transferred to the National Defense Ministry’s Intelligence Bureau after retirement.

This is ridiculous. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense doesn’t have an “Intelligence Bureau.” The Chinese military operates under the principle of “the Party commands the gun,” and the CCP is most averse to the nationalization of the military. The Ministry of National Defense is a shell, its main functions being external propaganda and press releases; actual military command rests with the Central Military Commission. Intelligence work is handled by the Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (formerly the General Staff Department), and all its personnel are active-duty officers. If Li Yuqiang were to retire, how could he possibly transfer to the Central Military Commission’s Intelligence Bureau? Not to mention, the Ministry of National Defense’s Intelligence Bureau doesn’t even exist. Retired military personnel typically transfer to local jobs (such as public security or civil affairs), not to core military intelligence agencies. The person who wrote this novel is out of their mind; they don’t even understand the structure of the Chinese military, yet they fabricated a “Ministry of National Defense Intelligence Bureau”—it’s an absurdly wild idea.

The fourth plot hole: Internal “wartime stability maintenance” special operations.

Haha, you’ve heard too much about Ukrainian special operations, haven’t you? The CCP doesn’t use the term “special operations.”

This is a complete copy of the Ukrainian script. The CCP’s discourse never uses terms like “wartime stability maintenance” or “special operations.” “Stability maintenance” in CCP official documents is usually referred to as “maintaining social stability” or “comprehensive social security management,” such as the “strengthening and innovating social management” proposed at the 2011 Central Stability Maintenance Work Conference. In 2023, China is not in a state of war; when Li Keqiang passed away, the country was stable—where did this “wartime” come from? Stability maintenance tasks are handled by the Armed Police and Public Security Bureau, not special forces or the intelligence bureau. As for “special operations,” the CCP prefers “special operations” or “special rectification,” such as the “anti-gang and anti-crime campaign.” The term “special operations” is clearly inspired by the “Ukrainian special military operation,” and the use of foreign terminology feels incongruous. The “on-site commander” is even more vague, failing to mention the location, time, or method—pure fantasy.

This is a complete rehash of the Ukrainian script. The CCP’s discourse never uses “wartime stability maintenance” or “special operations.” “Stability maintenance” in Party jargon is usually referred to as “maintaining social stability” or “comprehensive social security management,” such as the “strengthening and innovating social management” proposed at the 2011 Central Stability Maintenance Work Conference. In 2023, China is not in a state of war; when Li Keqiang died, China was not at war, so where does the “wartime” come from? Stability maintenance tasks are handled by the Armed Police and Public Security Bureau, not special forces or intelligence agencies. The General Staff Intelligence Bureau of China does sometimes issue intelligence related to stability maintenance. However, the General Staff never participates in operations. This idiot, doesn’t he understand? He’s so clueless. Does he even understand the difference between intelligence and operations? The term “special operation” is more like a forced imitation of the “Ukrainian special military operation.” The CCP often uses terms like “special operation” or “special rectification,” such as the “anti-gang and anti-crime campaign.” The “on-site commander” is utterly hollow, failing to mention the location, time, or method—purely fabricated.

This is ridiculous; the flaws are obvious. The CCP’s propaganda machine has now changed this version.

Li XX (Captain): Primarily responsible for the entire mission implementation, ensuring every step is executed according to plan.

Originally 112 characters, now reduced to 31, showing he can’t even explain 100 words clearly.

Let’s look at another person, someone he made up: Zhao Yechen, male, 32 years old, from Hangzhou, Zhejiang, graduated from Tsinghua University’s Computer Science Department in 2015 with a master’s degree, and joined the Ministry of State Security’s technical department in 2016. Zhao Yechen specializes in network security and signal jamming. 32 years old means born in 1993, graduated from Tsinghua University’s Computer Science Department in 2015, and graduated with a master’s degree at 22. Another child prodigy! Skipping three grades, while most master’s students graduate at 24 or 25. A Tsinghua prodigy master’s student involved in assassination—Tsinghua has fallen so low. No wonder Xi Jinping was forced to step down. Tsinghua University is failing.

According to Tsinghua University’s Graduate School, the list of candidates to be admitted to the Computer Science Department in 2015 has been released. Details are as follows: There are 49 people. Let’s see if anyone named Zhao Yechen is on it.

This is a complete fabrication. The details are too elaborate, but full of loopholes; it’s all fake. Of the 49 people admitted to Tsinghua’s Computer Science Department in 2015, 7 actually have a note about the “Strengthening the Military Plan,” possibly related to the People’s Liberation Army. Alas, Zhao Yechen works for the Ministry of State Security, not the military—another slip-up. And he’s sometimes employed by the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, sometimes by the Ministry of State Security. Is it one department or two?

The Ministry of State Security is an intelligence agency responsible for domestic and international security affairs. Its technical department focuses on network security, signal monitoring, etc. China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) is a state-owned enterprise specializing in the research and development of military electronics and communication equipment, such as radar and jamming systems. The two entities are completely different: the Ministry of State Security is a government agency, while CETC is a company. This person claims Zhao Yechen held positions in both, joining the Ministry of State Security in 2016 at the age of 23, and prior to that, squeezing in time to participate in military projects at CETC. The timeline and qualifications are illogical. How could a 23-year-old recent master’s graduate hold important positions in two high-security institutions? This is pure fabrication.

The degree and major do not match. Master’s degrees in Computer Science at Tsinghua University are typically awarded a Master of Engineering degree, focusing on computer science and technology, such as algorithms, software development, and network security. He claims Zhao Yechen specialized in signal jamming and communication shielding, which falls under the fields of electronic engineering or communication engineering, and is incompatible with Computer Science courses. Tsinghua University’s Department of Electronic Engineering (not Computer Science) is where signal jamming-related research is conducted, and awards a Master of Engineering degree there.

In short, regardless of whether one studies Computer Science or Electronic Engineering, the final degree awarded is a Master of Engineering. There is no such thing as a Master of Electronic Engineering. He confused computer science and electrical engineering degrees, and forced his cybersecurity expertise to signal jamming; it just shows this person never went to university.

This netizen said, “It can’t be true because he knows too much. Even if someone was personally involved, they could only know a very limited part. For example, in the assassination of Kim Jong-nam, the assassin didn’t know he was carrying out an assassination, and the planner fled the scene before the incident, so they didn’t know the details. If someone was involved in the whole thing, they would definitely be silenced.”

My reply is that traces can never be completely erased, no matter how much you try to eliminate them. The safest way is that the dead don’t stay silent. Besides, if they dared to eliminate Li Keqiang back then, would they be afraid of being discovered? That was to cover for Major General Peng. The whole story has just been revealed. They’re just making excuses.

The purpose is to cover for the real culprit, thousands of words long. But not a single word is valuable. For example, how did they replace Li Keqiang’s original security team? Or the specific time and people involved in Shanghai’s intervention? It’s impossible for the local authorities not to intervene.

Okay, thank you everyone.

END

大家好，
大包，分析高层派系斗争为主，也请紧跟时事，罗帅宇医生湘雅医院手术室变祭品事件再上热搜，此起彼伏的校园失踪，每年几百万失踪人口即使报案最后也悄无声息，国际医疗界对中国的器官移植黑幕多年来不停质疑，这背后的庞大利益到底都是谁家的蛋糕。

我的回复是，
首先我接受你的批评。我确实应该紧跟时事。我说过我现在已经没有中国的社交媒体了。所以对中国发生的事情没有一手的消息。因为我在中国生活过，我懂中国发生的事情。但是已经没有亲身体验，没有那种恐惧感和愤怒感，或者说少了很多。

我们简单的讲，泛泛的说，湖南官员三分之二都是习近平派系的。这还是从所谓搞个开放之后50年的维度去说。如果最近10年，习近平掌权，湖南官员，习近平派系起码百分之七八十。

我说过湖南的官员，要清洗的话，基本要一锅端了才行。大部分是习近平的人。

这名网友说，
罗帅宇事件最近很火，5月网上举报的两处代孕犯罪也在长沙。这表明，长沙是周派大本营，周派被消灭大批干将以后，新闻和举报都压不住了。仅仅只是新闻压不住了而已，这绝不表明，小胡想用零件的事情为难周派。小胡学大胡，理由都是贪污腐败。

我的回复是，
中共这些垃圾官员都是所谓大局为重。马上他就正式上台了。就湖南习近平根深蒂固。胡春华即便上台。起码清洗三年。这些事情都要揭盖子。就看胡春华的处理手法。就能知道他是什么样的人，到底是和习近平一样的货色呢。还是有什么改变，即便不改变中共的独裁体制。在中共独裁体制之下，这些事情也得给一个交代，不然说不过去。

湖南湘雅医院近期发生多起丑闻，主要涉及医生违规操作、学术不端以及桃色事件等问题。重要的就是这个器官的问题。

其中，湘雅三医院呼吸科医生被指控放任无资质学生进行支气管镜检查，导致患者死亡；湘雅二医院副主任医师刘翔峰被查出涉嫌严重违法，并被判刑；此外，还有副院长龚志成因桃色新闻和商业贿赂被免职。
详细情况如下：
湘雅三医院医生违规操作事件：医生被指控放任没有资质的学生进行支气管镜检查，导致患者死亡，引起社会广泛关注。
湘雅二医院刘翔峰事件：刘翔峰被查出涉嫌严重违法，并被判刑17年，案件涉及故意伤害罪等，反映出医院内部存在严重问题。
湘雅医院副院长龚志成事件：龚志成因桃色丑闻和商业贿赂被举报，最终被免职并给予党内严重警告处分，反映出医院管理层存在道德和廉洁问题。

所有的事情都是不痛不痒，根本就没有把幕后黑手揪出来。背后肯定是一个政治局常委。

这些网友肯定是想让我公布答案。湖南想就知道是谁，肯定是湖南人。哪个湖南人是政治局常委，猜就知道是谁？背后都是政治斗争，不然中国的网是局域网，不可能炒作起来。

我给大家简单的挖一下，很容易，就找一个政治局常委。他就是幕后黑手。

很简单中南大学湘雅医院，党委书记张欣和院长雷光华是什么背景。院长雷光华，姓氏并不是常见，我首先想到的就是中国卫健委主任雷海潮。据说雷海潮是组织抢救习近平有功，光速上位。4年就从正局级提拔成正部级。

我们简单粗暴，直接人脸比对，两个人的人脸相似度是10%。没法证明有血缘关系。人脸比对有一定的局限性，只能证明父子母子，父女母女的关系。侄子侄女，简单说，就是能够证明两代以内的血缘。三代四代的血缘关系就没法证明。

院长我没有找到好的线索，那就找中南大学湘雅医院党委书记张欣。

首先湘雅医院的级别，我不太确定。大概就是一个正局级。在权斗场，级别就很低。我一般不看正局级，除非特殊的人。就是我们看迅速的找到一个，和张欣绑定的，一个级别更高的上级。才能确定。

2024年11月29日，湖南省侨联第九届委员会第一次全体会议在长沙召开，会议任命张欣（兼）为副主席。当时的湖南省委书记是沈晓明（2023年3月 – ），湖南省长是毛伟明（2020年11月 – ），湖南省统战部长是隋忠诚 （2021年11月 – ），湖南侨联主席是孙庆民。

首先张欣只是医院的党委书记怎么就成为侨联副主席呢。2000年的2006年张欣在美国生活。侨联的全称是中华全国归国华侨联合会。华侨是什么意思呢，华侨是指定居在国外的中国公民。也就是说张欣有可能有美国绿卡，不知道6年怎么快就拿到美国绿卡。湖南省长毛伟明早期是朱镕基情人陈玉英提拔的。江苏省常州市官员。

湖南省统战部部长隋忠诚，我还没有来得及深挖肯定是有嫌疑，很有可能是习近平马仔。我们今天从湖南省侨联主席孙庆民入手。

孙庆民长期担任前任湖南省侨联主席朱道弘的大秘。这个人姓朱，又是湖南人，这就是嫌疑啊。我们这个中国核心权力层，12人名单，只有一个人姓朱，还是湖南人。

我们就简单粗暴，人脸比对，看看有没有答案。

朱道弘和朱镕基的人脸相似度是15%。朱镕基和朱镕基儿子朱云来的人脸相似度是48%。好消息又是一个亲生的。朱道弘和朱云来的人脸相似度是13%。

20%以下就是玄学范围，人脸比对就不好用，必须验DNA。最大的嫌疑就是朱道弘和朱镕基父子都有一定的相似度。我只能这么说朱道弘是朱镕基三代血缘的亲戚的可能性是60%。不是亲戚的可能性是40%。没法说。不过没关系，嫌疑人已经被我们找出来e。

2013年3月，朱道弘增补为湖南省归国华侨联合会主席。当时的湖南省委书记是周强（2010年4月 – 2013年3月）。湖南省长是徐守盛（2010年6月 – 2013年4月），湖南省统战部长是李微微 （2006年11月 – 2015年8月）。

原来是李微微，李微微也是薄一波和朱镕基马仔。我刚说了马洪把朱镕基推荐给袁宝华，袁宝华把朱镕基调入国家经委。吕东提拔的朱镕基，朱镕基专门写过纪念吕东的文章。薄熙来的爸爸薄一波就是国家经委主任。李微微就是吕东马仔曹伯纯提拔的。薄一波马仔王茂林提拔的。朱镕基也是吕东提拔的。朱镕基是吕东徒弟，李微微是吕东的徒孙。朱道弘是朱镕基疑似的亲戚，是李微微提拔的。

为什么炒作中南大学湘雅医院，就是胡春华要斗胡春华干爹胡锦涛的政敌朱镕基。

好的，谢谢大家。

《原文链接》

英文翻译

Decoding the Luo Shuaiyu incident at Xiangya Hospital, which Politburo Standing Committee member was the mastermind behind it? What is his relationship with Xi Jinping? What is his relationship with Li Weiwei?

Hello everyone,
Dabao, I mainly analyze the factional struggles at the top level, but please also keep up with current affairs. The incident of Dr. Luo Shuaiyu becoming a sacrifice in the operating room of Xiangya Hospital has become a hot topic again. There have been disappearances on campuses one after another, and millions of missing people every year have been reported but nothing has been found in the end. The international medical community has been questioning the dark side of China’s organ transplants for many years. Whose cake is the huge profit behind this?

My reply is,
First of all, I accept your criticism. I should really keep up with current affairs. I said that I don’t have any Chinese social media now. So I don’t have first-hand information about what’s happening in China. Because I have lived in China, I understand what’s happening in China. But I don’t have personal experience, and I don’t have that sense of fear and anger, or I have much less.

Let’s put it simply, generally speaking, two-thirds of Hunan officials are from Xi Jinping’s faction. This is still from the dimension of 50 years after the so-called opening up. If Xi Jinping had been in power in the past 10 years, at least 70 to 80 percent of Hunan officials would be from Xi Jinping’s faction.

I have said that if we want to purge Hunan officials, we basically have to purge them all at once. Most of them are Xi Jinping’s people.

This netizen said,
The Luo Shuaiyu incident has been very popular recently, and the two surrogacy crimes reported online in May were also in Changsha. This shows that Changsha is the base camp of Zhou’s faction. After a large number of Zhou’s faction members were eliminated, the news and reports could not be suppressed. It is just that the news could not be suppressed, which does not mean that Xiao Hu wants to embarrass Zhou’s faction with the spare parts issue. Xiao Hu is learning from Da Hu, and the reason is corruption.

My reply is,
These garbage officials of the CCP are all so-called putting the overall situation first. He will officially take office soon. Xi Jinping is deeply rooted in Hunan. Even if Hu Chunhua takes office, it will take at least three years to purge. These things must be uncovered. It depends on how Hu Chunhua handles them. We can know what kind of person he is, whether he is the same kind of person as Xi Jinping. Or there will be some changes, even if the CCP’s dictatorship system is not changed. Under the dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party, these things must be explained, otherwise it is unacceptable.

Hunan Xiangya Hospital has recently experienced many scandals, mainly involving doctors’ illegal operations, academic misconduct, and sex scandals. The important thing is the issue of this organ.

Among them, the respiratory doctor of Xiangya Third Hospital was accused of allowing unqualified students to perform bronchoscopy examinations, resulting in the death of patients; Liu Xiangfeng, deputy chief physician of Xiangya Second Hospital, was found to be suspected of serious violations of law and sentenced; in addition, Vice President Gong Zhicheng was dismissed for sex scandals and commercial bribery. 
The details are as follows:
Xiangya Third Hospital doctor’s illegal operation incident: The doctor was accused of allowing unqualified students to perform bronchoscopy examinations, resulting in the death of patients, which attracted widespread attention from the society. 
Xiangya Second Hospital Liu Xiangfeng incident: Liu Xiangfeng was found to be suspected of serious violations of law and sentenced to 17 years in prison. The case involved intentional injury, etc., reflecting serious problems within the hospital.
The incident of Gong Zhicheng, vice president of Xiangya Hospital: Gong Zhicheng was reported for sex scandals and commercial bribery, and was eventually dismissed and given a serious warning within the party, reflecting the moral and integrity problems of the hospital management. 

All the things are not painful, and the mastermind behind the scenes has not been found out at all. There must be a member of the Politburo Standing Committee behind it.

These netizens must want me to announce the answer. If you think about Hunan, you will know who it is. It must be Hunanese. Which Hunanese is a member of the Politburo Standing Committee? You can guess who it is? There are political struggles behind it, otherwise China’s network is a local area network and it is impossible to hype it up.

I will give you a simple digging, it is very easy, just find a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. He is the mastermind behind the scenes.

It is very simple. What is the background of Zhang Xin, secretary of the Party Committee, and Lei Guanghua, dean of Xiangya Hospital of Central South University? Dean Lei Guanghua’s surname is not common. The first person I think of is Lei Haichao, director of the National Health Commission of China. It is said that Lei Haichao was credited with organizing the rescue of Xi Jinping and rose to power at the speed of light. He was promoted from the bureau level to the ministerial level in 4 years.

We simply and crudely compared faces directly, and the similarity of the faces of two people was 10%. There is no way to prove blood relationship. Face comparison has certain limitations, and can only prove the relationship between father and son, mother and son, father and daughter, and mother and daughter. Nephews and nieces, in short, can prove blood relationship within two generations. Blood relationship of three or four generations cannot be proved.

Dean, I didn’t find a good clue, so I looked for Zhang Xin, secretary of the Party Committee of Xiangya Hospital of Central South University.

First of all, I’m not sure about the level of Xiangya Hospital. It’s probably a bureau level. In the power struggle, the level is very low. I usually don’t look at the bureau level, unless it’s a special person. That is, we look to quickly find a superior with a higher level who is bound to Zhang Xin. Only then can we be sure.

On November 29, 2024, the first plenary meeting of the 9th Committee of the Hunan Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese was held in Changsha, and the meeting appointed Zhang Xin (concurrently) as vice chairman. At that time, the Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee was Shen Xiaoming (March 2023 -), the Governor of Hunan was Mao Weiming (November 2020 -), the Minister of the United Front Work Department of Hunan Province was Sui Zhongcheng (November 2021 -), and the Chairman of the Hunan Overseas Chinese Federation was Sun Qingmin.

First of all, how could Zhang Xin become the Vice Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Federation when he was only the Party Secretary of the hospital? In 2000, Zhang Xin lived in the United States in 2006. The full name of the Overseas Chinese Federation is the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese. What does overseas Chinese mean? Overseas Chinese refer to Chinese citizens who have settled abroad. In other words, Zhang Xin may have a US green card. I don’t know how he got a US green card in 6 years. Mao Weiming, the Governor of Hunan Province, was promoted by Chen Yuying, Zhu Rongji’s lover, in the early days. An official in Changzhou City, Jiangsu Province.

Sui Zhongcheng, the Minister of the United Front Work Department of Hunan Province, I haven’t had time to dig deeper yet. There must be suspicion. It is very likely that he is Xi Jinping’s henchman. Let’s start with Sun Qingmin, the Chairman of the Hunan Overseas Chinese Federation today.

Sun Qingmin has long served as the chief secretary of Zhu Daohong, the former chairman of the Hunan Provincial Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese. This person’s surname is Zhu and he is from Hunan, which makes him suspicious. In our core power layer of China, there is only one person with the surname Zhu, and he is from Hunan.

Let’s do a simple and rough facial comparison to see if there is an answer.

The facial similarity between Zhu Daohong and Zhu Rongji is 15%. The facial similarity between Zhu Rongji and Zhu Rongji’s son Zhu Yunlai is 48%. The good news is that they are both biological children. The facial similarity between Zhu Daohong and Zhu Yunlai is 13%.

Below 20% is the metaphysical range, and facial comparison is not easy to use, and DNA testing is required. The biggest suspicion is that Zhu Daohong and Zhu Rongji and his son have a certain similarity. I can only say that there is a 60% chance that Zhu Daohong is a relative of Zhu Rongji for three generations. The possibility that he is not a relative is 40%. There is no way to say. But it doesn’t matter, the suspect has been found by us.

In March 2013, Zhu Daohong was added as the chairman of the Hunan Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese. The then Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee was Zhou Qiang (April 2010 – March 2013). The Governor of Hunan was Xu Shousheng (June 2010 – April 2013), and the Minister of the United Front Work Department of Hunan Province was Li Weiwei (November 2006 – August 2015).

It turned out to be Li Weiwei, who was also a henchman of Bo Yibo and Zhu Rongji. I just said that Ma Hong recommended Zhu Rongji to Yuan Baohua, and Yuan Baohua transferred Zhu Rongji to the State Economic Commission. Zhu Rongji was promoted by Lu Dong, and Zhu Rongji wrote an article specifically to commemorate Lu Dong. Bo Xilai’s father, Bo Yibo, was the director of the State Economic Commission. Li Weiwei was promoted by Cao Bochun, a henchman of Lu Dong. Wang Maolin, a henchman of Bo Yibo, promoted Zhu Rongji. Lu Dong also promoted Zhu Rongji. Zhu Rongji is Lu Dong’s apprentice, and Li Weiwei is Lu Dong’s apprentice’s grandson. Zhu Daohong is a suspected relative of Zhu Rongji, promoted by Li Weiwei.

Why is Xiangya Hospital of Central South University being hyped up? It’s because Hu Chunhua wants to fight against Zhu Rongji, the political enemy of Hu Chunhua’s godfather Hu Jintao.

Okay, thank you everyone.

END

大家好。2025年，中共政坛风起云涌，习近平下台的传言席卷网络，从X平台到墙内社交媒体，热议不断。中南海为何死守秘密，掩盖习近平失去权力的真相？今天，我们将揭开习近平权力崩塌的11大铁证，从官媒风向突变到军权亲信接连落马，再到李克强派系强势崛起，最震撼的莫过于习近平老家陕西500多访民的惊天上书。这封信不仅点燃民怨，更暴露了中共最大的恐惧：一旦习近平下台公开，民众清算的怒火可能烧毁整个体制。

核心问题：中共为何隐瞒习近平下台？

为何中共对习近平下台传言讳莫如深？答案藏在2025年6月9日陕西500多名访民的联名上书中。这封信直指习近平的家乡陕西富平，控诉其为“法外之地”，冤案如雪球般暴增。信中痛斥习近平执政十多年，“扫黑除恶”“依法治国”“不忘初心”全是空话，中央信访窗口暴力截访，地方与中央勾结，非法终结冤案无数。访民要求取消维稳产业链、废除寻衅滋事罪、成立宪法法院、释放被冤判的维权公民，甚至呼吁胡锦涛、汪洋将陕西作为“民主监督改革试点”，杀鸡儆猴。

这封上书如一颗消息，揭开了中共隐瞒习近平下台的深层原因：一旦习近平下台的消息公开，陕西访民的怒火可能席卷全国，民众不仅会清算习近平的“画大饼”政策，还可能顺势清算中共体制的罪行。维稳产业链、司法腐败、口袋罪的丑闻一旦曝光，可能引发社会动荡，动摇中共根基。访民上书是“民怨沸腾的导火索”，中共不敢让真相浮出水面，害怕民意失控。这封信不仅是民心的呐喊，更是中共掩盖习近平失势的致命破绽。

11大标志：习近平权力崩塌的铁证

下面，我们逐一揭开习近平失去权力的11大标志，从微妙信号到重磅消息，带你看清中南海的惊天变局。

1. 官媒重提胡锦涛、温家宝“民主决策”

2025年5月19日，《人民日报》和新华社高调报道“十五五”规划编制，罕见提及胡锦涛、温家宝主政时期的指示：“科学决策、民主决策、依法决策”。这三句话如同一记重锤，砸向习近平的独裁“一尊”形象。2003年，温家宝提出“科学民主决策、依法行政”准则，2007年和2012年胡锦涛在中共十七大、十八大报告中反复强调“民主决策”。反观习近平，十九大后确立“核心”地位，集权统治与“民主”背道而驰。五年前“十四五”规划报道从未提及胡温指示，2025年四中全会前夕，官媒突然转向，释放强烈信号。“这是在暗示胡锦涛等元老重新掌权。”官媒的微妙转向，意味着习近平的“绝对权威”已成空壳？

2. 习近平离京考察陪同高官规格下降

2025年，习近平的考察活动露出破绽。1月至5月，习近平奔赴辽宁、贵州、云南、上海、河南，往日高官簇拥的场面不复存在。标配陪同的中办主任蔡奇、中组部部长李干杰频频缺席。5月19日至20日河南考察，仅仅国务院副总理何立峰随行，蔡奇却跑去河北唐山调研。过去，习近平离京考察，动辄正国级、副国级高官陪同，阵势浩大。2024年上半年，李干杰六次考察全陪，2024年下半年至2025年3月卸任中组部长前，近十次考察李干杰一次也没有出现。陪同高官规格下降，显示党内对习近平的“核心”地位不再买账。“习近平已被架空，高官不陪同就是无声抗议。”这是否预示中南海权力格局的巨变？

3. 关中革命纪念馆开馆，习家人缺席

2025年5月24日，习近平爸爸习仲勋去世23周年，陕西富平“关中革命纪念馆”低调开馆，取代原“习仲勋纪念馆”。新华社和央视仅简单报道，没有中央或地方高官出席，习近平弟弟习远平也未现身。过去，习远平在陕西高调出席类似活动，彰显习家影响力。这次，习家代表集体缺席，纪念馆降格更像是对习氏家族的“无声贬低”。“关中革命纪念馆”搬走原习仲勋纪念馆的文物，意味着习仲勋的革命遗产被淡化，习家政治光环黯然失色。“这是在拆习近平的台。”纪念馆风波暗示习家已被边缘化？按照中共一贯历史虚无主义的尿性呢，首先习仲勋在中共党史的作用很小，地位很低，太高习仲勋无非拍习近平马屁。本来就是篡改历史。现在习近平马上下台。等到习近平下台之后，肯定还要搞一波去习化，不单是要消灭习近平痕迹还要消灭习仲勋的痕迹。就是习近平这10年吹捧习仲勋不存在一样。中共就是翻来覆去的篡改历史。

4. 习近平考察昆明驻军，没有军委成员陪同
   军权是习近平的命根子，但2025年军中信号异常。3月20日，习近平在昆明接见驻军军官，罕见没有任何一名军委副主席（比如如张又侠、何卫东）陪同。当然，现在我们知道，习近平去昆明的时候，何卫东已经被抓了。央视画面空荡荡，军委成员集体缺席。过去，习近平视察部队，军委高官必随行，彰显“枪杆子”忠诚。2025年4月上海、5月河南考察，习近平甚至不提军队。“军方早就不听习近平指挥。”昆明视察的冷清场面，证明习近平的军权已经名存实亡？

5. 清华系亲信李干杰被调离中组部
   2025年4月2日，习近平心腹、清华校友李干杰被调离中组部部长，转任统战部部长，中组部大权落入胡派石泰峰之手。中组部掌控人事任命，是习近平巩固权力的关键。石泰峰与李克强、胡春华同为北大校友，2016年石泰峰曾拜访胡锦涛夫妇，胡派背景浓厚。李干杰被调走，李干杰的湖南籍盟友接连被查，仕途蒙上阴影。“李干杰被踢出中枢，习近平人事控制彻底崩盘。”胡派强势接管中组部，意味着习近平已被架空？

6. 军中心腹何卫东缺席政治局会议，报导被清空
   习近平的军权亲信接连出事。2025年6月8日，前军委副主席许其亮葬礼上，现任军委副主席何卫东没有送花圈，是唯一缺席的政治局委员。5月9日，国防部官网删除何卫东所有活动报导，何卫东接连缺席涉军会议和政治局会议。何卫东与苗华涉“团伙政治”案，仕途岌岌可危。何卫东出身第31集团军，是习近平军改的得力干将，2022年二十大以黑马姿态升任政治局委员、军委副主席。如今报导被清空，说明习近平军中最后支柱已被拔除？没有枪杆子的支撑，习近平还能剩下什么？

7. 军中心腹苗华案定性升级
   军中清洗再升级。2025年5月31日，全国人大常委会公报定性军委委员苗华“涉嫌严重违纪违法”，国防部官网已经删除苗华的个人信息。说明苗华在5月29日的没有公布政治局会议上，被开除党籍。苗华出身第31集团军，是习近平军中心腹，曾助其巩固军权。2024年三中全会后，苗华传被抓，从“停职调查”到被免全国人大代表，再到“严重违纪违法”，案情步步升级。“苗华案直指习近平，军权已被胡派接管。”苗华的倒台，标志习近平军权核心彻底瓦解？军中还有谁敢为习近平站台？

8. 军中心腹许其亮猝死
   2025年6月2日，前军委副主席许其亮突然去世，官媒称“因病”，但X平台消息称许其亮5月28日凌晨死亡，可能因军中整肃压力“被吓死”。许其亮与习近平在福建福州有深厚交情，被视为习军改的操盘手，助习军改登上“一尊”地位。
   经过人脸比对，前中国空军副政委许乐夫是许其亮的生物学父亲或者叔叔。
   两个人的人脸相似度是33%，有直接的血缘关系。
   许乐夫是林彪团队核心成员吴法宪的马仔。
   许乐夫和许其亮就是一个县的，非要说没关系。

9. 新加坡何晶转发批习“黑帮老大”文章
   国际社会也对习近平开炮。2025年4月18日，新加坡媒体直批习近平执政12年如“黑帮老大”，像《教父》中的柯里昂，强推“无法拒绝的提议”。李显龙夫人何晶接连转发此文及另一篇配有习近平孤坐图片的文章，暗喻中共被世界孤立。何晶与朱镕基、王岐山关系密切，何晶在清华经管学院顾问委员会任职，背后有深厚政治背景。国际社会的公开批评，让习近平的“一尊”形象彻底崩塌。何晶很明显是跳船了。
   跳船也要有跳船的资本，和跳船的砝码。何晶就是习近平派系的
   但是何晶只是习近平国际盟友，统战对象。不是中国能够完全控制的。
   当然有跳船的本钱和讨价还价的本钱。

跳船也得有交换价值，如果只是一个正部级，怎么跳船。谁要啊？对方要一个正部级有什么价值呢？正部级说抓就抓了。一个军委副主席或者政治局常委这种级别，跳船还说得过去。

10. 李克强马仔卢东亮升任山西省长，显示接班人架势
    2025年，李克强派系强势崛起。卢东亮升任山西省长，引发热议。卢东亮由李克强导师厉以宁的学生熊维平提拔，与李克强的另一马仔、福建副书记郭宁宁同属李克强派。卢未来可能出任总书记或总理，最低也是政治局常委，且不会留在山西，可能调往江苏、四川等大省担任省委书记。接班人浮出水面，暗示党内已为习近平下台做好准备。“接班人都安排好了，习近平再不走就得动粗。”习近平提拔谁也不能提拔李克强的人，还把他提拔成接班人了。
    卢东亮这个我提前两个月打脸路透社。
    路透社提前一个礼拜跳出来打脸。太搞笑了。

11. 习近平老家访民上书，控诉冤案

2025年6月9日，陕西500多访民联名上书胡锦涛、汪洋，痛斥习近平家乡富平成“法外之地”。信中直指习近平执政十多年，“扫黑除恶”“依法治国”是空话，冤案暴增，信访窗口暴力截访，中央与地方勾结，非法终结冤案无数。访民要求取消维稳产业链、废除寻衅滋事罪、成立宪法法院、释放被冤判公民，甚至呼吁陕西试点“民主监督改革”，敲山震虎。这封信是“民怨的火药桶”。

为何这封上书让中共如此恐惧？因为它揭开了习近平失势的真相。一旦习近平下台公开，陕西的民怨可能席卷全国，民众不仅会清算习近平的“画大饼”政策，还会追责中共体制的腐败和暴行。维稳产业链、司法黑幕、口袋罪的曝光，可能引发社会动荡，动摇中共根基。中共隐瞒习近平下台，就是为了堵住这股民意洪流。

11大标志，从官媒转向胡温信号，到习家纪念馆降格、军权亲信许其亮猝死、苗华何卫东被清洗，再到李克强马仔卢东亮强势崛起，国际社会公开批习，陕西访民的怒吼更是点燃民怨的导火索。习近平的权力大厦已摇摇欲坠。中共为何隐瞒？因为陕西访民的上书暴露了致命真相：习近平下台可能引发全国清算，威胁中共根基。

这名网友说，
当年传的有鼻子有眼，说邓小平放出谁不改革谁下台的话之后，陈云连夜带上江蛤上邓家，江泽民一把鼻涕一把泪地检讨自己。于是邓小平放过了江泽民一马。。。我还信了几十年，这苏俄派就是这么恶心。是不是江泽民陪着陈云上邓家哭鼻子去了？

对比十三届四中全会和十四大的名单就知道，邓小平说谁不改革谁下台之后，谁下了？姚依林和宋平下，朱镕基，胡锦涛，刘华清上。

江泽民14大没有下，这是一个事实。说朱镕基是邓的人，都比说陈云提拔的江靠谱。现在江绵恒亲自背书了，我的说法。

首先这个座谈会，10年才开一次。下一次陈云130周年中共可能就倒台了。其次江绵恒已经74岁了，下一次江绵恒就84岁了，江绵恒本身得过癌症，康复了。江绵恒能不能活到84岁呢？就算能，就算中共没倒台。陈云130周年纪念会，江绵恒大概率也不会参加。也就是说江绵恒这辈子都不会参加。谁提拔的江泽民，江绵恒还不知道吗？

一共就三个总书记江泽民，胡锦涛，习近平，把谁提拔的江泽民都错了，根上就错了，还有什么都能说对呢？大前提就错了。等于大外宣所有一切都是谎言。

我先说的江泽民不是陈云提拔的。江绵恒就没有去陈云纪念会。我不知道他们为什么都听我指挥。我说直接提拔成卢东亮，从常务副省长，直接提拔省长就行。胡春华就提拔了。我说薄熙来和习近平是一家子人。薄瓜瓜亲自背书我的说法，我不知道为什么薄瓜瓜听我指挥。我说江泽民不是陈云提拔的，江绵恒他就不去陈云纪念会。我不知道为什么江绵恒听我指挥。只要总书记说对了，框架就是对的。江绵恒亲自背书说的说法。
好的，谢谢大家。

《原文链接》

英文翻译

Why did the CCP conceal the news of Xi’s resignation? 11 major signs that Xi Jinping has lost power. I don’t know why Hu Chunhua, Jiang Mianheng, and Bo Guagua have endorsed my statement.

Hello everyone. In 2025, the CCP’s political arena is turbulent, and rumors of Xi Jinping’s resignation have swept the Internet, from X platform to social media inside the wall, and there has been constant heated discussions. Why did Zhongnanhai keep the secret and cover up the truth that Xi Jinping has lost power? Today, we will reveal the 11 major evidences of Xi Jinping’s power collapse, from the sudden change in the official media’s wind direction to the successive fall of military power confidants, to the strong rise of Li Keqiang’s faction, and the most shocking is the shocking letter from more than 500 petitioners in Shaanxi, Xi Jinping’s hometown. This letter not only ignited public resentment, but also exposed the CCP’s greatest fear: once Xi Jinping’s resignation is made public, the anger of the people’s reckoning may burn the entire system.

Core question: Why did the CCP conceal Xi Jinping’s resignation?
Why is the CCP so secretive about the rumor of Xi Jinping’s resignation? The answer lies in a joint petition by more than 500 petitioners from Shaanxi on June 9, 2025. The letter points directly to Xi Jinping’s hometown of Fuping, Shaanxi, accusing it of being a “lawless place” where unjust cases have snowballed. The letter denounced Xi Jinping’s more than ten years in power, saying that “sweeping away gangs and eliminating evil”, “governing the country according to law” and “not forgetting the original intention” are all empty words, the central petition window violently intercepts petitions, and the local and central governments collude to illegally end countless unjust cases. Petitioners demanded the abolition of the stability maintenance industry chain, the abolition of the crime of provoking trouble, the establishment of a constitutional court, the release of unjustly sentenced rights-defending citizens, and even called on Hu Jintao and Wang Yang to use Shaanxi as a “democratic supervision reform pilot” to kill the chicken and scare the monkey.

This letter is like a piece of news, revealing the deep reason why the CCP concealed Xi Jinping’s resignation: once the news of Xi Jinping’s resignation is made public, the anger of Shaanxi petitioners may sweep across the country, and the people will not only settle accounts with Xi Jinping’s “big cake” policy, but also settle accounts with the crimes of the CCP system. Once the scandals of the stability maintenance industry chain, judicial corruption, and pocket crimes are exposed, they may cause social unrest and shake the foundation of the CCP. Petitioners’ letters are “the fuse of boiling public grievances”. The CCP dare not let the truth surface, fearing that public opinion will get out of control. This letter is not only the cry of the people, but also the fatal flaw of the CCP to cover up Xi Jinping’s loss of power.

11 major signs: ironclad evidence of Xi Jinping’s power collapse
Below, we will reveal the 11 major signs of Xi Jinping’s loss of power one by one, from subtle signals to heavy news, to show you the shocking changes in Zhongnanhai.

Official media re-mention Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s “democratic decision-making”
On May 19, 2025, the People’s Daily and Xinhua News Agency reported the preparation of the “15th Five-Year Plan” in a high-profile manner, and rarely mentioned the instructions of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao during their administration: “scientific decision-making, democratic decision-making, and decision-making in accordance with the law.” These three sentences are like a heavy hammer, hitting Xi Jinping’s image of a dictator “one man”. In 2003, Wen Jiabao proposed the principle of “scientific and democratic decision-making and administration according to law”. In 2007 and 2012, Hu Jintao repeatedly emphasized “democratic decision-making” in the reports of the 17th and 18th National Congresses of the Communist Party of China. In contrast, Xi Jinping established his “core” status after the 19th National Congress, and centralized rule runs counter to “democracy”. Five years ago, the “14th Five-Year Plan” report never mentioned Hu and Wen’s instructions. On the eve of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 2025 Central Committee, the official media suddenly turned around and sent a strong signal. “This is a hint that Hu Jintao and other elders are back in power.” Does the subtle turn of the official media mean that Xi Jinping’s “absolute authority” has become an empty shell?

Xi Jinping’s inspection of senior officials accompanying him outside Beijing has declined in standards
In 2025, Xi Jinping’s inspection activities revealed flaws. From January to May, Xi Jinping went to Liaoning, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shanghai, and Henan, and the scenes of being surrounded by senior officials in the past no longer existed. Cai Qi, director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee, and Li Ganjie, Minister of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, who were accompanied by the standard escort, were frequently absent. During the inspection in Henan from May 19 to 20, only Vice Premier He Lifeng accompanied him, while Cai Qi went to Tangshan, Hebei for research. In the past, when Xi Jinping left Beijing for inspection, he was often accompanied by senior officials at the state or vice-state level, with a grand array. In the first half of 2024, Li Ganjie accompanied all six inspections. From the second half of 2024 to March 2025, before he stepped down as Minister of Organization, Li Ganjie did not appear once in nearly ten inspections. The decline in the level of accompanying senior officials shows that the party no longer buys into Xi Jinping’s “core” status. “Xi Jinping has been sidelined, and the failure of senior officials to accompany him is a silent protest.” Does this foreshadow a huge change in the power structure of Zhongnanhai?

Guanzhong Revolutionary Memorial Hall Opens, Xi’s Family Absent
On May 24, 2025, the 23rd anniversary of the death of Xi Jinping’s father Xi Zhongxun, the “Guanzhong Revolutionary Memorial Hall” in Fuping, Shaanxi opened in a low-key manner, replacing the original “Xi Zhongxun Memorial Hall”. Xinhua News Agency and CCTV only reported briefly, no central or local senior officials attended, and Xi Jinping’s younger brother Xi Yuanping did not show up. In the past, Xi Yuanping attended similar events in Shaanxi in a high-profile manner, demonstrating the influence of the Xi family. This time, the Xi family representatives were collectively absent, and the downgrading of the memorial hall was more like a “silent devaluation” of the Xi family. The “Guanzhong Revolutionary Memorial Hall” moved the cultural relics of the original Xi Zhongxun Memorial Hall, which means that Xi Zhongxun’s revolutionary legacy has been diluted and the political halo of the Xi family has been eclipsed. “This is dismantling Xi Jinping’s stage.” Does the memorial hall incident imply that the Xi family has been marginalized? According to the CCP’s consistent historical nihilism, first of all, Xi Zhongxun played a very small role in the CCP’s party history and his status was very low. If he was too high, Xi Zhongxun would just flatter Xi Jinping. It was originally a distortion of history. Now Xi Jinping is about to step down. After Xi Jinping steps down, there will definitely be a wave of de-Xiization, not only to eliminate Xi Jinping’s traces but also to eliminate Xi Zhongxun’s traces. It’s like Xi Jinping has been praising Xi Zhongxun for 10 years and he doesn’t exist. The CCP is distorting history over and over again.

Xi Jinping inspected the garrison in Kunming, without the CMC members accompanying him
Military power is Xi Jinping’s lifeblood, but the military signals in 2025 are abnormal. On March 20, Xi Jinping met with garrison officers in Kunming, and it was rare that no vice chairman of the CMC (such as Zhang Youxia and He Weidong) accompanied him. Of course, now we know that He Weidong had been arrested when Xi Jinping went to Kunming. CCTV’s screen was empty, and the CMC members were collectively absent. In the past, when Xi Jinping inspected the troops, senior CMC officials must accompany him to demonstrate the loyalty of the “gun barrel”. In April 2025, when inspecting Shanghai and Henan in May, Xi Jinping did not even mention the army. “The military has long stopped listening to Xi Jinping’s command.” Does the deserted scene of the Kunming inspection prove that Xi Jinping’s military power is already in name only?
Tsinghua confidant Li Ganjie was transferred from the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee
On April 2, 2025, Xi Jinping’s confidant and Tsinghua alumnus Li Ganjie was transferred from the Minister of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee to the Minister of the United Front Work Department, and the power of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee fell into the hands of Hu faction Shi Taifeng. The Central Organization Department controls personnel appointments, which is the key to Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power. Shi Taifeng, Li Keqiang and Hu Chunhua are all Peking University alumni. In 2016, Shi Taifeng visited Hu Jintao and his wife, and has a strong Hu faction background. Li Ganjie was transferred away, and Li Ganjie’s Hunan allies were investigated one after another, casting a shadow on his career. “Li Ganjie was kicked out of the center, and Xi Jinping’s personnel control completely collapsed.” Does the strong takeover of the Central Organization Department by the Hu faction mean that Xi Jinping has been sidelined?

He Weidong, a core member of the military, was absent from the Politburo meeting, and the report was cleared
Xi Jinping’s military power confidants have been in trouble one after another. On June 8, 2025, at the funeral of former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xu Qiliang, the current Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission He Weidong did not send a wreath and was the only member of the Politburo who was absent. On May 9, the Ministry of National Defense’s official website deleted all reports on He Weidong’s activities. He Weidong missed military-related meetings and Politburo meetings one after another. He Weidong and Miao Hua were involved in the “gang politics” case, and their careers are in jeopardy. He Weidong was born in the 31st Group Army and is a capable general of Xi Jinping’s military reform. He was promoted to member of the Political Bureau and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission as a dark horse at the 20th National Congress in 2022. Now that the report has been cleared, does it mean that Xi Jinping’s last pillar in the military has been removed? Without the support of the gun, what else can Xi Jinping have left?
The case of Miao Hua, a core member of the military, has been escalated
The purge in the military has been upgraded again. On May 31, 2025, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress issued a communiqué that Miao Hua, a member of the Central Military Commission, was “suspected of serious violations of discipline and law”, and the official website of the Ministry of National Defense has deleted Miao Hua’s personal information. It means that Miao Hua was expelled from the party at the unannounced Politburo meeting on May 29. Miao Hua was born in the 31st Group Army and is a core member of Xi Jinping’s military. He helped him consolidate his military power. After the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in 2024, Miao Hua was reported to have been arrested. From “suspension for investigation” to being removed from the National People’s Congress, and then to “serious violations of discipline and law”, the case has escalated step by step. “The Miao Hua case points directly to Xi Jinping, and the military power has been taken over by the Hu faction.” The fall of Miao Hua marks the complete collapse of Xi Jinping’s core military power? Who else in the military dares to stand up for Xi Jinping?
Xu Qiliang, a core member of the military, died suddenly
On June 2, 2025, Xu Qiliang, former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, died suddenly. The official media said it was “due to illness”, but the X platform reported that Xu Qiliang died in the early morning of May 28, and he may have been “scared to death” due to the pressure of the military purge. Xu Qiliang and Xi Jinping had a deep friendship in Fuzhou, Fujian, and were regarded as the operator of Xi’s military reform, helping Xi’s military reform to ascend to the “one” status.
After facial comparison, Xu Lefu, former deputy political commissar of the Chinese Air Force, is Xu Qiliang’s biological father or uncle.
The facial similarity of the two people is 33%, and they have a direct blood relationship.
Xu Lefu is a henchman of Wu Faxian, a core member of Lin Biao’s team.
Xu Lefu and Xu Qiliang are from the same county, and they have to say that they have nothing to do with each other.
Ho Ching of Singapore forwarded an article criticizing Xi as a “gangster boss”
The international community also fired at Xi Jinping. On April 18, 2025, the Singapore media directly criticized Xi Jinping for being like a “gangster boss” in his 12 years in power, like Corleone in “The Godfather”, pushing “irrefutable offers”. Lee Hsien Loong’s wife Ho Ching forwarded this article and another article with a picture of Xi Jinping sitting alone, implying that the CCP is isolated by the world. Ho Ching has close ties with Zhu Rongji and Wang Qishan. Ho Ching serves on the advisory committee of Tsinghua School of Economics and Management and has a deep political background. The public criticism of the international community has completely collapsed Xi Jinping’s “one-man” image. Ho Ching obviously jumped ship.
Jumping ship also requires capital and weight to jump ship. Ho Ching is from Xi Jinping’s faction
But Ho Ching is only Xi Jinping’s international ally and a united front target. It is not something that China can fully control.
Of course, there is capital to jump ship and bargaining power.
Jumping ship also needs exchange value. If it is only a ministerial level, how can you jump ship. Who wants it? What’s the value of a ministerial-level official? Ministerial-level officials can be arrested at will. For a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission or a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, it’s reasonable to jump ship.

Li Keqiang’s henchman Lu Dongliang was promoted to governor of Shanxi Province, showing his successor posture
In 2025, Li Keqiang’s faction rose strongly. Lu Dongliang was promoted to governor of Shanxi Province, which caused heated discussions. Lu Dongliang was promoted by Xiong Weiping, a student of Li Keqiang’s mentor Li Yining. He belongs to the Li Keqiang faction with Li Keqiang’s other henchman, Fujian Deputy Secretary Guo Ningning. Lu may become general secretary or prime minister in the future, at least a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, and will not stay in Shanxi. He may be transferred to Jiangsu, Sichuan and other major provinces as provincial party secretary. The successor has surfaced, suggesting that the party has prepared for Xi Jinping to step down. “The successor has been arranged. If Xi Jinping doesn’t leave, he will have to use force.” Xi Jinping promoted someone who can’t promote Li Keqiang, and promoted him to be the successor.
I slapped Reuters in the face two months in advance about Lu Dongliang.
Reuters jumped out to slap them in the face a week in advance. So funny.
Petitioners from Xi Jinping’s hometown wrote to complain about unjust cases
On June 9, 2025, more than 500 petitioners in Shaanxi jointly wrote to Hu Jintao and Wang Yang, denouncing Xi Jinping’s hometown Fuping as a “lawless place”. The letter pointed out that Xi Jinping has been in power for more than ten years, and “sweeping away gangs and eliminating evil” and “ruling the country according to law” are empty words. Unjust cases have skyrocketed, petition windows have violently intercepted petitions, and the central and local governments have colluded to illegally end countless unjust cases. Petitioners demanded the abolition of the stability maintenance industry chain, the abolition of the crime of provoking trouble, the establishment of a constitutional court, the release of unjustly sentenced citizens, and even called on Shaanxi to pilot “democratic supervision reform” to shake the tiger. This letter is a “powder keg of public grievances.”

Why does this letter scare the CCP so much? Because it reveals the truth about Xi Jinping’s loss of power. Once Xi Jinping steps down publicly, public grievances in Shaanxi may sweep across the country. The people will not only settle accounts with Xi Jinping’s “big cake” policy, but also hold the CCP system accountable for corruption and atrocities. The exposure of the stability maintenance industry chain, judicial shady dealings, and pocket crimes may cause social unrest and shake the foundation of the CCP. The CCP concealed Xi Jinping’s resignation in order to block this torrent of public opinion.

The 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, from the official media turning to Hu-Wen signals, to the downgrading of the Xi family memorial hall, the sudden death of Xu Qiliang, a close military confidant, the purge of Miao Hua and He Weidong, to the strong rise of Li Keqiang’s henchman Lu Dongliang, the international community publicly criticized Xi, and the roar of Shaanxi petitioners ignited the fuse of public resentment. Xi Jinping’s power building is already shaky. Why did the CCP conceal it? Because the petitions of Shaanxi petitioners exposed the fatal truth: Xi Jinping’s resignation may trigger a nationwide reckoning and threaten the foundation of the CCP.

This netizen said,
The rumor that Deng Xiaoping said whoever did not reform would step down, Chen Yun took Jiang Zemin to Deng’s house overnight, and Jiang Zemin reviewed himself with tears and snot. So Deng Xiaoping let Jiang Zemin go. . . I have believed it for decades. This Soviet faction is so disgusting. Did Jiang Zemin accompany Chen Yun to Deng’s house to cry?

Comparing the list of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee and the 14th National Congress, we can see that after Deng Xiaoping said whoever does not reform should step down, who stepped down? Yao Yilin and Song Ping stepped down, and Zhu Rongji, Hu Jintao, and Liu Huaqing stepped up.

It is a fact that Jiang Zemin did not step down at the 14th National Congress. It is more reliable to say that Zhu Rongji is Deng’s man than to say that Jiang was promoted by Chen Yun. Now Jiang Mianheng personally endorsed it, my opinion.

First of all, this symposium is held only once every 10 years. The next time it is the 130th anniversary of Chen Yun, the CCP may fall. Secondly, Jiang Mianheng is already 74 years old, and the next time it is Jiang Mianheng will be 84 years old. Jiang Mianheng himself had cancer and recovered. Can Jiang Mianheng live to 84 years old? Even if he can, even if the CCP has not fallen. Jiang Mianheng will most likely not attend the 130th anniversary of Chen Yun. That is to say, Jiang Mianheng will never attend in his lifetime. Doesn’t Jiang Mianheng know who promoted Jiang Zemin?

There are only three general secretaries, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping. Whoever promoted Jiang Zemin is wrong. The root is wrong. What else can be said to be right? The premise is wrong. It means that all the foreign propaganda is lies.

I first said that Jiang Zemin was not promoted by Chen Yun. Jiang Mianheng did not go to Chen Yun’s memorial meeting. I don’t know why they all listened to my instructions. I said to directly promote Lu Dongliang, from executive vice governor, directly to governor. Hu Chunhua was promoted. I said that Bo Xilai and Xi Jinping are from the same family. Bo Guagua personally endorsed my statement, and I don’t know why Bo Guagua listened to my instructions. I said that Jiang Zemin was not promoted by Chen Yun, and Jiang Mianheng did not go to Chen Yun’s memorial meeting. I don’t know why Jiang Mianheng listened to my instructions. As long as the general secretary is right, the framework is right. Jiang Mianheng personally endorsed the statement.
Okay, thank you everyone.

END

大家好，
这名网友的说法，把费东斌往江泽民身上扯淡。这一看就是大外宣的说法。这次陈云120周年最大的看点，就是江绵恒没有出席。

2025年6月13日，中共中央在人民大会堂举行纪念陈云诞辰120周年座谈会，习近平、李强、赵乐际、王沪宁、蔡奇、丁薛祥、李希等出席，唯独江泽民之子江绵恒未现身。这是此次纪念会的最大看点，暗示江泽民的政治根基更多与邓小平而非陈云挂钩。

陈云与朱镕基的联系：1995年6月13日，中共中央举行陈云诞辰90周年座谈会，袁宝华代表薛暮桥、吴波、沈鸿、柴树藩跪舔陈云，张全景、胡绳也发了言，显示陈云在党内的影响力。

袁宝华出席如此重要场合，纪念陈云，明显是陈云马仔。在国家经委期间，经马洪推荐，提拔朱镕基进入国家经委。

而马洪又把朱镕基力荐给当年东北局的老同事袁宝华领导的国家经委。袁宝华是提拔朱镕基进入国家经委的贵人，又是陈云的马仔。朱镕基无疑是陈云马仔。我们看历届的国家经委主任。康世恩就是毛泽东，华国锋的人。1978年12月开的十一届三中全会。1980年华国锋辞去总理职务，国家经委主任就换上袁宝华了。袁宝华，张劲夫，吕东都是陈云马仔，王忠禹是朱镕基大秘。前面的经委主任就是薄一波，薄熙来唱红打黑的总后台就是朱镕基。

1992年5月25日，国务院副总理朱镕基正在太原出差。据当时陪同朱镕基出差的李剑阁(后调国家经贸委司长)回忆，下午正开着会，朱镕基接到一个电话，出去了一会儿。晚间散步时，朱镕基告诉李剑阁：“下午就是接到泽民同志的电话，商量能不能提‘社会主义市场经济’。”

“六九讲话”之后，江泽民专程拜访了邓小平、陈云等老同志。党内高层意见达成统一。

此处写的很清楚，1992年6月9日，江泽民在党校讲话提出社会主义市场经济体制，会后拜访了邓小平、陈云。绝对不是邓小平一人说了算那么简单。江泽民一个总书记为什么和副总理朱镕基商量呢？

不就说明朱镕基是陈云马仔是陈云在前台的代理人。陈云一贯支持计划经济，对市场化改革持保守态度。江泽民需要与朱镕基沟通，以争取陈云派支持。最终，陈云被迫背书“社会主义市场经济”，是邓小平施压的结果，凸显邓小平在改革方向上的主导地位。

江泽民的上位，按照大外宣的说法，1989年江泽民接替赵紫阳任中共中央总书记，经李先念提名、陈云推荐、邓小平同意。

然而2025年6月陈云120周年纪念会，江绵恒没有出席，邓小平之子邓朴方同样缺席。如果江泽民由陈云提拔，江绵恒作为其子理应出席以示尊重和延续政治关系。江绵恒的缺席表明江泽民与陈云派系的联系较弱，进一步佐证江泽民的上位更多依赖邓小平，而非陈云。

江泽民葬礼上江家和邓家的合影说明一切。江绵恒连陈云的纪念会都不参加。

1992年确立“社会主义市场经济”路线，江泽民需要与陈云马仔朱镕基沟通，并拜访陈云，说明陈云的影响力，但是最终改革方向由邓小平主导。江绵恒没有出席陈云120周年纪念会，反映江泽民家族与陈云派系的疏远。

当年党内权力格局中，邓小平为“一把手”，陈云为“二把手”。邓小平在1989年对金日成评价江泽民“工作扎实、比较民主”，显示邓小平对江泽民认可。陈云晚年虽然支持邓小平的改革开放，但是在经济政策上更保守，比如反对激进的价格改革，与江泽民推行的市场化路线有分歧。江绵恒没有出席陈云120周年纪念会，表明江泽民并非陈云嫡系。

朱镕基通过袁宝华进入国家经委，1992年又与江泽民密切沟通“社会主义市场经济”的路线问题，显示朱镕基作为陈云派“代理人”的角色。陈云对计划经济的坚持，使陈云对市场化改革持保留态度，但最终在邓小平压力下妥协。江泽民需通过朱镕基协调陈云派，说明陈云派在1992年仍有影响力，但江泽民的上位和政策推行更多依赖邓小平。

江绵恒没有出席陈云120周年纪念会，表明江泽民家族不认同与陈云派的历史联系。如果江泽民是陈云嫡系，江绵恒理应出席以巩固派系关系。邓朴方的缺席也暗示邓家与陈云派没有紧密联系，强化了江泽民由邓小平提拔的观点。

现在事实就是习远平出席了，但是江绵恒和邓朴方没有出席。江绵恒没有出席陈云120周年纪念会，是此次事件的核心亮点，因其直接挑战了江泽民与陈云派系密切相关的传统叙事。

江胡习就是三大派系，我不可能指挥江绵恒，也不可能指挥邓朴方。不让他们参加陈云的纪念会。

陈云儿子陈元近年表态支持习近平反腐，显示习近平就是陈云的代理人。

1992年确立“社会主义市场经济”路线，江泽民与朱镕基的沟通及陈云的被迫背书，说明邓小平主导改革。朱镕基就是阻挠市场经济的陈云的代言人。这都能洗地成改革派。江绵恒陈云120周年纪念会印证江泽民更多依赖邓小平，而非陈云。我先说的习近平就是陈云提拔的。江绵恒不出席陈云120周年纪念会这件事情是刚刚发生的。江绵恒缺席陈云120周年纪念会也证明习近平马上就要倒台了。

这名网友说，陈吉宁去上海交通大学滑跪江蛤。
江绵恒上了新闻联播，他也不去参加陈云的120周年纪念会。陈吉宁去了上海科技大学，又去上海交通大学。还能再明显点吗？一个上海市委书记，他还不知道，中国现在谁说了算吗？

2025年5月9日，中国某知名社交平台上出现一则帖子，引用汪洋2012年作为广东省委书记时的话：“必须破除人民幸福是党和政府恩赐的错误认识。不敢说后无来者，至少是前无古人”，获2.4万人点赞，而且没有被删除。同期，网络上关于习近平下台的传言四起，政治氛围敏感。

汪洋的话源自2012年，当时汪洋担任广东省委书记，提出“人民幸福不是党和政府恩赐”，强调政府权力来自人民，造福人民是责任而非恩赐。2025年，这句言论被重新翻出并获2.4万人点赞，反映了部分网民对当前政治生态的不满。习近平下台传言四起，表明社会对习近平执政，比如集权、个人崇拜，搞砸经济的质疑加剧。汪洋的话直指“恩赐”观念，与官方长期宣传的“党和政府带来幸福”形成对比，被网民视为对现行体制的隐晦批评。

2.4万点赞显示了广泛的共鸣，尤其在青年网民中。2024年中国青年网民社会心态调查报告指出，“90后”“00后”一代在社会变迁中追求更独立的价值观，对“幸福是权利而非恩赐”的理念更易产生认同。汪洋的言论被赞为“前无古人”，暗示网民认为汪洋突破了中共官场僵化的话语体系，呼应了民间对自由、自主幸福的渴望。在习近平下台传言的背景下，此帖成为网民借历史言论表达对现状不满的出口，反映民意对更开放、民主治理的期待。

下台传言放大帖子的影响力。网友将汪洋言论解读为“石破天惊”，甚至将汪洋与总书记接班传言联系，习下汪上。表明部分民意将其视为挑战习近平权威的象征。2.4万点赞没有被删，显示民意在网络空间的短暂聚集，可能是对习近平集权模式的一种间接抗议。

在中国网络环境下，高压审查机制对敏感政治内容反应迅速，尤其是涉及常委，比如汪洋，虽然只是退休常委，所有的潜在挑战官方叙事的言论，通常会被快速删除。2025年5月，习近平下台传言四起，政治敏感度更高，网络监控力度应进一步加强。社交平台数据显示，获2.4万点赞的热门帖子，通常会触发算法预警，进入人工审查范围。因此，获2.4万点赞的汪洋言论帖没有被删除，绝非审查疏忽，而是可能涉及更复杂的政治背景。

在高压审查体系下，2.4万点赞的帖子几乎不可能因“疏忽”而未被发现。中国的网络审查依赖先进算法和人工团队，2024年统计显示，敏感内容通常在数小时内，甚至十几分钟之内被识别并处理，尤其在知名社交平台，2.4万点赞会迅速进入监管视线。疏忽的可能性极低。

没有删帖只能解释成当局有意放任，以观察民意动向或评估社会情绪。汪洋的话来自2012年公开场合，在习近平下台传言的敏感期，中共的处理方式，意味深长。

汪洋会不会顶替胡春华担任总书记。我们需要继续观察中共政局的变化，好的，谢谢大家。

《原文链接》

英文翻译

24,000 people inside the wall petitioned Wang Yang to take over as general secretary. Fei Dongbin’s link to Jiang Zemin is just a propaganda whitewash. Jiang Mianheng’s absence from the 120th anniversary of Chen Yun’s memorial meeting tells the story.

Hello everyone,
This netizen’s statement is to blame Fei Dongbin on Jiang Zemin. This is obviously a propaganda statement. The biggest highlight of Chen Yun’s 120th anniversary is that Jiang Mianheng did not attend.

On June 13, 2025, the CPC Central Committee held a symposium in the Great Hall of the People to commemorate the 120th anniversary of Chen Yun’s birth. Xi Jinping, Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang, Li Xi and others attended, but Jiang Zemin’s son Jiang Mianheng did not show up. This is the biggest highlight of this memorial meeting, suggesting that Jiang Zemin’s political foundation is more linked to Deng Xiaoping than Chen Yun.

The connection between Chen Yun and Zhu Rongji: On June 13, 1995, the CPC Central Committee held a symposium on the 90th anniversary of Chen Yun’s birth. Yuan Baohua represented Xue Muqiao, Wu Bo, Shen Hong, and Chai Shufan to lick Chen Yun. Zhang Quanjing and Hu Sheng also spoke, showing Chen Yun’s influence in the party.

Yuan Baohua attended such an important occasion to commemorate Chen Yun, and was obviously Chen Yun’s lackey. During his time in the State Economic Commission, Zhu Rongji was promoted to the State Economic Commission on the recommendation of Ma Hong.

Ma Hong strongly recommended Zhu Rongji to the State Economic Commission led by Yuan Baohua, an old colleague of the Northeast Bureau at that time. Yuan Baohua was the nobleman who promoted Zhu Rongji to the State Economic Commission, and he was also Chen Yun’s lackey. Zhu Rongji was undoubtedly Chen Yun’s lackey. Let’s look at the successive directors of the State Economic Commission. Kang Shien was a man of Mao Zedong and Hua Guofeng. The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee was held in December 1978. In 1980, Hua Guofeng resigned as Premier, and Yuan Baohua took over as Director of the State Economic Commission. Yuan Baohua, Zhang Jinfu, and Lu Dong were all Chen Yun’s lackeys, and Wang Zhongyu was Zhu Rongji’s chief secretary. The previous Director of the Economic Commission was Bo Yibo, and Zhu Rongji was the general backstage of Bo Xilai’s campaign to promote the red cause and fight crime.

On May 25, 1992, Vice Premier Zhu Rongji was on a business trip in Taiyuan. According to Li Jiange (later transferred to the Director of the State Economic and Trade Commission), who accompanied Zhu Rongji on the business trip at the time, Zhu Rongji received a call in the afternoon and went out for a while. While taking a walk in the evening, Zhu Rongji told Li Jiange: “I received a call from Comrade Zemin in the afternoon to discuss whether we can propose the ‘socialist market economy’.”

After the “June 9 Speech”, Jiang Zemin made a special trip to visit Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun and other old comrades. The opinions of the top leaders of the party reached a consensus.

It is written very clearly here that on June 9, 1992, Jiang Zemin proposed the socialist market economic system in his speech at the Party School, and visited Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun after the meeting. It is definitely not as simple as Deng Xiaoping having the final say. Why did Jiang Zemin, a general secretary, discuss with Vice Premier Zhu Rongji?

Doesn’t it mean that Zhu Rongji is Chen Yun’s henchman and Chen Yun’s agent in the front. Chen Yun has always supported the planned economy and has a conservative attitude towards market-oriented reforms. Jiang Zemin needs to communicate with Zhu Rongji to win the support of Chen Yun’s faction. In the end, Chen Yun was forced to endorse the “socialist market economy” as a result of Deng Xiaoping’s pressure, highlighting Deng Xiaoping’s dominant position in the direction of reform.

According to the big foreign propaganda, Jiang Zemin’s rise to power was in 1989 when he succeeded Zhao Ziyang as General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, nominated by Li Xiannian, recommended by Chen Yun, and agreed by Deng Xiaoping.

However, Jiang Mianheng did not attend the 120th anniversary of Chen Yun in June 2025, and Deng Pufang, the son of Deng Xiaoping, was also absent. If Jiang Zemin was promoted by Chen Yun, Jiang Mianheng, as his son, should have attended to show respect and continue the political relationship. Jiang Mianheng’s absence shows that Jiang Zemin’s connection with Chen Yun’s faction is weak, further proving that Jiang Zemin’s rise to power depends more on Deng Xiaoping than Chen Yun.

The group photo of the Jiang and Deng families at Jiang Zemin’s funeral says it all. Jiang Mianheng did not even attend Chen Yun’s memorial.

In 1992, when the “socialist market economy” line was established, Jiang Zemin needed to communicate with Chen Yun’s henchman Zhu Rongji and visit Chen Yun, which shows Chen Yun’s influence, but the final direction of reform was led by Deng Xiaoping. Jiang Mianheng did not attend the 120th anniversary of Chen Yun, reflecting the estrangement between Jiang Zemin’s family and Chen Yun’s faction.

In the power structure within the party at that time, Deng Xiaoping was the “number one” and Chen Yun was the “number two”. Deng Xiaoping commented to Kim Il-sung in 1989 that Jiang Zemin “worked solidly and was relatively democratic”, which showed that Deng Xiaoping recognized Jiang Zemin. Although Chen Yun supported Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening up in his later years, he was more conservative in economic policies. For example, he opposed radical price reforms and disagreed with the market-oriented line promoted by Jiang Zemin. Jiang Mianheng did not attend the 120th anniversary of Chen Yun, indicating that Jiang Zemin was not Chen Yun’s direct line.

Zhu Rongji entered the State Economic Commission through Yuan Baohua, and in 1992 he communicated closely with Jiang Zemin on the line of “socialist market economy”, showing Zhu Rongji’s role as an “agent” of Chen Yun’s faction. Chen Yun’s insistence on the planned economy made Chen Yun reserved about market-oriented reforms, but he finally compromised under the pressure of Deng Xiaoping. Jiang Zemin needed to coordinate Chen Yun’s faction through Zhu Rongji, which shows that Chen Yun’s faction still had influence in 1992, but Jiang Zemin’s rise to power and policy implementation relied more on Deng Xiaoping.

Jiang Mianheng’s absence from the 120th anniversary of Chen Yun’s memorial service indicates that Jiang Zemin’s family does not recognize the historical connection with Chen Yun’s faction. If Jiang Zemin is a direct descendant of Chen Yun, Jiang Mianheng should have attended to consolidate factional relations. Deng Pufang’s absence also suggests that the Deng family is not closely connected to Chen Yun’s faction, reinforcing the view that Jiang Zemin was promoted by Deng Xiaoping.

Now the fact is that Xi Yuanping attended, but Jiang Mianheng and Deng Pufang did not. Jiang Mianheng’s absence from the 120th anniversary of Chen Yun’s memorial service is the core highlight of this event, because it directly challenges the traditional narrative that Jiang Zemin is closely related to Chen Yun’s faction.

Jiang, Hu and Xi are the three major factions. I cannot command Jiang Mianheng or Deng Pufang. Do not let them attend Chen Yun’s memorial service.

Chen Yun’s son Chen Yuan has expressed support for Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption efforts in recent years, indicating that Xi Jinping is Chen Yun’s agent.
The “socialist market economy” line was established in 1992. The communication between Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji and Chen Yun’s forced endorsement showed that Deng Xiaoping led the reform. Zhu Rongji was the spokesperson for Chen Yun who obstructed the market economy. He could even be called a reformer. The 120th anniversary commemoration of Jiang Mianheng and Chen Yun proved that Jiang Zemin relied more on Deng Xiaoping than Chen Yun. Xi Jinping, whom I mentioned first, was promoted by Chen Yun. Jiang Mianheng’s absence from Chen Yun’s 120th anniversary commemoration just happened. Jiang Mianheng’s absence from Chen Yun’s 120th anniversary commemoration also proved that Xi Jinping was about to fall.

This netizen said that Chen Jining went to Shanghai Jiaotong University to slide on his knees.
Jiang Mianheng was on the news broadcast, but he did not attend Chen Yun’s 120th anniversary commemoration. Chen Jining went to Shanghai University of Science and Technology and then to Shanghai Jiaotong University. Could it be more obvious? As a Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary, he still doesn’t know who has the final say in China now?

On May 9, 2025, a post appeared on a well-known Chinese social platform, quoting Wang Yang’s words when he was the secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee in 2012: “We must break the wrong perception that people’s happiness is a gift from the party and the government. I dare not say that there will be no successors, but at least there has been no predecessors.” It received 24,000 likes and was not deleted. At the same time, rumors about Xi Jinping’s resignation spread on the Internet, and the political atmosphere was sensitive.

Wang Yang’s words originated in 2012, when Wang Yang was the secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee. He proposed that “people’s happiness is not a gift from the party and the government”, emphasizing that government power comes from the people, and benefiting the people is a responsibility rather than a gift. In 2025, this remark was re-examined and received 24,000 likes, reflecting the dissatisfaction of some netizens with the current political ecology. Rumors of Xi Jinping’s resignation are spreading, indicating that the society’s doubts about Xi Jinping’s governance, such as centralization, personality cult, and messing up the economy, have intensified. Wang Yang’s words directly point to the concept of “grace”, which contrasts with the official long-term propaganda of “the party and the government bring happiness”, and is regarded by netizens as a veiled criticism of the current system.

24,000 likes show widespread resonance, especially among young netizens. The 2024 China Youth Netizens Social Mentality Survey Report pointed out that the “post-90s” and “post-00s” generations pursue more independent values in social changes and are more likely to identify with the concept of “happiness is a right rather than a gift.” Wang Yang’s remarks were praised as “unprecedented”, suggesting that netizens believe that Wang Yang has broken through the rigid discourse system of the CCP officialdom and echoed the people’s desire for freedom, autonomy and happiness. Against the backdrop of rumors that Xi Jinping will step down, this post has become an outlet for netizens to express their dissatisfaction with the status quo through historical remarks, reflecting the public’s expectations for more open and democratic governance.

Rumors of stepping down have magnified the influence of the post. Netizens interpreted Wang Yang’s remarks as “earth-shattering” and even linked Wang Yang to rumors of the succession of the general secretary, with Xi stepping down and Wang taking over. This shows that some public opinion regards it as a symbol of challenging Xi Jinping’s authority. The 24,000 likes were not deleted, indicating that the short-term gathering of public opinion in cyberspace may be an indirect protest against Xi Jinping’s centralized model.

In China’s online environment, the high-pressure censorship mechanism reacts quickly to sensitive political content, especially when it comes to members of the Standing Committee, such as Wang Yang, who is only a retired member of the Standing Committee. All remarks that potentially challenge the official narrative are usually deleted quickly. In May 2025, rumors of Xi Jinping’s resignation spread, and political sensitivity was higher, so network monitoring should be further strengthened. Data from social platforms show that popular posts with 24,000 likes usually trigger algorithm warnings and enter the scope of manual review. Therefore, the fact that Wang Yang’s speech post with 24,000 likes was not deleted is by no means negligence in censorship, but may involve a more complex political background.

Under the high-pressure censorship system, it is almost impossible for a post with 24,000 likes to go undetected due to “negligence”. China’s online censorship relies on advanced algorithms and manual teams. Statistics in 2024 show that sensitive content is usually identified and processed within hours or even more than ten minutes, especially on well-known social platforms, where 24,000 likes will quickly enter the regulatory sight. The possibility of negligence is extremely low.

The failure to delete the post can only be explained as the authorities deliberately letting it go in order to observe public opinion trends or assess social sentiment. Wang Yang’s words came from a public occasion in 2012. During the sensitive period of rumors about Xi Jinping’s resignation, the CCP’s handling of the situation is meaningful.

Will Wang Yang replace Hu Chunhua as general secretary? We need to continue to observe the changes in the CCP’s political situation. Okay, thank you.

END

编者按：中南大学研究生院招生办公室主任郭学益的上级是中南大学党委书记高文兵。高文兵于教育部副部长林蕙青多有交集。而林蕙青与彭丽媛关系密切。2025年12月27日，郭学益涉嫌贪腐被查。

2017年7月3-4日，中国高等教育学会第七次会员代表大会在北京会议中心隆重召开。大会选举产生了新一届理事会和监事会，杜玉波同志当选为第七届理事会会长，孙维杰同志当选为监事长，产生了新的学会领导集体。教育部党组成员、副部长林蕙青到会祝贺并发表讲话，中国学位与研究生教育学会赵沁平会长代表兄弟学会到会祝贺并致辞，第六届理事会会长瞿振元作了第六届理事会工作报告，学会第七届理事会会长杜玉波代表新一届理事会发表讲话。

教育部副部长林蕙青代表教育部党组到会祝贺并发表讲话。林蕙青副部长充分肯定了中国高等教育学会第六届理事会5年来的工作，深刻分析了当前我国高等教育面临的国际国内形势和任务，并对新一届理事会提出了四点希望：第一要深入学习贯彻习近平总书记系列重要讲话精神，用先进教育理念引领高等教育事业发展。希望高等教育学会充分发挥自身优势，以习近平教育思想指导高教研究，引领推动高等教育改革发展，为建设高等教育强国作出新贡献。第二要围绕中心、服务大局，积极投身高等教育改革发展主战场。希望高教学会进一步明确服务方向，积极投身高等教育事业主战场，努力提升学会服务高等教育事业发展的水平。第三要坚持理论联系实际，着力提升高等教育科学研究的能力。希望高教学会作为高等教育理论研究、政策研究和行业服务的重要智库，应着力加强四类研究，增强四种能力。第四要坚持规范办会，强化管理，把高教学会建成高水平的现代学术社团组织。希望高教学会积极探索新时期学术团体的发展规律，主动创新服务方式，自觉提升服务能力，努力将学会建成为具有重要学术影响力、权威社会公信力、持续自主发展力、强大会员凝聚力的现代学术性社团。

教育部党组成员、副部长林蕙青讲话

中国学位与研究生教育学会赵沁平会长在致辞中对会员代表大会的召开表示热烈祝贺，指出，中国高等教育学会经过了34年的发展，在历任会长的领导下，坚持党的领导，坚持正确办会方向，开拓进取，通过开展一系列有影响力的学术活动，在引领高等教育理念创新、学术研究、学科建设、资政服务、参与高等教育公共治理等方面做出了重要贡献。为推动高等教育科学研究，提高教育决策科学化、民主化水平，为高等教育改革发展，为广大会员和广大教育工作者做了大量卓有成效的工作，在战线赢得了很高的影响力。并希望学会再接再厉，不断加强自身建设，更好地为广大会员服务，在高等教育事业改革发展中发挥更重要的作用，努力把中国高等教育学会建设成为国内一流、具有重要国际影响的学术团体！

中国学位与研究生教育学会会长赵沁平代表兄弟学会致辞

第六届理事会瞿振元会长在报告中指出，第六届理事会在十八大精神和习近平总书记系列重要讲话精神指引下，注重发挥群众性学术社团的优势，以奋发有为的精神状态、求真务实的工作作风，推动学会事业持续健康发展，在繁荣高等教育科学研究方面做出了新成绩，在探索新时期学术社团发展规律方面取得了新进展，在参与高等教育治理方面发挥了新作用，为加快高等教育现代化、建设高等教育强国做出了新贡献。五年来，本届理事会以“学术立会、规范办会、服务兴会”为工作方针，在引领思想、围绕中心、服务大局、回应关切，建章立制、激发活力、形成特色方面做出了一些成绩。5年来，发挥学会自身优势，在构建中国特色高等教育话语体系与向世界高等教育提供中国方案、中国经验方面进行了初步的探索，取得了一些经验。并希望下一届理事会以更高的政治站位，更强的服务能力，更实的工作作风把学会事业推向新的高度，为实现高等教育现代化、建成高等教育强国做出新的更大贡献。

瞿振元会长做第六届理事会工作报告

杜玉波会长代表新一届理事会发表讲话。他感谢部党组和各位代表的信任，致敬瞿振元会长及其代表的第六届理事会，并表示一定努力工作，不辱使命，做出自己的贡献。杜玉波会长从提升政治站位，把握办会方向；找准职责定位，把握服务面向；推动争先进位，把握工作导向三个方面阐述了对学会今后工作的思考。指出学会要牢固树立“四个意识”，不断坚定“四个自信”，始终在思想上政治上行动上同以习近平同志为核心的党中央保持高度一致，推动学会各项工作再上新台阶。指出第七届理事会要紧紧围绕八项基本职能，服务我国高等教育事业的改革发展，服务政府部门的宏观决策，服务高等学校的办学治校，服务高等教育学术研究的理论探索。杜会长表示，第七届理事会将继续坚持和发扬学术立会、服务兴会、规范办会、创新强会的优良传统，加强自身建设，坚定信念、扎实工作，开拓事业、壮大力量、树立良好形象，赢得地位；把繁荣学术思想作为立会之本，把提供高端服务作为兴会之源，把完善标准规范作为办会之纲，把推动创新合作作为强会之要。努力把学会建设成为有广泛代表性、有重要社会影响和国际影响的学术团体。

杜玉波会长代表新一届理事会讲话

来自学会系统会员单位推荐的500多名代表参加了会议。大会选举出第七届理事会理事529名，常务理事 200 名。大会审议通过了《中国高等教育学会第六届理事会工作报告》，听取了《关于修改<中国高等教育学会章程>（2012年版）的说明》并审议通过了新的《中国高等教育学会章程》，审议通过了《中国高等教育学会第六届理事会财务报告》和《中国高等教育学会关于修订会费标准的报告》。会员代表大会后，召开了中国高等教育学会第七届理事会第一次会议和监事会第一次会议。

2017年7月4日，中国高等教育学会第七次会员代表大会在完成各项任务后胜利闭幕。

范文曜副会长做关于章程修改的说明

陈浩副会长宣读选举办法

康凯秘书长做第六届理事会财务报告

叶之红副秘书长做关于修订学会会费标准的报告

王小梅副秘书长做关于修改《中国高等教育学会会费管理办法》的报告

第七届理事会副会长、中南大学党委书记高文兵主持第七次会员代表大会

第七届理事会副会长、教育部高教司原司长张大良主持第七届理事会第一次理事会会议

监事长、吉林省教育厅党组书记、高校工委书记孙维杰主持第七届监事会第一次会议

第七届理事会副会长、国家民委原副部长级专职委员管培俊主持大会闭幕式

教育部党组成员、副部长林蕙青为“杰出学会工作者”获奖者周远清、潘懋元颁奖

“优秀学会工作者”获奖者合影

（来源： 中国高等教育学会，2017-07-04）

英文翻译

Peng Liyuan’s Corruption Chain: The 7th Congress of the China Association of Higher Education was held in Beijing.

Editor’s Note: Guo Xueyi, director of the Admissions Office of the Graduate School of Central South University, was subordinate to Gao Wenbing, the Party Secretary of Central South University. Gao Wenbing had frequent interactions with Lin Huiqing, Vice Minister of Education. Lin Huiqing had close ties with Peng Liyuan. On December 27, 2025, Guo Xueyi was investigated for suspected corruption.

From July 3-4, 2017, the 7th Congress of the China Association of Higher Education was held at the Beijing Conference Center. The congress elected a new council and supervisory board. Du Yubo was elected president of the 7th council, and Sun Weijie was elected chairman of the supervisory board, forming a new leadership team for the association. Lin Huiqing, member of the Party Group and Vice Minister of Education, attended the congress to offer congratulations and delivered a speech. Zhao Qinping, president of the China Association for Academic Degrees and Graduate Education, attended the congress on behalf of other associations and delivered a speech. Qu Zhenyuan, president of the 6th council, delivered the work report of the 6th council. Du Yubo, president of the 7th council, delivered a speech on behalf of the new council.

Vice Minister of Education Lin Huiqing, representing the Party Group of the Ministry of Education, attended the meeting to offer congratulations and delivered a speech. Vice Minister Lin fully affirmed the work of the Sixth Council of the China Association of Higher Education over the past five years, profoundly analyzed the current international and domestic situation and tasks facing higher education in my country, and put forward four hopes for the new council: First, to thoroughly study and implement the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s series of important speeches, and to guide the development of higher education with advanced educational concepts. She hoped that the Association of Higher Education would give full play to its own advantages, guide higher education research with Xi Jinping’s educational thought, lead and promote the reform and development of higher education, and make new contributions to building a strong higher education nation. Second, to focus on the central tasks and serve the overall situation, and actively participate in the main battlefield of higher education reform and development. She hoped that the Association of Higher Education would further clarify its service direction, actively participate in the main battlefield of higher education, and strive to improve the level of its service to the development of higher education. Third, to adhere to the principle of integrating theory with practice, and focus on improving the ability of higher education scientific research. She hoped that the Association of Higher Education, as an important think tank for higher education theoretical research, policy research, and industry services, should focus on strengthening four types of research and enhancing four capabilities. Fourth, to adhere to standardized operation and strengthen management, and build the Association of Higher Education into a high-level modern academic society. It is hoped that the China Association for Higher Education will actively explore the development patterns of academic organizations in the new era, proactively innovate service methods, consciously improve service capabilities, and strive to build the association into a modern academic society with significant academic influence, authoritative social credibility, sustainable independent development capabilities, and strong member cohesion.

Speech by Lin Huiqing, Member of the Party Leadership Group and Vice Minister of Education

In his address, Zhao Qinping, President of the China Association for Academic Degrees and Graduate Education, extended warm congratulations on the convening of the Members’ Representative Conference. He pointed out that after 34 years of development, under the leadership of successive presidents, the China Association for Higher Education has adhered to the leadership of the Party, maintained the correct direction in running the association, and forged ahead. Through a series of influential academic activities, it has made significant contributions to leading innovation in higher education concepts, academic research, discipline construction, policy advice, and participation in the public governance of higher education. It has done a great deal of effective work to promote scientific research in higher education, improve the scientific and democratic level of educational decision-making, and contribute to the reform and development of higher education, for its members and educators, thus gaining a high level of influence in the field. The association expressed its hope that it would continue its efforts, strengthen its own development, better serve its members, play a more important role in the reform and development of higher education, and strive to build the China Association of Higher Education into a first-class academic organization in China with significant international influence!

Zhao Qinping, President of the China Association for Academic Degrees and Graduate Education, delivered a speech on behalf of the fraternal associations.

In his report, Qu Zhenyuan, President of the Sixth Council, pointed out that under the guidance of the spirit of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s series of important speeches, the Sixth Council focused on leveraging the advantages of a mass academic society, promoting the continuous and healthy development of the association’s work with a spirit of striving for progress and a pragmatic work style. It made new achievements in promoting scientific research in higher education, made new progress in exploring the development laws of academic societies in the new era, and played a new role in participating in the governance of higher education, making new contributions to accelerating the modernization of higher education and building a strong higher education nation. Over the past five years, the current council has adhered to the working principle of “establishing the association through academics, standardizing its operation, and serving its members,” and has made some achievements in guiding thought, focusing on the central tasks, serving the overall situation, responding to concerns, establishing rules and regulations, stimulating vitality, and forming distinctive characteristics. Over the past five years, leveraging its own strengths, the association has made initial explorations and gained some experience in constructing a discourse system for higher education with Chinese characteristics and providing Chinese solutions and experiences to the world’s higher education. It is hoped that the next council will, with a higher political stance, stronger service capabilities, and a more pragmatic work style, propel the association’s work to new heights and make new and greater contributions to the modernization of higher education and the building of a strong higher education nation.

President Qu Zhenyuan delivered the work report of the Sixth Council.

President Du Yubo delivered a speech on behalf of the new council. He thanked the Party Group of the Ministry and all representatives for their trust, paid tribute to President Qu Zhenyuan and the Sixth Council he represented, and expressed his determination to work hard, fulfill his mission, and make his own contributions. President Du Yubo elaborated on his thoughts on the future work of the association from three aspects: raising the political stance and grasping the direction of the association; accurately defining responsibilities and grasping the service orientation; and promoting advancement and grasping the work orientation. He pointed out that the association should firmly establish the “Four Consciousnesses,” continuously strengthen the “Four Confidences,” and always maintain a high degree of consistency with the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core in thought, politics, and action, so as to promote the work of the association to a new level. The meeting emphasized that the 7th Council should closely focus on its eight basic functions: serving the reform and development of higher education in my country, supporting macro-level decision-making by government departments, assisting in the management and administration of universities, and promoting theoretical exploration in higher education academic research. President Du stated that the 7th Council will continue to uphold and carry forward the fine traditions of academic excellence, service-oriented development, standardized operation, and innovation-driven growth. It will strengthen its own development, remain steadfast in its beliefs, work diligently, expand its reach, grow its strength, establish a positive image, and gain a prominent position. The Council will take the flourishing of academic thought as its foundation, providing high-end services as its source of growth, perfecting standards and norms as its guiding principle, and promoting innovative cooperation as its key to strength. It will strive to build the Society into an academic organization with broad representation and significant social and international influence.

President Du Yubo delivered a speech on behalf of the new Council.

More than 500 representatives recommended by member units of the Society attended the meeting. The conference elected 529 council members and 200 standing council members for the 7th Council. The Congress reviewed and approved the “Work Report of the Sixth Council of the China Association of Higher Education,” heard the “Explanation on the Revision of the (2012 Edition)” and reviewed and approved the new “Constitution of the China Association of Higher Education,” as well as the “Financial Report of the Sixth Council of the China Association of Higher Education” and the “Report of the China Association of Higher Education on the Revision of Membership Fee Standards.” Following the Congress, the first meeting of the Seventh Council of the China Association of Higher Education and the first meeting of the Supervisory Board were held.

The Seventh Congress of the China Association of Higher Education successfully concluded on July 4, 2017, after completing all its tasks.

Vice President Fan Wenyao explained the amendments to the constitution.

Vice President Chen Hao read out the election procedures.

Secretary-General Kang Kai presented the financial report of the Sixth Council.

Deputy Secretary-General Ye Zhihong presented a report on revising the association’s membership fee standards.

Deputy Secretary-General Wang Xiaomei presented a report on revising the “China Association of Higher Education Membership Fee Management Measures.”

Gao Wenbing, Vice President of the Seventh Council and Secretary of the Party Committee of Central South University, presided over the Seventh Member Representative Assembly.

Zhang Daliang, Vice President of the Seventh Council and former Director of the Higher Education Department of the Ministry of Education, presided over the first meeting of the Seventh Council.

Sun Weijie, Chairman of the Supervisory Board, Secretary of the Party Committee of the Jilin Provincial Department of Education, and Secretary of the Higher Education Working Committee, presided over the first meeting of the Seventh Supervisory Board.

Guan Peijun, Vice President of the Seventh Council and former Vice Ministerial-level Full-time Member of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, presided over the closing ceremony.

Lin Huiqing, Member of the Party Committee and Vice Minister of the Ministry of Education, presented awards to Zhou Yuanqing and Pan Maoyuan as winners of the “Outstanding Association Worker” award.

Group photo of the “Excellent Association Worker” award winners.

(Source: China Association of Higher Education, 2017-07-04)

END

李颖（1988年3月30日－），女，汉族，白羊座，已婚，出生地浙江杭州市，户籍地上海徐汇区，曾经工作于世函盛建筑设计咨询（上海）有限公司，现任上海纽约大学城市研究实践助理教授。

世函盛建筑设计咨询（上海）有限公司，成立于2011年09月02日。法定代表人Hardie Christopher Forbes，注册资本30万美元

2007年-2011年，23岁的李颖毕业于墨尔本大学，获得建筑学学士

2013年，25岁的李颖获墨尔本大学建筑学硕士

2014年，26岁的李颖获哥伦比亚大学 （纽约） 高级建筑学硕士MSAAD，是一个1.5年3学期进修班，学费约为$177160。

《原文链接》

英文翻译

Li Ying, daughter of Chinese Premier Li Qiang

Li Ying (born March 30, 1988), female, Han nationality, Aries, married, born in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, with registered residence in Xuhui District, Shanghai. She previously worked at Shih-Han Architectural Design Consulting (Shanghai) Co., Ltd., and is currently an Assistant Professor of Urban Studies Practice at NYU Shanghai.

Shih-Han Architectural Design Consulting (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. was established on September 2, 2011. The legal representative is Hardie Christopher Forbes, and the registered capital is US$300,000.

From 2007 to 2011, at the age of 23, Li Ying graduated from the University of Melbourne with a Bachelor of Architecture degree.

In 2013, at the age of 25, Li Ying obtained a Master of Architecture degree from the University of Melbourne.

In 2014, at the age of 26, Li Ying obtained an MSAAD (Master of Science in Architecture) from Columbia University (New York), a 1.5-year, 3-semester advanced program with tuition fees of approximately $177,160.

END

大家好，
中共中央2025年6月13日上午在人民大会堂举行座谈会，纪念陈云出生120周年。

这名网友说，
纪念陈云讲话特意给了政治局委员特写，到张又侠这里就不见何卫东百分百被抓了，还给了胡春华跟王小洪坐一块给了特写，包包分析一下。
这名网友说，
中共中央举行纪念陈云同志诞辰120周年座谈会习近平发表重要讲话，习近平纪念他大爹了。
习还真是陈云的孝子贤孙，说明还不死心，借招魂反扑，看来非要斗个你死我活，烂尾式大乱斗，直到共产邪恶温床彻底崩塌为止。
反扑，他不可能反扑
这名网友说，
再说个细节，习近平还是两个茶杯，六分三十八秒，这特么是给陈云招魂啊，台下直给胡春华，边上是李铁映，真的是，大包说的全都是对的，但是就这么怂这么墨迹，真服了。
这杯子你不说我还没注意。就是习近平有口腔溃疡，习近平有重度系统性红斑狼疮，需要漱口。
这名网友说，
胡春华在会场表情 好像不是很乐观。你留心观察，不像幕后大佬。
春花那张照片还是去年三中后，春花哪有能量做幕后，肯定是胡锦涛啊！
有點不耐煩
这名网友说的很准，有点不耐烦。
现在幕后操作的就是胡春华，越来越多的证据表明，胡锦涛已经放手让胡春华去做。我做了一期，5月29日政治局会议背后都是胡春华的痕迹。又有新的证据。

这名网友说，
习近平从洛阳回来拜了三个死人，许其亮，热地，陈云，见了一个活佛，这是什么仪式吗？太抽象了。

这名网友说，
其实我个人认为胡春华不算习近平那种狠，怎么说呢！就是带点理想主义的轴！从他年轻时候就很明显看出来了，一个贫穷家庭子弟千辛万苦靠上大学竟然选择了个中文系！毕业了又往西藏跑，那时候跟现在不同哦！可以说如果不是在西藏遇到老胡，真有可能一辈子呆在那苦寒之地了！
这名网友说，
说反了，是认识胡锦涛才去的西藏。
这名网友说的太棒了。
胡春华肯定是认识胡锦涛才去的西藏。上面这名网友说的都是毒鸡汤。

我给大家总结毒鸡汤系列，胡春华一个北大学生，为了理想，才去西藏这种苦寒之地。扯淡，胡春华肯定是认识胡锦涛才去西藏。胡春华在北大已经认识了李克强，还真以为为了理想，扯淡。
汪洋发表支持改革的文章获得邓小平赏识，这不可能。除非汪洋在安徽一开始就是邓小平马仔提拔的。
许其亮是农民家庭，扯淡许其亮的爸爸是空军副政委许乐夫。许其亮是红二代。

全都是包装。都是骗人。共产党全是骗子。

这名网友说，
我希望是胡春华结班，他一定会了结习近平。
还真不好说啊。
这名网友说，
几年前我看一个人很肯定的预测说说习会死掉，所以前一两年我一直以为未来可能是习挂了，然后小胡上台，现在看错了，我真没想到老胡会搞成功，现在主要看习会不会走了

我的回复是
胡春华杀伐果断，我有点担心习近平的命运。我们今天就要分析，热地是自己走的，还是胡春华干的？

陈云的儿子陈元出席，刘源出席，胡德平出席，习远平出席。

这名网友说，
纪念陈云座谈会主席台坐了13个人，好像没见韩正，赵乐际主持，相当于人大开的。纪念毛泽东座谈会主席台坐了17+人，蔡奇主持，明确是党开的。这次座谈会实际上是维稳会，向全党和国际社会展示中央领导层很稳定，但又侧面暗示习已不再是主导，反习派已完全控制局面。

这名网友说的特别专业
陈云110周年的时候，就是刘云山主持， 当时张德江没有出席。

这名网友说，
上次有没有軍委副主席坐臺上？

我的回复是有啊，上次居然是许光头
看不清楚，但是光头很容易认出来。世界变化太快了。现在他已经嗝屁了

我们看胡春华的手势，快睡着了。

初始的十指交叉和闭目养神表明此人内心较为放松，对会议内容投入度不高，可能感到疲惫或认为议题与自身职责关联有限。紧扣手指是自我安抚的动作，头微低和闭目进一步暗示“半脱离”状态，试图在重要场合第一排维持礼貌姿态的同时短暂休息。后来双手放开按在笔记本上，表明其心理状态发生微妙变化，或自身短暂恢复精力，从而进入轻微警觉或“回归参与”的状态。双手按笔记本是更开放、准备性的姿势，表明其随时可能记笔记或表现出更专注的姿态

闭目养神通常反映轻度疲劳或注意力分散，可能因会议冗长、工作压力或个人状态（比如睡眠不足）导致。此人通过十指交叉和闭目缓解疲惫，寻求心理舒适。双手放开后按在笔记本上，可能表示短暂休息后精神略有恢复，或意识到第一排的显要位置需展现更“认真”的姿态，以避免被误解为不关注。放开双手的动作减少了自我安抚的成分，显示其试图调整到更符合重要人物身份的状态。

我们看这一堆说法和之前网友的说法，很吻合。

这次座谈会实际上是维稳会，向全党和国际社会展示中央领导层很稳定，但又侧面暗示习已不再是主导，反习派已完全控制局面。

我们看胡春华的表现，给出解释，内心放松，认为这是一个扯淡的会，与自己的职责无关，疲惫或睡眠不足。胡春华如果只是一个政协副主席。政协每天没事儿干，闲的蛋疼，怎么可能疲惫或者睡眠不足。除非胡春华天天去逛夜店，或者和习近平一样玩洗面奶。胡春华如果没有逛夜店，说明他这个政协副主席，工作还挺繁忙的。一个政协副主席，天天瞎忙什么呢。习近平如果大权在握，胡春华还能有心情在这里闭目养神，认为这个一个扯淡的会议吗？

这名网友说，
交通运输部党组成员，国家铁路局党组书记、局长费东斌涉嫌严重违纪违法，目前正接受中央纪委国家监委纪律审查和监察调查。

费东斌也是真正的铁帽子王，都胡春华给抓了。费东斌，热地，胡春华三个人，一个抓了，一个死了，不是胡春华干的，还能是谁干，就剩下一个喘气的。

我们看看这3个人到底是什么关系。热地也发了一个热地生平，这个很值得研究，可以单独研究一下。

我们先看时间线，2025年6月6日，热地86岁死了。2025年6月12日，费东斌抓了。就差一个礼拜，如果费东斌和热地有关系的，那么热地的死因是不是就很可疑了。

2007年5月 – 2008年6月，37岁的费东斌任青藏铁路公司常务副总经理、党委委员（2008年2月正局级）。当时的青藏铁路公司总经理朱明瑞（2006年9月 – 2008年）。青藏铁路就是青海到西藏，这不一下子就和西藏有关系。西藏就有可能和热地和胡春华有关系。

青藏铁路公司第一任总经理是卢春房。2001年6月至2005年3月，卢春房先后担任青藏铁路公司筹备组组长，铁道部青藏铁路建设总指挥部指挥长，青藏铁路公司总经理、党委书记。

2012年6月15日 在中国土木工程学会百年华诞之际，学会第九次全国会员代表大会暨九届一次理事会议在北京胜利召开。中国科学技术协会副主席、党组副书记程东红、住房和城乡建设部郭允冲副部长、铁道部卢春房副部长、交通运输部冯正霖副部长以及谭庆琏、蔡庆华、胡希捷等八届理事会领导出席了会议，来自建设、铁道、交通、水利以及相关学（协）会约300名代表参加了会议。

2012年6月15日 学会第九届一次常务理事会议在北京召开。学会理事长郭允冲，副理事长卢春房、冯正霖、杨忠诚、袁驷、李永盛、易军、李长进、孟凤朝、刘起涛、王俊，秘书长张雁出席会议。

郭允冲是吴邦国的秘书。吴邦国担任副总理的时候主管铁道部。吴邦国也死了。怎么那么巧都死了。吴邦国的秘书郭允冲是江苏省南通市人。丁薛祥是南通市人。苗华也是南通市。我说过了丁薛祥就是吴邦国提拔的，吴邦国是陈云的马仔，和江蛤没什么关系。

那么热地在哪儿呢。“十一”黄金周前的藏北高原，一派晴朗喜庆，总投资达十五亿元人民币的青藏铁路沿线最大现代物流中心，九月二十八日在藏北高原那曲车站开工建设。

那曲是藏北重要的交通枢纽，青藏铁路、青藏公路、黑昌公路、安狮公路在此交会，具有得天独厚的地理优势、交通优势和资源优势。按照胡锦涛总书记关于“最大限度地挖掘青藏铁路的巨大发展潜力，最大限度地发挥青藏铁路的强大辐射作用”要求，西藏自治区和铁道部经过深入调研和认真研究，确定在那曲车站建设现代化物流中心。

据青藏铁路公司总经理朱明瑞介绍，青藏铁路去年七月全线通车营运后，促使西藏进入铁路经济时代，藏北地区不仅传统畜牧业、畜产品加工业迅速扩大市场；旅游服务业、矿产业、现代运输业也呈现大好市场前景。

据了解，该物流中心规划占地八千亩，分为散堆装物流区、综合物流区和生产加工区三大部分，总工期为十五个月，预计二00九年将全面投入使用。西藏自治区政府主席向巴平措，西藏自治区党委副书记郝鹏、铁道部副部长卢春房等为该物流中心奠基。

提拔费东斌的卢春房和朱明瑞，在那曲修建了一个车站。热地就是那曲地委书记，当时2007年热地是中国人大副委员长。热地不仅是胡锦涛的政敌，也是胡春华的政敌，指不定热地就是被胡春华给做掉。这回真的来了一个狠角色。

2020年6月 – 2021年3月，50岁的费东斌任内蒙古自治区乌兰察布市委书记。当时的内蒙古党委书记是石泰峰（2019年10月 – 2022年4月），内蒙古主席是布小林（2016年3月 – 2021年8月）。可是石泰峰2025年4月8日，还曾经以中央巡视工作领导小组副组长的身份出席公开活动。石泰峰本身就是巡视工作副组长，就管着中纪委。

如果费东斌是石泰峰提拔的，那谁还敢抓呢？既然费东斌不是石泰峰提拔的，那么只能是布小林提拔的。可是布小林是乌兰夫的孙女，乌兰夫不是邓小平的同学吗？只能说明乌兰夫其实周恩来派系。

“文化大革命”开始后，乌兰夫因“内人党”问题被批斗，被攻击“搞独立王国”。1966年8月，被软禁于北京，并撤销党政军领导职务；后受到国务院总理周恩来的保护，并改名王自力。这就说明乌兰夫是周恩来的人，不是邓小平的人。

1972年5月20日至31日，中共中央在北京举行工作会议，为召开十大作准备。时任国务院总理周恩来力争，使乌兰夫得以参加大会，并被选为第十届中央委员。

1973年3月，邓小平复出任副总理。乌兰夫比邓小平早8个月复出。我们注意这个时间线凡是1966年到1973年之间复出或者没有被打倒，那就不是邓小平派系的。邓小平已经被打倒，自身难保。所以乌兰夫是周恩来习近平派系的，不是邓小平派系的。

费东斌不管从西藏这头说，还是从内蒙古这头说，都是胡春华要抓费东斌。说明胡锦涛已经交班给胡春华了，很多事情都是胡春华在操作。

那么还有没有费东斌是布小林提拔的，而不是石泰峰提拔的证据。当然有，不然我就不敢说。费东斌是费孝通的孙子，当然也有一个说法费东斌是费孝通姐姐费达生的女婿。

费东斌，辽宁省锦州市人。
费孝通，江苏省苏州市吴江区人。
这有点对不上，但是我们不较真儿。费东斌是费孝通的亲属，是靠谱的说法。

1951年6月，中央民族学院正式成立并举行开学典礼，乌兰夫兼任院长，费孝通任副院长。从此，费孝通先生与中央民族大学结下长达半个多世纪的不解之缘。也就是说费东斌传言中的爷爷费孝通和布小林的爷爷乌兰夫，关系十分密切。再说了费孝通是所谓的民主党派，统战都是周恩来管的。

费孝通和热地都是人大副委员长，热地担任人大副委员长的时候，委员长就是吴邦国。

这是第一届政协，这不是副主席周恩来吗？副主席沈钧儒，当然还有个主席毛泽东。我们看，沈钧儒和费孝通都是苏州人。民盟历届主席，沈钧儒和费孝通都是苏州人。

所以费东斌也是货真价实的铁帽子王。担任乌兰布察市市长的搭档市委书记是杜学军。费东斌也是接替杜学军担任市委书记的。

2021年2月24日，《中国纪检监察报》文章《倒查涉煤腐败 推动净化政治生态——内蒙古自治区系列涉煤腐败案以案促改工作启示》刊登，文章中提到了杜学军，这是官方首次证实杜学军已落马，他是涉煤领域腐败“倒查20年”专项行动的56名厅局级干部之一。

杜学军的派系我不知道。但是杜学军被查处2021年内蒙古的党委书记是石泰峰。倒查20年是针对习近平不是胡春华。石泰峰现在已经被证实是胡锦涛的马仔。内蒙古倒查20年是江泽民胡锦涛试图阻止习近平三连任行动一部分。

我们看2021年北戴河会议真实存在又添加新证据。天天说北戴河会议不存在的，是不是就是大外宣。

2021年1月26日，内蒙古自治区政府主席布小林在区人大会议开幕式上做政府工作报告时忽然晕倒。2021年8月5日，因身体原因刚满63岁的布小林辞去任自治区政府主席职务，由另一位蒙古族女性干部王莉霞接任内蒙古自治区主席。

布小林是习近平的马仔。石泰峰在内蒙古倒查20年把习近平马仔布小林赶出去了内蒙古。

2021年4月 – 2021年10月，51岁的费东斌任河南省副省长。当时的河南省委书记是王国生（2018年3月 – 2021年5月）。河南省长是王凯（2021年4月 – ）。费东斌和王凯几乎同时担任河南副省长，省长，王凯也得抓。巧不巧，这个时间刚好是2021年北戴河会议之前。

费东斌担任河南副省长期间的大秘是河南省政府副秘书长魏晓伟。魏晓伟曾经担任黄强的大秘。黄强和张庆伟基本是绑定的。张庆伟现在正在白俄访问，会见卢卡申科，卢卡申科不是刚刚去过中国吗？

卢卡申科和习近平同意确保暴风雨和暴雪不会破坏国家间的团结

暴风雨和暴雪在俄文中有政治风暴的意思。白俄官网的标题的意思就是即便中国发生政变，也不会影响中国和白俄的外交关系。

我给大家总结一下，费东斌由铁道部副部长卢春房提拔的，卢春房的上级郭允冲是吴邦国的秘书。吴邦国担任副总理期间主管铁道部。吴邦国提拔的丁薛祥，丁薛祥和吴邦国的秘书郭允冲都是江苏南通市人。苗华也是南通人。卢春房给西藏那曲修建了一个车站。
热地曾经担任那曲地委书记，修建拿去车站的时候热地是人大副委员长，人大委员长是吴邦国。
费东斌传言的爷爷费孝通和乌兰夫是搭档。乌兰夫的孙女布小林提拔的费东斌。
费东斌担任市长期间的市委书记杜学军被石泰峰给抓了。

现在热地死了，吴邦国也死了，费东斌抓了，是不是就是胡春华干的。我不知道。

这名网友说，
我靠！我刚看一个影片，一个主播说他妻子的一个亲戚在西藏工作过，对胡春华很了解，胡春华在西藏工作二十多年，骨子里有杀气，是一个会造反的人！

我的回复是，
我不了解胡春华，胡春华现在暂时没有正式登上政治舞台。我已经感觉到了胡春华杀气腾腾。胡春华会不会直接给习近平安排一个热地，我不知道。先知先觉李嘉诚，后知后觉王健林，不知不觉许家印，错知错觉习近平

好的，谢谢大家。

《原文链接》

英文翻译

Important: Arrange a Redi treatment for Xi? A complete interpretation of the Chen Yun memorial meeting. The relationship between Fei Dongbin and Fei Xiaotong, Wu Bangguo, Ding Xuexiang, Redi, Ulanhu, and Bu Xiaolin is revealed. Another iron hat king defeated by Hu Chunhua

Hello everyone,
The CPC Central Committee held a symposium in the Great Hall of the People on the morning of June 13, 2025 to commemorate the 120th anniversary of Chen Yun’s birth.

This netizen said,
The speech commemorating Chen Yun was specially given a close-up by the Politburo members, but it was not seen here by Zhang Youxia. He Weidong was 100% arrested, and Hu Chunhua and Wang Xiaohong were given a close-up when sitting together. Bao Bao analyzed it.
This netizen said,
The CPC Central Committee held a symposium to commemorate the 120th anniversary of Comrade Chen Yun’s birth. Xi Jinping delivered an important speech. Xi Jinping commemorated his father.
Xi is really Chen Yun’s filial son and grandson, which means he is still not giving up. He is counterattacking by summoning the soul. It seems that he must fight to the death, a bad end-style melee, until the hotbed of communist evil collapses completely.
Counterattack, he can’t counterattack
This netizen said,
One more detail, Xi Jinping still has two tea cups, six minutes and thirty-eight seconds, this is to summon the soul of Chen Yun, the audience is directly to Hu Chunhua, and next to him is Li Tieying, really, what Dabao said is all right, but he is so cowardly and slow, I really give in.
If you didn’t mention this cup, I wouldn’t have noticed it. It’s just that Xi Jinping has oral ulcers, Xi Jinping has severe systemic lupus erythematosus, and needs to rinse his mouth.
This netizen said,
Hu Chunhua’s expression at the meeting didn’t seem very optimistic. If you pay attention, he doesn’t look like a big boss behind the scenes.
The photo of Chunhua was taken after the Third Plenary Session last year. How could Chunhua have the energy to be behind the scenes? It must be Hu Jintao!
A little impatient
This netizen said it very accurately, a little impatient.
Now it is Hu Chunhua who is operating behind the scenes. More and more evidence shows that Hu Jintao has let Hu Chunhua do it. I did an issue, and behind the Politburo meeting on May 29th were traces of Hu Chunhua. There is new evidence.

This netizen said,
Xi Jinping came back from Luoyang and worshipped three dead people, Xu Qiliang, Reti, Chen Yun, and met a living Buddha. Is this a ritual? It’s too abstract.

This netizen said,
In fact, I personally think that Hu Chunhua is not as cruel as Xi Jinping. How should I put it! He is just a bit idealistic! It was obvious when he was young. A child from a poor family went to college with great difficulty and chose the Chinese department! After graduation, he ran to Tibet again. It was different from now! It can be said that if he hadn’t met Lao Hu in Tibet, he might have stayed in that bitter and cold place for the rest of his life!
This netizen said,
You said it the wrong way. He went to Tibet because he met Hu Jintao.
This netizen said it very well.
Hu Chunhua must have gone to Tibet because he met Hu Jintao. What the netizen said above is all poisonous chicken soup.

I will summarize the poisonous chicken soup series for everyone. Hu Chunhua is a Peking University student. He went to Tibet, a bitter cold place, for his ideals. Nonsense. Hu Chunhua must have known Hu Jintao before he went to Tibet. Hu Chunhua had already known Li Keqiang at Peking University. He really thought it was for his ideals. Nonsense.
Wang Yang published an article supporting reform and was appreciated by Deng Xiaoping. This is impossible. Unless Wang Yang was promoted by Deng Xiaoping’s lackeys in Anhui from the beginning.
Xu Qiliang is from a peasant family. Nonsense. Xu Qiliang’s father is Xu Lefu, deputy political commissar of the Air Force. Xu Qiliang is a second-generation red.

It’s all packaging. It’s all deception. The Communist Party is full of liars.

This netizen said,
I hope it’s Hu Chunhua who will end the class. He will definitely end Xi Jinping.
It’s really hard to say.
The netizen said,
A few years ago, I saw someone predict with certainty that Xi would die, so in the past year or two, I always thought that Xi might die in the future, and then Hu Jintao would take over. Now I was wrong. I really didn’t expect Hu Jintao to succeed. Now it depends on whether Xi will leave.

My reply was
Hu Chunhua is decisive and I am a little worried about Xi Jinping’s fate. Today we have to analyze whether Redi left on his own or because of Hu Chunhua.

Chen Yun’s son Chen Yuan attended, Liu Yuan attended, Hu Deping attended, and Xi Yuanping attended.

The netizen said,
There were 13 people sitting on the rostrum of the symposium in memory of Chen Yun, and Han Zheng didn’t seem to be seen. Zhao Leji presided over it, which was equivalent to the National People’s Congress. There were 17+ people sitting on the rostrum of the symposium in memory of Mao Zedong, and Cai Qi presided over it. It was clearly held by the party. This symposium was actually a stability maintenance meeting, showing the whole party and the international community that the central leadership is very stable, but it also indirectly hinted that Xi is no longer the leader and the anti-Xi faction has completely controlled the situation.

This netizen is very professional.

It was Liu Yunshan who presided over the 110th anniversary of Chen Yun, and Zhang Dejiang was not present at that time.

This netizen said,
Was there a vice chairman of the Military Commission sitting on the stage last time?

My reply was yes, and it was Xu Guangtou last time.

I can’t see clearly, but the bald head is easy to recognize. The world is changing too fast. Now he has died.

Let’s look at Hu Chunhua’s gestures, he is almost asleep.

The initial crossing of fingers and closing eyes indicate that this person is relatively relaxed, not very engaged in the content of the meeting, and may feel tired or think that the topic is limited to his own responsibilities. Clasp fingers is a self-soothing action, and the slightly lowered head and closed eyes further imply a “semi-detached” state, trying to take a short break while maintaining a polite posture in the first row of an important occasion. Later, his hands were released and pressed on the notebook, indicating that his mental state has undergone subtle changes, or he has temporarily recovered his energy, thus entering a state of slight alertness or “return to participation”. Pressing both hands on the notebook is a more open and prepared posture, indicating that he may take notes or show a more focused posture at any time.

Closing eyes to rest usually reflects mild fatigue or distraction, which may be caused by a long meeting, work pressure or personal status (such as lack of sleep). This person relieves fatigue and seeks psychological comfort by crossing his fingers and closing his eyes. After releasing his hands and pressing them on the notebook, it may mean that he has recovered slightly after a short break, or realizes that the prominent position in the first row requires a more “serious” posture to avoid being misunderstood as not paying attention. The action of releasing both hands reduces the self-soothing component, showing that he is trying to adjust to a state more in line with the status of an important person.

We look at this bunch of statements and the previous statements of netizens, which are very consistent.

This symposium is actually a stability maintenance meeting, showing the whole party and the international community that the central leadership is very stable, but it also indirectly implies that Xi is no longer the dominant one and the anti-Xi faction has completely controlled the situation.

We look at Hu Chunhua’s performance, giving an explanation, relaxing his heart, thinking that this is a nonsense meeting, irrelevant to his duties, tired or sleep deprived. If Hu Chunhua is just a vice chairman of the CPPCC. The CPPCC has nothing to do every day, so how could it be possible that it is tired or sleep deprived? Unless Hu Chunhua goes to nightclubs every day, or plays with facial cleansers like Xi Jinping. If Hu Chunhua does not go to nightclubs, it means that he, as the vice chairman of the CPPCC, is quite busy at work. What is a vice chairman of the CPPCC busy with every day? If Xi Jinping is in power, can Hu Chunhua still have the mood to close his eyes and rest here, thinking that this is a nonsense meeting?

This netizen said,
Fei Dongbin, member of the Party Leadership Group of the Ministry of Transport, Secretary of the Party Leadership Group and Director of the National Railway Administration, is suspected of serious violations of discipline and law, and is currently undergoing disciplinary review and supervision investigation by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission.

Fei Dongbin is also a real iron hat king, and Hu Chunhua has arrested him. Fei Dongbin, Redi, and Hu Chunhua, one of them was arrested and the other died. If it was not Hu Chunhua who did it, who else could have done it? Only one is left to breathe.

Let’s see what the relationship is between these three people. Redi also published a Redi biography, which is worth studying and can be studied separately.

Let’s look at the timeline first. On June 6, 2025, Reti died at the age of 86. On June 12, 2025, Fei Dongbin was arrested. It was only a week away. If Fei Dongbin had a relationship with Reti, then Reti’s cause of death would be very suspicious.

From May 2007 to June 2008, 37-year-old Fei Dongbin served as the executive vice president and party committee member of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway Company (at the bureau level in February 2008). The then general manager of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway Company was Zhu Mingrui (September 2006-2008). The Qinghai-Tibet Railway is from Qinghai to Tibet, so it is suddenly related to Tibet. Tibet may be related to Reti and Hu Chunhua.

The first general manager of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway Company was Lu Chunfang. From June 2001 to March 2005, Lu Chunfang served successively as the leader of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway Company Preparatory Group, the commander of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway Construction Headquarters of the Ministry of Railways, and the general manager and party secretary of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway Company.

On June 15, 2012, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the China Civil Engineering Society, the Ninth National Member Congress and the Ninth Council Meeting were successfully held in Beijing. Cheng Donghong, Vice Chairman and Deputy Secretary of the Party Group of the China Association for Science and Technology, Guo Yunchong, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, Lu Chunfang, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Railways, Feng Zhenglin, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Transport, and Tan Qinglian, Cai Qinghua, Hu Xijie and other leaders of the Eighth Council attended the meeting. About 300 representatives from construction, railways, transportation, water conservancy and related academic (association) societies attended the meeting.

On June 15, 2012, the Ninth Executive Council Meeting of the Society was held in Beijing. The meeting was attended by the president of the society, Guo Yunchong, vice presidents Lu Chunfang, Feng Zhenglin, Yang Zhongcheng, Yuan Si, Li Yongsheng, Yi Jun, Li Changjin, Meng Fengchao, Liu Qitao, Wang Jun, and secretary general Zhang Yan.

Guo Yunchong was Wu Bangguo’s secretary. When Wu Bangguo was vice premier, he was in charge of the Ministry of Railways. Wu Bangguo also died. How could they both die by such a coincidence? Wu Bangguo’s secretary, Guo Yunchong, was from Nantong City, Jiangsu Province. Ding Xuexiang was from Nantong City. Miao Hua was also from Nantong City. I said that Ding Xuexiang was promoted by Wu Bangguo. Wu Bangguo was Chen Yun’s lackey and had nothing to do with Jiang Zemin.

Where is the hottest place? Before the “National Day” Golden Week, the northern Tibetan Plateau was sunny and festive. The largest modern logistics center along the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, with a total investment of 1.5 billion yuan, started construction on September 28 at Nagqu Station on the northern Tibetan Plateau.

Nagqu is an important transportation hub in northern Tibet. The Qinghai-Tibet Railway, Qinghai-Tibet Highway, Heichang Highway and Anshi Highway intersect here. It has unique geographical advantages, transportation advantages and resource advantages. In accordance with General Secretary Hu Jintao’s requirement to “maximize the development potential of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and maximize the powerful radiation effect of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway”, the Tibet Autonomous Region and the Ministry of Railways have determined to build a modern logistics center at Nagqu Station after in-depth investigation and careful research.

According to Zhu Mingrui, general manager of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway Company, after the Qinghai-Tibet Railway was fully opened to traffic in July last year, Tibet has entered the railway economic era. Not only has the traditional animal husbandry and animal product processing industries in northern Tibet rapidly expanded their markets; the tourism service industry, mining industry and modern transportation industry have also shown great market prospects.

It is understood that the logistics center is planned to cover an area of 8,000 mu and is divided into three major parts: bulk logistics area, comprehensive logistics area and production and processing area. The total construction period is 15 months and it is expected to be fully put into use in 2009. Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region Government Xiangba Phuntsok, Deputy Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region Party Committee Hao Peng, and Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Railways Lu Chunfang laid the foundation for the logistics center.

Lu Chunfang and Zhu Mingrui, who promoted Fei Dongbin, built a station in Nagqu. Reti was the secretary of the Nagqu Prefectural Party Committee. In 2007, Reti was the vice chairman of the National People’s Congress of China. Reti was not only a political enemy of Hu Jintao, but also a political enemy of Hu Chunhua. It is possible that Reti was killed by Hu Chunhua. This time, a tough guy really came.

From June 2020 to March 2021, 50-year-old Fei Dongbin served as the secretary of the Ulanqab Municipal Party Committee of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. At that time, the secretary of the Inner Mongolia Party Committee was Shi Taifeng (October 2019-April 2022), and the chairman of Inner Mongolia was Bu Xiaolin (March 2016-August 2021). However, Shi Taifeng attended a public event as the deputy leader of the Central Inspection Leading Group on April 8, 2025. Shi Taifeng himself is the deputy leader of the inspection work, and he is in charge of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.

If Fei Dongbin was promoted by Shi Taifeng, who would dare to arrest him? Since Fei Dongbin was not promoted by Shi Taifeng, it can only be Bu Xiaolin who promoted him. But Bu Xiaolin is Ulanhu’s granddaughter, and isn’t Ulanhu a classmate of Deng Xiaoping? This can only mean that Ulanhu is actually from Zhou Enlai’s faction.

After the start of the “Cultural Revolution”, Ulanhu was criticized for the “Inner Party” issue and was attacked for “establishing an independent kingdom”. In August 1966, he was placed under house arrest in Beijing and his leadership positions in the party, government and military were revoked; he was later protected by Premier Zhou Enlai and changed his name to Wang Zili. This shows that Ulanhu is Zhou Enlai’s man, not Deng Xiaoping’s man.

From May 20 to 31, 1972, the CPC Central Committee held a working meeting in Beijing to prepare for the convening of the 10th National Congress. Zhou Enlai, then Premier of the State Council, fought hard to enable Ulanhu to attend the conference and was elected as a member of the 10th Central Committee.

In March 1973, Deng Xiaoping returned to serve as Vice Premier. Ulanhu returned to power 8 months earlier than Deng Xiaoping. We note that anyone who returned to power or was not overthrown between 1966 and 1973 was not from Deng Xiaoping’s faction. Deng Xiaoping had already been overthrown and could not protect himself. So Ulanhu was from Zhou Enlai and Xi Jinping’s faction, not from Deng Xiaoping’s faction.

Whether it is from the Tibet side or the Inner Mongolia side, it was Hu Chunhua who wanted to arrest Fei Dongbin. This shows that Hu Jintao has handed over power to Hu Chunhua, and many things are operated by Hu Chunhua.

So is there any evidence that Fei Dongbin was promoted by Bu Xiaolin instead of Shi Taifeng? Of course there is, otherwise I would not dare to say it. Fei Dongbin is the grandson of Fei Xiaotong. Of course, there is also a saying that Fei Dongbin is the son-in-law of Fei Xiaotong’s sister Fei Dasheng.

Fei Dongbin is from Jinzhou City, Liaoning Province.
Fei Xiaotong is from Wujiang District, Suzhou City, Jiangsu Province.
This is a bit inconsistent, but we don’t take it too seriously. It is a reliable statement that Fei Dongbin is a relative of Fei Xiaotong.

In June 1951, the Central University for Nationalities was formally established and held its opening ceremony. Ulanfu served as the dean and Fei Xiaotong as the vice dean. Since then, Mr. Fei Xiaotong has had an indissoluble bond with the Central University for Nationalities for more than half a century. In other words, Fei Xiaotong, the grandfather of Fei Dongbin, and Ulanfu, the grandfather of Bu Xiaolin, have a very close relationship. Besides, Fei Xiaotong is a so-called democratic party, and the united front is managed by Zhou Enlai.

Fei Xiaotong and Redi were both vice chairmen of the National People’s Congress. When Redi served as vice chairman of the National People’s Congress, the chairman was Wu Bangguo.

This is the first CPPCC. Isn’t this vice chairman Zhou Enlai? Vice chairman Shen Junru, and of course there is a chairman Mao Zedong. Let’s see, Shen Junru and Fei Xiaotong are both from Suzhou. Shen Junru and Fei Xiaotong, the former chairmen of the China Democratic League, are both from Suzhou.

So Fei Dongbin is also a genuine iron hat king. Du Xuejun is the party secretary of Ulanbucha, who is the partner of the mayor. Fei Dongbin also succeeded Du Xuejun as the party secretary.

On February 24, 2021, the article “Retrospective Investigation of Coal-related Corruption to Promote the Purification of Political Ecology-Enlightenment of the Work of Promoting Reform through Cases in a Series of Coal-related Corruption Cases in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region” was published in the “China Discipline Inspection and Supervision News”. Du Xuejun was mentioned in the article. This is the first time that the official has confirmed that Du Xuejun has been dismissed. He is one of the 56 bureau-level cadres in the special action of “retrospective investigation of corruption in the coal field for 20 years”.

I don’t know Du Xuejun’s faction. But Du Xuejun was investigated. The party secretary of Inner Mongolia in 2021 was Shi Taifeng. The 20-year retrospective investigation is aimed at Xi Jinping, not Hu Chunhua. Shi Taifeng has now been confirmed to be Hu Jintao’s lackey. The 20-year retrospective investigation in Inner Mongolia is part of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s attempt to prevent Xi Jinping from being re-elected for three consecutive terms.

Let’s see if the 2021 Beidaihe meeting really exists and new evidence has been added. Those who say every day that the Beidaihe meeting did not exist are just big foreign propaganda.

On January 26, 2021, Bu Xiaolin, chairman of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Government, made a government work report at the opening ceremony of the regional people’s congress.

Suddenly fainted. On August 5, 2021, Bu Xiaolin, who had just turned 63, resigned from the post of chairman of the autonomous region government due to health reasons, and another Mongolian female cadre Wang Lixia took over as chairman of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

Wang Lixia is Zhao Leji’s henchman, and Bu Xiaolin is Xi Jinping’s henchman. Shi Taifeng traced back 20 years in Inner Mongolia and drove Xi Jinping’s henchman Bu Xiaolin out of Inner Mongolia.

From April 2021 to October 2021, 51-year-old Fei Dongbin served as deputy governor of Henan Province. The secretary of the Henan Provincial Party Committee at that time was Wang Guosheng (March 2018-May 2021). The governor of Henan was Wang Kai (April 2021-). Fei Dongbin and Wang Kai served as deputy governors of Henan at almost the same time, and the governor, Wang Kai, had to be arrested. Coincidentally, this time was just before the Beidaihe meeting in 2021.

When Fei Dongbin was the deputy governor of Henan, his chief secretary was Wei Xiaowei, the deputy secretary-general of the Henan Provincial Government. Wei Xiaowei was once Huang Qiang’s chief secretary. Huang Qiang and Zhang Qingwei are basically tied together. Zhang Qingwei is now visiting Belarus and meeting with Lukashenko. Didn’t Lukashenko just visit China?

Lukashenko and Xi Jinping agreed to ensure that storms and blizzards will not undermine the unity between countries
Storms and blizzards mean political storms in Russian. The title of the Belarusian official website means that even if a coup occurs in China, it will not affect the diplomatic relations between China and Belarus.

Let me summarize for everyone. Fei Dongbin was promoted by Lu Chunfang, the deputy minister of the Ministry of Railways. Lu Chunfang’s superior Guo Yunchong was Wu Bangguo’s secretary. Wu Bangguo was in charge of the Ministry of Railways during his tenure as vice premier. Ding Xuexiang, who was promoted by Wu Bangguo, and Ding Xuexiang and Wu Bangguo’s secretary Guo Yunchong are both from Nantong City, Jiangsu Province. Miao Hua is also from Nantong. Lu Chunfang built a station in Nagqu, Tibet.
Reti was once the secretary of the Naqu Prefectural Party Committee. When the station was built, Reti was the vice chairman of the National People’s Congress, and the chairman of the National People’s Congress was Wu Bangguo.
Fei Dongbin’s grandfather Fei Xiaotong was rumored to be a partner with Ulanhu. Ulanhu’s granddaughter Bu Xiaolin promoted Fei Dongbin.
Du Xuejun, the secretary of the municipal party committee during Fei Dongbin’s tenure as mayor, was arrested by Shi Taifeng.

Now Reti is dead, Wu Bangguo is dead, and Fei Dongbin is arrested. Is it Hu Chunhua who did it? I don’t know.

This netizen said,
Damn! I just watched a video. A host said that a relative of his wife had worked in Tibet and knew Hu Chunhua very well. Hu Chunhua had worked in Tibet for more than 20 years. He was murderous in his bones and was a person who would rebel!

My reply was,
I don’t know Hu Chunhua. Hu Chunhua has not officially entered the political stage yet. I have already felt that Hu Chunhua is murderous. I don’t know whether Hu Chunhua will directly arrange a Reti for Xi Jinping. Li Ka-shing was the first to realize it, Wang Jianlin was the last to realize it, Xu Jiayin was the last to realize it, and Xi Jinping was the first to realize it.

Okay, thank you all.

END

大家好
解放军第82集团军（原38集团军，驻河北保定，被称为“万岁军”，承担拱卫京畿重任）最近的公开表态引发广泛关注。5月28日，《解放军报》刊登了66172部队第80合成旅政治工作部主任赵治国撰写的文章，6月10日中部战区“忠诚号”理论宣讲服务队活动进一步释放信号。结合2025年5月29日政治局会议决策背景及军方高层变动，我们深入分析其背后的权力更替含义。

彭丽媛珠宝

第82集团军的背景与赵治国身份

第82集团军源于38集团军，历史悠久，曾在抗美援朝中立下战功，被视为解放军核心部队，驻守保定，负责北京及周边安全。赵治国作为第80合成旅政治工作部主任，隶属66172部队，其文章代表集团军层级的官方声音。文章高喊“对党忠诚”，却绝口不提习近平，这一选择耐人寻味。

文章信号的解读

赵治国的文章核心是“用实际行动诠释对党忠诚”，这篇文章打开的时候还404，不知道什么原因。强调履行党员义务、恪守纪律、发扬战斗精神、坚守岗位，引用历史事例（如刘志海、杨根思）及现代典型（如王忠心），提出“确保部队随时拉得出、冲得上、打得赢”，“不相信有完不成的任务，不相信有克服不了的困难，不相信有战胜不了的敌人”。然而，文章没有提及“习近平”或“习近平强军思想”，以往军方宣传中极为常见习近平，不见了。

“对党忠诚”而非“对习近平忠诚”：

传统上，军队表忠心多以个人领袖（尤其是习近平）为中心。赵治国回避习近平，聚焦“党”，可能暗示其效忠对象已非个人，而是中共集体领导或新权力核心。这并非偶然，而是精心选择。
而且暗含警告：

“拉得出、冲得上、打得赢”及“不信有战胜不了的敌人”，表面是战斗动员，实则可能暗指对习近平残余势力的警告。拱卫京畿的“万岁军”如果不姓“习”，其战斗力或指向内部清洗。5月29日政治局会议接连处理苗华和许其亮（军委委员+副主席），时间线完美吻合：赵某某5月31日发布许其亮消息，官方6月2日确认死亡（赵某某称5月28日去世），会议29日召开，决策高效。

中部战区信号的佐证

2025年6月10日，中部战区陆军“忠诚号”理论宣讲服务队开展巡回宣讲，形式为“小课精讲、班排互动、故事化表达”。宣传稿同样没有提习近平或习近平思想，与赵治国文章一致。这一中部战区层面的动向，强化了军队高层对习近平的集体疏远。中部战区控制第81、82集团军，拱卫北京，中部战区的集体沉默表明军权可能易手。结合苗华被开除党籍、何卫东出事，而军委副主席张又侠没有被波及，军权或已落入张又侠胡春华手中。2025年5月8日政法领导干部专题研讨班，武警副司令曹均章（中将，为胡锦涛、刘振立系）亮相1秒，司令缺席，或显示军权调整。

最新的消息是纪念陈云诞辰120周年座谈会。张又侠出席，并在主席台就坐。

中共中央举行纪念陈云同志诞辰120周年座谈会习近平发表重要讲话，习近平纪念他大爹了。
这陈云是习近平货真价实的政治干爹。习近平所有的人归根到底都是陈云提拔的。习近平本人也是陈云提拔的。1990年6月，习近平升任福州市委书记，1993年升任福建省委常委。副部级必须要一把手二把手点头才行。习近平就是陈云提拔的。这个会，比较重要，看点比较多，我专门给大家说一期。

张又侠出席，习近平就没戏。

我给大家开10个指标性人物，习近平如果大权在握就把这个10个人打包抓了，或者抓1个，就说明他大权在握。
退休常委，胡锦涛，李瑞环，温家宝，张德江。
现任常委，李强，赵乐际，李希。
现任军委，张又侠，刘振立，张升民。

习近平真牛的话，随便抓一个就行。胡锦涛都能把何卫东抓走，习近平如果牛的话，为什么不能张又侠？
天天让胡锦涛一个花圈接着一个花圈送， 习近平如果牛的，就不让胡锦涛送花圈，又能怎么着。说明习近平不行。

赵治国文章及中部战区宣讲的沉默，暗示习近平已经失去军队支持。5月29日会议果断处理两名军委高官，显示高层清洗加速。我们讨论的重点不在于许其亮是胡锦涛的人还是习近平的人，而在于追悼会级别及宣传由政治局会议决定，反映主持者权威。不管此人是谁（胡春华、汪洋、胡锦涛或习近平），展现“杀伐果断，完全控盘”的姿态。

张又侠的角色：张又侠未受牵连，可能接管军权。第82集团军和中部战区表态，或为其稳固地位铺路。谁给此人胆子？武警司令、中部战区司令、火箭军司令身份决定军权归属，此人手握枪杆子，方敢同时处理苗华和许其亮。很简单的问题：中部战区控制北京安全，此人“浑不吝”，底气十足。

“对党忠诚”的新指向：军队效忠可能转向集体领导（比如张又侠）或新领导人（传胡春华代理总书记），而非习近平个人。枪杆子掌握在一人手中，解释其果断决策。

彭丽媛珠宝

第82集团军的政治信号表明，拱卫京畿的“万岁军”已不再效忠习近平。这一转变与5月29日政治局会议有关，军方清洗习近平旧部，配合贸易谈判（如接受55%关税）调整内外政策。赵治国文章的“战斗精神”呼声，或是向习近平余党发出最后通牒。

从5月30日至6月8日，《解放军报》头版刊登八篇“明辨是非系列谈”，主题涵盖成长进步、利益得失、人情往来、战友情谊、情趣爱好、家风家教、手中权力及监督约束，另有谈忠诚的文章。

我们看，就是这个陆军第八十二集团军政治工作部发通知说，解放军报自5月30起，在一版重要位置推出《怎么正确对待成长进步》《怎么正确对待利益得失》《怎么正确对待人情往来》等8篇“明辨是非系列谈”署名评论，引导党员干部明辨是非问题，澄清模糊认识，自觉纠偏正向，让我们一起学习。

5月30日《怎么正确对待成长进步》指出“把职务提升作为唯一标准”“背靠大树好乘凉”“素质硬不如关系硬”，并批评选人用人的宗派主义、任人唯亲，影射整个中共官场腐败，尤其指向近期军队高官落马（如苗华）。5月31日《怎么正确对待利益得失》提及“孤芳自赏”与“登绝顶”，暗喻习近平“一尊”地位动摇及下台可能。6月1日《怎么正确对待人情往来》将受贿、卖官淡化为“人情”，定性落马者搞“小山头、小团体”，指向习近平亲信。6月2日《怎么正确对待战友情谊》提出“以上率下”净化交往圈，追责军队“违规、违纪之交”至军委主席。6月4日《怎么正确对待情趣爱好》揭“爱好”掩贪腐，6月5日《怎么正确对待家风家教》暗讽“封妻荫子”，似戳习近平家事。6月6日《怎么正确对待手中权力》称权力与金钱联姻，6月8日《怎么正确对待监督约束》直指“绝对权力导致绝对腐败”，暗示习近平不配领导。这些文章虽未点名，但语境指向高层。

八连评借官场弊端之名，实则批评习近平领导下的腐败与权力滥用。6月2日《擦亮革命军人的忠诚底色》仅提“对党忠诚”，抹去对习近平宣传，6月5日《水田插秧》呼“顺时而动，应时而为”，似提醒官员重新站队，好像1992年邓小平南巡后《为改革开放保驾护航》社论重现。6月10日、11日头版刊登民生与深圳改革意见，呼应改革派声音。我们看任正非的文章发表的第二天6月11日的人民日报头版头条刊登《中共中央办公厅国务院办公厅关于深入推进深圳综合改革试点深化改革创新扩大开放的意见》（2024年8月30日）。中办发的第二个决定，《深圳改革》由胡春华制定，去年2024年7月三中全会上，胡春华坐在习近平身边。胡春华曾经主政过广东深圳。如今由中国发改委副主任李春临介绍该文件，等于军队拿枪杆子支持胡春华的深圳改革决定。

八连评与传胡春华主持5月29日政治局会议决策呼应。会议开除军委委员苗华党籍、决定前军委副主席许其亮追悼会规格，时间线吻合：许其亮消息5月31日由“赵某某”发布，6月2日官方确认死亡（赵某某称5月28日）。不论许其亮背景如何（胡锦涛或习近平派系），决策者展现“杀伐果断，完全控盘”权威。枪杆子掌握在胡春华一人手中，武警副司令曹均章（传胡锦涛系）5月8日亮相，司令缺席，强化军权易手迹象。李春临的主子是谁？我不知道，仅提供可能性：李春临陕西出身，2008年挂职安康市市长助理，时任市长方玮峰是温家宝“徒孙”（中纪委马馼马仔），方玮峰曾任李建国（与李瑞环关系好）或宋洪武秘书，或有温家宝、李瑞环、李克强背景。

意义与展望

八连评信号表明，军队与高层对习近平失势形成共识，军报借评点官场弊端，实推翻其权威。新领导胡春华借反腐与改革调整政策。

好的，谢谢大家。

《原文链接》

英文翻译

Xi Jinping turns into a puppet mascot. The 82nd Army pledges allegiance to the new central government. The Eighth Company of the Army is rated as Hu Chunhua’s “Shenzhen Reform” escort

Hello everyone
The recent public statements of the 82nd Army of the People’s Liberation Army (formerly the 38th Army, stationed in Baoding, Hebei, known as the “Long Live Army”, responsible for the important task of defending the capital) have attracted widespread attention. On May 28, the “People’s Liberation Army Daily” published an article written by Zhao Zhiguo, director of the Political Work Department of the 80th Combined Brigade of the 66172th Unit. On June 10, the “Loyalty” Theory Propaganda Service Team of the Central Theater Command further released signals. Combined with the decision-making background of the Politburo meeting on May 29, 2025 and the changes in the military’s top leadership, we deeply analyze the meaning of the power change behind it.

The background of the 82nd Army and Zhao Zhiguo’s identity
The 82nd Army originated from the 38th Army and has a long history. It has made military achievements in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. It is regarded as the core force of the People’s Liberation Army. It is stationed in Baoding and is responsible for the security of Beijing and its surrounding areas. Zhao Zhiguo, as the director of the Political Work Department of the 80th Combined Brigade, is affiliated with the 66172th Unit. His article represents the official voice of the group army level. The article shouts “loyalty to the party”, but never mentions Xi Jinping. This choice is intriguing.

Interpretation of the article signal
The core of Zhao Zhiguo’s article is “interpreting loyalty to the party with practical actions”. When the article was opened, it was still 404. I don’t know why. It emphasizes fulfilling the obligations of party members, abiding by discipline, carrying forward the fighting spirit, and sticking to the post. It cites historical examples (such as Liu Zhihai and Yang Gensi) and modern models (such as Wang Zhongxin), and proposes “ensuring that the troops can be pulled out, rushed up, and won at any time”, “do not believe that there are unfinished tasks, do not believe that there are difficulties that cannot be overcome, and do not believe that there are enemies that cannot be defeated”. However, the article does not mention “Xi Jinping” or “Xi Jinping’s Thought on Strengthening the Army”. Xi Jinping was very common in the military propaganda in the past, but he is gone.

“Loyalty to the party” instead of “loyalty to Xi Jinping”:
Traditionally, the military’s loyalty is centered on individual leaders (especially Xi Jinping). Zhao Zhiguo avoided Xi Jinping and focused on the “Party”, which may imply that his loyalty is no longer to an individual, but to the collective leadership of the Communist Party of China or the new power core. This is not accidental, but a careful choice.
And it implies a warning:

“We can pull out, rush up, and win” and “I don’t believe there is an enemy that cannot be defeated” are combat mobilizations on the surface, but in fact they may imply a warning to Xi Jinping’s remaining forces. If the “Long Live Army” guarding the capital is not named “Xi”, its combat effectiveness may point to internal cleansing. On May 29, the Politburo meeting dealt with Miao Hua and Xu Qiliang (member of the Military Commission + Vice Chairman) in succession, and the timeline was perfectly matched: Zhao Moumou released the news of Xu Qiliang on May 31, and the official confirmed his death on June 2 (Zhao Moumou said he died on May 28), and the meeting was held on the 29th, and the decision was efficient.

Evidence of the signal of the Central Theater Command
On June 10, 2025, the Central Theater Command Army’s “Loyalty” Theory Propaganda Service Team carried out a tour of propaganda in the form of “small class lectures, class interaction, and storytelling expression.” The propaganda draft also did not mention Xi Jinping or Xi Jinping Thought, which is consistent with Zhao Zhiguo’s article. This trend at the Central Theater Command level has strengthened the collective alienation of the military’s top brass from Xi Jinping. The Central Theater Command controls the 81st and 82nd Group Armies to protect Beijing. The collective silence of the Central Theater Command indicates that military power may change hands. Combined with Miao Hua’s expulsion from the party and He Weidong’s incident, while Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of the Military Commission, was not affected, military power may have fallen into the hands of Zhang Youxia and Hu Chunhua. At the special seminar for political and legal leading cadres on May 8, 2025, Cao Junzhang (lieutenant general, from Hu Jintao and Liu Zhenli) appeared for 1 second at the Armed Police Deputy Commander, and the commander was absent, which may indicate a military power adjustment.

The latest news is the symposium commemorating the 120th anniversary of Chen Yun’s birth. Zhang Youxia attended and sat on the rostrum.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held a symposium to commemorate the 120th anniversary of Comrade Chen Yun’s birth. Xi Jinping delivered an important speech. Xi Jinping commemorated his big daddy .
This Chen Yun is Xi Jinping’s real political godfather. All of Xi Jinping’s people were promoted by Chen Yun. Xi Jinping himself was also promoted by Chen Yun. In June 1990, Xi Jinping was promoted to the Secretary of the Fuzhou Municipal Party Committee, and in 1993 he was promoted to the Standing Committee of the Fujian Provincial Party Committee. Deputy ministerial level positions must be approved by the top or second-in-command. Xi Jinping was promoted by Chen Yun. This meeting is quite important and has many highlights. I will tell you about it in a special issue.

If Zhang Youxia attends, Xi Jinping will have no chance.

I will give you 10 indicator figures. If Xi Jinping holds power, he will arrest these 10 people in a package, or arrest one of them, which means he holds power.
Retired Standing Committee members: Hu Jintao, Li Ruihuan, Wen Jiabao, Zhang Dejiang.
Current Standing Committee members: Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Li Xi.
Current Military Commission members: Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, Zhang Shengmin.

If Xi Jinping is really powerful, he can just arrest any one of them. Hu Jintao can arrest He Weidong. If Xi Jinping is powerful, why can’t he arrest Zhang Youxia?
Every day, Hu Jintao was asked to send wreaths one after another. If Xi Jinping was powerful, what would happen if he didn’t let Hu Jintao send wreaths? It shows that Xi Jinping is not good enough.

Zhao Zhiguo’s article and the silence of the Central Theater Command’s propaganda imply that Xi Jinping has lost the support of the army. The decisive handling of two senior CMC officials at the meeting on May 29 showed that the high-level purge was accelerating. The focus of our discussion is not whether Xu Qiliang is Hu Jintao’s or Xi Jinping’s people, but that the level and publicity of the memorial service were decided by the Politburo meeting, reflecting the authority of the host. No matter who this person is (Hu Chunhua, Wang Yang, Hu Jintao or Xi Jinping), he showed a “decisive killing and complete control” attitude.

Zhang Youxia’s role: Zhang Youxia was not implicated and may take over the military power. The statements of the 82nd Group Army and the Central Theater Command may pave the way for him to consolidate his position. Who gave this person the courage? The identities of the commander of the armed police, the commander of the Central Theater Command, and the commander of the Rocket Force determine the ownership of the military power. This person holds the gun, so he dares to deal with Miao Hua and Xu Qiliang at the same time. It’s a very simple question: the Central Theater controls Beijing’s security, and this person is “unsparing” and full of confidence.

The new direction of “loyalty to the party”: the army’s loyalty may shift to collective leadership (such as Zhang Youxia) or new leaders (Hu Chunhua is rumored to be acting general secretary), rather than Xi Jinping personally. The gun is in the hands of one person, explaining his decisive decision.

The political signal of the 82nd Army Group shows that the “Long Live Army” guarding the capital is no longer loyal to Xi Jinping. This change is related to the Politburo meeting on May 29, when the military purged Xi Jinping’s old subordinates and adjusted domestic and foreign policies in conjunction with trade negotiations (such as accepting a 55% tariff). The call for “fighting spirit” in Zhao Zhiguo’s article may be an ultimatum to Xi Jinping’s remnants.

From May 30 to June 8, the front page of the “People’s Liberation Army Daily” published eight “Distinguishing Right from Wrong Series Talks”, covering topics such as growth and progress, gains and losses, personal relationships, comradeship, hobbies, family style and education, power in hand and supervision and restraint, and another article on loyalty.

Let’s see, it was the Political Work Department of the 82nd Army Group that issued a notice saying that since May 30, the People’s Liberation Army Daily has launched eight signed comments in the “Distinguishing Right from Wrong Series” such as “How to Correctly Treat Growth and Progress”, “How to Correctly Treat Gains and Losses of Interests”, and “How to Correctly Treat Interpersonal Relationships” in an important position on the first page, guiding party members and cadres to distinguish right from wrong, clarify vague understandings, and consciously correct deviations. Let us learn together.

On May 30, “How to Correctly Treat Growth and Progress” pointed out that “promotion of position is the only standard”, “it is better to lean on a big tree to enjoy the shade”, and “strong quality is not as good as strong relationship”, and criticized the sectarianism and nepotism in selecting and employing people, alluding to the corruption of the entire CCP officialdom, especially pointing to the recent fall of senior military officials (such as Miao Hua). On May 31, “How to Correctly Treat Gains and Losses of Interests” mentioned “self-admiration” and “reaching the top”, implying that Xi Jinping’s “one man” status was shaken and he might step down. On June 1, “How to Treat Personal Relationships Correctly” downplayed bribery and selling official positions as “personal relationships”, and characterized those who were dismissed as “small groups and small groups”, pointing to Xi Jinping’s cronies. On June 2, “How to Treat Comrades’ Friendship Correctly” proposed “leading by example” to purify the social circle, and held the military “violations of rules and disciplines” accountable to the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. On June 4, “How to Treat Hobbies Correctly” revealed that “hobbies” covered up corruption, and on June 5, “How to Treat Family Style and Family Education Correctly” implied “conferring wives and children”, which seemed to poke at Xi Jinping’s family affairs. On June 6, “How to Treat Power Correctly” said that power and money are married, and on June 8, “How to Treat Supervision and Restraint Correctly” directly pointed out that “absolute power leads to absolute corruption”, implying that Xi Jinping is not worthy of leadership. Although these articles did not name names, the context pointed to the top.

The Eighth Commentary borrowed the name of official malpractices to criticize corruption and abuse of power under Xi Jinping’s leadership. On June 2, “Polishing the Loyalty of Revolutionary Soldiers” only mentioned “loyalty to the party” and erased the propaganda about Xi Jinping. On June 5, “Planting Rice in Paddy Fields” called for “moving with the times and responding to the times”, which seemed to remind officials to re-align themselves, as if the editorial “Escorting Reform and Opening Up” after Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992 reappeared. On June 10 and 11, the front page published opinions on people’s livelihood and Shenzhen reform, echoing the voice of the reformists. Let’s look at the front page headline of the People’s Daily on June 11, the second day after Ren Zhengfei’s article was published, which published “Opinions of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council on Deepening the Shenzhen Comprehensive Reform Pilot, Deepening Reform, Innovation and Expanding Opening Up” (August 30, 2024). The second decision issued by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee, “Shenzhen Reform”, was formulated by Hu Chunhua, who sat next to Xi Jinping at the Third Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee in July 2024 last year. Hu Chunhua once governed Shenzhen, Guangdong. Now that Li Chunlin, deputy director of the National Development and Reform Commission of China, introduced the document, it is equivalent to the army using guns to support Hu Chunhua’s Shenzhen reform decision.

The eight consecutive comments echoed the decision made by Hu Chunhua at the Politburo meeting on May 29. The meeting expelled CMC member Miao Hua from the party and decided on the specifications of the memorial service for former CMC Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang. The timeline matched: Xu Qiliang’s news was released by “Zhao XX” on May 31, and his death was officially confirmed on June 2 (Zhao XX said it was May 28). Regardless of Xu Qiliang’s background (Hu Jintao or Xi Jinping’s faction), the decision-maker showed the authority of “decisive killing and complete control”. The gun is in the hands of Hu Chunhua alone. Deputy Commander of the Armed Police Cao Junzhang (rumored to be from Hu Jintao’s faction) appeared on May 8, and the commander was absent, which strengthened the signs of a change of military power. Who is Li Chunlin’s master? I don’t know, I can only offer a possibility: Li Chunlin was born in Shaanxi Province, and was appointed as the assistant mayor of Ankang in 2008. The then mayor Fang Weifeng was Wen Jiabao’s “disciple” (Ma Yan’s henchman of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection). Fang Weifeng had served as the secretary of Li Jianguo (who had a good relationship with Li Ruihuan) or Song Hongwu, or had a background in Wen Jiabao, Li Ruihuan, and Li Keqiang.

Significance and Prospects

The signal of the eight consecutive comments shows that the military and the top leaders have reached a consensus on Xi Jinping’s loss of power. The military newspaper used the comments to point out the malpractices of the officialdom to overthrow his authority. The new leader Hu Chunhua used anti-corruption and reform to adjust policies.

OK, thank you all.

END

大家好，
2025年6月6日晚7点，中央军委副主席张又侠亲自带队，穿戎装、腰佩短枪，率领全副武装的军人在北京六环内展开12小时巡逻。长安街、钓鱼台、中南海周边布满官兵，每个岗哨枪上膛，每个交叉口全封死。这不仅是一次军事巡防，更是张又侠对习近平发出的清晰权力信号：军权已牢牢掌握在其手中。

我看到一段真的笑了。这是谁写的，太唐了，是没有梗了吗？这是写给三岁小孩看的吗？就是不用枪的人是不是觉得非要拿枪顶着脑袋，才能发挥最大的威力。不然觉得不爽。

就是在井冈山那个时期，林彪缴获了一支手枪很漂亮，他就想送给毛泽东。但是毛泽东说，当我要用上枪的时候，红军就完蛋了。张又侠他爸，张宗逊就是毛泽东的警卫。当时解放军有70个军，张宗逊就是第1军。可见张宗逊在毛泽东心中的地位。

张又侠都75岁，张又侠一个军委副主席，都在亲自巡逻。他疯了吗？这都是纯粹写给痴呆看的故事。

张又侠的巡逻影片被悄悄送至习近平面前。习近平看完后，仅低声说了一句：“他比我大三岁，身体却比我好30岁，我完了。”这句话不仅反映了习近平对自身健康状况的无奈，也暴露了他对权力丧失的绝望。75岁的张又侠“一身腱子肉，坐如钟、动如风”，与传闻中风、站不稳、靠化妆撑场面的72岁习近平形成鲜明对比。

这个小编太二了，真的。

俄罗斯对外情报局6月9日提交给克里姆林宫的内部简报显示，习近平于5月25日至26日夜间突发心脏病，6月第一周又连续病发两次。医生评估，如果习近平继续高强度公开露面，可能“现场出事”。这一健康危机迫使习近平大幅减少公开活动，依靠短片剪辑与摆拍维持形象。军方故意放出习近平病重的消息，意在制造舆论前提，逼迫其让位。

这不是真正的俄罗斯对外情报局而是一个电报频道，天天瞎掰。习近平这不是刚去参加热地葬礼吗？天天就是参加葬礼。前两天刚参加许其亮的葬礼。

习近平身体不好， 这是肉眼可见的，但是这都能实时监测习近平的心电图，那也够神的。台湾医生在脸书PO文表示，最近要密切观察习近平的身体健康状况，以及中共高层权力变化。

习近平从2017年之后，脚步移动的画面常会被央视切掉；从2019年后，习近平步伐出现小碎步，左脚可用力支撑，但右脚较难施力，健康情况有不可逆的趋势。

2024年8月习近平出席越共总书记阮富仲丧礼后曾隐身3个礼拜，被质疑健康出现问题。

2024年访问法国时习近平行走前步伐不稳，在公开3方会谈中，有别于其他人的透明水杯，习近平使用的是黑色且不透明的饮用杯，且后方翻译员备有轮椅；而5月8日接受媒体访问时，习近平在短短9秒内，颈部不自然地歪斜并调整回正3次，身体疑似抱恙。

关于习近平是否在2027年攻打台湾一直备受国际关注。 近日，美国空军智库“中国航空航天研究所”（China Aerospace Studies Institute，CASI）的报告指出，中共军方无法贯彻2027年夺取台湾所需战力的关键军事改革，并引述中共军委副主席张又侠去年刊出的一篇专文，军方无法在2027年按照习近平的要求，做好攻打台湾的准备。有分析指出，张又侠等于公开的否定习近平2027年武统台湾的计划。

这份美军公布的报告显示，中共军方内部面临重重问题、改革进度严重落后，与习近平备战要求存在不小落差。这份报告指，张又侠2024在人民日报发表文章，指出了中共军方诸多不足之处，军方领导层的弱点、战时军民协调的问题，以及无法执行大规模联合作战的缺失。张又侠判断，按照目前的发展趋势，中共军方很难在2027年前具备足够能力，对台湾发动武力攻击。

1950年，毛泽东坚持派兵抗美援朝，纯粹出于帝王统治和个人权力的考虑， 目的是通过韩战， 借刀杀人，有效消耗投降中共的原国民党军队的力量。首先我们不去说，毛泽东要借助韩战消灭国民党投降的军队，这个是不是完全符合历史。但是起码是符合逻辑的。

习近平攻打台湾说，最大的自相矛盾是什么

习近平攻打台湾说，最大的自相矛盾是在什么地方呢？所谓的攻台主力31军，现在叫做73军，恰恰是习近平的嫡系部队。

习近平的嫡系部队是31集团军（2017年后改编为73集团军），驻扎福建厦门，长期被视为“对台一线部队”，装备两栖坦克，具有攻台作战的训练和经验。 然而，31军作为习近平的政治本钱，其重要性不言而喻。派31军攻台，等于让自己的核心力量冒“被团灭”的风险，这不符合逻辑。习近平如果真的有攻台的意图，更可能选择非嫡系部队，如江泽民的嫡系16集团军（现78集团军），以“借刀杀人”，削弱政敌势力，同时保存自身力量。

16集团军（现78集团军）驻扎东北哈尔滨，历史上与江泽民派系关系密切（比如徐才厚在16军任职7年）。 但是16军不具备两栖作战能力，缺乏两栖坦克和相关训练，难以胜任攻台任务。相比之下，31军因地理位置在福建和装备两栖坦克的优势，才是攻台的理论主力。这形成逻辑悖论：如果习近平真要攻台，理应选择31军，但这等于让自己嫡系部队去“送死”，不符合习近平的政治利益；如果选择16军，则能力不足而不可行。

胡锦涛军事政变成功之后，干的第一件事情就是“团灭”31军出身的高级军官，团灭习近平的嫡系力量。习近平的31军已经被胡锦涛重创，进一步降低31军攻台的可能性。胡锦涛还没有发军事政变之前，习近平如果在政变前主动让31军“送死”，更是不可理喻的政治失策。这进一步证明，攻台计划不现实，习近平不会牺牲自己的核心部队。

既然攻台不现实，为何习近平还要宣传攻台？逻辑上，这更像是政治策略，而非真实的军事意图。宣传攻台可提升31军的政治地位，进而巩固习近平在军内和国内的权威。31军作为“对台一线部队”，其曝光度高，象征意义强，通过渲染攻台威胁，习近平可以增强自身政治资本，同时对外展示强硬姿态，对内凝聚民族主义情绪。这种虚假宣传无需真打仗，就能达到政治效果。

综合以上逻辑，习近平攻台说自相矛盾。如果真要攻台，习近平不会用嫡系31军冒险“送死”，而非嫡系16军又不具备两栖作战能力，实际操作不可行。胡锦涛“‘团灭’31军”之后，更是进一步削弱攻台的可能性。攻台宣传更可能是习近平为提升政治地位、巩固军内控制的手段，而非真实战略意图。即便习近平掌握大权，也会优先用胡锦涛或江泽民的嫡系部队（比如16军）“借刀杀人”，而非牺牲自己的嫡系31军。因此，攻台说是一个彻头彻尾的骗局，逻辑上站不住脚。

这名网友说，
习近平下周出访哈萨克斯坦。
大包兄评论一下包子即将出访哈萨克呗。
包子刚说要去出访中亚…软禁的传闻又被打破了。

硬禁，监禁都要放风呢，别说软禁了。
哈萨克斯坦是我们可以控制的。
大包兄请分析一下包子出访哈萨克斯坦 谢谢。

习近平应该趁机带着彭丽媛习明泽齐心一家子去哈萨克斯坦政治避难，不行就去俄爹找普京政治避难。不然可就没机会了。不过彭丽媛一直被边控，可能没有机会出国。

这名网友说，
关注一下黄之风可能被求刑无期，这件事背后的意义。

美国国务院强烈谴责香港当局对知名民主活动人士黄之锋(Joshua Wong)提出新的国安指控，称这一举动是“对香港未来的悲剧性攻击”，意图进一步打压异议声音，并显示北京无意履行对香港的承诺。

一名国务院发言人在星期六(2025年6月7日)说：“美国强烈谴责香港当局2025年6月6日宣布对黄之锋提出的新指控，这可能使他面临终身监禁。”

发言人指出，黄之锋长期以来一直为捍卫香港居民应有的自由与权利而奋斗，这些自由是北京在1997年主权移交时向香港人民承诺的并且得到香港法律的保证。

国务院发言人还说：“黄之锋已经依据模糊的国家安全指控而遭到不公正的判决，这仅仅是因为他参与了和平的政治活动，而根据北京在《中英联合声明》中做出的国际承诺，这种活动本应得到尊重。”

美国国务院的这份声明说：“我们呼吁北京和香港官员停止使用虚假的国家安全法来针对香港人，释放所有政治犯，并撤销对黄之锋的这些令人愤慨的指控。”

黄之锋当地时间6月7日下午被从赤柱监狱押解至西九龙裁判法院提堂，首次面对《香港国安法》下“串谋勾结外国或者境外势力危害国家安全”罪名的正式指控。案件仅审理三分钟后由指定国安法法官、总裁判官苏惠德(So Wai-tak)裁定押后至2025年8月8日再讯。法院未要求黄之锋答辩。

根据起诉书，黄之锋被指在2020年7月至11月期间，与已流亡的前立法会议员罗冠聪(Nathan Law)及其他身份不明人士串谋，要求外国或境外组织对中国和香港实施制裁、封锁或其他敌对行为，严重干扰中国及香港的政策执行。控罪一旦成立，最高可判处终身监禁。

黄之锋已在狱中服刑逾四年，目前正为与“初选案”相关的多项控罪服刑，原定出狱日期为2027年。此次新控罪使他未来刑期可能大幅延长。

国际特赦组织(Amnesty International)中国事务总监白舒然(Sarah Brooks)在该组织的网站上发表的声明中指出，当局对黄之锋的这一最新指控“突显当局对异议人士的恐惧，也显示当局不惜一切手段，务求将这些人士长期关押，以持续打压香港的公民行动和社会参与。” 她呼吁“香港政府应该撤销这些指控，并立即停止执行《国安法》–这正是联合国相关机构多次呼吁的要求。所有因行使基本人权而被监禁的人士都应立即获释。”

《原文链接》

英文翻译

It is said that Xi Jinping has sought political asylum in Kazakhstan, and his family has immigrated. Zhang Youxia is very busy, patrolling Beijing at night and denying Xi Jinping. Huang Zhifeng is innocent, this is the CCP’s tyranny trampling on human rights

Hello everyone,
At 7 pm on June 6, 2025, Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, personally led a team, wearing military uniforms and a pistol on his waist, and led fully armed soldiers to conduct a 12-hour patrol within the Sixth Ring Road of Beijing. Chang’an Avenue, Diaoyutai, and Zhongnanhai are full of officers and soldiers. Every sentry gun is loaded and every intersection is blocked. This is not only a military patrol, but also a clear signal of power sent by Zhang Youxia to Xi Jinping: military power is firmly in his hands.

I really laughed when I saw a paragraph. Who wrote this? It’s too Tang. Is there no stalk? Is this written for three-year-old children? People who don’t use guns think that they have to hold guns against their heads to exert the greatest power. Otherwise, they feel uncomfortable.

It was during the Jinggangshan period that Lin Biao seized a beautiful pistol and wanted to give it to Mao Zedong. But Mao Zedong said that when I want to use the gun, the Red Army will be finished. Zhang Youxia’s father, Zhang Zongsun, was Mao Zedong’s guard. At that time, the People’s Liberation Army had 70 armies, and Zhang Zongsun was the 1st Army. It can be seen that Zhang Zongsun had a status in Mao Zedong’s heart.

Zhang Youxia is 75 years old, and Zhang Youxia, a vice chairman of the Military Commission, is patrolling in person. Is he crazy? These are all stories written purely for dementia.

Zhang Youxia’s patrol video was quietly sent to Xi Jinping. After watching it, Xi Jinping only whispered: “He is three years older than me, but his health is 30 years better than mine. I’m done.” This sentence not only reflects Xi Jinping’s helplessness about his own health, but also exposes his despair of losing power. The 75-year-old Zhang Youxia “has a body of tendons, sits like a bell, and moves like the wind”, which is in sharp contrast to the 72-year-old Xi Jinping who is rumored to have a stroke, can’t stand steadily, and relies on makeup to support the scene.

This editor is too stupid, really.

According to an internal briefing submitted by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service to the Kremlin on June 9, Xi Jinping suffered a heart attack on the night of May 25-26, and suffered two consecutive heart attacks in the first week of June. Doctors assessed that if Xi Jinping continued to make high-intensity public appearances, he might “get into trouble on the spot.” This health crisis forced Xi Jinping to significantly reduce his public activities and rely on short video editing and posing to maintain his image. The military deliberately released the news that Xi Jinping was seriously ill in order to create a public opinion premise and force him to give up his position.

This is not the real Russian Foreign Intelligence Service but a telegram channel, which talks nonsense every day. Didn’t Xi Jinping just go to the funeral in Redi? He attends funerals every day. He just attended Xu Qiliang’s funeral two days ago.

Xi Jinping is in poor health, which is visible to the naked eye, but it is amazing that this can monitor Xi Jinping’s electrocardiogram in real time. A Taiwanese doctor posted on Facebook that he would closely observe Xi Jinping’s physical health and the power changes at the top of the Chinese Communist Party recently.

Since 2017, CCTV has often cut off the footage of Xi Jinping’s footsteps. Since 2019, Xi Jinping’s steps have become small and broken. His left foot can support him, but his right foot is more difficult to exert force. His health condition has an irreversible trend.

In August 2024, Xi Jinping attended the funeral of Nguyen Phu Trong, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, and disappeared for three weeks, which was suspected to be a health problem.

When visiting France in 2024, Xi Jinping’s steps were unstable before walking. In the public trilateral talks, Xi Jinping used a black and opaque drinking cup, which was different from the transparent water cups of others, and the translator behind him had a wheelchair. When he was interviewed by the media on May 8, Xi Jinping’s neck tilted unnaturally and adjusted back to the right three times in just 9 seconds, and he seemed to be ill.

Whether Xi Jinping will attack Taiwan in 2027 has always attracted international attention. Recently, a report by the China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), a US Air Force think tank, pointed out that the Chinese military was unable to implement the key military reforms needed to seize the combat power needed for Taiwan in 2027, and quoted an article published by Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission, last year, that the military could not prepare to attack Taiwan in 2027 as required by Xi Jinping. Some analysts pointed out that Zhang Youxia was equivalent to publicly denying Xi Jinping’s plan to unify Taiwan by force in 2027.

This report released by the US military shows that the Chinese military faces many problems and the reform progress is seriously lagging behind, which is quite different from Xi Jinping’s requirements for preparations for war. The report pointed out that Zhang Youxia published an article in the People’s Daily in 2024, pointing out many shortcomings of the Chinese military, the weaknesses of the military leadership, the problems of military-civilian coordination in wartime, and the lack of ability to carry out large-scale joint operations. Zhang Youxia judged that according to the current development trend, it would be difficult for the Chinese military to have sufficient capabilities to launch a military attack on Taiwan before 2027.

In 1950, Mao Zedong insisted on sending troops to resist the US and aid Korea purely out of considerations of imperial rule and personal power. The purpose was to use the Korean War to kill with a borrowed knife and effectively consume the power of the former Kuomintang army that surrendered to the CCP. First of all, let’s not talk about whether Mao Zedong wanted to use the Korean War to eliminate the surrendered Kuomintang army. This is completely in line with history. But at least it is logical.

What is the biggest contradiction in Xi Jinping’s attack on Taiwan?

Where is the biggest contradiction in Xi Jinping’s attack on Taiwan? The so-called main force of the 31st Army, now called the 73rd Army, is exactly Xi Jinping’s direct troops.

Xi Jinping’s direct troops are the 31st Group Army (reorganized as the 73rd Group Army after 2017), stationed in Xiamen, Fujian, and have long been regarded as the “front-line troops against Taiwan”. They are equipped with amphibious tanks and have training and experience in attacking Taiwan. However, as Xi Jinping’s political capital, the importance of the 31st Army is self-evident. Sending the 31st Army to attack Taiwan is equivalent to letting his core forces risk “being wiped out”, which is illogical. If Xi Jinping really intends to attack Taiwan, he is more likely to choose non-direct troops, such as Jiang Zemin’s direct 16th Group Army (now 78th Group Army), to “kill with a borrowed knife”, weaken the power of political enemies, and preserve his own strength.

The 16th Group Army (now 78th Group Army) is stationed in Harbin, Northeast China, and has historically had close ties with Jiang Zemin’s faction (for example, Xu Caihou served in the 16th Army for 7 years). However, the 16th Army does not have amphibious combat capabilities, lacks amphibious tanks and related training, and is difficult to be competent for the task of attacking Taiwan. In contrast, the 31st Army is the theoretical main force for attacking Taiwan because of its geographical location in Fujian and the advantages of being equipped with amphibious tanks. This forms a logical paradox: If Xi Jinping really wants to attack Taiwan, he should choose the 31st Army, but this is equivalent to letting his direct troops “send themselves to death”, which is not in line with Xi Jinping’s political interests; if he chooses the 16th Army, it is not feasible because of its lack of ability.

After Hu Jintao’s successful military coup, the first thing he did was to “annihilate” the senior officers from the 31st Army and wipe out Xi Jinping’s direct forces. Xi Jinping’s 31st Army has been severely damaged by Hu Jintao, further reducing the possibility of the 31st Army attacking Taiwan. Before Hu Jintao launched a military coup, if Xi Jinping took the initiative to let the 31st Army “die” before the coup, it would be an unreasonable political mistake. This further proves that the plan to attack Taiwan is unrealistic and Xi Jinping will not sacrifice his core troops.

Since attacking Taiwan is unrealistic, why does Xi Jinping still promote the attack on Taiwan? Logically, this is more like a political strategy than a real military intention. Promoting the attack on Taiwan can enhance the political status of the 31st Army and consolidate Xi Jinping’s authority in the military and the country. As a “front-line force against Taiwan”, the 31st Army has high exposure and strong symbolic significance. By exaggerating the threat of attacking Taiwan, Xi Jinping can enhance his own political capital, show a tough attitude to the outside world, and gather nationalist sentiments at home. This kind of false propaganda can achieve political effects without a real war.

Based on the above logic, Xi Jinping’s attack on Taiwan is self-contradictory. If he really wants to attack Taiwan, Xi Jinping will not use the direct 31st Army to risk “die”, and the non-direct 16th Army does not have amphibious combat capabilities, so it is not feasible in actual operation. After Hu Jintao “annihilated the 31st Army”, the possibility of attacking Taiwan was further weakened. The propaganda of attacking Taiwan is more likely to be a means for Xi Jinping to enhance his political status and consolidate his control over the military, rather than a real strategic intention. Even if Xi Jinping holds power, he will give priority to using Hu Jintao or Jiang Zemin’s direct troops (such as the 16th Army) to “kill with a borrowed knife” rather than sacrificing his own direct 31st Army. Therefore, the attack on Taiwan is a complete scam and logically untenable.

This netizen said,
Xi Jinping will visit Kazakhstan next week.
Brother Dabao, please comment on Baozi’s upcoming visit to Kazakhstan.
Baozi just said that he was going to visit Central Asia…The rumors of house arrest have been broken again.

Hard confinement and imprisonment need to be released, let alone house arrest.
Kazakhstan is something we can control.
Brother Dabao, please analyze Baozi’s visit to Kazakhstan, thank you.

Xi Jinping should take the opportunity to take Peng Liyuan, Xi Mingze, and Qi Xin to Kazakhstan for political asylum. If not, he should seek political asylum from Putin in Russia. Otherwise, there will be no chance. However, Peng Liyuan has been under border control and may not have the opportunity to go abroad.

The netizen said,
Pay attention to the fact that Joshua Wong may be sentenced to life imprisonment. The meaning behind this matter.

The U.S. State Department strongly condemned the Hong Kong authorities for filing new national security charges against well-known democracy activist Joshua Wong, calling the move a “tragic attack on Hong Kong’s future” intended to further suppress dissenting voices and show that Beijing has no intention of fulfilling its commitments to Hong Kong.

A State Department spokesperson said on Saturday (June 7, 2025): “The United States strongly condemns the new charges against Joshua Wong announced by the Hong Kong authorities on June 6, 2025, which may put him in prison for life.”

The spokesperson pointed out that Joshua Wong has long fought to defend the freedoms and rights that Hong Kong residents deserve, which are promised to the people of Hong Kong by Beijing when sovereignty was transferred in 1997 and guaranteed by Hong Kong law.

The State Department spokesperson also said: “Joshua Wong has been unfairly sentenced on vague national security charges simply because he participated in peaceful political activities that should have been respected under Beijing’s international commitments in the Sino-British Joint Declaration.”

The U.S. State Department statement said: “We call on Beijing and Hong Kong officials to stop using the fake national security law to target Hong Kong people, release all political prisoners, and drop these outrageous charges against Joshua Wong.”

Joshua Wong was escorted from Stanley Prison to the West Kowloon Magistrates’ Courts on the afternoon of June 7 local time, facing the formal charge of “conspiracy to collude with a foreign or external force to endanger national security” under the Hong Kong National Security Law for the first time. After only three minutes of trial, the case was adjourned to August 8, 2025 by the designated national security law judge, Chief Magistrate So Wai-tak. The court did not require Joshua Wong to plead.

According to the indictment, Joshua Wong was accused of conspiring with exiled former Legislative Council member Nathan Law and other unidentified persons between July and November 2020 to ask foreign countries or overseas organizations to impose sanctions, blockades or other hostile actions on China and Hong Kong, seriously interfering with the implementation of China and Hong Kong policies. If the charges are proven, the maximum sentence is life imprisonment.

Joshua Wong has served more than four years in prison and is currently serving a number of charges related to the “primary election case”. His original release date was 2027. This new charge may significantly extend his future sentence.

Sarah Brooks, Amnesty International’s China director, said in a statement on the organization’s website that the latest charges against Wong “underscore the authorities’ fear of dissidents and their willingness to keep these individuals in detention for a long time in a continued crackdown on civic action and social participation in Hong Kong.” She called on “the Hong Kong government to drop these charges and immediately stop enforcing the National Security Law – something that relevant UN agencies have repeatedly called for. All those imprisoned for exercising their fundamental human rights should be released immediately.”

END

大家好， 这名网友说，
要是汪洋总书记你敢直播打自己十巴掌吗？
我的回复是，
哈哈，你这评论真是把我笑喷了，太幼稚了吧。如果汪洋真接了总书记，我愿意公开道歉给你看。可我为什么要打自己十巴掌啊？我都这年纪了，还会被你这小孩子般的激将法给激到？实在太可笑了，太幼稚了。难不成我要反过来问你，胡春华当总书记，你敢直播打自己十巴掌？咱们素不相识、无冤无仇，我赚你这十巴掌有啥意义啊？这摆明了就是为了搞节目效果嘛。

我只是追求准确，又不可能百分百准确，我也不是算命的。

我跟你说，不管是胡春华当总书记，还是汪洋上位，甚至习近平继续干，或者丁薛祥、陈吉宁接班，跟我有毛关系啊？我不是站队胡春华。我只希望共产党赶紧倒台。这不是站队，这是我对政治的分析，我判断今年就会发生的事，可能就几个月，甚至这个月。马上可以见分晓。

昨天我忘說一句，汪洋19大入常了，為什麼汪洋要刪除19大精神？這不是自我打臉嗎？誰19大沒有入常？还有一个没说，介绍《深圳改革》的发改委副主任李春临的派系，就能看出来是谁决定的

我把5月29日的政治局会议，再给大家，说一下，说过的只说干货不再重复，没有说过的再补充一下。5月29日的政治局会议，我们目前已知的，至少通过8个项议程。刚好分成四个方面一是军队，胡春华代理军委主席。二是中办发两个文件，侧面证明胡春华代理总书记。三是会议涉及两项人事任命，中组部石泰峰是和胡春华有交集还是和汪洋有交集，这个很明显。四是其他，中纪委处理朱芝松，此外，美中贸易谈判这么重大的事项，应该也是政治局会议批准的。

首先就是苗华被开除党籍，苗华被从中国国防部的网站撤下，已经不再是中央军委委员。根据专业人事的解读，就是苗华被开除党籍。而媒体报道5月29日，中国国防部网站，还有苗华的信息，还在，因此，我们推测就是5月29日的政治局会议，胡春华决定给苗华开除党籍。

这名网友说，
始终不太相信许其亮是习派人马，胡锦涛再自信，总要给自己那派留一个军委副主席的，只有主席和副主席才能提拔少将的。
就是胡锦涛指定了个没有背景的许其亮，然后许其亮臣服习了。
许其亮没有背景还能当上将？
听说过三姓家奴没有？
我的回复是，这名网友说得对，许其亮没有背景还能当上将？已经人脸比对过了，许乐夫就是许其亮的爸爸，父子两个人即便是长得像的，人脸相似度也就是45%。

不管许其亮是胡锦涛的人，还是习近平的人，他没有背景是不可能提拔上将的。我们讨论的重点不在于许其亮是胡锦涛的人还是习近平的人。不管他是谁的人，追悼会给什么级别，怎么宣传，怎么报道都是在2025年5月29日的政治局会议上决定的。赵某某2025年5月31日放的许其亮的消息，官方公布2025年6月2日死亡。赵某某说2025年5月28日死的。政治局会议是2025年 5月29日开的，时间线完美吻合。

就是我们要注意这个事实，5月29日的政治局会议上接连做出了苗华和许其亮，两个军委和军委副主席的决定。你不管这个人是胡春华，或者是汪洋，或者是胡锦涛，或者是习近平。

不管这个人是谁，这个人是不是杀伐果断，完全控盘。我们要注意，他同时处理1个军委委员+1个军委副主席。谁给他的胆子，他哪里来的底气。

先知先觉李嘉诚
后知后觉王健林
不知不觉许家印
错知错觉习近平

我们现在已经是后知后觉了，这件事情已经发生了两个礼拜了。

不管这个人是谁，说明枪杆子完全掌握在这个人手里，浑不吝，这就是这个人底气。很简单的问题，武警司令是谁，中部战区司令是谁，火箭军司令是谁？中部战区控制81军，82军，控制着北京。这个人手里有枪，他才不害怕，才敢同时处理苗华和许其亮两个军委委员+军委副主席。2025年5月8日在政法领导干部专题研讨班开班式，武警副司令曹均章仅仅1秒钟，央视就抓到了画面。这个会议按照规格应该是武警司令出席，但是曹均章肩章还是中将。曹均章是胡锦涛刘振立的人。

现任中部战区司令王强派系，我不知道。我不去打这个包票，我只是告诉大家一种可能性。王强出身于济南军区空军，王强有可能是当时的济南军区空军司令刘忠兴空军中将提拔的。

济南军区空军司令为刘忠兴 空军中将（2003年7月 – 2010年12月，济南军区副司令员兼）

这个刘忠兴空军中将，简历上写着他是四川人，邓小平就是四川人，赵紫阳也是四川背景。这个四川人刘忠兴退休之后，天天和广东人混在一起。和广东省政府办公厅原正厅级副主任赵松峰天天混在一起。赵松峰是林木声的下属，林木声是广东省委秘书长，胡春华的大秘。当年林木声给汪洋也当过半年的大秘，给胡春华当过3年半的大秘。

也就是说控制北京的中部战区司令王强，到底是不是胡锦涛的人，我不是百分百确定。但是提拔王强的前济南军区空军司令刘忠兴，天天和胡春华的大秘林木声的下属赵松峰。天天混在一起吃吃喝喝。赵松峰可能就是黄华华的秘书。黄华华是邓小平破格提拔，连升三级。黄华华的秘书是田纪云的秘书。这还是找到赵紫阳李克强的头上。

胡锦涛发动军事政变成功之后，2024年8月为什么用王强替换黄铭担任中部战区司令呢。也就是说2024年8月，胡锦涛已经决定让胡春华接任军委主席。我说过谁接替习近平担任军委主席，总书记是胡锦涛定的，不是我们能决定的。

2025年5月5日，网传王立岩担任火箭军司令。王立岩时曾经挂职担任南海舰队副参谋长两年，基地在广东省湛江市。2014年，湛江市委书记刘小华 与王立岩在南海舰队活动中有互动，刘小华后来曾任胡春华的秘书。

如果说中部战区司令王强和胡春华大秘林木声有交集，但是林木声也担任过半年胡春华的大秘。但是火箭军司令王立岩和汪洋没有任何交集，只和胡春华有交集。白俄总统见到习近平为什么吓得下意识侧身，转身想跑呢。为什么见过习近平之后吓得午饭都不敢吃，12点56就出现在首都机场呢。

因为胡春华给卢卡申科出示了核弹。核弹归谁管理，由谁操作，就是火箭军。火箭军司令王立岩和胡春华有交集。

所以为什么胡春华敢连斩苗华，许其亮两员大将。因为武警司令曹均章，中部战区司令王强，火箭军司令王立岩都和胡春华有关系。就这曹均章，王强，王立岩三个人，到底是和胡春华关系多，还是和汪洋关系多。

然后政治局会议通过的中办发的《党组讨论和决定党员处分规定》和中办转发《深圳改革》。中办发的这两个文件都是胡春华的意思，说明蔡奇要么被免去中央办公厅主任的职务了，要么实际上靠边站了。胡春华在实际上指挥中办。指挥中央办公厅的，不就是总书记吗？等于说胡春华在代理中共中央总书记。

中办发的第一个决定直接删除了2018年11月版本的19大精神。汪洋19大入常了，汪洋为什么要删除19大精神？这不是自我打脸吗？谁19大没有入常？就是胡春华。

中办发的第二个决定，《深圳改革》是去年2024年8月的文件，2024年7月三中全会，胡春华坐在习近平身边。现在由中国发改委副主任，李春临介绍《深圳改革》的文件。李春临的主子是谁呢？

李春临的主子是谁，我不知道，我只是给大家说一种可能性。我们随便看看，李春临和胡春华关系更近，还是和汪洋关系更近。

李春临是陕西省出身的官员，我们最近刚说了一个白少康，是李克强北大同学，李克强亲自护送白少康去上海担任公安局长。

2008年，40岁李春临挂职任陕西省安康市市长助理。当时的安康市长是方玮峰（2008年2月 – 2011年12月）。方玮峰在中纪委就是温家宝马仔马馼的马仔。方玮峰就是温家宝的徒孙子。方玮峰去陕西担任省委办公厅正处级秘书，当时的陕西省委书记就是李建国，李建国和李瑞环关系好，李瑞环是同性恋。方玮峰是不是就是李建国的秘书，不确定。但是方玮峰就是当时某位省委书记或者副书记的秘书。反正省委书记就是李建国，我没有找副书记。2003年11月，37岁的方玮峰任咸阳市市长助理。当时的咸阳市委书记是宋洪武（2002年8月 – 2005年8月）。

也就是说出来介绍《深圳改革》文件的中国发改委副主任李春临可能有温家宝，李瑞环，李克强的背景。那就要问温家宝和李瑞环支持胡春华还是汪洋。卢东亮是李克强干弟弟熊维平的马仔。谁提拔的卢东亮担任山西省长，当接班人？谁和李克强关系最近谁就是中共下任总书记。毫无疑问，是胡春华。

我知道好多人都希望汪洋接班，但是事实不是这样的，中联办主任周霁是赵紫阳的头号马仔田纪云的侄子田承忠提拔的。李克强就是赵紫阳提拔的。谁和李克强的关系更铁，胡春华还是汪洋。

开除朱芝松党籍，朱芝松的后台，就是彭丽媛，彭丽媛的马仔他都敢收拾。拍板美中贸易谈判，迅速妥协。

2025年6月2日，代理军委主席胡春华下令火箭军司令王立岩给白俄总统卢卡申科，出示核弹。东风5就是由火箭军管理和操作。王立岩2014年，挂职南海舰队副参谋长。基地在广东省湛江市，和胡春华大秘刘小华有直接交集。刘小华被习近平弄死了。

这名网友说，川普9月要訪中了

有可能，但是华尔街日报魏玲灵也放过不少假消息。路透社2025年5月22日也放过葛海蛟担任山西省长的假消息。很快就被证伪。

新聞報的 估計和胡溫搭上線
就是要川普访华的时候，中国的总书记和国家主席到底是习近平还是胡春华。

好的，谢谢大家。

《原文链接》

英文翻译

Xi Jinping is controlled by the Central Theater Command. What is the confidence of the new CMC Chairman to deal with CMC members and vice chairmen Miao Hua and Xu Qiliang at the same time? Who are Rocket Force Commander Wang Liyan and Armed Police Commander Cao Junzhang? Who showed the nuclear bomb to Belarusian President Lukashenko? Who controls China’s nuclear button?

Hello everyone, this netizen said,
If you were General Secretary Wang Yang, would you dare to slap yourself ten times live?
My reply is,
Haha, your comment really made me laugh, it’s too naive. If Wang Yang really takes over as General Secretary, I am willing to apologize to you publicly. But why should I slap myself ten times? I am so old, and I will be provoked by your childish provocation? It’s really ridiculous and naive. Do I have to ask you in return, if Hu Chunhua is the General Secretary, would you dare to slap yourself ten times live? We don’t know each other and have no grudges. What’s the point of me earning these ten slaps from you? This is obviously for the show effect.

I just pursue accuracy, but it is impossible to be 100% accurate. I am not a fortune teller.

Let me tell you, whether Hu Chunhua is the general secretary, or Wang Yang takes over, or even Xi Jinping continues to do so, or Ding Xuexiang or Chen Jining takes over, what does it have to do with me? I am not on Hu Chunhua’s side. I just hope that the Communist Party will fall quickly. This is not taking sides, this is my analysis of politics. I judge that what will happen this year may happen in a few months, or even this month. The outcome will be clear soon.

Yesterday I forgot to say that Wang Yang became a member of the Standing Committee of the 19th National Congress. Why did Wang Yang delete the spirit of the 19th National Congress? Isn’t this a slap in the face? Who did not become a member of the Standing Committee of the 19th National Congress? There is another thing I didn’t say. The faction of Li Chunlin, deputy director of the National Development and Reform Commission, who introduced “Shenzhen Reform”, can tell who made the decision.

I will tell you about the Politburo meeting on May 29 again. I will only talk about the key points of what I said and will not repeat them. I will add to what I didn’t say. As far as we know, the Politburo meeting on May 29 passed at least 8 agenda items. It just happens to be divided into four aspects. The first is the military, with Hu Chunhua acting as the Chairman of the Military Commission. The second is that the General Office of the CPC Central Committee issued two documents, which indirectly proved that Hu Chunhua was acting as the General Secretary. The third is that the meeting involved two personnel appointments. It is obvious whether Shi Taifeng of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee has an intersection with Hu Chunhua or Wang Yang. The fourth is others. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection dealt with Zhu Zhisong. In addition, such a major matter as the US-China trade negotiations should also be approved by the Politburo meeting.

First, Miao Hua was expelled from the party. Miao Hua was removed from the website of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense and is no longer a member of the Central Military Commission. According to the interpretation of professional personnel, Miao Hua was expelled from the party. The media reported on May 29 that the website of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense still had information about Miao Hua. Therefore, we speculate that Hu Chunhua decided to expel Miao Hua from the party at the Politburo meeting on May 29.

This netizen said,
I still don’t believe Xu Qiliang is from Xi’s faction. No matter how confident Hu Jintao is, he always has to leave a vice chairman of the Military Commission for his faction. Only the chairman and vice chairman can promote major generals.
Hu Jintao appointed Xu Qiliang, who has no background, and then Xu Qiliang surrendered to Xi.
How can Xu Qiliang become a general without a background?
Have you heard of the three-surnamed family slave?
My reply is that this netizen is right. Can Xu Qiliang become a general without a background? The faces have been compared. Xu Lefu is Xu Qiliang’s father. Even if the father and son look alike, the facial similarity is only 45%.
Whether Xu Qiliang is Hu Jintao’s or Xi Jinping’s, it is impossible for him to be promoted to a general without a background. The focus of our discussion is not whether Xu Qiliang is Hu Jintao’s or Xi Jinping’s. No matter whose person he is, what level the memorial service will be given, how to publicize it, and how to report it will all be decided at the Politburo meeting on May 29, 2025. Zhao released the news about Xu Qiliang on May 31, 2025, and the official announcement said he died on June 2, 2025. Zhao said he died on May 28, 2025. The Politburo meeting was held on May 29, 2025, and the timeline matches perfectly.

We should pay attention to the fact that the Politburo meeting on May 29 made decisions on Miao Hua and Xu Qiliang, two CMCs and vice chairmen of the CMC. You don’t care if this person is Hu Chunhua, Wang Yang, Hu Jintao, or Xi Jinping.

No matter who this person is, whether this person is decisive and in control. We should pay attention to the fact that he dealt with 1 CMC member + 1 vice chairperson of the CMC at the same time. Who gave him the courage, and where did he get the confidence from?

Li Ka-shing, who knew first
Wang Jianlin, who knew later
Xu Jiayin, who knew wrongly
Xi Jinping, who knew wrongly

We are already late to the party, and this incident has happened for two weeks.

No matter who this person is, it means that the gun is completely in his hands, and he is not stingy. This is the confidence of this person. It is a very simple question. Who is the commander of the armed police, who is the commander of the Central Theater Command, and who is the commander of the Rocket Force? The Central Theater Command controls the 81st Army, the 82nd Army, and controls Beijing. This person has a gun in his hand, so he is not afraid and dares to deal with Miao Hua and Xu Qiliang, two members of the Military Commission + Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, at the same time. On May 8, 2025, at the opening ceremony of the special seminar for political and legal leading cadres, CCTV captured the picture of Cao Junzhang, deputy commander of the armed police, for only 1 second. According to the specifications, the commander of the armed police should attend this meeting, but Cao Junzhang’s shoulder badge is still a lieutenant general. Cao Junzhang is a person of Hu Jintao and Liu Zhenli.

I don’t know the faction of Wang Qiang, the current commander of the Central Theater Command. I won’t make a guarantee, I just tell you a possibility. Wang Qiang came from the Air Force of the Jinan Military Region. Wang Qiang may have been promoted by Liu Zhongxing, the then commander of the Air Force of the Jinan Military Region.

The Air Force Commander of the Jinan Military Region is Liu Zhongxing, Air Force Lieutenant General (July 2003 – December 2010, Deputy Commander and concurrently of the Jinan Military Region)

This Air Force Lieutenant General Liu Zhongxing, his resume says that he is from Sichuan. Deng Xiaoping is from Sichuan, and Zhao Ziyang is also from Sichuan. After retiring, this Sichuanese Liu Zhongxing hangs out with Guangdong people every day. He hangs out with Zhao Songfeng, the former deputy director of the Guangdong Provincial Government Office, every day. Zhao Songfeng is a subordinate of Lin Musheng, who is the Secretary-General of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee and Hu Chunhua’s chief secretary. Lin Musheng also served as Wang Yang’s chief secretary for half a year and Hu Chunhua’s chief secretary for three and a half years.

In other words, I am not 100% sure whether Wang Qiang, the commander of the Central Theater Command who controls Beijing, is Hu Jintao’s man. But Liu Zhongxing, the former Air Force Commander of the Jinan Military Region who promoted Wang Qiang, hangs out with Zhao Songfeng, a subordinate of Hu Chunhua’s chief secretary Lin Musheng, every day. They eat and drink together every day. Zhao Songfeng may be Huang Huahua’s secretary. Huang Huahua was promoted by Deng Xiaoping in an exceptional manner, and was promoted three levels in a row. Huang Huahua’s secretary was Tian Jiyun’s secretary. This was still found on the heads of Zhao Ziyang and Li Keqiang.

After Hu Jintao successfully launched a military coup, why did he replace Huang Ming with Wang Qiang as the commander of the Central Theater Command in August 2024? That is to say, in August 2024, Hu Jintao had decided to let Hu Chunhua take over as Chairman of the Military Commission. I said that who will succeed Xi Jinping as Chairman of the Military Commission and General Secretary is decided by Hu Jintao, not by us.

On May 5, 2025, it was rumored on the Internet that Wang Liyan served as the commander of the Rocket Force. Wang Liyan once served as the deputy chief of staff of the South China Sea Fleet for two years, with a base in Zhanjiang City, Guangdong Province. In 2014, Liu Xiaohua, secretary of the Zhanjiang Municipal Party Committee, interacted with Wang Liyan in the activities of the South China Sea Fleet. Liu Xiaohua later served as Hu Chunhua’s secretary.

If we say that Wang Qiang, commander of the Central Theater Command, and Lin Musheng, Hu Chunhua’s chief secretary, have some connections, then Lin Musheng also served as Hu Chunhua’s chief secretary for half a year. However, Wang Liyan, commander of the Rocket Force, has no connections with Wang Yang, but only with Hu Chunhua. Why did the Belarusian president subconsciously turn sideways and turn around to run when he saw Xi Jinping? Why did he not dare to eat lunch after meeting Xi Jinping, and appeared at the Capital Airport at 12:56?

Because Hu Chunhua showed Lukashenko a nuclear bomb. Who manages and operates the nuclear bomb? It’s the Rocket Force. Wang Liyan, commander of the Rocket Force, has some connections with Hu Chunhua.

So why did Hu Chunhua dare to kill two generals, Miao Hua and Xu Qiliang? Because Cao Junzhang, commander of the Armed Police Force, Wang Qiang, commander of the Central Theater Command, and Wang Liyan, commander of the Rocket Force, all have connections with Hu Chunhua. As for these three people, Cao Junzhang, Wang Qiang, and Wang Liyan, who have more connections with Hu Chunhua or Wang Yang?

Then the Political Bureau passed the “Regulations on Party Group Discussion and Decision on Party Member Disciplinary Actions” issued by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the “Shenzhen Reform” forwarded by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee. These two documents issued by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee are the intentions of Hu Chunhua, which means that Cai Qi has either been removed from the post of Director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee or has actually stepped aside. Hu Chunhua is actually directing the General Office of the CPC Central Committee. Isn’t it the General Secretary who directs the General Office of the CPC Central Committee? It is equivalent to saying that Hu Chunhua is acting as the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee.

The first decision issued by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee directly deleted the November 2018 version of the 19th National Congress. Wang Yang became a member of the Standing Committee of the 19th National Congress. Why did Wang Yang delete the spirit of the 19th National Congress? Isn’t this a slap in the face? Who didn’t become a member of the Standing Committee of the 19th National Congress? It was Hu Chunhua.

The second decision issued by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee, “Shenzhen Reform”, was a document issued in August 2024 last year. At the Third Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee in July 2024, Hu Chunhua sat next to Xi Jinping. Now, Li Chunlin, Deputy Director of the National Development and Reform Commission of China, will introduce the document “Shenzhen Reform”. Who is Li Chunlin’s master?

I don’t know who Li Chunlin’s boss is. I’m just telling you a possibility. Let’s take a look. Is Li Chunlin closer to Hu Chunhua or Wang Yang?

Li Chunlin is an official from Shaanxi Province. We just talked about Bai Shaokang recently. He is Li Keqiang’s classmate at Peking University. Li Keqiang personally escorted Bai Shaokang to Shanghai to serve as the director of the Public Security Bureau.

In 2008, 40-year-old Li Chunlin was appointed as the assistant mayor of Ankang City, Shaanxi Province. The mayor of Ankang at that time was Fang Weifeng (February 2008-December 2011). Fang Weifeng was the henchman of Wen Jiabao’s BMW Ma Yan in the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Fang Weifeng is Wen Jiabao’s disciple. Fang Weifeng went to Shaanxi to serve as a section-level secretary of the General Office of the Provincial Party Committee. At that time, the Secretary of the Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee was Li Jianguo. Li Jianguo and Li Ruihuan had a good relationship. Li Ruihuan was a homosexual. It is not certain whether Fang Weifeng was Li Jianguo’s secretary. But Fang Weifeng was the secretary of a provincial party secretary or deputy secretary at that time. Anyway, the provincial party secretary is Li Jianguo, and I didn’t look for a deputy secretary. In November 2003, 37-year-old Fang Weifeng was appointed assistant mayor of Xianyang. The secretary of the Xianyang Municipal Party Committee at that time was Song Hongwu (August 2002-August 2005).

In other words, Li Chunlin, deputy director of the National Development and Reform Commission, who came out to introduce the “Shenzhen Reform” document, may have the background of Wen Jiabao, Li Ruihuan, and Li Keqiang. Then we have to ask whether Wen Jiabao and Li Ruihuan support Hu Chunhua or Wang Yang. Lu Dongliang is the henchman of Li Keqiang’s brother Xiong Weiping. Who promoted Lu Dongliang to be the governor of Shanxi Province and the successor? Whoever has the closest relationship with Li Keqiang will be the next general secretary of the Communist Party of China. Without a doubt, it is Hu Chunhua.

I know that many people hope that Wang Yang will take over, but the fact is not like this. Zhou Ji, director of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, was promoted by Tian Chengzhong, the nephew of Tian Jiyun, Zhao Ziyang’s number one henchman. Li Keqiang was promoted by Zhao Ziyang. Who has a closer relationship with Li Keqiang, Hu Chunhua or Wang Yang?

Expelled Zhu Zhisong from the party. Zhu Zhisong’s backer is Peng Liyuan. He dared to deal with Peng Liyuan’s lackeys. He made the final decision on the US-China trade negotiations and compromised quickly.

On June 2, 2025, Acting Chairman of the Central Military Commission Hu Chunhua ordered Rocket Force Commander Wang Liyan to show the nuclear bomb to Belarusian President Lukashenko. The Dongfeng 5 is managed and operated by the Rocket Force. In 2014, Wang Liyan served as deputy chief of staff of the South China Sea Fleet. The base is in Zhanjiang City, Guangdong Province, and has direct contact with Hu Chunhua’s chief secretary Liu Xiaohua. Liu Xiaohua was killed by Xi Jinping.

This netizen said that Trump will visit China in September

It is possible, but Wei Lingling of the Wall Street Journal also let a lot of false news. Reuters also let the false news that Ge Haijiao was the governor of Shanxi Province on May 22, 2025. It was soon falsified.

The news report estimated that it was in line with Hu and Wen.
It was to find out whether Xi Jinping or Hu Chunhua would be the general secretary and president of China when Trump visited China.

Okay, thank you everyone.

END

大家好，
5月份的政治局会议，虽然央视没有公布。但是央视新闻在随后的中央候补委员的朱芝松的处分决定里面，明确说了，报中央政治局会议审议，决定给与朱芝松开除党籍处分。之前我们已经说了，这次政治局会议有3项内容，其实的还有5项内容。最近，还发生了5件事情也需要政治局会议批准。也就是说，我们可以推测出来，这个新任的总书记，杀伐过于果断。有点吓人。真的是个狠人。胡春华做出了另外1项决定。这个应该不需要政治局会议批准。

我知道大家都希望汪洋接任总书记，但是这个不是我们决定。马上就要公布，嗯炒作汪洋，他又不会接任总书记，马上就被打脸了。

这名网友说，
中办、国办印发《关于深入推进深圳综合改革试点 深化改革创新扩大开放的意见》，大包，这也算是个邓派抬头的信号吧。

这名网友说，
最新公布的关于深圳的文件，居然是2024年8月的，太诡异了。

我的回复是，抬什么头啊。这个是胡春华发的，胡春华是现任的中共代理总书记。我知道大家都想听汪洋要当总书记，可是汪洋不会当。有人嗯炒作汪洋，没用，再怎么炒作也没用。

之前大家说了9个人，然后还有网友补充
这名网友说，
杜某和石某记一个上线，蔡教授谁给钱捧谁，驸马就一骗子。
蔡教授是谁，是推特的大威吗？
这名网友说，
大家都没注意到一个舔习指数1000%的频道吗？ 叫：岳某某的，超级恶心，各种跪舔姿势，蔡奇见了都要五体投地！

我没有针对他们的意思，我没有提过他们任何一个人全名。我只是要说这个现象。

还有那个老某频道，胡搅蛮缠还骂支持习下台的人😅
还有一个人是蔡某某
蔡某某和王某也是大外宣，居然还有那么多人看。
这名网友说，
翟山某的背景，金融，国务院，建行，空军，妈呀刁包子全家桶他全沾过，味太大了。

我们都加进去，一共才16个人，别说16个人，160个人，1600个人能不能拿枪杆子，能不能发动军事政变，不能啊。

我给大家解释一下，人民日报连续两天6月10日，和6月11日的头版文章。为什么都是胡春华发的。

2025年06月10日，《人民日报》头版发表文章《国家越开放，会促使我们更加进步》。这是谁让任正非发表的这篇文章，汪洋，胡春华，还是李强？谁和任正非关系最近，谁就是现任中共代理总书记。很明显是胡春华啊。2017年2月23日上午，广东省人民政府与华为技术有限公司在广州签署战略合作协议，省委书记胡春华，省长马兴瑞，华为公司总裁任正非出席协议签署仪式见证签约。

当然，你可以说这是弱证据，可以说汪洋或者李强和任正非的关系，走得更近。大家可以去找找李强或者汪洋和任正非是不是有什么交集。

我们看任正非的文章发表的第二天，4月11日的人民日报头版头条。
中共中央办公厅国务院办公厅关于深入推进深圳综合改革试点深化改革创新扩大开放的意见
（二〇二四年八月三十日）

那么中办转发的这个深圳改革的意见，之前一个半月，7月18日的三中全会上，谁坐在习近平旁边。是胡春华还是汪洋。

我们看2025年5月26日，中共中央修订的中共中央办公厅印发《党组讨论和决定党员处分事项工作程序规定》，直接把2018年11月的19大精神删掉。19大，胡春华没有入常。因为这个写的很清楚，有可能是在5月29日的政治局会议上通过的。那么5月29日的政治局会议上，还有3项内容是什么呢？

中国军方与军工系统反腐继续，中共中央军委委员、军委政治工作部主任苗华被官宣涉嫌违法后，其个人在国防部网站中央军事委员会栏目的资料被删除，意味着苗华不再是中央军事委员会委员。

中国人大网5月15日公布的2025年第3号全国人大常委会公报提到，苗华因“涉嫌严重违纪违法”被罢免全国人大代表职务。这是官方首次披露苗华涉嫌违法。去年11月28日，官方公布苗华因涉嫌严重违纪停职检查。

在星期四（5月29日）下午，中国国防部官网高层栏目“中央军委委员”一栏，仍有苗华的名字。但目前这一栏目内，苗华的资料已被删除，意味着苗华不再是中央军事委员会委员。

我们注意，5月29日，根据记者报道，苗华还没有被删，那么国防部为什么删除苗华呢，因为苗华被开除党籍。5月29日，苗华还在，就是5月29日，胡春华主持的政治局会议上，开除了苗华的党籍。这次政治局会议上还批准了对许其亮的处理方式。也就是说，5月29日的政治局会议上，胡春华做出了对许其亮处理方式，报道规格之后。两天之后赵某某放出了许其亮的消息。包括新华社报道许其亮生平的文章，都是胡春华做出的决定。

新闻联播没有报道5月29日政治局会议，这一异常现象引发猜测。因为习近平已经下台，官方媒体选择沉默可能与胡春华代理总书记主持会议有关。结合近期军方反腐动态，苗华被开除党籍、许其亮被处理，我们分析汪洋、胡锦涛、胡春华三人主持会议的可能性，并探讨这一决定的权威性。

新闻联播向来是宣传习近平权威的窗口，新闻联播，没有报道5月29日的政治局会议，可能意在掩盖习近平下台的敏感信息。胡春华以代理总书记身份主持会议，这一过渡性权力更替可能被刻意低调处理，以避免引发社会动荡。会议做出开除苗华党籍和处理前军委副主席许其亮的果断决定，显示新主持人的强势姿态，与习近平时期的风格迥异。

汪洋曾任国务院副总理、全国政协主席，2022年二十大后退出政治局常委，影响力下降。他以温和派和市场经济支持者著称，但缺乏军方背景。

汪洋主持的可能性较低。他在2022年二十大闭幕后被边缘化，5月29日会议涉及军委高层清洗（如苗华、许其亮），需要强硬手腕，汪洋的温和形象不符。而且汪洋约70多岁的年龄，难以掌控如此敏感议题。如果汪洋主持，决策可能更倾向协商，难以解释苗华、许其亮的快速处理。

这个新总书记杀伐过于果断，显然他的年龄很低，暴脾气。

胡锦涛作为前总书记（2002-2012），2022年二十大闭幕时被架离会场，但目前公开活动稀少。胡锦涛发动军事政变，虽然有这个权威，一下子处理两名上将，包括一名军委副主席，一名军委委员。但是一般认为，胡锦涛没有这么果断。

这名网友说，
仁宗，古代皇帝獲得這個廟號，表明他沒啥主意，不搞個人獨斷獨行，的優柔寡斷，瞻前顧後，患得患失，顧此失彼的一種性格，更貼切。
我的回复是，这回来一个狠人， 一个杀伐果断，我觉得也不一定是什么好事儿。

胡春华，1963年生，2022年二十大后退出政治局，2023年起任全国政协副主席。他曾是“胡派”代表，长期主政广东、内蒙古，具备经济与基层治理经验。近期传言他可能接替习近平，5月29日会议由胡春华主持符合过渡期逻辑。

胡春华主持政治局最具可能性。会议开除涉嫌严重违纪违法的苗华党籍和处理许其亮，显示胡春华有能力掌控军方人事调整。苗华资料5月29日后从国防部网站删除，许其亮消息两天后由“赵某某”发布，均指向胡春华主导。新闻联播沉默可能为胡春华的稳固权力留空间。

胡春华的果断决策（如同时处理两名军委高官）体现其权威，暗示胡春华获得军方支持或新领导层背书。

5月29日政治局会议一次性决定开除苗华党籍和处理许其亮，力度之大超乎寻常。苗华停职检查始于2024年11月，2025年5月15日被罢免人大代表职务，29日直接开除党籍，流程之快显示新领导层强势介入。许其亮作为前军委副主席，其处理方式同样迅速，暗示胡春华可能得到军方派系的支持。这一权威性表明，胡春华不仅有政治基础，还可能在习近平下台后迅速整合资源。

胡春华最可能主持5月29日会议，新闻联播没有报道，可能因为胡春华代理总书记的身份暂时没有公开，官方想低调过渡。汪洋和胡锦涛因年龄，感觉没有这么暴脾气。汪洋我也不了解他的性格，胡锦涛大家一般都认为他没有这么暴脾气。

胡春华的“胡锦涛”背景可能推动经济改革，苗华、许其亮的处理或为清除习近平旧部铺垫。新领导层可能借此展示反腐决心，同时避免与美对抗，寻求稳定。

这次政治局会议上，还有一项日程，就是美中贸易谈判。

中国迅速决定接受美国55%关税，这一决定凸显胡春华的果断。面对高关税压力，胡春华未犹豫，展现了处理复杂国际事务的决心。新总书记“杀伐过于果断，有点吓人”，胡春华快速推动贸易妥协。接受55%关税虽让中国经济承压，我们假设越南25%关税。就是接受现实，中国要面对的就是比越南关税高30%的条件下，参与国际竞争。胡春华的决策反映了务实态度，优先稳住国际关系，而非与美国对抗。

怎么判断这个决策是胡春华做出而不是汪洋呢？就看李成钢的关系和胡春华更近，还是和汪洋更近。李成刚是胡锦涛吴仪的人。

从人事关系上就可以推测是谁在做决定。卢东亮是李克强干弟弟熊维平的马仔。

谁提拔的卢东亮担任山西省长，当接班人？谁和李克强关系最近谁就是中共下任总书记。毫无疑问，是胡春华。我知道好多人都希望汪洋接班，但是事实不是这样的，

不要一厢情愿，以证据说话。1982年，北京大学校园内未名湖畔，时年26岁的北大学生会主席，校团委书记李克强向校长张龙翔介绍年仅18岁的中文系优秀学生胡春华，三人亲切交谈时留影。
中联办主任周霁是赵紫阳的头号马仔田纪云的侄子田承忠提拔的。
李克强就是赵紫阳提拔的。谁和李克强的关系更铁，胡春华还是汪洋。

这些人事任命，政策决定的背后都指向胡春华，并没有看出来汪洋的影子。大家可以把这些事情都往汪洋身上贴，看看能不能更容易说的通。
好的，谢谢大家。

《原文链接》

英文翻译

In the May Politburo meeting, 8 agenda items were exposed. The new general secretary is too decisive in killing, which is a bit scary. Xi Jinping did not attend the Politburo meeting. The new chairman of the Military Commission killed two generals in a row. Everyone will soon understand why Hu Jintao is interested in this person.

Hello everyone,
Although CCTV did not announce the Politburo meeting in May. However, CCTV News clearly stated in the subsequent disciplinary decision of Zhu Zhisong, an alternate member of the Central Committee, that it was reported to the Central Politburo meeting for deliberation and decided to expel Zhu Zhisong from the party. We have said before that there are 3 items in this Politburo meeting, but there are actually 5 items. Recently, 5 things have also happened that need to be approved by the Politburo meeting. In other words, we can infer that the new general secretary is too decisive in killing. A bit scary. He is really a ruthless person. Hu Chunhua made another decision. This should not require the approval of the Politburo meeting.

I know everyone hopes that Wang Yang will take over as general secretary, but this is not our decision. It will be announced soon. Well, hype Wang Yang, he will not take over as general secretary, and he will be slapped in the face immediately.

This netizen said,
The General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council issued the “Opinions on Deepening the Shenzhen Comprehensive Reform Pilot, Deepening Reform, Innovation and Expanding Opening Up”, which is a big deal. This can be regarded as a signal that the Deng faction is rising.

This netizen said,
The latest document published about Shenzhen is actually from August 2024, which is too weird.

My reply is, why are you raising your head? This was sent by Hu Chunhua, who is the current acting general secretary of the Communist Party of China. I know everyone wants to hear that Wang Yang wants to be the general secretary, but Wang Yang will not be. Some people hype Wang Yang, but it is useless, no matter how much they hype it.

Everyone mentioned 9 people before, and then another netizen added
This netizen said,
Du and Shi are online, Professor Cai who gives money to support whoever, the son-in-law is a liar.
Who is Professor Cai, is he the big Wei of Twitter?
This netizen said,
Has everyone not noticed a channel with a licking Xi index of 1000%? The name is: Yue Moumou, super disgusting, all kinds of kneeling and licking postures, Cai Qi would have to prostrate himself when he saw it!

I don’t mean to target them, I haven’t mentioned any of their full names. I just want to talk about this phenomenon.

There is also that old channel, which is unreasonable and scolds those who support Xi’s resignation😅
There is another person named Cai Moumou
Cai Moumou and Wang Mou are also big foreign propaganda, but there are still so many people watching.
This netizen said,
Zhai Shanmou’s background, finance, the State Council, CCB, the Air Force, my god, he has been involved in all the family buckets of Diao Baozi, the smell is too strong.

If we add them all in, there are only 16 people in total. Let alone 16 people, 160 people, 1600 people, can they hold guns and launch a military coup? No.

Let me explain to you, the front-page articles of the People’s Daily for two consecutive days on June 10 and June 11. Why were they all published by Hu Chunhua?

On June 10, 2025, the People’s Daily published an article on the front page titled “The more open the country is, the more progress we will make.” Who asked Ren Zhengfei to publish this article, Wang Yang, Hu Chunhua, or Li Qiang? Whoever has the closest relationship with Ren Zhengfei is the current acting general secretary of the Communist Party of China. Obviously it is Hu Chunhua. On the morning of February 23, 2017, the People’s Government of Guangdong Province and Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. signed a strategic cooperation agreement in Guangzhou. Provincial Party Secretary Hu Chunhua, Governor Ma Xingrui, and Huawei President Ren Zhengfei attended the signing ceremony to witness the signing.

Of course, you can say that this is weak evidence, and you can say that Wang Yang or Li Qiang and Ren Zhengfei are closer. You can go and find out if Li Qiang or Wang Yang and Ren Zhengfei have any intersection.

Let’s look at the front page headline of the People’s Daily on April 11, the day after Ren Zhengfei’s article was published.
Opinions of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council on Deepening the Shenzhen Comprehensive Reform Pilot, Deepening Reform, Innovation and Expanding Opening-up
(August 30, 2024)

So who sat next to Xi Jinping at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, one and a half months before the Shenzhen Reform Opinions forwarded by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee. Was it Hu Chunhua or Wang Yang?

Let’s look at the “Procedures for Party Group Discussion and Decision on Party Member Disciplinary Matters” issued by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee on May 26, 2025, which directly deleted the spirit of the 19th National Congress in November 2018. At the 19th National Congress, Hu Chunhua did not become a member of the Standing Committee. Because this is written very clearly, it may have been passed at the Politburo meeting on May 29. So what are the other three items at the Politburo meeting on May 29?

The anti-corruption campaign in the Chinese military and military industry continues. After Miao Hua, a member of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee and director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission, was officially announced to be suspected of violating the law, his personal information in the Central Military Commission column of the Ministry of National Defense website was deleted, which means that Miao Hua is no longer a member of the Central Military Commission.

The 2025 3rd Communiqué of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, published on the website of the National People’s Congress of China on May 15, mentioned that Miao Hua was removed from his post as a deputy to the National People’s Congress for “suspected serious violations of discipline and law”. This is the first time that the official has disclosed that Miao Hua is suspected of violating the law. On November 28 last year, the official announced that Miao Hua was suspended for investigation for suspected serious violations of discipline.

On Thursday afternoon (May 29), the “Central Military Commission Member” column of the high-level column of the official website of the Ministry of National Defense of China still had Miao Hua’s name. But at present, Miao Hua’s information has been deleted in this column, which means that Miao Hua is no longer a member of the Central Military Commission.

We note that on May 29, according to reporters’ reports, Miao Hua had not been deleted, so why did the Ministry of National Defense delete Miao Hua? Because Miao Hua was expelled from the party. On May 29, Miao Hua was still there. That is, on May 29, at the Politburo meeting chaired by Hu Chunhua, Miao Hua was expelled from the party. At this Politburo meeting, the handling method for Xu Qiliang was also approved. In other words, at the Politburo meeting on May 29, Hu Chunhua made a decision on the handling method for Xu Qiliang, after the reporting specifications. Two days later, Zhao Moumou released the news about Xu Qiliang. Including the article about Xu Qiliang’s life reported by Xinhua News Agency, all the decisions were made by Hu Chunhua.

The news broadcast did not report the Politburo meeting on May 29, which aroused speculation. Because Xi Jinping has stepped down, the official media chose to remain silent, which may be related to Hu Chunhua’s acting general secretary presiding over the meeting. Combined with the recent anti-corruption dynamics of the military, Miao Hua was expelled from the party and Xu Qiliang was dealt with. We analyze the possibility of Wang Yang, Hu Jintao, and Hu Chunhua presiding over the meeting and explore the authority of this decision.

The news broadcast has always been a window to publicize Xi Jinping’s authority. The news broadcast did not report the Politburo meeting on May 29, which may be intended to cover up the sensitive information of Xi Jinping’s resignation. Hu Chunhua presided over the meeting as acting general secretary. This transitional power change may be deliberately handled in a low-key manner to avoid causing social unrest. The meeting made a decisive decision to expel Miao Hua from the party and deal with Xu Qiliang, the former vice chairman of the Military Commission, showing the strong attitude of the new host, which is very different from the style of the Xi Jinping period.

Wang Yang was once the Vice Premier of the State Council and the Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. He withdrew from the Politburo Standing Committee after the 20th National Congress in 2022, and his influence declined. He is known as a moderate and a supporter of the market economy, but lacks a military background.

It is less likely that Wang Yang will preside over the meeting. He was marginalized after the closing of the 20th National Congress in 2022. The meeting on May 29th involved the purge of the top leaders of the Military Commission (such as Miao Hua and Xu Qiliang), which required a tough approach, which did not match Wang Yang’s gentle image. Moreover, Wang Yang is about 70 years old and it is difficult for him to control such a sensitive issue. If Wang Yang presided over the meeting, the decision might be more inclined to consultation, which is difficult to explain the quick handling of Miao Hua and Xu Qiliang.

This new general secretary is too decisive in killing, and it is obvious that he is very young and has a bad temper.

As the former general secretary (2002-2012), Hu Jintao was taken away from the venue at the closing of the 20th National Congress in 2022, but his public activities are rare at present. Hu Jintao launched a military coup, although he had the authority to deal with two generals at once, including a vice chairman of the Military Commission and a member of the Military Commission. But it is generally believed that Hu Jintao is not so decisive.

This netizen said,
Renzong, the ancient emperors were given this temple title, indicating that he had no ideas, did not act alone, and was indecisive, looked ahead and behind, worried about gains and losses, and lost this and lost that. This is more appropriate.
My reply is that this time a ruthless person came back, and a person who kills decisively, I don’t think it is necessarily a good thing.

Hu Chunhua, born in 1963, will withdraw from the Politburo after the 20th National Congress in 2022 and serve as Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference from 2023. He was a representative of the “Hu faction” and has long been in charge of Guangdong and Inner Mongolia. He has experience in economy and grassroots governance. Recently, there have been rumors that he may succeed Xi Jinping. It is in line with the logic of the transition period for Hu Chunhua to preside over the meeting on May 29.

Hu Chunhua is most likely to preside over the Politburo. The meeting expelled Miao Hua from the party and dealt with Xu Qiliang, who was suspected of serious violations of discipline and law, showing that Hu Chunhua is capable of controlling the personnel adjustments of the military. Miao Hua’s information was deleted from the Ministry of National Defense website after May 29, and Xu Qiliang’s news was released by “Zhao XX” two days later, both pointing to Hu Chunhua’s leadership. The silence of the news broadcast may leave room for Hu Chunhua to consolidate his power.

Hu Chunhua’s decisive decision (such as dealing with two senior CMC officials at the same time) reflects his authority, suggesting that Hu Chunhua has the support of the military or the endorsement of the new leadership.

The Politburo meeting on May 29 decided to expel Miao Hua from the party and deal with Xu Qiliang at one time, which was unusually strong. Miao Hua’s suspension for inspection began in November 2024, and he was removed from his position as a NPC deputy on May 15, 2025. He was directly expelled from the party on the 29th. The speed of the process shows that the new leadership intervened strongly. As a former vice chairman of the CMC, Xu Qiliang’s handling method was also swift, suggesting that Hu Chunhua may have the support of the military faction. This authority shows that Hu Chunhua not only has a political foundation, but can also quickly integrate resources after Xi Jinping steps down.

Hu Chunhua is most likely to preside over the meeting on May 29. The news broadcast did not report it, probably because Hu Chunhua’s identity as acting general secretary has not been made public for the time being, and the official wants to make a low-key transition. Wang Yang and Hu Jintao do not seem to have such a bad temper due to their age. I don’t know Wang Yang’s personality, but people generally think that Hu Jintao does not have such a bad temper.

Hu Chunhua’s “Hu Jintao” background may promote economic reforms, and the treatment of Miao Hua and Xu Qiliang may pave the way for the removal of Xi Jinping’s old subordinates. The new leadership may use this to demonstrate its determination to fight corruption, while avoiding confrontation with the United States and seeking stability.

There is also an agenda for this Politburo meeting, which is the US-China trade negotiations.

China quickly decided to accept the US 55% tariff, and this decision highlights Hu Chunhua’s decisiveness. Faced with the pressure of high tariffs, Hu Chunhua did not hesitate and showed his determination to deal with complex international affairs. The new general secretary is “too decisive and a bit scary”, and Hu Chunhua quickly promoted trade compromises. Although accepting a 55% tariff puts pressure on the Chinese economy, let’s assume Vietnam’s 25% tariff. It means accepting reality. China has to face international competition under the condition of 30% higher tariffs than Vietnam. Hu Chunhua’s decision reflects a pragmatic attitude, giving priority to stabilizing international relations rather than confronting the United States.

How to judge whether this decision was made by Hu Chunhua rather than Wang Yang? It depends on whether Li Chenggang is closer to Hu Chunhua or Wang Yang. Li Chenggang is a man of Hu Jintao and Wu Yi.

From the personnel relationship, we can infer who is making the decision. Lu Dongliang is the henchman of Li Keqiang’s younger brother Xiong Weiping.

Who promoted Lu Dongliang to be the governor of Shanxi Province and the successor? Whoever has the closest relationship with Li Keqiang will be the next general secretary of the Communist Party of China. There is no doubt that it is Hu Chunhua. I know that many people hope that Wang Yang will take over, but the facts are not like this.

Don’t be wishful thinking, speak with evidence. In 1982, by the Weiming Lake on the campus of Peking University, Li Keqiang, then 26-year-old president of the Peking University Student Union and secretary of the school Youth League Committee, introduced Hu Chunhua, an outstanding student of the Chinese Department, who was only 18 years old, to the president Zhang Longxiang. The three took a photo while talking cordially.
Zhou Ji, director of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, was promoted by Tian Chengzhong, the nephew of Tian Jiyun, Zhao Ziyang’s top henchman.
Li Keqiang was promoted by Zhao Ziyang. Who has a closer relationship with Li Keqiang, Hu Chunhua or Wang Yang?

Behind these personnel appointments and policy decisions, Hu Chunhua is pointed to, and Wang Yang’s shadow is not seen. You can put all these things on Wang Yang to see if it can be more easily explained.
OK, thank you all.

END

大家好，
我们今天说一下，后习时代，有会什么政策变化。现在习近平还没有正式下台呢。但是已经有很多政策转变，路线转变的信号。
这名网友说，
现在还在坚挺习近平的海外孤忠还有杜某、章某某、还一个翟山某，其它的都怕打脸。
杜某是被胡春华收拾了，是没办法。
还有翟天某。
这是两个人吗，我以为是一个人呢。
杜某和胡春华血海深仇。他不挺习，难道挺团派？是被迫站队习。
增加了。
这名网友说，
章某某怎么和轮系的其它人还唱反调呢？是为了对冲吗？
还有自称驸马那沙比玩意呢。
江湖道义，收了水费就的洗地！
杜某就是派出来胡说八道的，翟山某就是一个诈骗犯。
章是有问题的。
公子某。
这名网友说，
翟山某斯德哥尔摩了，天天辱包怎么会是孤忠。

另外还有个矢某某某绝对是孤忠，入籍台湾成为匪谍。
传统媒体人通常对流言持谨慎态度，例如王某，但王某不否认包子失权的种种迹象。矢某则是过于明显了，他最近一期节目的tittle是“习近平掌权肃清XXX”，哪壶不开提哪壶……
他如何和胡春华对立，在关押期间为何不说真相？或者编故事整倒胡春华？
漏了两个大神，京都静源刘某教授，和赵某贱人。

这是谁啊，我知道这个人，网友给我搬运过几次，我名字都没记住，这个名字还挺拗口的。

我感觉章就是纯收好处了。
轮子该查查章是不是通匪了！
这名网友说，
孙子某是做移民生意的，包子在位越久越利好他们。

美国做移民生意的多，加拿大也做吗？美国做移民生意的那些人也不做油管。

公子某当年在胡锦涛被架出去的时候，说是因为胡锦涛病了身体不好。从那以后就不太想看公子某的节目了。基本上好几个YouTuber 一旦故意扭曲事实，我就不想再多看了。我估计很多观众也有同感。也不知道这些YouTube 怎么想的，真不怕掉粉打脸？

这个我想说，有一个推特大V，名叫王某某，拥有23万粉丝，YouTube也有14万订阅者。这个人他可以自由出入中国，这一点尤其引人注目。有一次，他去了泰国，大家都以为他这次可能不会再回国了，结果他却照常返回中国，后来又出国游走，如此往返，显得非常随意。这种自由进出的特权，他就很有可能是共产党的人。

不过，值得一提的是，他的观点总体上并没有明显偏颇。我记得2022年年底，他做年终总结时，提到了当年最大的新闻——胡锦涛在20大被架离会场。他当时坦言自己“没法说”或者“不敢说”，选择绕过了这个敏感话题，但是却没有扭曲事实。这种做法其实挺不容易的。毕竟，做时政新闻，如果连2022年最重大的事件——胡锦涛被架走这个基本事实都否认，那就实在说不过去。这个人虽然可以自由出入中国，嫌疑很大，但是他的观点没有毛病，三观很正。你可以支持习近平，但是，连基本的事实都否定，那就恶心。

面对威胁或收买，没几个人能够坚持下来。
活成了自己讨厌的样子，我们也不知道他们当初怎么想的。

不听组织安排会被收拾的, 萧某质疑 “武汉肺炎中国死了几亿人” 就被开除了轮籍，章某某舔包却没事. 看来轮子也不是铁板一块。
还海外孤忠，五岳某某都不提，虽然习近平权力仍然在线，但是有些许动摇迹象，没有以前稳是事实。

的确漏数了他，只能说明大家对他连瞄一眼的兴趣都没。
这些人都是习的大外宣。

大家提到的一共9个人，杜某、章某某、翟山某，翟天某，公子某，矢某某某，京都静源刘某教授，赵某贱，五岳某某。

一开始传言习近平要干到2037年，2037年，习近平都要84岁了。现在等于习近平提前15年退休。本来习近平延迟了3年退休。大外宣少收了15年的钱。一直数钱数到2037年，没想到好日子结束了，提前15年结束了。世界不是他们想象的那样，或者希望的那样。

习近平要下台的迹象越来越明显，现在墙内也出现种种的信号。

国家越开放，会促使我们更加进步

假设习近平即将在2025年6月18日，6月28日，7月8日，7月18日，7月28日，8月8日的某一天突然下台，这一政治地震将标志着中国政策路线的重大转向。我们给他设6个发射窗口。看看会使用哪一个。新领导层汪洋或者胡春华迅速调整战略，试图摆脱当前的对抗姿态，转而拥抱开放与合作。在这一背景下，华为创始人任正非成为焦点人物，任正非的专访赫然登上《人民日报》头版，释放出令人振奋的信号。这一事件不仅象征着中国对民企的支持，更预示着中国将以更开放的姿态迈向未来，试图转向。

任正非的专访标题直击要害：“国家越开放，会促使我们更加进步！”这不仅是华为的个人立场，更是新领导层对内对外的强有力宣示。文章强调，面对外部压力和逆全球化浪潮，中国的大门不会关闭，反而会越开越大。任正非呼吁以实干精神突破技术瓶颈，比如芯片被“卡脖子”的难题，依靠创新和长期投入定能破解。这一表态暗含新领导层将不再与美国持续对抗的意愿，试图通过开放合作重塑国际形象。

说明他们还是不会放弃，民族主义的神主牌，改革开放的遮羞布。但是试图在民族主义和开放之间，进行再平衡。

《人民日报》头版刊登任正非专访，本身就是对民企的强力背书。在全球局势复杂、中国经济发展受阻的背景下，中国把任正非搬出来，试图为所有民营企业家注入信心。任正非表示，华为每年投入1800亿元研发，其中600亿元用于无回报考核的基础研究，体现了对长期主义的执着。这种“笨办法”被视为未来发展的基石，呼应了新领导层对科技自强的期待。

与此同时，美国总统川普在“真相社交”平台上宣布，与中国达成框架协议，称美中关系“极好”。川普表示，协议需经他与习近平最终批准，中国将供应稀土和磁铁，美国则允许中国学生继续留在美大学。这一交易显示出双方在贸易和教育领域的妥协。川普还承诺与新领导层合作，推动中国对美开放市场，称其为“两国的伟大胜利”。尽管股市反应平淡，但美国财政部长贝森特表示，若中国证明谈判诚意，中美经济关系或将重新平衡。

川普表示，中国新领导层已经决定接受55%的关税。这一决定标志着中国政策路线的显著转向，伴随着人事调整与中美关系的重新定位。中国迅速和美国达成协议，为习近平下台，为中国国内的人事腾出了空间。

中国接受55%的关税，这一数字虽高，但是假设越南的关税为25%，尽管中国面临的关税负担更重，这更多是“少挣钱”与“不挣钱”的区别。毕竟，关税并非中国独有，越南及其他国家也有关税。关键在于，别的国家也有关税，让中国在全球市场仍然能保持一定竞争力。其他国家的关税存在，反而为中国提供了喘息空间，就是比较优势，多少还能做点生意。这表明新领导层选择在经济压力下寻求生存，而不是彻底放弃国际市场。直接按照习近平的想法，闭关锁国，走朝鲜的模式。

新领导层的这一转向迅速体现在外交行动上。胡锦涛、温家宝及吴仪的嫡系人马李成钢，以国务院副总理何立峰的助手身份，在伦敦谈判中展现专业态度，与美国达成协议。这一举动凸显了新领导层与美国合作的能力。李成钢是“胡温”吴仪的马仔，深得他们的信任，李成钢参与暗示新政局可能延续温和派路线，寻求缓和与美国的紧张关系。加关税？加就加呗，要钱又不是要命。这种态度反映了新领导层对经济压力的坦然接受，同时也为国内稳定奠定基础。

尽管高关税给中国经济带来显著困难，新领导层并没有将矛头对准美国，而是将目光转向内部。经济发展的核心仍然要依靠自身，而外部压力的确可能成为推动内部改革的契机。与美国翻脸、因关税问题彻底对抗，显然是不理智的选择。

之前一直有网友给我留言说， 和美国打贸易战，是习近平的风格。那现在已经达成协议了。

何立峰的确是习近平的人，当时何立峰也是一个党棍，听党的。现在党的头目，党的总书记换了。何立峰会不会被中纪委调查，那是另外一回事的。现在事实表明，何立峰也是按照新的总书记的指示在办事。主子换了。

关税带来的经济挑战或许能激发出民主改革的压力和动力。民众对经济困境的关注可能促使新领导层调整治理模式，引入更多透明与参与机制，以缓解社会矛盾并重振经济活力。

如果天天躺着挣钱，谁还愿意改革呢？

这个关税水平，我觉得就是让中国很难受。但是多多少少还有生意，直接加到145%，那就彻底没生意了。

新政局的人事调整中，李成钢的角色尤为关键。在伦敦谈判中，他以理性、深入的沟通姿态赢得了认可，显示出新领导层在外交上的灵活性与专业性。据传，他不仅是胡锦涛、温家宝及吴仪的嫡系，还可能代表温和派的声音，旨在巩固国内稳定同时改善国际形象。这一转向或许预示着中国将逐步减少对抗姿态，更多依赖开放与合作来应对挑战。

中国接受55%关税的决定，表面上是经济妥协，实则暗藏战略调整。李成钢的斡旋成功表明新领导层具备与美国对话的能力，而经济压力或将成为民主改革的催化剂。尽管道路曲折，但这一政策转向或为中国打开新的发展窗口。网友或将在X平台热议：高关税下，中国能否借机实现内部变革？中美关系是否真正缓和？这些问题无疑将主导2025年的全球目光。

这名网友说，
中办、国办印发《关于深入推进深圳综合改革试点 深化改革创新扩大开放的意见》，大包，这也算是个邓派抬头的信号吧。
这名网友说，
比亚迪最近被整改了，我以前就听说比亚迪是彭丽媛家族的，在中国横着走没人敢管。
这名网友说，
百度首页热搜已经一个多礼拜不见习字。
这名网友说，
最新公布的关于深圳的文件，居然是2024年8月的，太诡异了。

这个符合我的论述体系，2024年6月，胡锦涛发动的军事政变。
这名网友说，
最近所有媒体首页都没有了习的照片。我脑洞一下：媒体也掌握在了习的反对派手里。至于目前关于习的文字报道仍然在首页，原因是反对派以“安全退休、不清算”为承诺，交换习“主动辞职”，每天等一个文字形式的头条，也是信守承诺的一部分。如果忽然什么报道都没有了，这个变化太大了，就不可能“安全退休，不清算了”了。
权力就是毒品一样，只要尝了就想要更多，如果不受控制，那便是要一路走到黑。
至某尊：为了您自己，也为了您的家人，若能平安落地，那就收手吧，放下执念，也算是放自己一马。您这一辈子，最委屈的事情受过，最荣耀的位子也坐过，其实没什么遗憾的。把事情留给正确的人去做，这个才是正确的历史写法。

这名网友说，
人民日报微信公众号，刊发燕陆撰写的评论《“既要又要还要”问题在哪？基层干部有苦咋解？》。

我们看，信号太多了，还有一个长三角座谈。太多了，我在做点功课，给大家展开说一下。

墙内都有信号了，说明习近平马上就要下台。就是这6个日期，大家可以竞猜一下。
好的，谢谢大家。

《原文链接》

英文翻译

In the post-Xi era, will there be a second reform and opening up? Who will take the helm, Wang Yang or Hu Chunhua? Guess the 6 possible dates for Xi Jinping to step down. Why has the CCP changed its line? Keep a low profile, change the soup but not the medicine, make some repairs, or democratic reform?

Hello everyone,
Today we will talk about what policy changes will happen in the post-Xi era. Now Xi Jinping has not officially stepped down. But there are already many policy changes and signs of line changes.
This netizen said,
The overseas loyalists who are still firmly supporting Xi Jinping include Du, Zhang, and Zhai Shan. The others are afraid of being slapped in the face.
Du was dealt with by Hu Chunhua, there is no way.
And Zhai Tian.
Are these two people? I thought it was one person.
Du and Hu Chunhua have a deep hatred. If he doesn’t support Xi, does he support the Youth League? He was forced to stand with Xi.
Added.
This netizen said,
Why is Zhang singing a different tune from other people in the wheel system? Is it for hedging?
There is also the guy who claims to be the son-in-law.
Jianghu ethics, if you collect water fees, you have to whitewash!
Du was sent out to talk nonsense, and Zhai Shan is a fraudster.
Zhang has problems.
Gongzi.
This netizen said,
Zhai Shan has gone to Stockholm, how can he be a lone loyalist who insults Bao every day.

In addition, there is a certain Ya who is absolutely a lone loyalist, who became a naturalized Taiwanese spy.
Traditional media people are usually cautious about rumors, such as Wang, but Wang does not deny the various signs that Baozi has lost power. Ya is too obvious. The title of his latest program is “Xi Jinping takes power to purge XXX”, which is a pot that is not open…
How did he oppose Hu Chunhua, why didn’t he tell the truth during his detention? Or did he make up a story to bring down Hu Chunhua?
Two great gods were missed, Professor Liu of Jingyuan, Kyoto, and the bitch Zhao.

Who is this? I know this person. Netizens have recommended him to me several times, but I don’t remember his name. It’s a hard name to pronounce.

I feel that Zhang is just collecting benefits.
The wheel should check whether Zhang is colluding with the bandits!
This netizen said,
Sun Zi is in the immigration business. The longer Baozi is in office, the better it is for them.

There are many people in the United States who do immigration business. Does Canada do it too? Those who do immigration business in the United States don’t do YouTube.

When Hu Jintao was taken out, Gong Zi said that it was because Hu Jintao was sick. Since then, I don’t want to watch Gong Zi’s program. Basically, once several YouTubers deliberately distort the facts, I don’t want to watch it anymore. I guess many viewers feel the same way. I don’t know what these YouTubers think. Are they really not afraid of losing fans and getting slapped in the face?

I want to say that there is a Twitter celebrity named Wang Moumou, who has 230,000 fans and 140,000 subscribers on YouTube. This person can enter and leave China freely, which is particularly eye-catching. Once, he went to Thailand, and everyone thought he might not return to China this time, but he returned to China as usual, and then traveled abroad again, going back and forth like this, which seemed very casual. With this privilege of free entry and exit, he is very likely a member of the Communist Party.

However, it is worth mentioning that his views are generally not obviously biased. I remember that at the end of 2022, when he made his year-end summary, he mentioned the biggest news of the year-Hu Jintao was taken away from the venue at the 20th National Congress. He admitted at the time that he “couldn’t say” or “dared not say”, and chose to bypass this sensitive topic, but did not distort the facts. This approach is actually not easy. After all, if you do current affairs news, if you deny even the most important event in 2022-Hu Jintao was taken away, it is really unacceptable. Although this person can enter and leave China freely, he is very suspicious, but his views are not wrong, and his values are very positive. You can support Xi Jinping, but it’s disgusting to deny even the basic facts.

Faced with threats or bribery, few people can stick to it.
They have become the people they hate, and we don’t know what they were thinking at the beginning.

If you don’t listen to the organization’s arrangements, you will be punished. Xiao was expelled from the party for questioning “hundreds of millions of people died in China due to Wuhan pneumonia”, but Zhang was fine. It seems that the party is not a monolithic entity.

He is also a lone loyalist overseas, and Wuyue is not mentioned. Although Xi Jinping’s power is still online, there are some signs of vacillation, and it is a fact that he is not as stable as before.

He was indeed missed, which only shows that everyone is not interested in even taking a look at him.
These people are Xi’s big foreign propaganda.

There are a total of 9 people mentioned by everyone, Du, Zhang, Zhai Shan, Zhai Tian, Gongzi, Ya, Professor Liu Jingyuan of Kyoto, Zhao Jian, Wuyue.

At the beginning, it was rumored that Xi Jinping would work until 2037. In 2037, Xi Jinping will be 84 years old. Now it means that Xi Jinping will retire 15 years early. Originally, Xi Jinping delayed his retirement by 3 years. The big foreign propaganda received 15 years less money. They have been counting money until 2037, but they didn’t expect that the good days would end, 15 years ahead of schedule. The world is not what they imagined or hoped.

The signs that Xi Jinping will step down are becoming more and more obvious, and now there are all kinds of signals inside the wall.

The more open the country is, the more we will be promoted

Assuming that Xi Jinping is about to step down suddenly on June 18, June 28, July 8, July 18, July 28, or August 8, 2025, this political earthquake will mark a major shift in China’s policy line. We set up 6 launch windows for him. See which one will be used. The new leadership Wang Yang or Hu Chunhua quickly adjusted the strategy, trying to get rid of the current confrontational posture and embrace openness and cooperation. Against this background, Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei became the focus, and Ren Zhengfei’s interview was on the front page of the People’s Daily, sending out an exciting signal. This event not only symbolizes China’s support for private enterprises, but also indicates that China will move towards the future with a more open attitude and try to turn.

The title of Ren Zhengfei’s interview hits the nail on the head: “The more open the country is, the more progress we will make!” This is not only Huawei’s personal position, but also a strong declaration of the new leadership to the inside and outside. The article emphasizes that in the face of external pressure and the tide of anti-globalization, China’s door will not close, but will open wider and wider. Ren Zhengfei called for a practical spirit to break through technical bottlenecks, such as the problem of chips being “stuck in the neck”, which can be solved by innovation and long-term investment. This statement implies that the new leadership will no longer continue to confront the United States, and try to reshape its international image through open cooperation.

It shows that they will not give up the nationalist tablet and the fig leaf of reform and opening up. But they are trying to rebalance between nationalism and openness.

The People’s Daily published an interview with Ren Zhengfei on the front page, which is itself a strong endorsement of private enterprises. Against the backdrop of a complex global situation and China’s economic development being hindered, China brought Ren Zhengfei out to try to inject confidence into all private entrepreneurs. Ren Zhengfei said that Huawei invests 180 billion yuan in research and development every year, of which 60 billion yuan is used for basic research without return assessment, which reflects its persistence in long-termism. This “stupid method” is regarded as the cornerstone of future development, echoing the new leadership’s expectations for technological self-reliance.

At the same time, US President Trump announced on the “truth social” platform that he had reached a framework agreement with China, calling US-China relations “excellent”. Trump said that the agreement needs to be finally approved by him and Xi Jinping, and China will supply rare earths and magnets, and the United States will allow Chinese students to continue to stay in US universities. The deal shows the compromise between the two sides in the fields of trade and education. Trump also promised to work with the new leadership to promote China’s market opening to the United States, calling it “a great victory for both countries.” Despite the flat reaction in the stock market, US Treasury Secretary Benson said that if China proves its sincerity in the negotiations, the economic relationship between China and the United States may be rebalanced.

Trump said that China’s new leadership has decided to accept a 55% tariff. The decision marks a significant shift in China’s policy line, accompanied by personnel adjustments and a repositioning of Sino-US relations. China quickly reached an agreement with the United States, making room for Xi Jinping to step down and for personnel changes in China.

China accepted a 55% tariff, which is high, but assuming Vietnam’s tariff is 25%, although China faces a heavier tariff burden, it is more of a difference between “making less money” and “making no money”. After all, tariffs are not unique to China, Vietnam and other countries also have tariffs. The key is that other countries also have tariffs, allowing China to remain competitive in the global market. The existence of tariffs in other countries has provided China with breathing space, which is a comparative advantage, and it can still do some business. This shows that the new leadership has chosen to survive under economic pressure rather than completely abandon the international market. Directly follow Xi Jinping’s ideas, close the country to the outside world, and follow the North Korean model.

This shift of the new leadership was quickly reflected in diplomatic actions. Li Chenggang, a direct descendant of Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Wu Yi, showed a professional attitude in the London negotiations as an assistant to Vice Premier He Lifeng and reached an agreement with the United States. This move highlights the ability of the new leadership to cooperate with the United States. Li Chenggang is a henchman of “Hu-Wen” and Wu Yi, and is deeply trusted by them. Li Chenggang’s participation suggests that the new political situation may continue the moderate line and seek to ease tensions with the United States. Add tariffs? Just add them, it’s not about money, it’s not about life. This attitude reflects the new leadership’s calm acceptance of economic pressure, and also lays the foundation for domestic stability.

Although high tariffs have brought significant difficulties to China’s economy, the new leadership has not pointed the finger at the United States, but turned its attention to the inside. The core of economic development still depends on itself, and external pressure may indeed become an opportunity to promote internal reforms. It is obviously an irrational choice to turn against the United States and completely confront the tariff issue.

Some netizens have left me messages saying that fighting a trade war with the United States is Xi Jinping’s style. Now an agreement has been reached.

He Lifeng is indeed Xi Jinping’s man. At that time, He Lifeng was also a party stick and listened to the party. Now the party leader, the general secretary of the party, has changed. Whether He Lifeng will be investigated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection is another matter. Now the facts show that He Lifeng is also doing things according to the instructions of the new general secretary. The master has changed.

The economic challenges brought by tariffs may stimulate pressure and motivation for democratic reform. The public’s concern about the economic difficulties may prompt the new leadership to adjust the governance model and introduce more transparent and participatory mechanisms to ease social conflicts and revitalize the economy.

If you can make money lying down every day, who would be willing to reform?
I think this tariff level makes China very uncomfortable. But there is still some business. If it is directly increased to 145%, there will be no business at all.

In the personnel adjustments of the new political situation, Li Chenggang’s role is particularly critical. In the London negotiations, he won recognition with his rational and in-depth communication attitude, showing the flexibility and professionalism of the new leadership in diplomacy. It is rumored that he is not only a direct descendant of Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Wu Yi, but also may represent the voice of the moderates, aiming to consolidate domestic stability while improving the international image. This shift may indicate that China will gradually reduce its confrontational stance and rely more on openness and cooperation to meet challenges.

China’s decision to accept a 55% tariff is an economic compromise on the surface, but it actually hides a strategic adjustment. Li Chenggang’s successful mediation shows that the new leadership has the ability to dialogue with the United States, and economic pressure may become a catalyst for democratic reform. Although the road is tortuous, this policy shift may open a new window for China’s development. Netizens may discuss on the X platform: Under high tariffs, can China take the opportunity to achieve internal changes? Are Sino-US relations truly eased? These issues will undoubtedly dominate the global attention in 2025.

This netizen said,
The General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council issued the “Opinions on Deepening the Shenzhen Comprehensive Reform Pilot, Deepening Reform, Innovation and Expanding Opening Up”, which is a big package. This can be regarded as a signal that the Deng faction is rising.
This netizen said,
BYD has been rectified recently. I heard that BYD belongs to Peng Liyuan’s family before. No one dares to control it in China.
This netizen said,
The Xi character has not been seen on the hot search on the Baidu homepage for more than a week.
This netizen said,
The latest document published on Shenzhen is actually from August 2024, which is too weird.

This is in line with my argument system. In June 2024, Hu Jintao launched a military coup.
This netizen said,
Recently, all media front pages have lost photos of Xi. I have a brainwave: the media is also controlled by Xi’s opponents. As for the current text reports about Xi still on the front page, the reason is that the opposition promised “safe retirement and no liquidation” in exchange for Xi’s “voluntary resignation”. Waiting for a text headline every day is also part of keeping the promise. If there are no reports suddenly, this change is too big, and it is impossible to “safely retire and no liquidation”.
Power is like a drug. Once you taste it, you want more. If it is not controlled, you will go all the way to the end.
To a certain person: For yourself and your family, if you can land safely, then stop, let go of your obsession, and it can be regarded as letting yourself go. In your life, you have suffered the most aggrieved things and sat in the most glorious position. In fact, there is nothing to regret. Leave things to the right people to do, this is the correct way to write history.

This netizen said,
The WeChat public account of the People’s Daily published a commentary written by Yan Lu, “Where is the problem of “wanting both and wanting more”? How to solve the suffering of grassroots cadres? “.

Let’s see, there are too many signals, and there is also a Yangtze River Delta forum. There are too many, I am doing some homework, and I will explain it to you in detail.

There are signals inside the wall, which means Xi Jinping will step down soon. These are the 6 dates, you can guess.
Okay, thank you everyone.

END

大家好，这名网友说，
“给予朱芝松其开除党籍的处分，待召开中央委员会全体会议时予以追认。”我怎么感觉四中全会真如大包预料的日期8月8号呢？大包这张嘴不会又双叒叕一次开光了吧
我的回复是，朱芝松这个的确今天最重要的新闻。因为官方，第一次提到四中全会。虽然暂时没有公布日期。我们要详细分析一下。

这一段信息比较重要也不是很长，我们就把念一下，好几个关键的信息点。

经查，朱芝松丧失理想信念，背弃初心使命，对党不忠诚不老实，对抗组织审查；无视中央八项规定精神，长期接受可能影响公正执行公务的宴请，由他人支付应由个人支付的费用；组织原则缺失，不如实报告个人有关事项，在职工录用工作中违规为他人谋取利益；廉洁底线失守，利用职权或者职务上的影响为亲属谋取利益，违规收受礼品礼金和消费卡；违规决定降低国有土地使用权出让价格，违规干预和插手工程项目承包；利用职务便利为他人在工程承揽、企业经营等方面谋利，并非法收受巨额财物。

朱芝松严重违反党的政治纪律、组织纪律、廉洁纪律和工作纪律，构成严重职务违法并涉嫌受贿犯罪，且在党的十八大后不收敛、不收手，性质严重，影响恶劣，应予严肃处理。依据《中国共产党纪律处分条例》《中华人民共和国监察法》《中华人民共和国公职人员政务处分法》等有关规定，经中央纪委常委会会议研究并报中央政治局会议审议，决定给予朱芝松开除党籍处分；由国家监委给予其开除公职处分；终止其党的二十大代表、上海市第十二次党代会代表、上海市浦东新区第五次党代会代表资格；收缴其违纪违法所得；将其涉嫌犯罪问题移送检察机关依法审查起诉，所涉财物一并移送。给予其开除党籍的处分，待召开中央委员会全体会议时予以追认。

首先第一段，我们就要注意，对党不忠诚不老实，对抗组织审查。都被中纪委抓进去了，谁给朱芝松的胆子呢？因为朱芝松和彭丽媛有一腿。朱芝松我是2024年11月29日我就说了，他是彭丽媛的人。半年之后，中纪委说朱芝松对抗组织审查，没有彭丽媛，朱芝松哪儿来胆子？抓进去了，还对抗组织审查呢。

这里面还有一句《并报中央政治局会议审议》，说明5月真的召开了政治局会议，但是没有公布任何消息。因为这里说了，决定给予朱芝松开除党籍处分。这是政治局会议决定。当然其实是中纪委决定的，政治局会议背书的，好歹走个程序。

然后这里还有一句，待召开中央委员会全体会议时予以追认。这是官方消息第一次明确表示，四中全会要召开了。这句话我也不知道该怎么理解，是说四中全会的日期已经确定，但是没有公布，还是只是泛泛的说一说。

首先，我们说一下，5月份的政治局会议到底有什么内容呢。现在已知有3项内容。

5月30日，任命卢东亮为山西省长。
5月30日，任命周霁为中联办主任。
这两项任命都是在5月的政治局会议上通过的。今天我们知道，5月的政治局会议上还有一项日程是开除朱芝松党籍，朱芝松是中央候补委员。

2025年5月24日上午，应印度尼西亚总统普拉博沃和东盟轮值主席国马来西亚总理安瓦尔邀请，国务院总理李强乘包机离开北京，对印尼进行正式访问，赴马来西亚出席东盟—中国—海合会峰会。

2025年5月28日下午，国务院总理李强在结束对印尼进行正式访问和在马来西亚出席东盟－中国－海合会峰会后，乘包机回到北京。

赵乐际5月14日，19日，22日，三天都有外交活动。
王沪宁根据不完全统计5月14日，20日，27日28日有活动。

2025年5月14日，中共中央政治局常委、中央书记处书记蔡奇在北京会见由蒙古人民党总书记索德巴特尔率领的代表团。 中共政治局常委、中央書記處書記蔡奇16至17日在河北唐山調研。5月27日蔡奇出席中国少年先锋队第九次全国代表大会。

5月19日至20日，习近平在河南考察。

5月15日，突尼斯总统赛义德在突尼斯市会见率中共代表团访突的中共中央政治局委员、中宣部部长李书磊。

应世界卫生组织总干事谭德塞和瑞士、白俄罗斯政府邀请，中共中央政治局委员、国务院副总理刘国中将于5月18日至23日赴瑞士日内瓦出席第78届世界卫生大会并顺访瑞士

5月21日上海市委书记陈吉宁去上海科技大学滑跪江绵恒。

我们综合一下，看看这些政治局为常委和委员的行程呢。

5月14日，赵乐际，王沪宁，蔡奇，丁薛祥，4个政治局常委都有活动。说明至少5月14日这一天没有开会。5月19日20日，习近平在河南，24日到28日李强出国访问。因此最有可能就是5月15日到18日，这4天开会。这4天呢，李书磊和蔡奇缺席，其实缺席一两个人，无所谓。之前丁薛祥，何卫东都缺席过政治局会议。还需要看一下，其他政治局委员有没有活动。缺席两三个人以上应该就是没有召开。

但是现在新闻联播明确说了5月份召开了政治局会议。只能推测是5月29日召开的政治局会议，但是没有公布。5月29日的政治局会议，至少有三项日程，任命卢东亮为山西省长，周霁为中联办主任，开除中央候补委员朱芝松党籍。

2019年08月，50岁的朱芝松任上海市人民政府副秘书长，中国（上海）自由贸易试验区临港新片区管理委员会常务副主任、洋山保税港区管理委员会主任（兼）。主任是陈寅，朱芝松给陈寅担任大秘。陈寅是应勇大秘，失踪很久。陈寅是死是活没人知道。也就是说，朱芝松是应勇的秘书，陈寅的秘书。陈寅抓了，一直不公布，就是等着抓应勇呢。应勇是习近平的铁杆马仔。

上海市副市长陈宇剑曾经是周波的下属，也曾经是陈寅的下属。陈宇剑按说也应该抓了，不知道为什么不抓，都跑不了啊。

朱芝松是应勇的秘书陈寅的秘书，应勇既然是习近平的铁杆马仔，那么朱芝松也应该是习近平的铁杆马仔才对。

上海航天技术研究院，又名八院。这就是习近平的犯罪窝点。这里面的人都抓了。
金壮龙，2025年2月28日，失踪两个月后被免职
袁洁，已抓，未公布
朱芝松，2024年11月27日被查，2025年6月双开。
代守仑，2024年8月22日被查

大外宣为了给习近平洗地，扯到江绵恒身上了。现在江绵恒都上新闻联播了，5月21日，陈吉宁刚刚去上海科技大学滑跪江绵恒，求江绵恒保自己。八院都已经团灭了，如果八院是江绵恒，江绵恒还能不能出来得瑟。

朱芝松曾经担任八院总体所所长（1999年朱芝松被破格晋升为研究员）；当时的八院院长是金壮龙（1998年-2001年）。所以按说应该先把金壮龙抓了，再抓应勇。八院前后三个院长，袁洁，朱芝松，代守仑都抓了。金壮龙也不能跑了呀。金壮龙提拔的朱芝松。

这一段是我2024年11月就说的。当时金壮龙还没有被抓呢。现在是不是被拿掉了。的确没有官宣被抓了。但是李乐成都已经接任工信部长了。他命大没办法。不知道是被秘密处决，还是逃过一劫，退休了。

2014年05月，45岁的朱芝松任上海市委宣传部副部长，当时的上海市委书记韩正（2012年11月20日 – 2017年10月29日），当时的上海副书记是应勇 （2014年7月 – 2017年1月）

2015年12月 – 2017年06月，46岁的朱芝松任上海市闵行区委副书记、代区长、区长。2016年01月去代转正。

2017年05月，48岁的朱芝松任上海市闵行区委书记。

朱芝松就是韩正提拔的，韩正是朱镕基提拔的。韩正提拔副局级正局级，朱镕基上海市委书记市长一肩挑。韩正，朱镕基，习近平是一个派系的，和江泽民没有关系。要不然怎么解释江泽民的人都被习近平收拾了呢。

2008年11月，39岁的朱芝松任上海航天局局长、党委副书记。当时的中国航天工业总公司总经理是马兴瑞（2007年 – 2013年）。朱芝松和马兴瑞都是哈尔滨工业大学，哈尔滨帮。

朱芝松到底和习近平有什么关系呢，金壮龙要提拔朱芝松呢。1989年，20岁的朱芝松毕业于哈尔滨工业大学机械制造专业。20岁就毕业，跳级了还是怎么回事儿。这不还是哈尔滨帮吗？哈尔滨帮就是彭丽媛罗健马兴瑞的大本营。准确的说还不能说是哈尔滨帮，哈尔滨市是副部级单位，肯定不止一个派系。准确的说应该是哈尔滨工业大学帮。哈工大才是习近平真正的全家桶。但是哈工大主要是研究生院，马兴瑞的导师黄文虎，是哈工大帮。

朱芝松念的是机械制造专业。朱芝松的系主任叫做齐毓霖。齐毓霖，男，1928年1月生于浙江杭州，长期担任哈尔滨工业大学机械工程系主任。齐毓霖是朱芝松的系主任，曾经担任谭震林秘书。谭震林我们简单看一下，就是新四军，陈毅。这些都是习近平派系的关键词。这不是又回到陈毅的秘书谷牧，谷牧提拔的贾庆林，贾庆林提拔的习近平。转来转去就跑不出那几个人

这名网友说，
没有自己人，胡竟然敢裸退，真的是天真还是信错了人啊。
人肯定有，只不过小看了江和习的无耻。
18届军委8个人，胡锦涛有4个人，房峰辉 （2018年1月9日官宣被查）、张阳 （2017年8月28日被查）、吴胜利、魏凤和 （2023年9月21日被查）。
大外宣胡说八道给胡锦涛带高帽子，怎么可能裸腿呢，胡锦涛后面都是一个巨大的政治利益集团。
计划废了，六大门派围攻团团。
胡的翻盘核心军中核心力量是谁？没有军队力量话语权就要逊于江派，现在看却高于江派。

这个问题是个好问题，只能说，江泽民死了，江派现在群龙无首。现在谁才是江派的老大？没有一锤定音的人。军队，我说不是仅仅台面的上，张又侠，刘振立，张升民三个人说了算。退休的都有话语权，但是有大的话语权，单说。这迟浩田都95岁，还在闻鸡起舞呢

胡锦涛是2024年6月发动军事政变。这时候江泽民已经死了，军队江泽民的人，如果不跟着胡锦涛，那就是死路一条，全得被习近平给收拾了，没有选择。

这名网友说，
大包，总感觉许不是习的人，他当时是军委副主席，怎么提拔另一个军委副主席。党内三个派系，只有军委主席和副主席才能算军头。习既然是主席了，那另外两个副主席，只能给其它派系，江胡各一个。范长龙是江派的人，许其亮只能是胡派。

我的回复是，
你说的很符合逻辑，我一开始也是默认大家的说法，我也没想许其亮不是胡锦涛的人。我也认同，三个军委主席副主席，分别属于三个不同的派系。但是现在已经发现了许其亮有林彪，吴法宪渊源。不管许乐夫是不是许其亮爸爸，许其亮也是许乐夫提拔的。许乐夫两次担任过吴法宪的下属，这是事实。许其亮在空八军时候，南京军区空军司令就是和许乐夫搭档的姜玉田。

你可以说许其亮不是姜玉田提拔的，但是姜玉田曾经是许其亮的上级这是事实。你可以去找当时的南京军区空军政委。中国空军政委。许其亮可以是别人提拔， 但是姜玉田就是担任过许其亮的上级。同样许乐夫也可以不是吴法宪提拔的，但是吴法宪两次担任过许乐夫的上级，这是事实。

习近平当时虽然是副主席，但是他马上上位，郭声琨也是习近平的人。也是习近平刚刚上位，就任命的公安部长。郭声琨当了10年的刀把子。许其亮给习近平当了10年的枪杆子。

江泽民和胡锦涛之所以下，可能不是高风亮节，而是迫不得已。
好的，谢谢大家。

《原文链接》

英文翻译

The news broadcast confirmed that Xi Jinping will step down and the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee will be held soon. Zhu Zhisong thought Peng Liyuan would save him, so he “resisted organizational review”

Hello everyone, this netizen said,
“Zhu Zhisong was expelled from the party and will be confirmed when the plenary session of the Central Committee is held.” Why do I feel that the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee is really on August 8 as Dabao expected? Dabao’s mouth will not be opened again, right?
My reply is that Zhu Zhisong’s news is indeed the most important news today. Because the official mentioned the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee for the first time. Although the date has not been announced yet. We need to analyze it in detail.

This piece of information is more important and not very long. Let’s read it out. There are several key information points.

After investigation, it was found that Zhu Zhisong had lost his ideals and beliefs, betrayed his original mission, was disloyal and dishonest to the Party, and resisted organizational review; he ignored the spirit of the Central Committee’s eight regulations, accepted banquets that may affect the fair performance of official duties for a long time, and had others pay for expenses that should be paid by individuals; he lacked organizational principles, did not report personal matters truthfully, and illegally sought benefits for others in the recruitment of employees; he lost his integrity, used his power or influence to seek benefits for his relatives, and illegally accepted gifts, cash gifts and consumption cards; he decided to reduce the transfer price of state-owned land use rights in violation of regulations, and illegally intervened and intervened in the contracting of engineering projects; he used his position to seek benefits for others in engineering contracting and business operations, and illegally accepted huge amounts of property.

Zhu Zhisong seriously violated the Party’s political discipline, organizational discipline, integrity discipline and work discipline, constituted a serious violation of duty and was suspected of bribery, and did not stop after the 18th National Congress of the Party. The nature is serious and the impact is bad, and he should be dealt with seriously. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the “Regulations on Disciplinary Punishment of the Communist Party of China”, “Supervision Law of the People’s Republic of China”, “Administrative Punishment Law of Public Officials of the People’s Republic of China”, etc., after the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Standing Committee meeting studied and reported to the Central Political Bureau meeting for deliberation, it was decided to expel Zhu Zhisong from the party; the National Supervision Commission shall expel him from public office; terminate his qualifications as a representative of the 20th National Congress of the Party, the 12th Party Congress of Shanghai, and the 5th Party Congress of Pudong New Area, Shanghai; confiscate his illegal gains; transfer his suspected criminal issues to the procuratorate for review and prosecution in accordance with the law, and transfer the relevant property together. He was expelled from the party and will be ratified when the plenary meeting of the Central Committee is held.

First of all, in the first paragraph, we must pay attention to being disloyal and dishonest to the party and resisting organizational review. They were all arrested by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Who gave Zhu Zhisong the courage? Because Zhu Zhisong and Peng Liyuan had an affair. I said Zhu Zhisong on November 29, 2024 that he was Peng Liyuan’s man. Half a year later, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection said that Zhu Zhisong resisted the organizational review. Without Peng Liyuan, how could Zhu Zhisong have the courage? He was arrested, but he still resisted the organizational review.

There is also a sentence “and report to the Central Political Bureau meeting for review”, which shows that the Political Bureau meeting was really held in May, but no news was announced. Because it says here that it was decided to expel Zhu Zhisong from the party. This was a decision made by the Political Bureau meeting. Of course, it was actually decided by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and endorsed by the Political Bureau meeting. At least it went through the procedures.

Then there is another sentence here, which will be ratified when the plenary session of the Central Committee is held. This is the first time that official news has clearly stated that the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee will be held. I don’t know how to understand this sentence. Does it mean that the date of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee has been determined, but it has not been announced, or is it just a general statement.

First of all, let’s talk about what the Politburo meeting in May actually contained. Now it is known that there are 3 contents.

On May 30, Lu Dongliang was appointed as the governor of Shanxi Province.
On May 30, Zhou Ji was appointed as the director of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Both appointments were approved at the Politburo meeting in May. Today we know that another agenda item at the Politburo meeting in May was to expel Zhu Zhisong from the party, who is an alternate member of the Central Committee.

On the morning of May 24, 2025, at the invitation of Indonesian President Prabowo and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar, the rotating chair of ASEAN, Premier Li Qiang left Beijing by charter flight for an official visit to Indonesia and went to Malaysia to attend the ASEAN-China-GCC Summit.

On the afternoon of May 28, 2025, Premier Li Qiang returned to Beijing by charter flight after concluding his official visit to Indonesia and attending the ASEAN-China-GCC Summit in Malaysia.

Zhao Leji had diplomatic activities on May 14, 19, and 22.
According to incomplete statistics, Wang Huning had activities on May 14, 20, 27, and 28.

On May 14, 2025, Cai Qi, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Secretariat, met with a delegation led by Sodbaatar, General Secretary of the Mongolian People’s Party, in Beijing. Cai Qi, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Secretariat, conducted research in Tangshan, Hebei from May 16 to 17. On May 27, Cai Qi attended the Ninth National Congress of the Young Pioneers of China.

From May 19 to 20, Xi Jinping inspected Henan.

On May 15, Tunisian President Said met with Li Shulei, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Minister of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, who led a delegation of the CPC to visit Tunisia in Tunis.

At the invitation of Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of the World Health Organization, and the governments of Switzerland and Belarus, Liu Guozhong, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council, will attend the 78th World Health Assembly in Geneva, Switzerland from May 18 to 23 and visit Switzerland.

On May 21, Chen Jining, Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, went to Shanghai University of Science and Technology to slide on Jiang Mianheng’s knees.

Let’s take a comprehensive look at the itinerary of these Politburo Standing Committee members and members.

On May 14, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang, four members of the Politburo Standing Committee, all had activities. This means that at least there was no meeting on May 14. On May 19 and 20, Xi Jinping was in Henan, and Li Qiang went abroad from May 24 to 28. Therefore, the most likely meeting was held on May 15 to 18. During these four days, Li Shulei and Cai Qi were absent. In fact, it doesn’t matter if one or two people are absent. Ding Xuexiang and He Weidong have both been absent from the Politburo meeting before. We still need to see if other Politburo members have activities. If more than two or three people are absent, it should be that the meeting was not held.

But now the news broadcast clearly stated that the Politburo meeting was held in May. We can only speculate that it was the Politburo meeting held on May 29, but it has not been announced. The Politburo meeting on May 29 had at least three agendas, appointing Lu Dongliang as the governor of Shanxi Province, Zhou Ji as the director of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and expelling Zhu Zhisong, an alternate member of the Central Committee, from the party.

In August 2019, 50-year-old Zhu Zhisong was appointed as the deputy secretary-general of the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, the executive deputy director of the Lingang New Area Management Committee of the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, and the director of the Yangshan Free Trade Port Management Committee (concurrently). The director is Chen Yin, and Zhu Zhisong serves as Chen Yin’s chief secretary. Chen Yin is Ying Yong’s chief secretary and has been missing for a long time. No one knows whether Chen Yin is dead or alive. In other words, Zhu Zhisong is Ying Yong’s secretary and Chen Yin’s secretary. Chen Yin was arrested, but it has not been announced, just waiting to arrest Ying Yong. Ying Yong is Xi Jinping’s iron-clad henchman.

Shanghai Vice Mayor Chen Yujian was once Zhou Bo’s subordinate and also Chen Yin’s subordinate. Chen Yujian should have been arrested, but I don’t know why he was not arrested. He can’t run away.

Zhu Zhisong is the secretary of Ying Yong’s secretary Chen Yin. Since Ying Yong is Xi Jinping’s iron-clad henchman, Zhu Zhisong should also be Xi Jinping’s iron-clad henchman.

Shanghai Academy of Space Technology, also known as the Eighth Academy. This is Xi Jinping’s criminal den. Everyone in this case has been arrested.
Jin Zhuanglong, February 28, 2025, was dismissed two months after disappearing
Yuan Jie, arrested, not announced
Zhu Zhisong, investigated on November 27, 2024, expelled from the party and removed from office in June 2025.
Dai Shoulun, investigated on August 22, 2024

In order to whitewash Xi Jinping, the big foreign propaganda has dragged Jiang Mianheng into it. Now Jiang Mianheng has even appeared on the news broadcast. On May 21, Chen Jining just went to Shanghai University of Science and Technology to kneel down to Jiang Mianheng and beg Jiang Mianheng to protect him. The Eighth Institute has been wiped out. If the Eighth Institute was Jiang Mianheng, would Jiang Mianheng still be able to show off?

Zhu Zhisong once served as the director of the General Institute of the Eighth Institute (Zhu Zhisong was promoted to researcher in 1999); the president of the Eighth Institute at that time was Jin Zhuanglong (1998-2001). So it should be that Jin Zhuanglong should be arrested first, and then Ying Yong. The three former and current presidents of the Eighth Hospital, Yuan Jie, Zhu Zhisong, and Dai Shoulun, were all arrested. Jin Zhuanglong can’t run away either. Zhu Zhisong was promoted by Jin Zhuanglong.

I said this in November 2024. At that time, Jin Zhuanglong had not been arrested yet. Has he been removed now? There is indeed no official announcement of his arrest. But Li Lecheng has already taken over as Minister of Industry and Information Technology. He is very lucky. I don’t know whether he was secretly executed or escaped and retired.

In May 2014, 45-year-old Zhu Zhisong was appointed as Deputy Minister of the Propaganda Department of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee. At that time, the Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee was Han Zheng (November 20, 2012 – October 29, 2017), and the Deputy Secretary of Shanghai at that time was Ying Yong (July 2014 – January 2017)

From December 2015 to June 2017, 46-year-old Zhu Zhisong was appointed as Deputy Secretary of the Minhang District Party Committee, Acting District Mayor, and District Mayor of Shanghai. In January 2016, he was promoted from acting to full-time.

In May 2017, 48-year-old Zhu Zhisong was appointed as the Secretary of the Minhang District Committee of Shanghai.

Zhu Zhisong was promoted by Han Zheng, who was promoted by Zhu Rongji. Han Zheng promoted deputy bureau-level officials to bureau-level officials, while Zhu Rongji was the Secretary and Mayor of Shanghai. Han Zheng, Zhu Rongji, and Xi Jinping are from the same faction and have nothing to do with Jiang Zemin. Otherwise, how can we explain that Jiang Zemin’s people were dealt with by Xi Jinping?

In November 2008, 39-year-old Zhu Zhisong was appointed as the Director and Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of the Shanghai Aerospace Administration. The General Manager of China Aerospace Corporation at that time was Ma Xingrui (2007-2013). Zhu Zhisong and Ma Xingrui were both from Harbin Institute of Technology, and were members of the Harbin Gang.

What is the relationship between Zhu Zhisong and Xi Jinping, and why did Jin Zhuanglong want to promote Zhu Zhisong? In 1989, 20-year-old Zhu Zhisong graduated from Harbin Institute of Technology with a major in mechanical manufacturing. He graduated at the age of 20. Did he skip a grade or something? Isn’t this still the Harbin Gang? The Harbin Gang is the base camp of Peng Liyuan, Luo Jian, and Ma Xingrui. To be precise, it cannot be called the Harbin Gang. Harbin City is a vice-ministerial unit, so there must be more than one faction. To be precise, it should be the Harbin Institute of Technology Gang. Harbin Institute of Technology is Xi Jinping’s real family bucket. But Harbin Institute of Technology is mainly a graduate school, and Ma Xingrui’s mentor Huang Wenhu is from the Harbin Institute of Technology Gang.

Zhu Zhisong studied mechanical manufacturing. Zhu Zhisong’s department head is Qi Yulin. Qi Yulin, male, was born in Hangzhou, Zhejiang in January 1928. He has long served as the head of the Department of Mechanical Engineering at Harbin Institute of Technology. Qi Yulin is Zhu Zhisong’s department head and once served as Tan Zhenlin’s secretary. Let’s take a quick look at Tan Zhenlin. He is the New Fourth Army and Chen Yi. These are the keywords of Xi Jinping’s faction. Isn’t this going back to Chen Yi’s secretary Gu Mu, Gu Mu promoted Jia Qinglin, and Jia Qinglin promoted Xi Jinping. It’s just that those few people are still around.

This netizen said,
Without his own people, Hu dared to retire naked. Is he really naive or did he trust the wrong people?

There must be people , but they underestimated the shamelessness of Jiang and Xi.

There are 8 people in the 18th Military Commission, and Hu Jintao has 4 people, Fang Fenghui (officially announced to be investigated on January 9, 2018), Zhang Yang (investigated on August 28, 2017), Wu Shengli, and Wei Fenghe (investigated on September 21, 2023).

The big foreign propaganda is talking nonsense to put a high hat on Hu Jintao, how could he be naked? Behind Hu Jintao is a huge political interest group.

The plan is scrapped, and the six major factions are besieging Tuantuan.

Who is the core force in the military that is the core of Hu’s turnaround? Without the power of the army, the right to speak will be inferior to that of the Jiang faction, but now it seems to be higher than that of the Jiang faction.

This is a good question. I can only say that Jiang Zemin is dead and the Jiang faction is now leaderless. Who is the boss of the Jiang faction now? There is no one who can make the final decision. In the military, I say it is not just the ones on the surface. Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, and Zhang Shengmin have the final say. Retired people have a say, but those who have a big say are just talking. Chi Haotian is 95 years old and is still dancing at the sound of cock-crows.

Hu Jintao launched a military coup in June 2024. At this time, Jiang Zemin is dead. If Jiang Zemin’s people in the military do not follow Hu Jintao, they will die. They will all be dealt with by Xi Jinping. There is no choice.

This netizen said,
Dabao, I always feel that Xu is not Xi’s person. He was the vice chairman of the Military Commission at that time. How can he promote another vice chairman of the Military Commission? Among the three factions in the party, only the chairman and vice chairman of the Military Commission can be considered military leaders. Since Xi is the chairman, the other two vice chairmen can only be given to other factions, one each for Jiang and Hu. Fan Changlong is a member of the Jiang faction, and Xu Qiliang can only be a member of the Hu faction.

My reply is,
What you said is very logical. I also tacitly agreed with everyone’s statement at the beginning. I didn’t think Xu Qiliang was not Hu Jintao’s man. I also agree that the three chairmen and vice chairmen of the Military Commission belong to three different factions. But now it has been discovered that Xu Qiliang has a connection with Lin Biao and Wu Faxian. Regardless of whether Xu Lefu is Xu Qiliang’s father, Xu Qiliang was promoted by Xu Lefu. Xu Lefu served as Wu Faxian’s subordinate twice, this is a fact. When Xu Qiliang was in the Eighth Air Force, the commander of the Air Force of the Nanjing Military Region was Jiang Yutian, who was Xu Lefu’s partner.

You can say that Xu Qiliang was not promoted by Jiang Yutian, but Jiang Yutian was Xu Qiliang’s superior, this is a fact. You can go to the then political commissar of the Nanjing Military Region Air Force. The political commissar of the Chinese Air Force. Xu Qiliang may have been promoted by others, but Jiang Yutian was Xu Qiliang’s superior. Similarly, Xu Lefu may not have been promoted by Wu Faxian, but Wu Faxian served as Xu Lefu’s superior twice, this is a fact.

Although Xi Jinping was the vice president at the time, he took office immediately. Guo Shengkun was also Xi Jinping’s man. He was also appointed as the Minister of Public Security when Xi Jinping just took office. Guo Shengkun served as the knife handle for 10 years. Xu Qiliang served as the gun for Xi Jinping for 10 years.

The reason why Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao stepped down may not be because of their noble character, but because they had no choice.
Okay, thank you everyone.

END

我的观点是，
江泽民和胡锦涛都没有提拔过许其亮。首先许其亮就是他爸许乐夫提拔的。从1985年到1990年，许其亮历任空军上海指挥所参谋长，空八军代理副军长，参谋长，军长。当时的南京军区空军司令姜玉田，担任空26师师长的时候和当时的师政委许乐夫搭档了3年。许其亮就是他爸许乐夫的战友提拔的。

首先我们人脸比对许乐夫和许其亮的人脸相似度是33%。

《瞭望东方周刊》由新华社主管，瞭望周刊社主办，于2003年在上海创刊。2007年许其亮不单是空军司令还担任军委委员。新华社作为官媒为什么要造谣军委委员，空军司令呢？有什么合理的理由吗？就是因为新华社曝光许其亮是红二代，不是农民出身，所以才被迫道歉。

当时的新华社社长是谁？当时的新华社社长田聪明，是胡锦涛当年在西藏主政时的第三把手。更为重要的是，胡锦涛那时大半时间养病在京，这西藏的日常党务就靠田聪明替他顶着。田聪明之前在内蒙古是赵紫阳的改革大将周惠的秘书。也就是说曝光许其亮的爸爸是许乐夫的《瞭望东方周刊》由新华社主管。新华社当时的社长是田聪明，田聪明是胡锦涛马仔。道歉就是李长春让道歉的。

1993年1月 – 1994年10月，43岁的许其亮任空军副参谋长。
1994年10月 – 1999年1月，44岁的许其亮任空军参谋长。
许其亮这两次提拔，1993年1994年邓小平没死，陈云也没死。陈云倒是住院了，1994年5月25日，陈云因为肺炎住进北京医院。1995年4月10日，陈云死亡。陈云的实力存疑。只要清醒，陈云完全有权力，有实力把许其亮提拔的成空军参谋长。

当时的军委委员：傅全有 （1992年10月 – 2003年3月）就是周恩来陈云的马仔。傅全有是谢振华推荐的，谢振华是周恩来的马仔。谢振华主政山西的时候把陈永贵抓了。陈永贵是毛泽东树立的农业学大寨的典型。谢振华向军委建议，在自卫还击作战中归昆明军区指挥的解放军第一军军长傅全有表现不错，可以作为合并整编后的成都军区司令员人选。

1999年1月，49岁的许其亮任沈阳军区副司令兼沈阳军区空军司令。当时的军委委员：傅全有 （1992年10月 – 2003年3月），这是许其亮在江泽民军委主席的任期之内唯一的一次职务变动。
1994年江泽民没有完全掌握军权，邓小平还在。1999年邓小平死了。江泽民掌权了。但是这一步许其亮只是平调，从空军参谋长，平调到沈阳军区空军司令。都是副战区级别，副军区级别。江泽民没有提拔过许其亮。

2004年6月11日，54岁的许其亮任中国人民解放军副总参谋长。这一步还是平调， 而且特殊，这是换届。
2004年9月19日，四中全会补选：胡锦涛为军委主席，江泽民退出军委主席。之前我就说过，江泽民退休之后，江泽民没法很容易提拔正部级。江泽民的人往往是换届才上去的。

许其亮这一步发生在胡锦涛接替军委主席之前3个月。说明不是胡锦涛提拔的。胡锦涛当时的确是军委副主席。胡锦涛是在1999年9月22日四中全会被增补为军委副主席。许其亮平调到沈阳军区空军司令，刚好是在胡锦涛接任军委副主席之前8个月。说明也不是胡锦涛操作。

许其亮1994年就已经是空军参谋长，已经是副战区级。到了2004年江泽民退休，许其亮变成副总参谋长。还是副战区级。江泽民10年没有提拔的许其亮。在江泽民的任期之内，许其亮维持副战区级的级别，只是平调了两个工作岗位。

2007年9月，57岁的许其亮任中国人民解放军空军司令员，10月晋升军委委员。这一步许其亮晋升正战区级，晋升军委委员。等于连升两级。为什么还不是胡锦涛提拔的？我们对比16届军委和17届军委的名单就知道了。当时张定发死了，乔清晨退休，两个军委退休为什么能晋升三名军委呢。因为徐才厚，从军委晋升副主席，曹刚川退休。

我们看当时梁光烈67岁，陈炳德66岁，比乔清晨岁数大都没有退休。乔清晨当时66岁，七上八下，没到退休年龄。是乔清晨把自己军委的位置让给了许其亮，才上许其亮上位的。乔清晨和苗华的老丈人叶汉林有直接的交集。

黄铭是在2023年1月接替吴亚男担任中部战区司令。那么这一步操作的意义是什么呢，就是吴亚男把自己的司令让给了自己人黄铭，以便于黄铭能够晋升上将。

2016年，付文化大校接替徐起零少将，升任中国人民解放军陆军第五十四集团军（现为陆军第八十三集团军）参谋长，跻身副军级。徐起零把54集团军参谋长的位置让给了付文化。以便于付文化能够晋升副军级。

乔清晨66岁没到67岁的退休年龄，完全可以再干一届军委的情况下。把自己的位置让给了许其亮，许其亮才得以上位。许其亮如果是胡锦涛的人，直接提拔就行。

乔清晨和苗华的老丈人有直接的交集。
1985年10月 – 1990年1月，乔清晨担任空8军政治部主任，空8军就是福州军区空军。
1981年 – 1987年，苗华的老丈人叶汉林担任福州军区政治部副主任。

我给大家整理时间线，
2024年10月24日，苗华老丈人叶汉林死亡，叶汉林和乔清晨曾经是同事。
2025年3月6日，前空军政委于忠福出席二会。其实何卫东也出席了二会。。
2025年4月16日，传言于忠福被抓。于忠福是乔清晨提拔，乔清晨把军委委员让给许其亮。
2025年6月2日，许其亮死亡。

江泽民和胡锦涛都没有提拔过许其亮。也就是说从军队来看， 真的有三个派系。许其亮在江泽民担任军委主席10年一直是副战区级。许其亮在胡锦涛担任军委主席期间晋升正战区级，空军司令并晋升军委委员。这是乔清晨提前退休，把位置让给许其亮的。

许其亮心梗抢救成功的可能性是96%。于忠福的师傅乔清晨把自己的军委委员让给了许其亮。于忠福传言被抓一个半月之后，许其亮就死了。许其亮死了之后新华社播发了许其亮生平，一般副国级没有这个待遇。新华社强调许其亮效忠习近平。

胡锦涛给许其亮送花圈，但是没有出席许其亮的葬礼。但是胡锦涛出席了另外一个军委副主席，张震的葬礼，等于胡锦涛没有背书许其亮。

吴邦国和李克强死了，新华社的报道中都有胡锦涛送花圈表示哀悼。但是许其亮报道中，新华社没有写这句话。当然许其亮的级别比吴邦国和李克强低。他只是政治局委员不是政治局常委。所以许其亮不是胡锦涛的人，一开始就是习近平的人。
好的，谢谢大家。

《原文链接》

英文翻译

How did Xu Qiliang die? Neither Jiang Zemin nor Hu Jintao promoted Xu Qiliang. Hu Jintao did not endorse Xu Qiliang. How did Xu Qiliang become a member of the CMC? The relationship between Xu Qiliang and Yu Zhongfu’s master Qiao Qingchen. Xu Qiliang’s position as Vice Chairman of the CMC was promoted by Xi Jinping

My point of view is that
Neither Jiang Zemin nor Hu Jintao promoted Xu Qiliang. First of all, Xu Qiliang was promoted by his father Xu Lefu. From 1985 to 1990, Xu Qiliang served as Chief of Staff of the Shanghai Command Post of the Air Force, Acting Deputy Commander of the Eighth Air Force, Chief of Staff, and Commander. Jiang Yutian, the then Commander of the Air Force of the Nanjing Military Region, served as the commander of the 26th Air Force Division and worked with Xu Lefu, the then Political Commissar of the Division, for 3 years. Xu Qiliang was promoted by his father Xu Lefu’s comrade-in-arms.

First of all, our facial comparison shows that the facial similarity between Xu Lefu and Xu Qiliang is 33%.

Oriental Outlook Weekly is managed by Xinhua News Agency and hosted by Outlook Weekly. It was founded in Shanghai in 2003. In 2007, Xu Qiliang was not only the Air Force Commander but also a member of the Central Military Commission. Why did Xinhua News Agency, as an official media, spread rumors about the Central Military Commission and the Air Force Commander? Is there any reasonable reason? It was because Xinhua News Agency exposed that Xu Qiliang was a second-generation red and not a peasant, so he was forced to apologize.

Who was the president of Xinhua News Agency at that time? Tian Congming, the president of Xinhua News Agency at that time, was the third in command when Hu Jintao was in power in Tibet. More importantly, Hu Jintao was recuperating in Beijing most of the time at that time, and Tian Congming was responsible for the daily party affairs in Tibet. Tian Congming was the secretary of Zhou Hui, Zhao Ziyang’s reform general in Inner Mongolia. In other words, Oriental Outlook Weekly, which exposed that Xu Qiliang’s father was Xu Lefu, was managed by Xinhua News Agency. The president of Xinhua News Agency at that time was Tian Congming, who was Hu Jintao’s henchman. The apology was made by Li Changchun.

From January 1993 to October 1994, 43-year-old Xu Qiliang served as deputy chief of staff of the Air Force.
From October 1994 to January 1999, 44-year-old Xu Qiliang served as chief of staff of the Air Force.
During the two promotions of Xu Qiliang, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun did not die in 1993 and 1994. Chen Yun was hospitalized. On May 25, 1994, Chen Yun was admitted to a Beijing hospital due to pneumonia. On April 10, 1995, Chen Yun died. Chen Yun’s strength is questionable. As long as he is sober, Chen Yun has the power and strength to promote Xu Qiliang to chief of staff of the Air Force.

The then member of the Military Commission: Fu Quanyou (October 1992-March 2003) was a henchman of Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun. Fu Quanyou was recommended by Xie Zhenhua, who was a henchman of Zhou Enlai. When Xie Zhenhua was in charge of Shanxi, Chen Yonggui was arrested. Chen Yonggui was a model of learning from Dazhai in agriculture established by Mao Zedong. Xie Zhenhua suggested to the Military Commission that Fu Quanyou, the commander of the First Army of the People’s Liberation Army under the command of the Kunming Military Region, performed well in the self-defense counterattack and could be a candidate for the commander of the Chengdu Military Region after the merger and reorganization.

In January 1999, 49-year-old Xu Qiliang was appointed as the deputy commander of the Shenyang Military Region and the commander of the Shenyang Military Region Air Force. The then member of the Military Commission: Fu Quanyou (October 1992-March 2003), this was the only job change of Xu Qiliang during Jiang Zemin’s term as Chairman of the Military Commission.
In 1994, Jiang Zemin did not fully control the military power, and Deng Xiaoping was still there. Deng Xiaoping died in 1999. Jiang Zemin took power. But this step Xu Qiliang was just a horizontal transfer, from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to the Commander of the Air Force of the Shenyang Military Region. They were both deputy theater level and deputy military region level. Jiang Zemin never promoted Xu Qiliang.

On June 11, 2004, 54-year-old Xu Qiliang was appointed as the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. This step was still a horizontal transfer, and it was special, this was a change of term.
On September 19, 2004, the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee elected: Hu Jintao as Chairman of the Military Commission, and Jiang Zemin withdrew from the Chairman of the Military Commission. I have said before that after Jiang Zemin retired, Jiang Zemin could not easily promote ministerial-level officials. Jiang Zemin’s people often got promoted after the change of term.

Xu Qiliang’s move took place 3 months before Hu Jintao took over as Chairman of the Military Commission. This shows that it was not promoted by Hu Jintao. Hu Jintao was indeed the Vice Chairman of the Military Commission at the time. Hu Jintao was added as the Vice Chairman of the Military Commission at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee on September 22, 1999. Xu Qiliang was transferred to the Air Force Commander of the Shenyang Military Region, just 8 months before Hu Jintao took over as Vice Chairman of the Military Commission. This shows that it was not Hu Jintao’s operation.

Xu Qiliang was already the Air Force Chief of Staff in 1994, and was already at the deputy theater level. In 2004, when Jiang Zemin retired, Xu Qiliang became the Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Still at the deputy theater level. Jiang Zemin did not promote Xu Qiliang for 10 years. During Jiang Zemin’s term, Xu Qiliang maintained the deputy theater level and was only transferred to two jobs.

In September 2007, 57-year-old Xu Qiliang was appointed Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, and was promoted to member of the Military Commission in October. This step promoted Xu Qiliang to the theater level and to the member of the Military Commission. It is equivalent to being promoted twice in a row. Why was he not promoted by Hu Jintao? We can know it by comparing the list of the 16th and 17th Military Commissions. At that time, Zhang Dingfa died and Qiao Qingchen retired. Why could three Military Commissions be promoted after two retired Military Commissions? Because Xu Caihou was promoted from the Military Commission to Vice Chairman, and Cao Gangchuan retired.

We can see that Liang Guanglie was 67 years old and Chen Bingde was 66 years old at that time, and they were older than Qiao Qingchen and did not retire. Qiao Qingchen was 66 years old at the time, and he was not yet of retirement age. It was Qiao Qingchen who gave up his position in the Military Commission to Xu Qiliang, which led to Xu Qiliang’s promotion. Qiao Qingchen and Miao Hua’s father-in-law Ye Hanlin have direct connections.

Huang Ming replaced Wu Yanan as the commander of the Central Theater Command in January 2023. So what is the significance of this operation? Wu Yanan gave up her commander to her own Huang Ming so that Huang Ming could be promoted to general.

In 2016, Colonel Fu Wenhua replaced Major General Xu Qiling and was promoted to Chief of Staff of the 54th Group Army of the People’s Liberation Army (now the 83rd Group Army of the Army), reaching the deputy army level. Xu Qiling gave up the position of Chief of Staff of the 54th Group Army to Fu Wenhua. So that Fu Wenhua could be promoted to the deputy army level.

Qiao Qingchen was 66 years old and had not reached the retirement age of 67. He could have served another term in the Military Commission. He gave up his position to Xu Qiliang, so that Xu Qiliang could take the position. If Xu Qiliang is Hu Jintao’s man, he can be promoted directly.

Qiao Qingchen and Miao Hua’s father-in-law have direct contact.
From October 1985 to January 1990, Qiao Qingchen served as the director of the Political Department of the 8th Air Force, which is the Air Force of the Fuzhou Military Region.
From 1981 to 1987, Miao Hua’s father-in-law Ye Hanlin served as the deputy director of the Political Department of the Fuzhou Military Region.

I will sort out the timeline for everyone.
On October 24, 2024, Miao Hua’s father-in-law Ye Hanlin died. Ye Hanlin and Qiao Qingchen were colleagues.
On March 6, 2025, former Air Force Political Commissar Yu Zhongfu attended the Second Session. In fact, He Weidong also attended the Second Session. .
On April 16, 2025, it was rumored that Yu Zhongfu was arrested. Yu Zhongfu was promoted by Qiao Qingchen, and Qiao Qingchen gave up the position of member of the Military Commission to Xu Qiliang.
On June 2, 2025, Xu Qiliang died.

Neither Jiang Zemin nor Hu Jintao promoted Xu Qiliang. In other words, from the perspective of the military, there are really three factions. Xu Qiliang was at the deputy theater level for 10 years when Jiang Zemin was the chairman of the Military Commission. Xu Qiliang was promoted to the theater level, Air Force Commander and member of the Military Commission during Hu Jintao’s tenure as Chairman of the Military Commission. This is Qiao Qingchen’s early retirement and giving up his position to Xu Qiliang.

The probability of Xu Qiliang’s heart attack being successfully rescued is 96%. Yu Zhongfu’s master Qiao Qingchen gave up his position as a member of the Military Commission to Xu Qiliang. Xu Qiliang died one and a half months after Yu Zhongfu was rumored to have been arrested. After Xu Qiliang died, Xinhua News Agency broadcast Xu Qiliang’s life, which is generally not treated as a vice-state level. Xinhua News Agency emphasized that Xu Qiliang was loyal to Xi Jinping.

Hu Jintao sent a wreath to Xu Qiliang, but did not attend Xu Qiliang’s funeral. But Hu Jintao attended the funeral of another vice chairman of the Military Commission, Zhang Zhen, which means that Hu Jintao did not endorse Xu Qiliang.

When Wu Bangguo and Li Keqiang died, the Xinhua News Agency reported that Hu Jintao sent wreaths to express condolences. But in the report on Xu Qiliang, Xinhua News Agency did not write this sentence. Of course, Xu Qiliang’s rank is lower than Wu Bangguo and Li Keqiang. He is only a member of the Politburo, not a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. So Xu Qiliang is not Hu Jintao’s man, but Xi Jinping’s man from the beginning.
Okay, thank you everyone.

END

这名网友说，
如果林彪是周恩来的人，为什么周派一直在台面上，不给林彪平反。
周恩来和誰都是自己人 林彪不過是周恩来用來制衡的工具。
给林彪平反的消息一直在民间暗地流传。。。符合他们的宣传手法。
这就是胡说，莫说林彪了，林彪的手下打的黑山阻击战都不宣传，可以百度一下，这场战争太重要了，打的非常漂亮。
如果林彪也是周恩来的人，那四野也是周恩来的嫡系，那周恩来也太强大了，二野，三野，四野都是周恩来的人，毛泽东怎么和周恩来斗。
我的回复是，二野不是周恩来。这个我刚好看搜索王海，看到答案。这个人专业研究林彪的他说的1980年代只有1篇论文。1990年代有10篇，现在有66篇。

谁不让给林彪平反呢？就是邓小平，2000年之后，1997年邓小平死了，1998年朱镕基上台。可能有一两年的滞后性。

海内外出版的林彪事件当事人和见证人的传记、回忆录、研究著作，也主要集中在2000年之后。大家想想2000年发生了什么就知道了。大外宣就是朱镕基的马仔，这不就是2000年前后发生的事情。

这名网友说，
大包，其实央媒是特意告诉大家，许其亮是习近平的人，在这个时期还提许其亮是军委主席负责制的坚定支持者。
我的回复是，对，央媒发布许其亮生平，我也在想到底是什么意思。可以理解成暗示许其亮是习近平的人。主要是胡锦涛没有去现场背书许其亮。张震死的时候，胡锦涛去了。但是江泽民也去了，就看胡锦涛背书谁，不背书谁，就是知道答案。胡锦涛把儿子胡海峰塞到民政部，就说明，胡锦涛背书民政部，背书了陆治原。

大外宣说什么习近平大权在握，那这句话怼他们就行，把陆治原抓了，就证明习近平大权在握。我记得真有网友问我，陆治原怎么还不下。陆治原是胡锦涛背书的，习近平能拿下陆治原，证明他重掌大权。

这名网友说，
包子连任的那个影片，胡派都哭丧着脸，许光头是发自内心的笑，他肯定是习派无疑。
我的回复是，这个确实是一个专业的好梗，许其亮发自内心的笑。所有人看了这个镜头都会这么说，这个比较明显。其实这里面还有三个很重要的人，王岐山，汪洋，张德江。张德江这两个镜头都很高兴。第三个镜头张德江就有点撇嘴了。所以说表情不一定准，到底是演的，还是拍摄角度的问题。习近平当时的表情的确有点志得意满的意思，都写在脸上。这都不好说，沈跃跃鼓掌也挺带劲的。大家可以看看汪洋到底是不是支持习近平。

这名网友说，
如果周恩来要跟毛腊肉夺权，有没有可能胜利。
我的回复是我没有研究过文革，根据我有限的知识。周恩来尝试了两次暗杀毛，都没有成功。一次是百万雄师，一次是林彪571工程，背后都是周恩来。只不过周恩来做的不留痕迹而已。大家不要忘了，周恩来的老本行是什么。周恩来就是特科出身的。普京就是克格勃出身的。专业的，做事不留痕迹。

文革，毛泽东都已经明说了，造反派夺权。一个巴掌拍不响，夺权的标准是什么，如果说彻底打倒。毛泽东也没有把周恩来彻底打倒，周恩来也没有把毛泽东彻底打倒。当然最后可以说毛泽东把周恩来肉体消灭了。

如果只说是造反派夺权，毛泽东根本就没有赢。当时什么三结合，最后把周恩来的人都结合进去了。我们刚说的胡锦涛的政敌，热地，1975年担任西藏党委书记，当时有第一书记，相当于现在的省委常委。毛泽东天天煽动造反派夺权，最后权都到周恩来手里。

这名网友说，
十八大那届军委副主席肯定有个和包子合作了，否则包子不可能一下干掉俩个顶级军官张阳和房峰辉。这俩倒了对胡锦涛打击很大，他之后再也不染黑发，装嫩了，2019年阅兵更是满脸的悲愤。
而范长龙才当了一届，就在包子权力登顶的十九大被退了，说明包子对他不合作很不满，而许其亮确实就很可疑了。另外包子派31军那伙子大量提拔也是在18大到19大。

这名网友说，
说一种可能性：许其亮可能是包包最后的反扑，靠还剩下的国安势力干掉了许其亮。如果许其亮是习近平这边的人，那么习近平在2013年在军委里就有军委主席和第一副主席两个人了，胡锦涛在军委里还有谁？当时力量就已经不平衡了，似乎这样的可能性偏小。叛变可能性倒是更大一些，体制内叛变可能性小，但依然还是有的。
我的回复是，
首先，习近平现在还有多大的国安势力，不好说。因为我没有证据，我感觉陈一新已经被换掉了。但是中共比较黑暗。他们不公布这个，陈一新在中国长安网，也就是中国政法委的官网，上面的报道还是2024年12月27日，陈一新在2025年5月8日的，政法领导干部专题研讨班上面，还是中国的国安部长。陈一新有可能在5月底已经被拿掉了。但是这个消息我不确定。如果陈一新已经被换掉的消息是真的话。习近平还拿什么国安势力反扑啊？

这个可以稍微等一下，确认一下，陈一新是不是被拿掉了。如果陈一新在许其亮死之前已经换下了。那就不存在这个问题，国安部比较黑箱。

当时军委的权力结构和现在不一样，当时8个军委委员呢。军委副主席的份量不像现在这么大。其中是房峰辉，张阳，吴胜利都是胡锦涛的人。
魏凤和可能也是胡锦涛的人。
范长龙，张又侠是江泽民的人。
许其亮，赵克石，马晓天是习近平的人。
常万全我不太确定，我猜是习近平的人。2019年常万全被处理，但是并没有被彻底拿下，如果常万全是习近平的人，那就是习近平保他。常万全需要深入分析才能确定。退休的我研究的不多。

习近平在19大的时候，把军委的人数从8个军委委员砍到4个军委委员，就是要提高军委主席和军委副主席的权力，军委主席就是习近平本人。

所以我说中共一代不如一代，1997年上海市委，除了市长还有4个副书记。现在就剩下一个。当时每个省都是这样，当时的权力结构和现在不一样。中共就是逆淘汰，越来越集权。

这名网友说，
之前分析的是胡的人，所以越来越不清楚派系对不对了。
我没有深入分析过许其亮。
出现失误很正常，大方向没错。
这个我可以泛泛的说，有的是人云亦云抄一段。我不可能每个都去研究，有的是一个小时，有的研究20小时。即便有的研究20个小时，可能也没有发现什么东西。有的可能随便看看，就能大发现。许其亮从王海这头，没看出来什么东西。但是从姜玉田这里，姜玉田和许其亮他爸许乐夫是三年的搭档。

这个信息，之前我就是不知道啊。没有多少人知道空军航空兵第二十师。因为看到许其亮的上级姜玉田和许乐夫是搭档。一个师长，一个政委，又有传言许乐夫是许其亮的爸爸。又在否认，否认许乐夫是许其亮的爸爸，许其亮也是许乐夫提拔的。不是爸爸为什么要提拔呢？

我给大家总结一个都是爸爸提拔的系列。
许其亮就是他爸爸许乐夫的搭档姜玉田提拔的，说白了许其亮就是他爸爸提拔的。
苗华就是老丈人叶汉林提拔的。
王岐山就是老丈人姚依林提拔的，章更生毕井泉都是先姚依林，然后是王岐山提拔
薄熙来就是爸爸薄一波安排的令狐安和曹伯纯
周小周就是爸爸周衣冰安排战友提拔的。
习近平就是习仲勋给陈毅当大秘，陈毅的大秘谷牧提拔的贾庆林，贾庆林提拔习近平。
李小鹏去交通部是因为黄镇东是李小鹏爸爸李鹏的马仔，李鹏是他的爸爸周恩来提拔的。

全都是拼爹，起码证明他们都是亲生的。

这名网友说，
我看了你大半年了 你的派系分析最致命的问题是逻辑可能性 很多官员和各个派别都有交集 做事上采用的也是博弈论上的混合策略 提高自身的政治生存和晋升概率 派系是可以混合的（团30% 江70%比如） 许其亮一开始是邓提拔的 江和胡 也重用了 之所以“意外”了 还不是胡和习闹翻了？ 胡和习出现裂痕到闹翻也就是2017年习要修宪连任开始 到2021年二十大之后达到矛盾高潮 许早期是胡和习都能接受的人 后期倒向习 现在胡重新掌权 所以嗝屁了 不难理解

我可以回复你，这个技术性问题。胡锦涛和习近平是不是2017年闹翻的？今天我说的房峰辉和张阳都是胡锦涛的人。

房峰辉，2017年8月21日最后出现。
张阳，2017年11月23日死亡，也是2017年8月，甚至更早开始调查。
从房峰辉和张阳，来说，是2017年的事情。但是令计划是2014年12月被查。令计划也是胡锦涛的干儿子。肯定不止这3个人，还可以继续找2012年到2017年，十八大到19大之间抓了130个副部级。
这130个人，有习近平的人。我把这130人大概看了一下，可能二三十个，我一看名字大概能猜出派系。我估计有10%是习近平的人，就是对手反击。剩下90%就是江泽民和胡锦涛的人。是不是这130个副部级就是江泽民占50%以上。130个人分析一遍也太多了，我1年也就能分析130个官员吧。所以胡锦涛和习近平是不是2017年闹翻。我只能说有可能。

这名网友说，
大包，白俄罗斯第一副总理爆料，最近细胞子与卢叠的会晤中细胞子女儿和白鹅总统共同进餐，这是要荣登大位成女皇帝了？
我的回复是这是一个大瓜。2025年6月9日，白通社报道。白俄罗斯第一副总理尼古拉·斯诺普科夫在白俄罗斯1电视台《第一时间》栏目节目中分享了白俄罗斯总统亚历山大·卢卡申科与中国国家主席习近平近期会晤的细节。

他特别引用了中国领导人在会晤非公开部分所说的话：“我的朋友，您和我关系特殊，所以今天我们将举行一次家庭晚宴。历史上，我的女儿将第一次以这样的方式与一位外国领导人共进晚餐。”

尼古拉·斯诺普科夫反问道：“您认为，这次访问、会见和晚宴是在什么样的关系和氛围下进行的？当时，他的女儿在场，彭丽媛夫人（习近平的夫人—白通社注）在场，习近平同志本人也在场。两位朋友，两位领导人，两位活力四射的人相遇了。这并非悲情。他们对生活的理解、对政治的理解、对发展的理解、对各自民族责任的理解都一致。这次会面真诚、精彩、非凡。”

首先2025年5月30日，美国刚说习明泽在美国，那6月4日就回中国，这个细节有点出入。

其实这个细节就说明，川普和普京都知道习近平下台了。这个完全可以理解成美国和俄罗斯代理人之争。中国发生政权更迭这么大的事情，美国俄国，不可能坐视不管。白俄第一副总理斯诺普科夫，就是普京的代言人或者传话人。章家敦，卢默就是川普的代言人，来说一些美国官方不太方便说的话。

最关键的这句话，就是这5个字，这并非悲情。原始翻译是这并非夸张。我也不懂俄语，用翻译软件也没用。这个很细节。

我们可以判断，从夸张，到悲情，这是斯诺普科夫亲自修改。斯诺普科夫应该不懂中文吧。大概率是不会中文。那他怎么修改呢，肯定反复与翻译核对。都说到悲情，那就等于直接说，习近平被软禁。而且故意发纯一斋的照片，还能再直白点吗？

斯诺普科夫不懂中文，都能从夸张修改到悲情。白俄第一副总理要表达的意思，已经很明确了。

好的，谢谢大家。

《原文链接》

英文翻译

Belarusian Deputy Prime Minister broke the news and officially announced that Xi Jinping was under house arrest. Is Xi Mingze in Massachusetts or Beijing, the proxy dispute between Trump and Putin. Does Belarusian Deputy Prime Minister Snopkov understand Chinese?

This netizen said,
If Lin Biao was Zhou Enlai’s man, why did Zhou’s faction always appear on the stage and not rehabilitate Lin Biao.
Who are Zhou Enlai and his own people Lin Biao is just a tool used by Zhou Enlai to check and balance.
The news of rehabilitating Lin Biao has been secretly circulating among the people. . . It fits their propaganda method.
This is nonsense. Let alone Lin Biao, the Montenegro blocking war fought by Lin Biao’s men was not publicized. You can search Baidu. This war is too important and fought very beautifully.
If Lin Biao is also Zhou Enlai’s man, then the Fourth Field Army is also Zhou Enlai’s direct line, then Zhou Enlai is too powerful, the Second Field Army, the Third Field Army, and the Fourth Field Army are all Zhou Enlai’s people, how can Mao Zedong fight Zhou Enlai.
My reply is that the Second Field Army is not Zhou Enlai. I just happened to search for Wang Hai and saw the answer. This person who specializes in Lin Biao said that there was only one paper in the 1980s. There were 10 papers in the 1990s, and now there are 66 papers.

Who didn’t let Lin Biao be rehabilitated? It was Deng Xiaoping. After 2000, Deng Xiaoping died in 1997 and Zhu Rongji came to power in 1998. There may be a lag of one or two years.

The biographies, memoirs, and research works of the parties and witnesses of the Lin Biao incident published at home and abroad are also mainly concentrated after 2000. Think about what happened in 2000 and you will know. The big foreign propaganda is Zhu Rongji’s lackeys. Isn’t this what happened around 2000?

This netizen said,
Dabao, in fact, the central media deliberately told everyone that Xu Qiliang is Xi Jinping’s man, and during this period, it was mentioned that Xu Qiliang was a firm supporter of the responsibility system of the chairman of the Military Commission.
My reply was, yes, the central media released Xu Qiliang’s life, and I was also wondering what it meant. It can be understood as a hint that Xu Qiliang is Xi Jinping’s man. The main reason is that Hu Jintao did not go to the scene to endorse Xu Qiliang. When Zhang Zhen died, Hu Jintao went. But Jiang Zemin also went. It depends on who Hu Jintao endorses and who he does not endorse, and you will know the answer. Hu Jintao put his son Hu Haifeng in the Ministry of Civil Affairs, which means that Hu Jintao endorsed the Ministry of Civil Affairs and endorsed Lu Zhiyuan.

The big foreign propaganda said that Xi Jinping is in power, so just say this to them. Arresting Lu Zhiyuan proves that Xi Jinping is in power. I remember that a netizen really asked me why Lu Zhiyuan was still in power. Lu Zhiyuan was endorsed by Hu Jintao. Xi Jinping’s ability to take Lu Zhiyuan down proves that he is back in power.

This netizen said,
In the video of Baozi’s re-election, the Hu faction all had sad faces, and Xu Guangtou laughed from the bottom of his heart. He must be Xi’s faction.
My reply was that this is indeed a professional and good joke. Xu Qiliang laughed from the bottom of his heart. Everyone who sees this shot will say this. This is more obvious. Actually, there are three very important people here, Wang Qishan, Wang Yang, and Zhang Dejiang. Zhang Dejiang was very happy in these two shots. In the third shot, Zhang Dejiang pouted a little. So the expression may not be accurate. Is it acting or the shooting angle? Xi Jinping’s expression at that time was indeed a bit complacent, and it was all written on his face. It’s hard to say. Shen Yueyue’s applause was also very enthusiastic. You can see whether Wang Yang supports Xi Jinping.

This netizen said,
If Zhou Enlai wanted to seize power from Mao, would he have won?
My reply is that I have not studied the Cultural Revolution, based on my limited knowledge. Zhou Enlai tried to assassinate Mao twice, but failed. One was the Million Heroes Army, and the other was Lin Biao’s 571 Project. Zhou Enlai was behind it. It’s just that Zhou Enlai did it without leaving any traces. Don’t forget what Zhou Enlai’s main business was. Zhou Enlai was from the Special Operations Department. Putin was from the KGB. Professional, doing things without leaving any traces.

During the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong had already said that the rebels would seize power. It takes two to tango. What is the standard for seizing power? If we say that it is a complete overthrow. Mao Zedong did not completely overthrow Zhou Enlai, and Zhou Enlai did not completely overthrow Mao Zedong. Of course, in the end, it can be said that Mao Zedong physically eliminated Zhou Enlai.

If we only say that the rebels seized power, Mao Zedong did not win at all. At that time, there was a combination of three things, and in the end, Zhou Enlai’s people were combined. The political enemy of Hu Jintao we just mentioned, Reting, served as the secretary of the Tibet Party Committee in 1975. At that time, there was a first secretary, which is equivalent to the current provincial party committee standing committee. Mao Zedong incited the rebels to seize power every day, and in the end, the power went to Zhou Enlai.

This netizen said,
There must be one vice chairman of the Military Commission at the 18th National Congress who cooperated with Baozi, otherwise Baozi would not have been able to kill two top military officers, Zhang Yang and Fang Fenghui. The fall of these two was a big blow to Hu Jintao. He never dyed his hair black again and pretended to be young. In the 2019 military parade, his face was full of grief and indignation.
Fan Changlong served only one term, but was dismissed at the 19th National Congress when Xi Jinping reached the peak of power. This shows that Xi Jinping was very dissatisfied with his non-cooperation, and Xu Qiliang is indeed very suspicious. In addition, the 31st Army group of Xi Jinping was promoted in large numbers from the 18th to the 19th National Congress.

This netizen said,
One possibility: Xu Qiliang may be Xi Jinping’s last counterattack, and he killed Xu Qiliang with the remaining national security forces. If Xu Qiliang is Xi Jinping’s side, then Xi Jinping had two people in the CMC in 2013, the Chairman of the CMC and the First Vice Chairman. Who else did Hu Jintao have in the CMC? At that time, the power was already unbalanced, and it seems that this possibility is relatively small. The possibility of betrayal is greater. The possibility of betrayal within the system is small, but it is still possible.
My reply is,
First of all, it is hard to say how much national security power Xi Jinping still has now. Because I have no evidence, I feel that Chen Yixin has been replaced. But the CCP is darker. They don’t announce this. Chen Yixin is still reported on China Chang’an Network, the official website of the Chinese Political and Legal Commission, on December 27, 2024. Chen Yixin is still China’s Minister of National Security at the special seminar for political and legal leading cadres on May 8, 2025. Chen Yixin may have been removed at the end of May. But I am not sure about this news. If the news that Chen Yixin has been replaced is true. What national security forces can Xi Jinping use to fight back?

This can be waited for a while to confirm whether Chen Yixin has been removed. If Chen Yixin has been replaced before Xu Qiliang’s death. Then there is no such problem. The Ministry of National Security is more black box.

The power structure of the Military Commission at that time was different from that of now. There were 8 members of the Military Commission at that time. The weight of the Vice Chairman of the Military Commission was not as great as it is now. Among them, Fang Fenghui, Zhang Yang, and Wu Shengli are all Hu Jintao’s people.
Wei Fenghe may also be Hu Jintao’s people.
Fan Changlong and Zhang Youxia are Jiang Zemin’s people.
Xu Qiliang, Zhao Keshi, and Ma Xiaotian are Xi Jinping’s people.
I’m not sure about Chang Wanquan. I guess he is Xi Jinping’s person. Chang Wanquan was dealt with in 2019, but he was not completely taken down. If Chang Wanquan is Xi Jinping’s person, it means Xi Jinping protects him. Chang Wanquan needs in-depth analysis to be confirmed. I haven’t studied much since I retired.

At the 19th National Congress, Xi Jinping cut the number of members of the CMC from 8 to 4, in order to increase the power of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the CMC. The Chairman of the CMC is Xi Jinping himself.

So I say that each generation of the CCP is inferior to the previous one. In 1997, the Shanghai Municipal Committee had 4 deputy secretaries in addition to the mayor. Now there is only one left. Every province was like this at that time, and the power structure at that time was different from now. The CCP is reverse elimination and more and more centralized.

This netizen said,
The previous analysis was of Hu’s people, so it is increasingly unclear whether the faction is right or wrong.
I haven’t analyzed Xu Qiliang in depth.
It is normal to make mistakes, and the general direction is correct.
I can say this in general. Some people just copy what others say. I can’t study every one of them. Some people study for one hour, and some people study for 20 hours. Even if I study for 20 hours, I may not find anything. Some people may make great discoveries just by looking at them casually. Xu Qiliang didn’t see anything from Wang Hai. But from Jiang Yutian, Jiang Yutian and Xu Qiliang’s father Xu Lefu were partners for three years.

I didn’t know this information before. Not many people know about the 20th Air Force Aviation Division. Because I saw that Xu Qiliang’s superior Jiang Yutian and Xu Lefu were partners. One division commander, one political commissar, and there are rumors that Xu Lefu is Xu Qiliang’s father. They are denying that Xu Lefu is Xu Qiliang’s father, and Xu Qiliang was promoted by Xu Lefu. Why should he be promoted if he is not his father?

I will summarize a series of people who were promoted by their fathers.
Xu Qiliang was promoted by Jiang Yutian, the partner of his father Xu Lefu. To put it bluntly, Xu Qiliang was promoted by his father.
Miao Hua was promoted by his father-in-law Ye Hanlin.
Wang Qishan was promoted by his father-in-law Yao Yilin, Zhang Gengsheng and Bi Jingquan were promoted by Yao Yilin first and then Wang Qishan.
Bo Xilai was promoted by Linghu An and Cao Bochun arranged by his father Bo Yibo.
Zhou Xiaozhou was promoted by his comrades arranged by his father Zhou Yibing.
Xi Jinping was promoted by Jia Qinglin, who was promoted by Chen Yi’s chief secretary Gu Mu, when Xi Zhongxun was Chen Yi’s chief secretary.
Jia Qinglin promoted Xi Jinping.
Li Xiaopeng went to the Ministry of Transport because Huang Zhendong was a henchman of Li Xiaopeng’s father Li Peng, and Li Peng was promoted by his father Zhou Enlai.

They all competed with their fathers, which at least proves that they are all biological children.

This netizen said,
I have been following you for more than half a year. The most fatal problem of your faction analysis is logical possibility. Many officials have intersections with various factions. They also adopt mixed strategies in game theory to improve their own political survival and promotion probability. Factions can be mixed (30% for the Tuan and 70% for Jiang, for example). Xu Qiliang was promoted by Deng at the beginning. Jiang and Hu also reused him. The reason why he was “unexpected” was not because Hu and Xi had a falling out? The rift between Hu and Xi and the falling out began in 2017 when Xi wanted to amend the constitution for re-election. The contradiction reached a climax after the 20th National Congress in 2021. Xu was a person acceptable to both Hu and Xi in the early days. Later, he turned to Xi. Now Hu is back in power, so he died. It is not difficult to understand.

I can reply to you about this technical question. Did Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping fall out in 2017? Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang, whom I am talking about today, are both Hu Jintao’s people.

Fang Fenghui, last appeared on August 21, 2017.
Zhang Yang died on November 23, 2017. The investigation also began in August 2017, or even earlier.
For Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang, it was 2017. But Ling Jihua was investigated in December 2014. Ling Jihua is also Hu Jintao’s godson. There are definitely more than these three people. We can continue to look for 130 vice-ministerial officials arrested between 2012 and 2017, from the 18th to the 19th National Congress.
Among these 130 people, there are Xi Jinping’s people. I roughly looked at these 130 people, maybe 20 to 30. I can roughly guess the faction by looking at the names. I estimate that 10% are Xi Jinping’s people, that is, opponents fighting back. The remaining 90% are Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s people. Is it true that Jiang Zemin accounts for more than 50% of these 130 vice-ministerial officials? It is too much to analyze 130 people once. I can only analyze 130 officials in a year. So did Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping fall out in 2017? I can only say it is possible.

This netizen said,
Big bag, the First Deputy Prime Minister of Belarus broke the news that during the recent meeting between the cell and Ludie, the cell’s daughter and the White Goose President had dinner together. Is she going to ascend the throne and become the empress?
My reply is that this is a big melon. On June 9, 2025, BelTA reported. Belarus’ First Deputy Prime Minister Nikolay Snopkov shared the details of the recent meeting between Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Chinese President Xi Jinping in the “First Time” column of Belarus 1 TV station.

He specifically quoted what the Chinese leader said during the private part of the meeting: “My friend, you and I have a special relationship, so today we will have a family dinner. For the first time in history, my daughter will have dinner with a foreign leader in this way.”

Nikolay Snopkov asked in return: “In what kind of relationship and atmosphere do you think this visit, meeting and dinner took place? At that time, his daughter was present, Mrs. Peng Liyuan (Xi Jinping’s wife – BelTA note) was present, and Comrade Xi Jinping himself was present. Two friends, two leaders, two dynamic people met. This is not tragic. They have the same understanding of life, politics, development, and their respective national responsibilities. This meeting was sincere, wonderful, and extraordinary.”

First of all, on May 30, 2025, the United States just said that Xi Mingze was in the United States, and then she would return to China on June 4. This detail is a bit different.

In fact, this detail shows that both Trump and Putin know that Xi Jinping has stepped down. This can be completely understood as a proxy dispute between the United States and Russia. It is impossible for the United States and Russia to sit idly by when such a big thing as regime change occurs in China. Snopkov, the First Deputy Prime Minister of Belarus, is Putin’s spokesperson or messenger. Chang Jiadun and Loomer are Trump’s spokespersons, saying things that are not convenient for American officials to say.

The most critical sentence is these five words, “This is not tragic.” The original translation is “This is not an exaggeration.” I don’t understand Russian either, and it’s useless to use translation software. This is very detailed.

We can judge that from exaggeration to tragedy, this is Snopkov’s personal modification. Snopkov should not understand Chinese. There is a high probability that he does not know Chinese. So how did he modify it? He must have repeatedly checked with the translator. If it is all about tragedy, it is equivalent to directly saying that Xi Jinping is under house arrest. And deliberately posting the photo of Chun Yizhai, can it be more straightforward?

Snopkov does not understand Chinese, but he can modify it from exaggeration to tragedy. The meaning of the First Deputy Prime Minister of Belarus is already very clear.

OK, thank you everyone.

END